Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

Matter No S176/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

MEREDITH HELLICAR  RESPONDENT

Matter No S177/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

MICHAEL ROBERT BROWN  RESPONDENT

Matter No S178/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

MICHAEL JOHN GILLFILLAN  RESPONDENT

Matter No S179/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

MARTIN KOFFEL  RESPONDENT

Matter No S175/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS

COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

GREGORY JAMES TERRY  RESPONDENT

Matter No S180/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

GEOFFREY FREDERICK O'BRIEN  RESPONDENT

Matter No S181/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

PETER JOHN WILLCOX  RESPONDENT

Matter No S174/2011

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

PETER JAMES SHAFRON  RESPONDENT

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Brown
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Gillfillan
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Koffel
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Terry
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v O'Brien
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Willcox
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Shafron
[2012] HCA 17
3 May 2012
S176/2011 to S179/2011, S175/2011, S180/2011 to S181/2011 & S174/2011

ORDER

In matter S174/2011:

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010 in Matter No 2009/00298416, in which Peter James Shafron was appellant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission was respondent.

3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal and cross-appeal in that matter as relates to penalty.

4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

In matters S175/2011 and S180/2011:

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.

3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of:

(a)so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty; and

(b)the cross-appeal to that Court in relation to costs.

4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

In matters S176/2011, S177/2011, S178/2011, S179/2011 and S181/2011:

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.

3.Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty.

4.The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and A J L Bannon SC with R T Beech-Jones SC and…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCA 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought proceedings against directors and officers of James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL) for alleged contraventions of section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which requires individuals to act with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person in their position would exercise. ASIC alleged that the directors contravened this section by approving a draft announcement to the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) that was materially similar to a misleading announcement subsequently released. ASIC also alleged that the company secretary and general counsel contravened section 180(1) by failing to advise the board that the draft announcement was misleading. The central dispute revolved around whether the directors had indeed approved the draft announcement and the cogency of the evidence presented by ASIC, particularly board minutes, to prove this approval.

The High Court of Australia was required to determine several key legal issues. Firstly, it had to consider whether the minutes of a board meeting, which recorded the tabling and approval of the draft ASX announcement, constituted sufficient evidence to prove the directors' approval, especially given subsequent approvals of the minutes and the fact that all directors had received them. Secondly, the Court had to assess whether ASIC owed the respondents a "duty of fairness" in its conduct of the litigation, and if so, whether ASIC breached this duty by not calling the corporation's solicitor, who had supervised the preparation of the minutes and attended the board meeting. Finally, the Court needed to determine the proper consequence of any such breach of a duty of fairness, specifically whether it should lead to discounting the cogency of ASIC's case.

The High Court reasoned that the board minutes, having been confirmed and signed as a correct record, were prima facie evidence of the matters they recorded. The Court found that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the "correlation evidence" between statements made at the meeting and the draft announcement, was preferable due to the advantage of having observed the witnesses. The Court also addressed the alleged "duty of fairness," concluding that there was no unfairness in ASIC's conduct in not calling the solicitor, and that the absence of protest from the directors after the minutes were confirmed also weighed against their arguments. The Court ultimately found that the Court of Appeal had erred in overturning the trial judge's findings regarding the approval of the draft announcement and the cogency of the evidence.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal, and remitted the matters to the Court of Appeal for determination of issues relating to penalty and relief from liability, as well as costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

In matter S174/2011:

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010 in Matter No 2009/00298416, in which Peter James Shafron was appellant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission was respondent.

3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal and cross-appeal in that matter as relates to penalty.

4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

In matters S175/2011 and S180/2011:

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.

3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of:

(a) so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty; and

(b) the cross-appeal to that Court in relation to costs.

4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

In matters S176/2011, S177/2011, S178/2011, S179/2011 and S181/2011:

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 17 December 2010.

3. Remit the matter to the Court of Appeal for determination of so much of the appeal to that Court as relates to relief from liability and penalty.

4. The costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal are to be in the discretion of that Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

The balance of these reasons is organised as follows:Some basic facts [12]‑[19]The proceedings [20]‑[22]First instance [23]‑[29]Appeal to the Court of Appeal [30]‑[35]Some undisputed facts [36]‑[38]The respondents' principal arguments [39]‑[40]Proposals for separation [41]‑[52]The central conundrum [53]‑[64]The board minutes [65]‑[71]Why start with the board minutes? [72]‑[75]Alterations to the 7.24 draft announcement [76]‑[110]The inaccuracies in the minutes [111]‑[116]The significance of inaccuracies in the minutes [117]‑[122]Mr Brown and the "correlation evidence" [123]‑[132]Absence of later protest [133]‑[138]A "failure" to call Mr Robb? [139]‑[146]The source and content of the duty of fairness? [147]‑[155]No unfairness in fact [156]‑[163]The cogency of proof [164]‑[170]Conclusion and orders [171]‑[178]Some basic facts Until October 2001 JHIL was the ultimate holding company of the James Hardie group of companies. JHIL was a listed public company; its shares were listed on the ASX. Two wholly owned subsidiaries of JHIL, James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd ("Coy") and Jsekarb Pty Ltd ("Jsekarb"), had manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Each of Coy and Jsekarb was subject to claims for damages for personal injury suffered by those who had come in contact with its asbestos products. In 2001 the board of JHIL expected that there would be further claims made against Coy and Jsekarb. The board of JHIL decided to restructure the James Hardie group by "separating" Coy and Jsekarb from the rest of the group. This was to be done by JHIL establishing a foundation (the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation – "the MRCF") to manage and pay out asbestos claims made against Coy and Jsekarb and to conduct medical research into the causes of, and treatments for, asbestos‑related diseases. Jsekarb and Coy would make a Deed of Covenant and Indemnity with JHIL under which Jsekarb and Coy would make no claim against and indemnify JHIL in respect of all asbestos‑related liabilities and, in return, JHIL would, over time, pay Jsekarb and Coy an amount of money. New shares would be issued by Coy and Jsekarb to be held by or for the ultimate benefit of the MRCF; JHIL's shares in both Coy and Jsekarb would be cancelled. A new company, James Hardie Industries NV ("JHINV"), would be incorporated in the Netherlands and that company would become the immediate holding company of JHIL and ultimate holding company of the James Hardie group. On 15 February 2001, the board of JHIL met to consider the separation proposal. What happened at that board meeting is the focus of these proceedings. Minutes of the meeting of the directors of JHIL held on 15 February 2001 were confirmed by the board, at a meeting held on 3‑4 April 2001, as a correct record and subsequently "[s]igned as a correct record" by the chairman of the board at or after that April meeting. All of the directors of JHIL had received the minutes of the February meeting with their board papers for the April meeting. One of the respondents in this Court, Mr Willcox, did not attend the April meeting; all other respondents did.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

These submissions fail. As already noted, under Mr Brown's questioning regarding an impending public announcement, the Chief Executive Officer said at the meeting that he was "sure" there would be sufficient funds in the Foundation[253]. No-one disagreed. The trial judge found that Mr Brown was dissatisfied with the communications strategy stated in the 15 February 2001 meeting papers, as he had been in relation to the proposed questions and answers and the draft ASX press release provided with the 17 January 2001 meeting papers. He was dissatisfied because they did not convey certainty of funding. Accordingly, as the trial judge found, Mr Brown welcomed the proposed communications to the market, including an announcement to the ASX, which did indicate certainty of funding. The significance of Mr Cameron's and Mr Robb's silence at the meeting was discussed above[254]. [253]Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199 at 234 [149]-[150].[254]See above at [281]-[282]."Correlation evidence" The Hellicar respondents submitted that while Mr Brown gave evidence that "messages" suitable for dispatch to the market were discussed and approved in general terms, they were messages which management could implement as it thought fit. The board's approval of the messages did not amount to approval of an announcement along the lines of the 7.24am Draft Announcement. Mr Brown testified that the Chief Executive Officer gave an assurance at the meeting that the Foundation would be fully funded and that any announcement would communicate that message. He also testified that part of the communication to the market would be an announcement to the ASX. He also testified that it was "likely" that the Chief Executive Officer or Mr Baxter stated that various messages would be communicated. Each message corresponded with part of the 7.24am Draft Announcement. Mr Koffel gave evidence that these statements could have been made. On the basis of this evidence, the trial judge found that either the Chief Executive Officer or Mr Baxter had made statements to that effect at the meeting. His Honour found there was a "strong correlation" between these statements and the 7.24am Draft Announcement[255]. The Court of Appeal overturned that finding. It held that the correlation was only "weak"[256]. It described Mr Brown's evidence as involving speculation, not recollection. However, the evidence does appear to have been based on recollection, even if it was not a recollection which extended to the "specific terms" of what was said. In the last resort, what Mr Brown meant was a matter of judgment. It is the type of judgment which turns on nuance. Truth can lie in a nuance[257]. The trial judge saw and heard Mr Brown give evidence for five days. His possession of that advantage makes the assessment of nuance which led to his finding preferable to the Court of Appeal's rejection of it.[255]Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199 at 240 [194].[256]Morley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2010) 274 ALR 205 at 288 [420].[257]Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ

Before dealing with these arguments there are some matters of history to which reference must be made.Proposals for separation Since as early as 1996, the board of JHIL had been considering and taking some steps towards a corporate restructuring of the James Hardie group. As part of that restructuring, JHIL's directors had been considering separation of "the asbestos litigation poison pill" from the "operating assets" since at least December 1999. In April 2000, the board was told that the restructuring could be disrupted or hindered if the separation was seen as "James Hardie abandoning its responsibilities to claimants". Thereafter the board considered separation proposals at several meetings. It is enough to direct attention to the board meetings of January 2001 and February 2001. A detailed paper was put to the board in January 2001 considering "the establishment of a stand alone trust company to manage the asbestos liabilities in the James Hardie Group". The objective of establishing the trust was described as being that "[a]sbestos liabilities would be effectively, but not completely, separated from [JHIL]". The paper recorded that JHIL then accounted for asbestos liabilities "by providing for the expected costs of known claims" (emphasis added). But as the paper also recorded, when Australian Accounting Standards Board, Provisions and Contingencies, Exposure Draft No 88, December 1997 ("ED88") became effective – then expected to be in March 2003 – it seemed "probable" that JHIL would have to provide "for at least the minimum amount of the expected future liability" and "significant disclosure concerning the nature and extent of potential future asbestos liabilities will have to be made" (emphasis added). The proposal put to the board at its January meeting – the "net assets model" – proceeded from the premises (noted[50] by the Court of Appeal) that "the maximum quantum of funds available to Australian asbestos claimants is the existing net assets of [Coy] and Jsekarb" and that "[t]here is no sound rationale for increasing the net assets of [Coy] and Jsekarb and thereby expanding this quantum of funds available to claimants". Accordingly, the proposal put to the board was that JHIL give its shares in Coy and Jsekarb to a trust and that the net assets of Coy and Jsekarb be applied by the trust to meeting existing and future asbestos claims. In addition, JHIL would give $2 million to the trust for research into asbestos‑related diseases.[50](2010) 274 ALR 205 at 224 [79]. The board paper for the January meeting explained, under the heading "Risks", that "[t]he creation of the Trust would … carry with it the message that JHIL would not support [Coy] and Jsekarb in the event that funds prove to be insufficient". It also said that the "effect of the Trust and associated arrangements" may be subject to "attack", including through legislation by which JHIL was "declared liable for all of the asbestos related liabilities of its subsidiaries" or by the freezing of JHIL's assets "pending undertakings [being given] suitable to" government.