Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

JOHN DAVID RICH & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  RESPONDENT

Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42

Date of Order:  22 April 2004
Date of Publication of Reasons:  9 September 2004
S131/2004

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 26 November 2003 and in their place order:

(i)       appeal allowed with costs;

(ii)set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Austin J made on 30 April 2003 and paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the order of Austin J made on 7 October 2003 and in their place order that the plaintiff's application for discovery is dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

Mr B W Walker SC with D L Williams SC and S A Goodman for the appellants (instructed by Joanne Kelly)

R B S Macfarlan QC with M A Wigney and N J Beaumont for the respondent (instructed by Australian Securities and Investments Commission)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ.   The appellants were directors of One.Tel Ltd ("One.Tel"), a company now in liquidation.  The respondent ("the Commission") has commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the appellants.  The Commission seeks three kinds of relief in those proceedings:

    (a)declarations under s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("declarations of contravention");

    (b)orders pursuant to s 1317H(1) of the Act ("the 2001 Act") that the appellants pay One.Tel compensation ("compensation orders"); and

    (c)orders pursuant to ss 206C and 206E of the 2001 Act disqualifying each appellant from managing a corporation for such period as the Court considers appropriate ("disqualification orders").

  2. The Commission sought an order in those proceedings that the appellants make discovery of documents.  The appellants resisted that application, contending that the proceedings exposed the appellants to penalties and that, for that reason, they should not be ordered to make discovery.

  3. The primary judge, Austin J, ordered the appellants to make discovery of documents by verified list[1].  The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against that order, and against an order that the appellants file and serve affidavits giving the evidence they would intend to adduce at the trial of the proceedings, was dismissed[2].  Spigelman CJ, with whose reasons Ipp JA agreed, concluded[3] that the Commission's proceedings against the appellants were not penal.  In their Honours' view[4], the power to disqualify the appellants from managing a corporation was "purely protective", and was not a power that could "be exercised in order to punish".  The third member of the Court of Appeal, McColl JA, disagreed, concluding[5] that the distinction between "punitive" and "protective"…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning discovery orders made against Mr John Rich and Mr Mark Silbermann (the appellants) in proceedings initiated by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). ASIC sought declarations of contravention under the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth), compensation orders, and orders disqualifying the appellants from managing corporations. The central dispute revolved around whether the appellants could claim privilege against self-incrimination in relation to discovery, given the potential for disqualification orders.

The legal issues before the Court were whether exposure to an order disqualifying a person from managing corporations, under provisions described as "civil penalty provisions" in the *Corporations Act 2001*, constituted exposure to a penalty for the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court was also required to determine whether such disqualification orders were punitive or protective in nature, and whether this classification was determinative of the discovery issue.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the discovery orders. The Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to proceedings where a party faces exposure to a penalty. While the *Corporations Act 2001* labels certain provisions as "civil penalty provisions," the Court found that the disqualification orders sought by ASIC were not purely protective. The Court considered that the practical application of these provisions, including the imposition of fixed periods of disqualification and the factors taken into account by courts in making such orders, demonstrated punitive elements akin to those in criminal proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that the appellants were entitled to refuse discovery, as to compel them to list documents would risk exposing them to the very penalty the privilege was designed to prevent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 26 November 2003 and in their place order:

(i) appeal allowed with costs;

(ii) set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Austin J made on 30 April 2003 and paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the order of Austin J made on 7 October 2003 and in their place order that the plaintiff's application for discovery is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mine is a minority view. The other members of the Court joined in the orders announced at the end of oral argument[93]. I now state my reasons for coming to the opposite conclusion.[93]See joint reasons at [5] and reasons of McHugh J at [59].The facts, legislation and decisional history The facts and legislation:Most of the facts, particular to the proceedings involving Mr John Rich and Mr Mark Silbermann ("the appellants") and their resistance to the application for discovery brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("the Commission") are set out in the joint reasons[94]. Also explained there, by reference to the Act and other legislation[95], may be found descriptions of the functions and authority of the Commission and the proceedings it has taken against the appellants under the Act for a "declaration of contravention"[96], compensation orders[97], and disqualification "from managing corporations for the period that the Court considers appropriate"[98]. As is explained, the Commission relied upon one subparagraph of the Act providing for a person's disqualification if such person[99]:"has at least twice contravened this Act while they were an officer of a body corporate".[94]Joint reasons at [1]-[10].[95]Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth); Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth) and the former Corporations Law; see joint reasons at [11]-[20].[96]The Act, s 1317E(1).[97]The Act, s 1317H(1).[98]The Act, s 206E(1).[99]The Act, s 206E(1)(a)(ii). Like the other members of this Court, I will assume that breach of the nominated provision of the former Corporations Law would be picked up by the transitional provision in the Act[100], so that past contravention of the Corporations Law, if proved, would amount, for these purposes, to a contravention of the Act[101].[100]The Act, s 1400.[101]See joint reasons at [18]. I will not repeat the other provisions of the Act or of the Corporations Law. As appears from those provisions, the Parliament has made it plain that "[i]f a Court is satisfied that a person has contravened 1 of the … provisions [including contravention of s 180(1) of the Act], it must make a declaration of contravention"[102].[102]The Act, s 1317E(1) (emphasis added). The provisions giving rise to the obligatory declaration are described by the Parliament as "civil penalty provisions". The reference to the concept of "civil penalty" is contained in the heading to the part of the Act in which the provision for declarations of contravention appears ("Part 9.4B – Civil consequences of contravening civil penalty provisions"). The words "civil penalty provisions" appear repeatedly, as if in emphasis, throughout that Part. As the joint reasons observe, such legislative descriptions do not foreclose the classification by a court of the true character of the relief consequent upon "declarations of contravention"[103]. By the same token, these references and the companion provisions (by contra-distinction) for "criminal proceedings"[104], are not unimportant. They make it clear that the concept of "civil penalty" was deliberately introduced. [103]Joint reasons at [22]. See also Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 36 at [107]-[111] of my own reasons; Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37 at [155].[104]The Act, ss 1317M, 1317N, 1317P, 1317Q.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ HUGH J (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent)
The primary judge ordered that the appellants make discovery of documents by verified list. That order would permit the appellants to object to production of any document on a ground of privilege. At first sight, that might suggest that the appellants' challenge to the order for provision of a verified list of documents is premature. That is, it might suggest that any question of privilege is one about privilege from production rather than privilege from making discovery. That is not so. As Isaacs J pointed out in R v Associated Northern Collieries[51], once it is determined that the proceedings expose a person to penalty, the proper course is to refuse any order for discovery. As Isaacs J said[52], to leave the party at risk of penalty to object to production of documents, having first listed them, may lead to the very mischief which the privilege is designed to prevent. In the words of Lord Coleridge CJ in Jones v Jones[53], to which Isaacs J referred[54]:"The whole case for the plaintiff may depend upon his power to trace a particular document into the possession of the defendant, and, upon its non‑production, to prove its contents by secondary evidence."That being so, the proper course in this matter was to refuse the application for discovery.[51](1910) 11 CLR 738 at 747.[52](1910) 11 CLR 738 at 747.[53](1889) 22 QBD 425 at 428-429.[54](1910) 11 CLR 738 at 747-748.Conclusion It is for these reasons that we joined in the orders set out earlier. Mc My reasons for agreeing that this appeal should be allowed are substantially contained in the reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. In addition to those reasons, however, I think that the factors that courts take into account when ordering disqualification and fixing periods of disqualification under the corporations legislation make it impossible to hold that the "civil penalty" provisions and, in particular, the disqualification provisions, are purely protective in nature. Despite frequent statements by the judges who administer the legislation that the purpose of the disqualification provisions is protective, what the judges actually do in practice is little different from what judges do in determining what orders or penalties should be made for offences against the criminal law. Elements of retribution, deterrence, reformation and mitigation as well as the objective of the protection of the public inhere in the orders and periods of disqualification made under the legislation. If the disqualification provisions were purely protective, the only issue for the court would be whether the defendant is now or will in the future be a fit and proper person to manage corporations. If the court were to find that, despite the misconduct, the defendant is now a fit and proper person to manage corporations, the court should refuse to make an order of disqualification. If the court were to find that the defendant would be a fit and proper person to manage corporations in the future, the only issue for determination would be the time when that would occur. Moreover, if the jurisdiction were purely protective, it is hard to see why orders for disqualification should be for fixed periods, as they almost invariably are. Fixed periods of disqualification suggest punishment rather than protection in the same way that disqualification from driving for a period is a punishment rather than an act protective of the public. If the jurisdiction were purely protective, one might have thought that the proper order would be indefinite disqualification with the onus on the defendant to show at some future date that he or she were now a fit and proper person to manage corporations[55]. At all events, if the jurisdiction were purely protective, the defendant should have liberty to apply during the period of disqualification to show that he or she is now a fit and proper person to manage corporations.[55]For example, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hutchings (2001) 38 ACSR 387, Windeyer J ordered that the defendant directors be disqualified from managing corporations for life, with the right to apply on three months' notice after five years for a variation of the order: at 395.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ,