Adams v The Queen

Case [2008] HCA 15


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ

STEVEN ADAMS  APPELLANT

AND

THE QUEEN  RESPONDENT

Adams v The Queen [2008] HCA 15
23 April 2008
M121/2007

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria

Representation

L C Carter with C B Boyce for the appellant (instructed by Leanne Warren & Associates)

W J Abraham QC with R R Davis for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Adams v The Queen

Criminal law – Sentencing – Federal offences – Appellant convicted of possessing a "commercial quantity" of the narcotic MDMA (ecstasy) – Customs Act 1901 (Cth) fixed the commercial quantities of certain narcotics and imposed maximum penalties that did not distinguish between the narcotics – Whether appellant should have been sentenced on the basis that MDMA was less harmful than heroin.

Practice and procedure – Appellant did not demonstrate factual assertion that MDMA was less harmful than heroin – Whether controversy "moot" or "academic".

Words and phrases – "commercial quantity", "moot", "trafficable quantity".

Customs Act 1901 (Cth), ss 233B, 235.

  1. GLEESON CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ. Following a trial by jury in the County Court of Victoria, the appellant was convicted of possessing, on 9 January 2004, prohibited imports contrary to s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ("the Customs Act"). The prohibited imports in question were 19.927 kilograms of a mixture that contained 8.916 kilograms of MDMA, commonly known as ecstasy. The appellant, a United States citizen temporarily in Australia, had been charged following the interception by the authorities of containers shipped to Australia from overseas.

  2. The Customs Act adopted (and the Criminal Code (Cth) as amended since the relevant time adopts) a quantity-based penalty regime, fixing "trafficable" and "commercial" quantities of certain drugs, distinguishing between those drugs in setting such trafficable and commercial quantities, but otherwise making no distinction between them in terms of maximum penalties. Under s 235 of the Customs Act, offences involving a trafficable quantity of narcotic goods carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years and/or a fine not exceeding $500,000, and offences involving a commercial quantity of such goods carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life and/or a fine not exceeding $750,000[1].  For example, the trafficable quantity of cocaine was 2 grams; that of heroin was 2 grams; that of MDMA was 0.5 grams.  The commercial quantity of cocaine was 2 kilograms; that of heroin was 1.5 kilograms; that of MDMA was 0.5 kilograms.

    [1]The amounts are as set out in the respondent's written submissions.  The legislation is expressed in terms of penalty units, the value of which changes from time to time.

  3. This legislative approach, which recognises the financial rewards available from dealing in illicit drugs, thus differentiates between various narcotic substances in designating the trafficable and commercial quantities, but applies the same penalty…

Continue reading Adams v The Queen

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Adams v The Queen [2008] HCA 15
Case
[2008] HCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Adams, was convicted of possessing a commercial quantity of MDMA (ecstasy) contrary to federal law. The dispute concerned the appropriate sentencing for this offence, specifically whether the appellant should have been sentenced on the basis that MDMA is less harmful than heroin, given that the relevant legislation, the *Customs Act 1901* (Cth), fixed commercial quantities and maximum penalties without distinguishing between different narcotics. The High Court of Australia was required to determine this appeal.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the sentencing of the appellant should have taken into account a perceived difference in harm between MDMA and heroin, notwithstanding the statutory framework. This involved considering whether the appellant had discharged the onus of demonstrating a factual assertion that MDMA was less harmful than heroin, and if not, whether the question of differential harm was a moot or academic point in the context of the appeal.

The Court reasoned that the appellant had failed to demonstrate the factual assertion that MDMA was less harmful than heroin. Consequently, the question of whether the sentencing should have proceeded on that basis was rendered moot or academic. The statutory scheme prescribed penalties based on the quantity of the prohibited substance, and without evidence establishing a differential harm that the legislation contemplated or permitted to be considered in sentencing, the appellant could not succeed on this ground.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ HEYDON J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ, HEYDON J

Full text does not contain this section.