HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJMatter No S176/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
MEREDITH HELLICAR RESPONDENT
Matter No S177/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
MICHAEL ROBERT BROWN RESPONDENT
Matter No S178/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
MICHAEL JOHN GILLFILLAN RESPONDENT
Matter No S179/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
MARTIN KOFFEL RESPONDENT
Matter No S175/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANT
AND
GREGORY JAMES TERRY RESPONDENT
Matter No S180/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
GEOFFREY FREDERICK O'BRIEN RESPONDENT
Matter No S181/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
PETER JOHN WILLCOX RESPONDENT
Matter No S174/2011
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION APPELLANTAND
PETER JAMES SHAFRON RESPONDENT
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Brown
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Gillfillan
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Koffel
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Terry
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v O'Brien
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Willcox
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Shafron
[2012] HCA 17
3 May 2012
S176/2011 to S179/2011, S175/2011, S180/2011 to S181/2011 & S174/2011ORDER
In matter S174/2011:
1.Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010 in Matter No 2009/00298416, in which Peter James Shafron was appellant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission was respondent.
3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal and cross-appeal in that matter as relates to penalty.
4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
In matters S175/2011 and S180/2011:
1.Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.
3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of:
(a)so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty; and
(b)the cross-appeal to that Court in relation to costs.
4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
In matters S176/2011, S177/2011, S178/2011, S179/2011 and S181/2011:
1.Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.
3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty.
4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and A J L Bannon SC with R T Beech-Jones SC and…
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- Case
- [2012] HCA 17
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia was required to determine several key legal issues. Firstly, it had to consider whether the minutes of a board meeting, which recorded the tabling and approval of the draft ASX announcement, constituted sufficient evidence to prove the directors' approval, especially given subsequent approvals of the minutes and the fact that all directors had received them. Secondly, the Court had to assess whether ASIC owed the respondents a "duty of fairness" in its conduct of the litigation, and if so, whether ASIC breached this duty by not calling the corporation's solicitor, who had supervised the preparation of the minutes and attended the board meeting. Finally, the Court needed to determine the proper consequence of any such breach of a duty of fairness, specifically whether it should lead to discounting the cogency of ASIC's case.
The High Court reasoned that the board minutes, having been confirmed and signed as a correct record, were prima facie evidence of the matters they recorded. The Court found that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the "correlation evidence" between statements made at the meeting and the draft announcement, was preferable due to the advantage of having observed the witnesses. The Court also addressed the alleged "duty of fairness," concluding that there was no unfairness in ASIC's conduct in not calling the solicitor, and that the absence of protest from the directors after the minutes were confirmed also weighed against their arguments. The Court ultimately found that the Court of Appeal had erred in overturning the trial judge's findings regarding the approval of the draft announcement and the cogency of the evidence.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal, and remitted the matters to the Court of Appeal for determination of issues relating to penalty and relief from liability, as well as costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
In matter S174/2011:
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010 in Matter No 2009/00298416, in which Peter James Shafron was appellant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission was respondent.
3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal and cross-appeal in that matter as relates to penalty.
4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
In matters S175/2011 and S180/2011:
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.
3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of:
(a) so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty; and
(b) the cross-appeal to that Court in relation to costs.
4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
In matters S176/2011, S177/2011, S178/2011, S179/2011 and S181/2011:
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.
3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty.
4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ
Before dealing with these arguments there are some matters of history to which reference must be made.Proposals for separation Since as early as 1996, the board of JHIL had been considering and taking some steps towards a corporate restructuring of the James Hardie group. As part of that restructuring, JHIL's directors had been considering separation of "the asbestos litigation poison pill" from the "operating assets" since at least December 1999. In April 2000, the board was told that the restructuring could be disrupted or hindered if the separation was seen as "James Hardie abandoning its responsibilities to claimants". Thereafter the board considered separation proposals at several meetings. It is enough to direct attention to the board meetings of January 2001 and February 2001. A detailed paper was put to the board in January 2001 considering "the establishment of a stand alone trust company to manage the asbestos liabilities in the James Hardie Group". The objective of establishing the trust was described as being that "[a]sbestos liabilities would be effectively, but not completely, separated from [JHIL]". The paper recorded that JHIL then accounted for asbestos liabilities "by providing for the expected costs of known claims" (emphasis added). But as the paper also recorded, when Australian Accounting Standards Board, Provisions and Contingencies, Exposure Draft No 88, December 1997 ("ED88") became effective – then expected to be in March 2003 – it seemed "probable" that JHIL would have to provide "for at least the minimum amount of the expected future liability" and "significant disclosure concerning the nature and extent of potential future asbestos liabilities will have to be made" (emphasis added). The proposal put to the board at its January meeting – the "net assets model" – proceeded from the premises (noted[50] by the Court of Appeal) that "the maximum quantum of funds available to Australian asbestos claimants is the existing net assets of [Coy] and Jsekarb" and that "[t]here is no sound rationale for increasing the net assets of [Coy] and Jsekarb and thereby expanding this quantum of funds available to claimants". Accordingly, the proposal put to the board was that JHIL give its shares in Coy and Jsekarb to a trust and that the net assets of Coy and Jsekarb be applied by the trust to meeting existing and future asbestos claims. In addition, JHIL would give $2 million to the trust for research into asbestos‑related diseases.[50](2010) 274 ALR 205 at 224 [79]. The board paper for the January meeting explained, under the heading "Risks", that "[t]he creation of the Trust would … carry with it the message that JHIL would not support [Coy] and Jsekarb in the event that funds prove to be insufficient". It also said that the "effect of the Trust and associated arrangements" may be subject to "attack", including through legislation by which JHIL was "declared liable for all of the asbestos related liabilities of its subsidiaries" or by the freezing of JHIL's assets "pending undertakings [being given] suitable to" government.