CORPORATIONS LAW - application for review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal - whether a proceeding for a banning order under s 829 of the Corporations Law is "a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty" - respondent objected to admission of evidence on basis of privilege against self-incrimination - consideration of the object of the Australian Securities Commission Act - consideration of s 1(2) and (3) - court to look at the predominant purpose of the provision - consideration of authorities relating to professional disciplinary sanctions and distinction between disciplinary sanctions designed to protect public confidence and the punitive provisions - statute cast in specific terms - use of language of purpose - effect of banning order is exclusion from futures and securities markets - it may impose hardships but purpose is not punitive.
Corporations Law ss 837, 829, 835
Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 19, 68(1), 68(2), 68(3), 79, 13(1), 19(1), 19(2), 19(3), 1(2) and (3)
Coogans v MacDonald (1954) SLT 279, distinguished
Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397, distinguished
Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466, distinguished
Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1975) 1 ACLR 203, cited
Friend v Corporate Affairs Commission (1989) 7 ACLC 106, cited
Story v NCSC (1988) 6 ACLC 560, cited
Nicholas v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1987)
5 ACLC 258, cited
Nicholas v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1987)
5 ACLC 673, cited
Quinn v Australian Securities Commission (1994) 12 ACLC 412, cited
Re Network Agencies International Ltd (in liq); Johnston v Edwards (1991) 5 NZCLC 65, 535, cited
New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177, cited
Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, cited
Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279, cited
Derby Corporation v Derbyshire County Council [1897] AC 550, cited
Sir Frederick Jordon, Selected Legal Papers, Legal Books (1983) Pt 3 "General Principles of Administration of Justice"
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION v
MAXWELL ALFRED KIPPE & STEPHANIE FORGIE
No QG 199 OF 1995
von Doussa, Cooper & Tamberlin JJ
Brisbane
28 June 1996
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. QG 199 of 1995
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES
COMMISSION
Applicant
AND: MAXWELL ALFRED KIPPE
First Respondent
STEPHANIE A FORGIE
Second Respondent
CORAM: von DOUSSA, COOPER & TAMBERLIN JJ
PLACE: BRISBANE
DATED: 28 JUNE 1996
MINUTE OF ORDERS
THE COURT:
Orders that the application be granted
Orders that the decision of the Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
Declares that the proceeding for a banning order under s829 of the Corporations Law is not a proceeding for the imposition of…
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- Case
- [1996] FCA 517
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the language of the relevant provisions and considered the object of the Australian Securities Commission Act, particularly its function to maintain investor confidence by ensuring adequate protection. The court noted that the effect of a banning order, while potentially imposing hardships, was not punitive but rather aimed at protecting the public interest and ensuring the effective operation of the securities industry. The court distinguished between disciplinary sanctions designed to protect public confidence and those that were punitive. It concluded that the proceeding for a banning order was protective and not intended to punish or penalise, even though it might result in exclusion from the industry.
Based on the reasoning above, the court held that the proceeding for a banning order under section 829 of the Corporations Law was not a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty within section 68(3) of the Australian Securities Commission Act 1989. The court granted the application, set aside the decision of the AAT, and remitted the matter back for determination in accordance with the law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the application.
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