HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJJOHN DAVID RICH & ANOR APPELLANTS
AND
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION RESPONDENTRich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42
Date of Order: 22 April 2004
Date of Publication of Reasons: 9 September 2004
S131/2004ORDER
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 26 November 2003 and in their place order:
(i) appeal allowed with costs;
(ii)set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Austin J made on 30 April 2003 and paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the order of Austin J made on 7 October 2003 and in their place order that the plaintiff's application for discovery is dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation:
Mr B W Walker SC with D L Williams SC and S A Goodman for the appellants (instructed by Joanne Kelly)
R B S Macfarlan QC with M A Wigney and N J Beaumont for the respondent (instructed by Australian Securities and Investments Commission)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ. The appellants were directors of One.Tel Ltd ("One.Tel"), a company now in liquidation. The respondent ("the Commission") has commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against the appellants. The Commission seeks three kinds of relief in those proceedings:
(a)declarations under s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("declarations of contravention");
(b)orders pursuant to s 1317H(1) of the Act ("the 2001 Act") that the appellants pay One.Tel compensation ("compensation orders"); and
(c)orders pursuant to ss 206C and 206E of the 2001 Act disqualifying each appellant from managing a corporation for such period as the Court considers appropriate ("disqualification orders").
The Commission sought an order in those proceedings that the appellants make discovery of documents. The appellants resisted that application, contending that the proceedings exposed the appellants to penalties and that, for that reason, they should not be ordered to make discovery.
The primary judge, Austin J, ordered the appellants to make discovery of documents by verified list[1]. The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against that order, and against an order that the appellants file and serve affidavits giving the evidence they would intend to adduce at the trial of the proceedings, was dismissed[2]. Spigelman CJ, with whose reasons Ipp JA agreed, concluded[3] that the Commission's proceedings against the appellants were not penal. In their Honours' view[4], the power to disqualify the appellants from managing a corporation was "purely protective", and was not a power that could "be exercised in order to punish". The third member of the Court of Appeal, McColl JA, disagreed, concluding[5] that the distinction between "punitive" and "protective"…
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- Case
- [2004] HCA 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether exposure to an order disqualifying a person from managing corporations, under provisions described as "civil penalty provisions" in the *Corporations Act 2001*, constituted exposure to a penalty for the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court was also required to determine whether such disqualification orders were punitive or protective in nature, and whether this classification was determinative of the discovery issue.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the discovery orders. The Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to proceedings where a party faces exposure to a penalty. While the *Corporations Act 2001* labels certain provisions as "civil penalty provisions," the Court found that the disqualification orders sought by ASIC were not purely protective. The Court considered that the practical application of these provisions, including the imposition of fixed periods of disqualification and the factors taken into account by courts in making such orders, demonstrated punitive elements akin to those in criminal proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that the appellants were entitled to refuse discovery, as to compel them to list documents would risk exposing them to the very penalty the privilege was designed to prevent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 26 November 2003 and in their place order:
(i) appeal allowed with costs;
(ii) set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the order of Austin J made on 30 April 2003 and paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the order of Austin J made on 7 October 2003 and in their place order that the plaintiff's application for discovery is dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ,