Director of Public Prosecutions v Margus
[2020] VCC 342
•13 February 2020
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
Case No. CR-16-00727
CR-16-00545
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| RAMI MARGUS |
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JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE TRAPNELL | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 14 February 2019, 2 August 2019, 27 November 2019 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 13 February 2020 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Margus | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VCC 342 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject: CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence
Catchwords: Trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a large commercial quantity – Trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a commercial quantity – Trafficking in a drug of dependence – Intentionally causing injury – Possessing a firearm whilst being a prohibited person – Early pleas of guilty – Drug courier and packager – Shot victim twice with a handgun in thigh and foot – Serious examples of offences – Suffered from childhood physical and emotional trauma – Disadvantaged socio-economic background – Drug abuse – Intellectual disability – Muldrock v R and R v Verdins applied – Strong family support – Total effective sentence of 13 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a 7 years non-parole period
Legislation Cited: -
Cases Cited:-
Sentence: -
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Ms S Pillai 2 August 2019 Mr A Malik | Ms A Hogan, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr R Chadhauri 14 February 2019 Mr R Melasecca | Melasecca Kelly & Zayler Barristers & Solicitors |
HIS HONOUR:
1 Rami Margus, you have pleaded guilty to charges preferred on two indictments. On Indictment number E14176319 (‘the First Indictment’) you have pleaded guilty to three charges of trafficking in a drug of dependence (Charges 1, 2 and 3), one charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than the large commercial quantity (Charge 4) and one charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than the commercial quantity (Charge 5).
2 On Indictment number F10315110.1 (‘the Second Indictment’) you have pleaded guilty to one charge of intentionally causing injury and one charge of possessing a firearm whilst being a prohibited person.
3 The maximum penalty for trafficking in a drug of dependence is 15 years’ imprisonment. The maximum penalty for trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a commercial quantity is 25 years’ imprisonment. The maximum penalty for trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a large commercial quantity is life imprisonment. The maximum penalty for intentionally causing injury is 10 years’ imprisonment and the maximum penalty for possessing a firearm whilst being a prohibited person is 10 years’ imprisonment.
The Facts
‘Operation Grote’ – First Indictment Charges 1, 2, 4 and 5
4 For the purposes of sentencing you in relation to your involvement in ‘Operation Grote’, being First Indictment Charges 1, 2 ,4 and 5, I accept the facts as set out in the summary of prosecution opening dated 17 January 2019.[1]
[1] Exhibit P1.
5 The Joint Organised Crime Task Force, consisting of members of Victoria Police, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission and Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, conducted an investigation code named ‘Operation Grote’, which was an investigation into the syndicated trafficking of large commercial quantities of heroin.
6 In relation to this operation you were engaged in trafficking heroin in Campbellfield and Epping between 20 October 2014 and 17 December 2014. The trafficking by you includes your involvement in both actual sales of heroin and packaging heroin for sale in an amount totalling approximately 3 kilograms of heroin. Your offending conduct was constituted by your involvement in sales of heroin in three transactions on 30 October 2014 (499.5 grams) (Charge 1), 19 November 2014 (498.5 grams) (Charge 2) and 15 December 2014 (1001.6 grams) (Charge 4).
7 Moreover, on 17 December 2014 999.5 grams of heroin was located in a stockpile at ‘Baset Autotech’ in Epping which you packed. This is the subject of Charge 5. I cannot find beyond reasonable doubt that you were ever observed entering Baset Autotech during the surveillance operation mounted as part of this operation.
8 The heroin trafficking was conducted pursuant to an agreement with a syndicate of other offenders including Mohammed Osman, Anthony Harris (a pseudonym), Baset Wahab and, so the Crown allege, Ali Aydin.
9 I accept your roles in this syndicate were those of a packager of drugs and a drug courier. Your primary role was to prepare heroin for sale by apportioning the heroin in to bags and to seal the bags. I do not accept that you were ‘in control’ of the preparation of the drugs as asserted by the prosecution. I find that in preparing the drugs for sale you were acting at the direction of others higher up the chain of command. Nonetheless, yours was a responsible position and it is clear you were trusted by those in control of the syndicate to perform this important role.
10 You also were a drug courier, transporting the heroin and handing the heroin to covert police operatives on 30 October 2014 and 19 November 2014. You also transported the $110,000 cash sale proceeds in relation to the transaction on 30 October 2014 back to Osman.
11 I accept there is insufficient evidence for me to find that you are the person referred to as ‘the boy’ in conversations relating to the 9 December 2014 drug transaction. In any event, you are not specifically charged in relation to that transaction and the former Giretti count has been discontinued.
12 Nonetheless, the fact the syndicate tasked you to package heroin for sale shows they trusted you and were prepared to give you a degree of responsibility. Your role was clearly above that of a ‘mere’ courier or foot soldier. The term ‘lance corporal’ was used by your counsel, which connotes some degree of responsibility being reposed in you.
13 I note it is not in dispute you packaged the drugs involved in the sale on 30 October 2014 (Charge 1) and the large commercial quantity of heroin involved in the sale on 15 December 2014 (Charge 4). For this purpose you used a heat sealing machine which was later found at your home. You also packaged the commercial quantity of heroin seized from Baset Autotech on 17 December 2014 using that heat sealing machine (Charge 5).[2]
[2] See Addendum to prosecution Opening for Plea dated 15 February 2019 (part of Exhibit P1).
14 It is also not in dispute that you packaged nine plastic bags containing heroin with a combined weight of approximately 9.019 kilograms, which were found in your fellow syndicate member Wahab’s bedroom at his home in Bundoora. I note that there is no charge in relation this heroin, and it plays no role in the sentences I impose on you.
15 The details of the four sales of heroin to police covert operatives the subject of Operation Grote are set out in my reasons for sentence in the matter of DPP v Harris[3] and need not be repeated here.
[3] [2019] VCC 1546 [3]–[29].
16 I accept there is insufficient evidence for me to find that you were directly involved in any drug negotiations or coded communications with covert police operatives. Nor is there evidence you were involved in sourcing the heroin the subject of these charges. You were a courier and packer of drugs for the syndicate. This was a crucial role and you knowingly and willingly performed it.
17 On 17 December 2014 you were interviewed by Australian Federal Police officers and made no comment to all allegations put to you, as was your right.
‘Operation Kanji’ – First Indictment Charge 3
18 In the summary of prosecution opening for plea dated 17 January 2019 in respect of ‘Operation Kanji’[4] the Crown allege, and I accept, that on 20 November 2014 investigators from the Drug Taskforce purchased a block of heroin weighing 348.9 grams for $131,000 utilising covert police operatives. Physical surveillance showed that once the handover of money occurred $95,000 in cash was ultimately conveyed to you through a circuitous route.[5] The packaging containing the block of heroin was analysed and tested positive for your DNA.
[4] Exhibit P2.
[5] Both the written prosecution opening and the prosecutor’s oral opening mistakenly refer to the heroin being conveyed to Margus, but this must be an error.
19 The details of this transaction are that at about 3.45 pm on 20 November 2014 Covert Operative ‘Tommy’ went to KNT Preston Automotive in Preston with two envelopes containing cash totalling $131,000. He entered the workshop and met with a person named Jackie Pham (aka Jade Trinh) and handed her the two envelopes. Pham told the covert operative that the drug supplier had changed the way business was conducted and that the process is now to collect the money upfront in exchange for the heroin. Pham told the covert operative that a person named Quang Duc Dong would collect the money from Pham and take it to their supplier and collect the heroin. Once Pham counted the money she handed it to Dong who left the premises with $95,000 in cash.
20 Dong drove to a nearby street where he met with the heroin supplier, Lai, and handed over the cash. In return Lai handed Dong a takeaway food bag with a vacuumed sealed bag inside containing 348.9 grams of heroin of approximately 70% purity. Dong drove back to KNT Preston Automotive, entered the office and placed the plastic bag containing the heroin at the covert operative’s feet, who then left the premises with the drugs.
21 Soon after receiving the money from Dong, Lai drove to a car park in Preston where he met an unknown male and handed over the $95,000. The unknown male then drove to another car park in Preston where he met you and handed over the money.
22 You then drove to business premises in Brunswick, which you entered and returned a short time later with Anthony Harris, who as I earlier mentioned was involved with you in the offences detected as part of ‘Operation Grote’. You and Harris travelled in convoy to Harris’ apartment in Docklands.
23 A forensic sample taken from the seal region of the plastic bag which contained the heroin was analysed and found to comprise a mixed DNA profile with two contributors. A statistical analysis determined that it was 100 billion times more likely that you were a contributor to this sample.
24 Moreover, the ‘block’ of heroin is linked by way of its similar chemical profile to three other quantities of heroin seized during ‘Operation Grote’; these comprise the transaction on 30 October 2014 (Charge 1), the transaction on the 15 December 2014 (Charge 4) and the heroin found on 17 December 2014 at Baset Autotech (Charge 5).
25 The compressed light brown powdered substance purchased by covert operatives on 20 November 2014 was analysed and found to be heroin weighing 348.9 grams with a purity of approximately 70%.
26 On 17 December 2014 you were interviewed by Australian Federal Police officers and made no comment to all allegations put to you, as was your right.
27 The Crown accepts that you committed the offences the subject of the First Indictment to support an addiction to crystal methylamphetamine (‘ice’). You told Mr Armstrong, a consultant psychologist engaged by your legal representatives, that you ‘just wanted to help [your dealer] out’ and you ‘thought he would like me more if I did it’ and you’ thought I might get more ice off him as well’. You also told Mr Armstrong, ‘I know that what I was doing was wrong’.
The Second Indictment
28 The facts in respect of the Second Indictment are set out in a summary of prosecution opening for plea dated 17 June 2017,[6] which I accept.
[6] Exhibit P3.
29 On 12 December 2014 at 11:49 pm police intercepted a mobile telephone call between you and your co-accused Esen, in which you arranged to meet him in about half an hour’s time. Esen then phoned the victim, Aboud Allouch, and arranged for him to meet the two of you in Justin Avenue, Glenroy.
30 At 12.48 pm, at the location of the meeting, you got out of a motor vehicle and as Allouch and his male companion approached you, you shot Allouch twice with a handgun. One bullet went into Allouch’s left thigh and the other struck him in the right foot. (Charge 1 – intentionally causing injury)
31 I have viewed CCTV footage of the shooting.[7] It is clear this was an entirely unprovoked and targeted shooting. The coolness with which you fired at Allouch when you were about 10 to 20 metres from him is chilling. This is a shocking and terrifying crime. I do not accept there was any element of self-defence motivating you to commit this crime. It was a pure cold-blooded act of vigilantism against a person whom you thought was ‘a dog’ or an associate of one.
[7] Exhibit P6.
32 At about 1:12 am Allouch attended the Emergency Department of the Royal Melbourne Hospital and received treatment for the gunshot wounds to his left thigh and right foot. He sustained two wounds to his right foot, ‘dorsum and plantar’ wounds involving two toes and two wounds to his left thigh at the left/lateral posterior and left anterior thigh. There was a fracture of the 2nd phalanx.
33 Allouch had orthopaedic surgery to his right foot. It is not known whether there is any permanent impairment or persisting physical injuries or psychological issues as a result of the incident.[8]
[8] Report by Dr Timothy Chittleborough, The Royal Melbourne Hospital dated 17 April 2015 (Exhibit P4).
34 Allouch was discharged on 15 December 2014. No victim impact statement has been filed, but Dr Maaike Moller, a forensic physician, opined: ‘Mr Allouch had a combination of injuries, underwent surgery and was likely to have experienced significant pain and discomfort’.[9]
[9] Statement by Dr Maaike Moller, Forensic Physician Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine, dated 13 August 2015 (Exhibit P5).
35 It appears your action in shooting Allouch was some form of payback for an argument which had occurred some months before the shooting regarding whether or not one of your associates was a police informer.
36 At about 5:15 pm on 15 December 2014 police saw you drop one unspent and five spent rounds of Smith and Wesson .32 calibre ammunition in a drain on the corner of Gowrie and May Streets, Glenroy. The ammunition was recovered by police.
37 The weapon used in the shooting has never been located. The Crown alleges, based on the recovered ammunition and CCTV footage, that it was a .32 calibre handgun.
38 At the time of the shooting you were a prohibited person as defined in s 3 (a)(v) of the Firearms Act 1996, in that not more than 5 years had expired since you had finished serving a term of imprisonment of less than 5 years for an indictable offence. (Charge 2 – Possessing a firearm whilst prohibited)
Offence Seriousness
39 Dealing first with the drug offences you committed, the most serious charge before me, trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a drug of dependence, is a very serious criminal offence as indicated by the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, which is the highest maximum penalty in the criminal calendar. Moreover, you also fall to be sentenced for trafficking in a commercial quantity of a drug of dependence which is also a serious criminal offence, as indicated by the maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment, which is the highest fixed maximum penalty in the criminal calendar.
40 These maxima show, unambiguously, how seriously the community, through the Parliament, views the conduct you have committed in First Indictment Charges 4 and 5.[10] Trafficking in a drug of dependence is also a relatively serious offence (First Indictment Charges 1, 2 and 3).
[10] Djordjic v The Queen [2018] VSCA 227 [68] (Beach and Kaye JJA, Whelan JA agreeing).
41 As the Court of Appeal has recently reiterated, the sentencing regime for drug trafficking offences is quantity-based and, while the quantity trafficked is not determinative of my assessment of the objective gravity of these offences, ‘it will always be of importance’. All things being equal, the greater the quantity trafficked, the more serious the trafficking offence.[11] Other important indicators of offence seriousness are your role, the duration of your offending and your motivation for involvement in it.[12]
[11] DPP v Fatho and Ors [2019] VSCA 311 [70] (Maxwell P, Priest and Beach JJA). See also DPP v Gregory (2017) 268 A Crim R 1, 17–8 [23]–[24] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Beach JJA); DPP v Fernando (2017) 268 A Crim R 26, 38–40 [50]–[55] (Redlich JA); DPP v KMD (2015) 254 A Crim R 244, 254 [36], 257 [50]–[52], 260 [64] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Beach JJA); Adams v The Queen (2008) 234 CLR 143.
[12] Gregory 18 [24].
42 I note that the amount trafficked by you in charge 4 was at the lowest end of the threshold quantity for that offence at the relevant time, being only 1.6 grams over a ‘large commercial quantity’. The weight of drug you trafficked in committing Charge 4, falling as it does towards the lower end of the scale for large commercial quantity, is a relevant factor in assessing the objective gravity of your offending conduct.[13]
[13] Gregory, 7 [23]; Djordjic v The Queen [2108] VSCA 227 [69].
43 So far as the remaining drug charges are concerned, Charge 5 involves 999.5 grams of heroin, which is only 0.5 grams under the large commercial quantity threshold at the relevant time. This means that so far as the quantity trafficked by you is concerned, this is a very serious example of that offence.
44 Turning to the trafficking simpliciter charges, Charges 1 and 2 involved 499.5 grams and 498.5 grams of heroin respectively, which are both only very slightly under the commercial quantity threshold at the relevant time of 500 grams. This means that so far as the quantity trafficked by you is concerned, these also are very serious examples of the offence.
45 Finally, Charge 3 relates to your involvement with a different drug syndicate and involves you trafficking in 348.9 grams of heroin. This is very nearly 70% of the commercial trafficking threshold and over 116 times the trafficking threshold at the relevant time. If committed today, your crime would constitute a commercial trafficking offence. I make this comparison simply to emphasise the significance of the quantity you trafficked in committing this offence.
46 Whilst the legislation is quantity-based and not harm-based, it is nonetheless relevant to observe that grave harm is inflicted on the community by offences involving the trafficking of heroin by modern methods. The harmful effects of heroin and the seriousness of these offences have been emphasised numerous times in recent decisions in the Victorian Court of Appeal.[14]
[14] See eg Gregory; Fernando v The Queen (2017) 268 A Crim R 26, 41 [61]; Arico v The Queen [2018] VSCA 135 [338]–[339].
47 In Gregory (a Pseudonym) v The Queen, the Victorian Court of Appeal recently held that current sentencing practice for commercial quantity trafficking is inadequate and needs to be uplifted.[15] The Court opined that ‘sentences well into double figures would have been expected for CQ trafficking offences where … the quantity involved approached the LCQ threshold’.[16] Moreover, in Nguyen v The Queen the Court said that ‘there is a need for sentences for trafficking a large commercial (and a commercial) quantity of drugs to increase substantially’.[17]
[15] Gregory 24–25, [100]–[103].
[16] Ibid 24 [98].
[17] Nguyen v The Queen [2019] VSCA 184 [49]. See also Gregory 25 [102].
48 You played a significant enough role in a highly sophisticated criminal enterprise. You were an integral part in an extensive and successful business of trafficking in heroin. The fact your role was that of a packager of drugs and a drug courier does not entitle you to any particular degree of leniency. ‘Couriers and intermediaries must expect substantial sentences, because without them the trade in narcotics would collapse.’[18] Whatever descriptor is used to characterise your role must not obscure my assessment of what you actually did.[19]
[18] R v Muanchukingkan (1990) 52 A Crim R 354, 356 (Wood J). See also R v Le Cerf (1975) 13 SASR 237, 239 (Wells CJ); DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSW LR 1, 62 [256] (McClellan CJ at CL).
[19] See R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 279 [19] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Hayne and Callinan JJ).
49 By performing your role in the syndicate you were knowingly part of the conduit between the importer of heroin and the final buyer on the street. Your role can be characterised as being that of a willing participant at the wholesale level, albeit you were not the prime instigator or organiser of the business. Nonetheless, the business required people to perform the role you willingly undertook. In this sense your played a critical part in the success of the operation overall.
50 I am unable to make any concluded finding regarding what motivated you to commit the drug offences, however, I accept there is no evidence of enrichment arising out of the present offences or a grandiose lifestyle in your case. The ability to obtain a free supply of ice, and possibly other drugs, for your own use was no doubt a contributing factor and it appears you had the use of luxury cars such as a BMW and a Porsche. I was told by your counsel you had an addiction to ice which required the daily consumption of one gram.
51 Overall, I assess your moral culpability in relation to the drug offending charges as being objectively high, however, as I later explain, this finding is to be moderated by reason of your personal circumstances.
52 Turning to the charges on the Second Indictment, yours is a very serious example of intentionally causing injury. As to the circumstances of this offending, I note that you acted alone and armed yourself with a handgun. You took the law into your own hands having already stated to the victim ‘I’m going to fuck him (referring to another male) and whoever he’s with’ and said that if the victim was with the other male ‘Well bad luck then’. It is very fortunate that the victim of the shooting was not more seriously injured or even killed.
Personal Circumstances
53 You are now aged 29 and were 23 and 24 years old at the time you committed these offences.
54 You were born and raised in Baghdad in Iraq during the Iraqi-Kuwait war. You have a brother and two sisters.
55 You and your family fled Iraq when you were 2 years of age. Your family initially fled to Turkey for 4 months and then payed smugglers to assist with a passage to Greece.
56 You and your family lived in a refugee camp in Greece for 4 years. During this time your father used alcohol as a coping mechanism and he became abusive of you. Your father would drink and kick and slap you and your sister. Your mother, fearing for her own safety, would not intervene. Your father would direct you to hawk scratch lotto tickets and clean car windows on the street. Your father was jailed for one month for forcing his children to engage in illegal work. Your education was interrupted by the trauma in and flight from Iraq.
57 In about 1997 when you were aged 6 or 7 you and your family received visa clearance to immigrate to Australia. You arrived in Australia but you did not speak English. Consequently, you found school difficult and you did not perform well.
58 A year later your father’s drinking escalated and the violence against you recommenced. You recall your father’s violence worsened as you grew older. You described your father’s behaviour as ‘unpredictable, punitive, violent and sadistic’. You recall that from 8 years of age your father began punching, kicking and slapping you and your sister on a regular basis.
59 In about 2003 you and your sister started wagging school. You recall that you were caught for petty theft. It was after being caught for stealing and truancy that the bashing by your father intensified and included whipping with an audio-visual cord.
60 You recall that after a particularly savage beating of you and your sister by your father, your sister told you that she was urinating blood. Your sister reported the abuse to police and she was removed from your family. Your sister never lived with your family again. Your father was charged.
61 You left school at the end of year 7. You recall attending a community centre for 12 months after you left school. However, you quickly disengaged from support staff.
62 You have a childhood and adolescent history of nightmares and involuntary distressing memories of domestic violence, startle responses and hyper vigilance. Your counsel submitted that your behavioural presentation is consistent with features of post-traumatic stress disorder.
63 When you were 16 years of age you experimented with cannabis and ice for the first time. You were not addicted at this time. In fact, you recall hating ice because it kept you awake. You recall being pressured to continue using ice, and by the time you were 19, you were using up to 1 gram of ice daily and up to 2 grams of cannabis daily until you were arrested. You instructed your counsel that at the time of committing the present offences you were using about 1 gram of ice per day.
64 You became a father at 16 years of age, when you had a daughter Alexandra. You did not believe that you were able to conceive babies at this young age. Your relationship with the child’s mother, Amanda, ended because of your drug abuse problem.
65 You met another woman named ‘Maddy’ when you were about 21 years of age. You have a daughter, Alina, together. However, this relationship also ended because of your drug use.
66 You are once again in a relationship with Amanda and speak to her daily on the telephone for 30 minutes. You also speak with your 12-year-old daughter Alexandra. You communicate on a weekly basis with your ex-partner Maddy, who allows you to speak with your five-year-old daughter Alina.
Prior Criminal History
67 As far as your prior criminal history is concerned you have a relevant and reasonably extensive list of prior convictions and findings of guilt extending back to September 2009. These largely comprise dishonesty offences and a very large number of road traffic offences.
68 However, a very concerning prior criminal appearance occurred in this Court on 7 August 2013 when you were convicted and sentenced on one charge of kidnapping under common law and common law assault. You received a sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment on the kidnapping charge and 4 months’ imprisonment concurrent on the common law assault, making a total effective sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment. I have read the judge’s reasons for sentence in relation to this matter.[20] This is particularly relevant to the sentence I impose on Charge 1 on the Second Indictment.
[20] DPP v Margus [2013] VCC 1105 (Judge Pullen).
69 Moreover, the convictions you received at the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on 2 July 2013 on a charge of non-prohibited person possessing a general category hand gun without a licence and a charge of non-prohibited person possessing an unregistered category C long arm are of particular relevance to the sentences I impose on Charge 2 on the Second Indictment. Together with a number of dishonesty offences, you received an aggregate sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment of which 60 days was suspended and you were ordered to serve 30 days. The operational period of the suspended sentence was 12 months. In April 2014 you were breached in respect of that suspended sentence order and the suspended sentence was wholly restored and you were ordered to serve the remaining 60 days’ imprisonment
70 The only other sentence of imprisonment you have served in the past was in May 2013 when you were convicted and sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment on a number of theft of motor vehicle charges.
71 It is noteworthy that there are no drug related matters in your prior criminal record. However, I understand that there is a charge pending in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court of attempting to traffick buprenorphine to which you pleaded guilty in May 2019.[21] I have not had regard to this matter in sentencing you for the present offences.
[21] See Sentence/Remand Report – Comprehensive Prison History dated 19 December 2019 (Exhibit M10).
72 It is clear from your prior criminal history that you have had many opportunities in the past by way of community correction orders and suspended sentences of imprisonment where you have failed to take the opportunities afforded you.
73 In light of your prior criminal history, it is clear that specific deterrence and protection of the community must be given significant weight in sentencing you for the present offences.[22]
Mental State
[22] See Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477–8.
74 I have had regard to the contents of a psychological assessment report prepared by Mr Luke Armstrong dated 15 July 2019.[23] Mr Armstrong conducted his assessment and prepared the report on behalf of your legal representatives. He relates a personal history which he obtained from you; however, he comments that your recollections were difficult to follow.
[23] Exhibit M4.
75 Mr Armstrong expressed the view that ‘his disjointed history reflected his limited cognitive abilities’. He opined that in the period of at least 12 months leading up to your arrest in regard to the present offending you had a stimulant use disorder (severe amphetamine type substance). You also presented at interview with features of an antisocial personality disorder, secondary to a highly disturbed childhood. However, Mr Armstrong was not prepared to make a full diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.
76 Mr Armstrong administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Fourth Edition. Your general cognitive ability was found to be within the extremely low range of intellectual functioning, with a full scale IQ of 64. Mr Armstrong observed that you are ‘street smart having adjusted to his lifestyle as a legacy of a highly destructive upbringing’. He assessed you as performing at a Grade 2 primary school level in reading and a Grade 1 primary school level in spelling and arithmetic.
77 Mr Armstrong opined that your level of gullibility was apparent in your decision to offend and that you did not fully comprehend the serious nature of your involvement in the drug offending. He said that you were naïve and ‘beguiled by [your] dealer’.
78 Mr Armstrong opined that you have demonstrated ‘a long history of deficits in adaptive functioning’ and that ‘you continue to function within the Mild Intellectual Disability range of cognitive functioning’. In this regard Mr Armstrong opined that there was evidence of significant naivety which he said is a feature of extremely low cognitive ability. He was of the opinion your low cognitive functioning made you susceptible to being exploited and that you were a person who could be easily led by more sophisticated offenders. He observed that this a ‘feature well recognised in the research’.
79 Mr Armstrong also opined that your diagnosis of a severe Stimulant Use Disorder, which was present before the time of your arrest, was such as likely to impair your judgment. He also opined that you ‘present with a very long history of personality disturbance, as a result of a chronic and severe experience of childhood physical and emotional trauma’.
80 In my opinion, based on Mr Armstrong’s assessment of you, your mild intellectual disability coupled with your stimulant use disorder provides an explanation as to how you became so involved in the offending conduct giving rise to the First Indictment charges. It is unclear to me how much your intellectual disability may also have contributed to the Second Indictment charges.
81 I have also had regard to documents relied on by your counsel which are of some age. These are a psychological assessment report conducted by Ms Georgina Cameron, a provisional psychologist, dated 19 September 2008[24] and a target group assessment by Ms Cameron of 20 October 2008.[25] These documents, together with letters from the Department of Human Services dated 20 October 2008 and a statement of intellectual disability under the Disability Act2006 dated 20 October 2008, confirm your intellectual disability and your ability to receive services under the Disability Act.[26]
[24] Exhibit M5.
[25] Exhibit M6.
[26] Exhibit M7.
82 Following the further plea hearing on 2 August 2019, I ordered a pre-sentence psychology report pursuant to s 8A of the Sentencing Act1991. A report from Dr Bonnie Albrecht dated 26 September 2019 was received in my chambers.[27] As a consequence of receiving that report I listed a further plea hearing for 27 November 2019.
[27] Exhibit C1.
83 I sought the report particularly in regard to matters giving rise to the Second Indictment and your risk of further violent reoffending. Dr Albrecht observed that you demonstrated ‘no evidence of perceptual disturbance, formal thought disorder, or other indicators of major mental illness’. She commented that you minimised your drug use and offending behaviour at times during the interview and you expressed disappointment in your actions. She opined that you have ‘little insight into [your] cognitive abilities or social vulnerabilities’.
84 Dr Albrecht noted that you are on good terms with the mothers of your two children and that you have regular contact with them and with the children who are aged six and 12 respectively. So far as your future is concerned, she said that you recognise that you need to develop a new social network and you expressed an intention to cut all contact with offending drug-using acquaintances. You told her that your immediate and extended family and your partner would be your main personal supports upon your release from custody. I note that your partner, elder daughter, mother, sister and younger brother were supporting you during the various plea hearings.
85 Dr Albrecht observed that ‘prior and recent cognitive assessments suggest that Mr Margus’ cognitive abilities fall within the mild range of intellectual disability. A consistent weakness seems to be his verbal comprehension’. However, she noted that your reading skills appear to be adequate, but difficulties you have attending to daily responsibilities, such as planning and budgeting, were highlighted by your partner.
86 It is clear that you lack insight into your current level of mental functioning. Dr Albrecht observed:
Mr Margus disagreed with his intellectual disability diagnosis. He acknowledged being ‘not the smartest’, particularly around school-work, but that he is not ‘stupid’ and knows ‘right from wrong’. He was unable to describe his cognitive strengths or weaknesses. He, however, noted the benefit of having a disability worker in his late teens, afforded via early justice system involvement.
87 So far as you substance use history is concerned, it appears that the information you gave to Dr Albrecht was inconsistent with Court documents, which indicate daily ice and cannabis use in addition to monthly cocaine use prior to your arrest in 2014.
88 You reported to Dr Albrecht that you commenced using ice around 16 years of age, initially on weekends with friends. This eventually progressed to daily individual use. You reported brief periods of non-use, before starting in secret from your family and intimate partners. Prior to your arrest in 2014, you reported to Dr Albrecht that you were smoking 1.5 to 2 grams of ice daily. You admitted to her that during the current offending period you were receiving your ice without charge in return for your participation in the two syndicates the subject of the present drug charges.
89 You denied drug use since entering Barwon Prison, however, Dr Albrecht notes that this is inconsistent with documentation provided to her concerning ‘custodial incidents’.
90 So far as your drug use whilst in custody is concerned, Dr Albrecht observed that you have returned a number of positive or ‘adulterated’ drug tests over your custodial history, most recently returning positive outcomes in September, October and November 2018, and February and March 2019. There was also evidence of non-prescribed buprenorphine on each of these occasions.
91 According to Dr Albrecht, you have also been involved in a number of incidents involving you acting contrary to the ‘good order’ of prison, as well as incidents involving violence. Dr Albrecht was unable to ascertain whether you were the perpetrator or victim of this violence and, accordingly, I have no regard to these matters.
92 In the course of conducting a risk assessment of you, Dr Albrecht observed that ‘Consistent evaluations of low cognitive capacity gives evidence of Mental Disorder’. She opined:
There is, however, no evidence of mood or psychotic disorders. Mr Margus may endure periods of lowered mood, however, these as described by him fail to meet diagnostic thresholds for major depression. … There is no reliable evidence of Personality Disorder. Poor planning and impulse management appear better explained by his cognitive deficits and the impact of substance use, rather than a pervasive antisocial tendency and underlying antisocial attitudes. Taken together, Mr Margus’ baseline risk of violence appears to be High.
93 Turning to clinical factors, Dr Albrecht noted that you show some insight most particularly in relation to your drug use and a need for professional support and intervention upon your release from custody. She opined that ‘There is no evidence of behavioural or affective instability. There is no evidence of Violent Ideation’.
94 In summary Dr Albrecht concluded:
The constellation of static and dynamic factors present suggests that Mr Margus is currently of Moderate risk of future violence, but that the increased containment inherent of a custodial setting may be moderating this risk to a degree.
95 I take this to mean that whilst in prison your risk of future violence is somewhat constrained by the circumstances of being in a management unit and that this risk could increase if you were not so confined. Dr Albrecht further observes:
He would be most likely to engage in violence if he felt threatened, to protect himself or others, and/or to respond to perceived wrongs against a loved one.
96 Dr Albrecht administered the level of service risk need responsivity tool. Your overall profile suggests that you fall within the range of high risk/needs in relation to the risk of general reoffending, as opposed to violent reoffending.
97 I note from Dr Albrecht’s report that so far as your present situation in custody is concerned, given you are on remand and in a lock-down regime in a management unit, you have not completed any custodial programs to date and you work for only brief periods of time per week as a billet.
98 Dr Albrecht observed that your offending history appears to have occurred in the context of antisocial peers and has been associated with a desire on your part to fit in with those whom you regarded highly. She opined that this need, in combination with your limited self-awareness and cognitive capacity, makes you vulnerable to exploitation by others.
99 Accordingly, I accept that to some extent your involvement in the drug-related offending was part of your general vulnerability and this somewhat lessens your moral culpability. I am, however, unable to make a similar finding in relation to the Second Indictment charges on the facts as presented to me.
100 Nonetheless, in sentencing you on both indictments I have had regard to the principles laid down by the High Court in Muldrock v R[28] in relation to sentencing persons with an intellectual disability. The Victorian Court of appeal decision in R v Verdins[29] also has some application here.
[28] (2011) 244 CLR 120.
[29] (2007) 16 VR 269.
101 I am satisfied that your intellectual disability played some causative role in your offending conduct on the drug charges such as to lessen the weight I would otherwise give to general deterrence and denunciation and by reducing your moral culpability for that offending conduct. I accept it impaired your ability to make calm and rational choices or to think clearly, and it impaired your ability to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of your conduct. It also made you easy prey for other syndicate members who sought to exploit your vulnerability. In my opinion your case is distinguishable on this basis from the case of Sikaloski v The Queen[30] which the prosecution relied upon.
[30] [2012] VSCA 130.
102 I have also taken into account the principles espoused in Bugmy v R[31] in relation to sentencing persons who come from a disadvantaged socio-economic background and deprived childhood and have thereby suffered the effects of ‘profound depravation’.
[31] (1990) 169 CLR 525.
103 I am somewhat heartened by Dr Albrecht’s concluding remarks in which she opines that you are
motivated to change his lifestyle and recognizes his need for professional support to achieve this, and he has personal supports who are prosocial and to whom he feels indebted. These elements are likely to assist in his engagement in recommended intervention, although it is important that his cognitive and social needs are carefully attended to in the design and application of such intervention.
104 It is to be hoped that when you are granted parole you will receive the support you need to fully rehabilitate and reintegrate yourself as a law abiding member of this community and that you will take full advantage of all the support mechanisms provided to you.
Custodial History
105 I was provided with your sentence/remand report – comprehensive prison history, dated 19 December 2019[32] which sets out your custodial circumstances from 7 March 2011 until 4 December 2019.
[32] Exhibit M10.
106 It is clear you have spent most of the last nine years in custody for one reason or another. Your initial reception occurred on 7 March 2011 and you were granted freedom on 29 March 2011. You were then received again into custody on 9 May 2011 after only six weeks at liberty. On that occasion you remained in custody until 21 November 2011, when you obtained your freedom. You were again received into custody on 26 April 2012 following barely five months at liberty in the community. On that occasion you remained in custody until being released on 2 July 2013. You then remained at large in the community until being remanded in custody on 17 January 2014. On that occasion you were at large for little over six months. You were then released on 24 April 2014. Finally, you were remanded in custody on 18 December 2014 in relation to the present matters and have remained in custody since that date. You were at large on your last occasion of liberty in 2014 for a little under eight months.
107 Accordingly, during the past almost nine years you have been at large in the community for only 20½ months. In relation to your present remand, you have been in custody for 1,884 days which is declarable as PSD in this case. This is a period of nearly 62 months.
108 During your time in custody in relation to these offences you have spent a great deal of time in management conditions. I was told by your counsel that your remand has been ‘significantly difficult’ as you have been in a ‘lockdown situation’ for nearly two years. I was told your present daily routine is to awake at 6.00 am and you receive breakfast through a trapdoor at 7.30 am. You are then allowed out into a ‘confined exercise yard’ alone for a period of one and a half hours.
109 Apparently, your only other distraction is that you are allowed a 30 minute phone call per day. As your counsel observed, this effectively means that you are confined to your cell for about 22 hours per day. Whilst on remand, you cannot participate in courses and your only contact with other people are prison guards, one box visit for an hour once per week, and a visit from the prison chaplain every Tuesday. Your counsel submitted that for a man of limited intellect and limited resources, and having regard to the time you have spent in gaol on remand for the present offences, this has resulted in you suffering significant extra-curial punishment.
110 I am not aware of the reasons why you have spent so much time in a management setting whilst in gaol. From Dr Albrecht’s report it appears that there have been some instances of misbehaviour on your part, however I am unable to exclude the possibility that an element of your intellectual disability has played a role in your inability to function appropriately whilst in custody.
111 Accordingly, I am prepared to extend leniency to you on account of the circumstances in which you have served this period of imprisonment on remand, as well as the fact that you have been on remand for a very long period of time.
112 Whilst I am unable to make a definitive finding regarding the circumstances giving rise to the way you are serving your time on remand, I am prepared to apply the principles set out in cases such as R v Roston[33] and take this into account as a circumstance which makes your incarceration to date more burdensome than would be the case of an ordinary prison inmate. Hopefully, once you are a sentenced prisoner your custodial situation will improve.
[33] [1996] 2 VR 97.
113 It is also relevant that you have spent so much of the last nine years in custody for various offending, and I take that matter into account in applying the totality principle and as part of your personal circumstances.
114 It appears you are in good physical health and do not suffer from any chronic medical condition.
Mitigating Circumstances
115 I have already referred to a number of mitigating circumstances present in your case. I will take them all into account in your favour. There are additional circumstances which mitigate the sentences I will impose on you.
116 I accept that your pleas of guilty to the drug offences at trial on 9 November 2018 were entered at the first reasonable forensic opportunity given the Crown’s discontinuance of the Giretti count and agreement regarding your role in both syndicates.[34] Likewise, the Crown withdrawing the most serious charge of attempted murder on 4 April 2016 obviously prompted your indication on 27 April 2016 of an intention to plead guilty to intentionally causing injury. Accordingly, I will treat your pleas to the Second Indictment on 12 July 2016 as being entered at the first reasonable forensic opportunity.
[34] See Atholwood v The Queen (1999) 109 A Crim 465, 468 (Ipp J); Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 345–6 [20]–[22] (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ).
117 Your pleas have significant utilitarian benefit, particularly in light of the likely length and complexity of any trial on the drug matters. Your pleas also indicate an acceptance by you of responsibility for your offending conduct and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
118 While I accept you are undoubtedly regretful for the situation in which you find yourself and the effect this has had, and will continue to have, on you and your family, there is insufficient evidence before to make a finding in your favour that you demonstrate true contrition and remorse beyond what is evident from the pleas themselves.[35]
[35] See Barbaro v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 354, 364–365 [32]–[38] ((Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA).
119 I accept your role in the drug offending was not that of an organiser, but as a ‘lance corporal’. Nonetheless, you were a willing participant in two criminal syndicates and you knowingly played your roles. I accept that you were not involved in significant planning in relation to the storing, selling and distribution of the heroin over and above the specific acts for which you fall to be sentenced. You did not engage directly in negotiations with buyers. You did not physically threaten anyone or carry any weapons at any relevant time.
120 It appears your main motive for committing the drug offences was to obtain free drugs for your own use; a habit requiring one gram of ice per day is conceded. I accept there is no evidence of enrichment as a result of your participation in these crimes or a grandiose lifestyle.
121 I accept that the delay in this case is, as your counsel described it, ‘prolonged and substantial’ and this has been through no fault of yours. As a result, the uncertainty of these matters hanging over you has had an adverse effect on you, which I take into account in your favour. As you counsel submitted, ‘this matter has had a long and difficult history’. Clearly the investigation and preparation for trial in relation to your drug related crimes was complicated and time-consuming. A number of trial dates were vacated for various reasons and the sentencing of you has been long and drawn out, partly because of the need to obtain psychological reports and partly owing to my circumstances.
122 So far as your prospects of rehabilitation are concerned, I can only adopt a very cautious approach in light of your prior criminal history and your drug addiction. I accept you have strong family support and the prospect of obtaining employment on your release from custody, which should be protective measures in your case.
Application of Sentencing Principles
123 I have had regard to current sentencing practices in relation to the charge of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a drug of dependence and trafficking in a commercial quantity and trafficking simpliciter in light of the decision of the High Court of Australia in DPP v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym)[36] and the Victorian Court of Appeal decisions in Gregory (a Pseudonym) v The Queen[37] and Nguyen v The Queen.[38] The Crown also referred me to Fernando v The Queen[39] concerning current sentencing practices in relation to these offences.
[36] DPP v Dalgliesh(a Pseudonym) (2017) 262 CLR 482.
[37] Gregory v The Queen (2017) 268 A Crim R 1 (“Gregory”).
[38] Nguyen v The Queen [2019] VSCA 184.
[39] Fernando v The Queen [2017] VSCA 208.
124 I have also had regard to current sentencing practices in relation to the charges of intentionally causing injury and possessing a firearm whilst prohibited.
125 It is difficult to gauge more than a very general yardstick from so-called ‘comparable cases’ given the wide range of offending conduct which can constitute these offences and the myriad of personal circumstances pertaining to individual offenders. Nonetheless, to the extent that I have been able to gain any assistance from these and other comparable cases, I have sought to do so in your case.
126 I note you will fall to be sentenced as a serious offender on Charge 5 on the First Indictment. I must regard protection of the community as the principle sentencing purpose on that charge. The Crown did not submit that I should impose a disproportionate sentence on you in order to achieve that purpose. Moreover, unless I otherwise direct, the sentence I impose on Charge 5 must be served cumulatively on all other sentences I impose on you in this case. In your case I will otherwise direct.
127 So far as Charge 4 on the First Indictment is concerned, on convicting you on that offence I must make an order declaring you to be a serious drug offender.
128 So far as parity is concerned, I have had regard to the sentence imposed on Mohammed Wahab by another judge of this Court.[40] He received a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years, which was imposed for his storage of approximately 20.3 kilograms of heroin and MDMA, which is over 6 times the combined amount of heroin you are charged with. Moreover, he faced a Giretti count[41] covering the period 9 to 17 December 2014, rather than the four stand-alone charges you face in relation to ‘Operation Grote’.
[40][2018] VCC 1892 (Judge Wilmoth).
[41] Giretti v The Queen (1986) 24 A Crim R 112.
129 His role and personal circumstances are somewhat different from yours. He had no prior criminal history and he had taken ‘remarkable steps’ towards his rehabilitation during the lengthy delay in finalising his case. He had ‘taken every possible opportunity to use [his] time well’. He was found to have ‘excellent prospects’ of rehabilitation, demonstrated true contrition and remorse and could rely on a significant body of supportive character references from friends and community members. He was educated and had conducted a successful business as an auto mechanic. Nonetheless, despite these distinguishing features, to the extent that Wahab’s sentence is of assistance to me, I have had regard to it.
130 I have also had regard to the sentences I passed on your co-offender in ‘Operation Grote’ Anthony Harris.[42] On a charge of trafficking simpliciter in a drug of dependence, equivalent to your First Indictment Charge 2, he was convicted and sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment. On a charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a large commercial quantity, equivalent to your First Indictment Charge 4, he was convicted and sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. He received a total effective sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 8 years.
[42] [2019] VCC 1546.
131 Harris pleaded not guilty and was convicted by a jury at trial. His role was different, but not entirely dissimilar, from yours, as were his personal circumstances.
132 Finally, on the issue of parity I have had regard to the sentence imposed by another judge of this Court on Quang Dong in relation to his involvement in ‘Operation Kanji’.[43] On two charges of trafficking simpliciter in a drug of dependence, one charge being equivalent to your First Indictment Charge 3, he was convicted and received an aggregate sentence of 23 months’ imprisonment. The opacity and, with respect, artificiality of this sentence makes it difficult for me to properly apply the parity principle in your case. Nonetheless, to the extent that Dong’s sentence is of assistance to me, I have had regard to it.
[43] [2016] VCC 937 (Judge Allen).
133 Another co-accused in relation to the ‘Operation Kanji’ charge was Jade Trinh (aka Huyen Thi Thuy Pham). She pleaded guilty before another judge of this Court to a rolled-up charge (her Charge 3) of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a commercial quantity. This charge included the circumstances giving rise to your First Indictment Charge 3. She was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months. The difference in the offence she faced and the rolled-up nature of her charge also make the application of the parity principle in your case problematic. Nonetheless, to the extent that Trinh’s sentence is of any assistance to me, I have had regard to it
134 The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are just punishment, deterrence, both specific and general, rehabilitation, denunciation and protection of the community. In sentencing you I must have regard to a range of factors, such as the seriousness of the offences, your culpability for them, the impact on the victim and your personal circumstances.
135 I am required to balance the interests of the community in denouncing criminal conduct with the interests of the community in seeking to ensure that, so far as is possible, you are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.
136 General deterrence and denunciation are very important sentencing considerations, particular for the offences charged in Charges 4 and 5 on the First Indictment.[44] These offences are prevalent in the community and, as the Court of Appeal has observed, the link between prevalence and general deterrence is self-evident.[45] Nonetheless, by reason of your intellectual disability, I will sensibly moderate the weight I give to these factors.
[44] Nguyen v The Queen (2016) 311 FLR 289, 330 [139]–[140] (Redlich JA, Tate JA agreeing) (“Nguyen”); Dawid v DPP [2013] VSCA 64 [35] (Kaye AJA, Redlich and Whelan JJA agreeing); Gregory 20 [83].
[45] Nguyen 331 [141].
137 Whilst just punishment, general deterrence and denunciation must be given significant consideration in my instinctive synthesis, I am of the view that, in your case, specific deterrence and protection of the community need be given some real weight. Moreover, I can only adopt a cautious approach to your prospects of rehabilitation, which I find to be reasonably good, provided you remain drug free on your release from custody.
138 I have found the sentencing exercise presented to me in your case to be a very difficult one. That difficulty largely arises from the need to impose sentences which properly reflect the seriousness of your offending conduct, while giving full weight to the constellation of significant mitigating circumstances present in your case. In the result, I have decided to extend a measure of leniency towards you in the hope that when you are eventually released from custody you can rid yourself of the scourge of ice addiction and lead a lawful and rewarding life with your partner, daughters and the rest of your family.
Stand up Mr Margus
On the First Indictment no E14176319 you are sentenced as follows:
On the charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence (Charge 1) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months.
On the charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence (Charge 2) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months.
On the charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence (Charge 3) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 20 months.
On the charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a large commercial quantity (Charge 4) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years.
On the charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in not less than a commercial quantity (Charge 5) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 6 years.
I order that 10 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 1, 10 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 2, 10 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 3 and 2 years of the sentence imposed on Charge 5 be served cumulatively with the sentence imposed on Charge 4 and on each other.
That makes a total effective sentence on the First Indictment of imprisonment for 11 years and 6 months.
On the Second Indictment no F10315110.1 you are sentenced as follows:
On the charge of intentionally causing injury (Charge 1) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years.
On the charge of possessing a firearm whilst prohibited (Charge 2) you will be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months.
I order that 6 months of the sentence imposed on Charge 2 be served cumulatively with the sentence imposed on Charge 1.
That makes a total effective sentence on the Second Indictment of imprisonment for 3 years and 6 months.
I order that 2 years of the total effective sentence imposed on the Second Indictment be served cumulatively with the total effective sentence imposed on the First Indictment, making an overall total effective sentence of imprisonment for 13 years and 6 months.
I will fix a minimum non-parole period which is shorter than I would impose in a different case because of your personal circumstances and in order to promote your prospects of rehabilitation.
I order that you serve a minimum of 7 years’ imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole.
I declare 1884 days (not including this day) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I direct that the fact that declaration was made and its details be noted in the records of the court.
Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 I state that the overall total effective sentence I would have imposed on you but for your pleas of guilty would have been 18 years’ imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 11 years imprisonment.
On First Indictment Charge 4 I make an order declaring you to be a serious drug offender.
On First Indictment Charge 5 I direct that the fact you have been sentenced as a serious offender on that charge be entered in the records of the Court.
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