Meredith v State of New South Wales (No 5) - [2025] NSWSC 1133

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Meredith v State of New South Wales (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 1133
Hearing dates: 5 May 2025, 13-16 May 2025
Date of orders: 30 September 2025
Decision date: 30 September 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Yehia J
Decision:
(1)   Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $93,000 plus pre-judgment interest.
(2)   Direct the parties to confer and agree as to the quantum of interest payable.
(3)   Defer for later assessment the quantum of exemplary damages for the plaintiff.
(4)   The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the ordinary basis unless a party shows an entitlement to some other costs order.

Catchwords:
TORTS – intentional torts – representative proceedings – strip searches at music festivals – cause of action for assault, battery and false imprisonment – lead plaintiff directed to take her clothes off and move her body parts and body to facilitate the search – where defendant changed its position weeks before the hearing date – where defendant now accepts the search was unlawful
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) – the operation of ss 31, 32 and 33 of LEPRA – what is required to satisfy the preconditions of “seriousness” and “urgency” of the circumstances – whether the searching officers failed to comply with the safeguards afforded under ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA – whether there is an implied power to direct that a person being strip searched move their body and/or body parts to facilitate the search – whether “genital area” includes the anus for the purpose of s 32(6) of LEPRA
DAMAGES – whether the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) bars the plaintiff from an award of aggravated and exemplary damages – whether the plaintiff is entitled to aggravated damages for the conduct of the proceedings – where the non-compliance with the LEPRA provisions resulted in egregious breaches by the searching police

Legislation Cited:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3B(1)(a), 11, 15B
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 157, 166
Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW), ss 17, 18, 20, 22, 23
Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW)
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138(1)
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3, 21, 21A, 27, 28, 30, 31, 31(a), 31(b), 32, 33, 99, 197, 198, 198A, 199, 201, 202, 203, 230
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Act 2013 (NSW)
Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), ss 6, 8
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 11(1), 14(1)(b), 18A, 50A, 50C
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 14.22, 14.23

Cases Cited:
AD v State of NSW (2023) 308 A Crim R 367; [2023] NSWCA 115
Adams v Kennedy & Ors (2000) 49 NSWLR 78; [2000] NSWCA 152
Anderson v State of NSW; Perri v State of NSW [2023] NSWCA 160
ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17
Attalla v NSW (2018) 28 DCLR(NSW) 337; [2018] NSWDC 190
Attorney General for New South Wales v XX (2018) 98 NSWLR 1012; [2018] NSWCCA 198
Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (2008) 232 CLR 314; [2008] HCA 9
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185; [1966] HCA 37
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221; [1968] ALR 3
Australian Securities and Investments Commission(ASIC) v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17
Bhattacharya v State of New South Wales & Anor [2003] NSWSC 261
Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; (1774) 98 ER 969
Bulsey v The State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187
Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 31
Carvana v State of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 254
Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1; [1982] HCA 67
Clifton & Ors v Lewis [2012] NSWCA 229
Costa and Another v The Public Trustee of NSW (2008) 1 ASTLR 56; [2008] NSWCA 223
Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; (1988) 34 A Crim R 364
CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Rizzani De Eccher Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1798
Croucher v Cachia (2016) 95 NSWLR 117; [2016] NSWCA 132
DanielFromberg v R (2017) 26 DCLR(NSW) 6; [2017] NSWDC 259
David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516
Dell v Dalton (1991) 23 NSWLR 528; [1991] NSWCA 76
Digital Pulse Pty Limited v Christopher Harris and Ors (2002) 166 FLR 421; [2002] NSWSC 33
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Greenhalgh [2022] NSWSC 980
Dowse v State of New South Wales (2012) 226 A Crim R 36; [2012] NSWCA 337
Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu (2019) 266 FCR 83; [2019] FCAFC 133
Fede v Gray by his tutor New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2018) 98 NSWLR 1149; [2018] NSWCA 316
Fenton v Hampton (1858) 11 Moo PCC 347; (1858) 14 ER 727
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26
Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70
Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309
Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2012] NSWSC 1026
Hrdavec v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 52
Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336
Jamieson v R (1993) 177 CLR 574; [1993] HCA 48
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] HCA 8
Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47
Louis v Commonwealth (1987) 87 FLR 277
Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; [1972] HCA 27
McLaughlin v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWDC 525
McLaughlin v State of New South Wales (No. 2) [2023] NSWDC 557
Melbourne Steamship Co Ltd v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333; [1912] HCA 69
Meredith v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1546
Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.3) [2024] NSWSC 1499
Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.4) [2025] NSWSC 13
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21
Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (2020) 268 CLR 326; [2020] HCA 17
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181; [2004] HCA 41
New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57
Nixon v Philip Morris (Aust) Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 453; [1999] FCA 1107
Owlstara v State of New South Wales (2020) 285 A Crim R 53; [2020] NSWCA 217
Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191
Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19
Pham v Commissioner of Victim Rights [2019] NSWSC 1060
Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon (2000) 170 ALR 487; [2000] FCA 229
Pinson v Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72
Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19
R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467
R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540
Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWDC 28
Rigby v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 729
Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265
Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48
Smith v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1980) 147 CLR 134; [1980] HCA 49
Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1
State of New South Wales v Abed (2014) 246 A Crim R 549; [2014] NSWCA 419
State of New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32
State of New South Wales v Dennis [2025] NSWCA 118
State of New South Wales v Exton (2017) 270 A Crim R 182; [2017] NSWCA 294
State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445
State ofNew South Wales v Landini [2010] NSWCA 157
State of New South Wales v McLaughlin [2024] NSWCA 137
State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88
State ofNew South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208
State of New South Wales v Robinson (2016) 93 NSWLR 280; [2016] NSWCA 334
State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194
State of New South Wales v Steven Charles Radford (2010) 79 NSWLR 327; [2010] NSWCA 276
State of New South Wales v Williamson [2011] NSWCA 183
State of New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57
State of NSW v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; [2007] NSWCA 303
TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited v Henry Alfred Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82
The Korean Times Pty Ltd & Anor v Un Doc Pak [2011] NSWCA 365
Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 409
Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; [1966] HCA 40
Walumba Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12
Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; [1971] HCA 33
WCX M4-M5 Link AT Pty Ltd v Acciona Infrastructure Projects Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 505
Whitbread & Anor v Rail Corporation NSW & Ors [2011] NSWCA 130
Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; [1920] HCA 75
Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88
XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; [1985] HCA 12
Yong Jun Qin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155; (1997) 144 ALR 695
Zaravinos v State of New South Wales; State of New South Wales & Ors v Zaravinos (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320

Texts Cited:
[Redacted]
Harold Luntz and Sirko Harder, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (5th ed, 2021, LexisNexis)
M2016-03-Model Litigant Policy for Civil Litigation and [Redacted]
New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 at 4846
[Redacted]
Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (Final Report, 1997) vol 2

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Raya Meredith (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
K Nomchong SC with A Edwards (Plaintiff)
J Sexton SC with M Hutchings and C Langford (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Slater and Gordon Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Makinson d’Apice Lawyers (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2022/00214157
Publication restriction:
Non-publication orders were made by Garling J on 21 March 2025 and by Yehia J on 5 May 2025.

Non-publication orders made on 21 March 2025
Plaintiff’s notice of motion dated 18 March 2025
…

3. The following material filed in relation to this motion:
a) the affidavit of Raya Meredith affirmed on 17 March 2025;
b) the affidavit of William Zerno affirmed on 18 March 2025 and its exhibit; and
c) the submissions of the Plaintiff served on 20 March 2025,
d) be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that:
e) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act); and
f) the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act).
4. Further to order 3, the following material at the trial of these proceedings:
a) paragraph 45 of the statement of Raya Meredith dated 21 November 2023; and
b) any further evidence adduced in cross examination or any oral or written submission or transcript concerning the subject matter of that paragraph,
be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Act on the basis that:
c) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act); and
d) the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act).
5. Orders 3 and 4 are to operate until the conclusion of the proceeding, subject to further order.
6. Orders 3 to 4 are to apply throughout the Commonwealth of Australia.

Non-publication orders made on 5 May 2025
1. In respect of the following documents filed in these proceedings and listed in Attachment A:
(a) NSW Police Notebooks;
(b) NSW Police COPS Events;
(c) NSW Police SITREP and After Action Reports;
(d) Drug Registers;
(e) Coronial Reports;
(f) Complaints in Tab 428 of the Court Book
the names of the Police Officers, save for the following:
(i) SC Danielle George
(ii) SC Todd Petrie
(iii) SC Dave Jarnet
(iv) Sgt Malcolm Kentwell
(v) Detective Inspector Matthew Woods; and the names of all persons, other than the Plaintiff, listed in those documents be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act).

2. In respect of the witness statement of Raya Meredith dated 31 November 2023 (Tab 44 of the Court Book) the residential address and occupation be subject to a non publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance withs 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act), and the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act).
3. In respect of the witness statement of Sean Rood dated 8 December 2023 (Tab 45 of the Court Book) the residential address and occupation and paragraph 28 be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act), and the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act).

Judgment

Procedural history
Legal principles of general applicability
The onus
Inferences

The evidence
The events on 20 July 2018

Elements of the torts alleged
The position of the parties
The issues to be determined
Legal principles and interpretation – LEPRA
Powers of search – LEPRA
Suspicion on reasonable grounds
Necessity, seriousness, urgency
Sections 32 and 33 – safeguards
Additional issues
Is there an implied power to direct a person to move his/her body or body parts?
Does genital area include a person’s anal area?

Factual and legal contentions – the plaintiff’s search
Section 31(b)
Sections 32 and 33

Factual and legal contentions – damages
The Limitation Act Defence
Defendant’s submissions
Plaintiff’s submissions

Consideration of the Limitation Defence
Radford distinguished

Compensatory (general) damages
Aggravated and exemplary damages distinguished
Aggravated damages for assault and false imprisonment
Aggravated damages for the conduct of the proceedings by the defendant
Exemplary damages
Evidence relating to exemplary damages
Statement of Agreed Facts
Verified discovery
Documents relating to education and training in respect of relevant LEPRA provisions
Police Academy Training
Pre-LEPRA
Post-LEPRA
Mandatory continuing education
NSWPF Handbook and the Code of Practice for CRIME
Journal articles and newsletters

Operational orders, joining orders and instructional material in respect of music festivals
SITG 2018
SITG 2017
SITG 2016
SITG 2015
SITG 2014
Defqon 2018
Hot Dub Wine Machine Concert 2018
Harbourlife 2018
Defqon 2017
Midnight Mafia 2017
FOMO 2017
Subsonic 2016
Newcastle City This That 2016

Individual training of the relevant searching police officers
Senior Constable Danielle George
Post-2018
Senior Constable Todd Petrie
Post-2018
Senior Constable David Jarnet
Post-2018

Evidence relating to senior officers’ awareness of strip searches not being conducted in compliance with LEPRA
Mardi Gras 2013 and LLU Report
NSW Government response to the Coroner’s Inquest into the deaths of six patrons of NSW music festivals

Post-2018 improvements
Music Festival Fundamentals
SITG 2019
Harbourlife 2019
Field Day 2020
Person Search Manual
Summary of post-2018 improvements

Is the plaintiff entitled to exemplary damages?
To what extent do the improvements in training, education and supervision post-2018 mitigate the punitive and deterrent effect of exemplary damages?
Can the Court quantify and award exemplary damages at this stage having regard to the nature of the proceedings as representative proceedings?

Orders

Common Questions

Judgment

These are representative proceedings pursuant to s 157 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (“CPA”). There is one lead plaintiff, Raya Meredith (“the plaintiff”). The plaintiff was strip searched by police on 20 July 2018 when she attended the Splendour in the Grass music festival at North Byron Parklands (“SITG 2018”). Two hundred and five person searches were conducted during the festival. Approximately one hundred and forty-three of them were strip searches.
The plaintiff was separated from her friends and partner and directed to a makeshift search area. A “person search” was conducted by way of a pat down. The plaintiff was then directed to pull down her top, exposing her breasts. The plaintiff told the searching police officer that she had inserted a tampon and that she was menstruating. She was directed to pull down her shorts and underwear and pull out her tampon. While naked from the waist down, she was directed to turn around and bend over. While in that position, a male police officer entered the “cubicle” (unannounced) to return the plaintiff’s bag. The plaintiff had no drugs in her possession. The strip search was unlawful. The defendant concedes that the strip search was unlawful. However, there remain several issues for resolution.
It is important to state at the outset that while the Court acknowledges the community’s interest in and concern about the potential for drug overdoses at music festivals, this case is not about harm minimisation policies or initiatives. Rather, the Court is required to consider the conduct of searching police officers by reference to the legal requirements, constraints and safeguards Parliament has seen fit to impose on the exercise of police powers in conducting strip searches. It also involves an assessment of the appropriate damages.
The proceedings are pursued on behalf of the plaintiff and those persons (“group members”) who:

Attended a music festival within New South Wales held on or from 22 July 2016 (Festival);

While on the Festival grounds or surrounds, were stopped and directed by police officers to an area where searches were conducted;

Were subjected to a search by police officers which included one or more of the following:

Being asked to remove some or all of their items of clothing, other than a coat or jacket or similar article of outer clothing or any gloves, shoes, socks, or hat;

Police officers looking under a person’s clothing at that person’s body; and/or

Police officers placing their hand(s) or finger(s) under a person’s clothing,

(hereafter, a strip search); and

That person was told by police officers or otherwise understood the strip search was conducted on the basis of a suspicion of possession of a prohibited plant or drug.

The claims of the plaintiff and the group members give rise to substantial common issues of law and fact.
At all material times the police officers who conducted searches and gave directions (“the searching police”), were members of and employed by the New South Wales Police Force (“NSWPF”). The searching police were, at all material times, pursuant to s 6 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), deemed to be persons in the service of the Crown.
Pursuant to s 8 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act and the Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW), the defendant is vicariously liable for torts committed by persons in the service of the Crown.

Procedural history

The following summary of the procedural history of this case does not include every application filed and heard during case management. Instead, this summary provides an overview of the history of the proceedings commencing in 2022.
The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the State of New South Wales (“the defendant”) alleging intentional torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The original Statement of Claim (“SoC”) was filed on 21 July 2022.
On 29 September 2022, the defendant filed a Defence to the initial SoC. The defendant identified the searching police officers. The defendant did not admit to the characteristics of the group members.

The defendant did not admit that the strip search of the plaintiff was unlawful. The plaintiff’s pleadings regarding the strip search were either not admitted or denied. The defendant maintained that the strip search of the plaintiff was lawfully authorised pursuant to s 31(b) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (“LEPRA”) because the searching police officer suspected on reasonable grounds that a strip search was necessary for the purposes of the search and that the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances made the strip search necessary.
The defendant denied that any of the particularised conduct or other pleadings amounted to an assault, battery, or false imprisonment. The defendant did not admit or denied all paragraphs pertaining to the loss and damages claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant raised a defence pursuant to the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) (“Limitation Act”) in respect of the claim for aggravated and exemplary damages.
On 2 November 2022, the plaintiff filed an Amended Statement of Claim (“ASoC”) pursuant to orders made by Garling J on 27 October 2022 granting leave for the plaintiff to do so. This ASoC had amendments only to the pleadings identifying those persons classed as a group member to the action, where a sub-pleading was removed.
On 23 November 2022, the defendant filed a Defence to the ASoC which included particulars as to the reasonable grounds and seriousness and urgency of the circumstances for the police powers exercised in respect of the plaintiff on 20 July 2018.
The factors which were commonly pleaded to have constituted reasonable grounds to stop, search, and detain the plaintiff included:

Each officer’s personal experience in their role within the NSWPF.

The plaintiff’s attendance at a music festival in a location associated with common recreational drug use.

Information about drug use at the music festival in prior years.

A drug dog gave a positive indication that there was a prohibited substance in the air space around the plaintiff.

The officers’ assessment of the plaintiff’s conduct and responses leading up to and during their dealings.

Information that a subsequent officer had received from an officer who formerly interacted with the plaintiff.

Factors that were pleaded to have constituted reasonable grounds for the strip search were:

The ordinary search did not yield any prohibited drugs where the officer had formed the view, based on the above grounds, that the plaintiff was likely to have drugs in her possession.

The officer’s assessment of the extent to which the plaintiff’s clothing or hairstyle would allow for a prohibited drug to be concealed even during an ordinary search.

The defendant pleaded that there was suspicion that the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances made the strip search necessary based on:

The health risk to the plaintiff or others if a prohibited drug were to be ingested.

There would not be another opportunity for the officer to search the plaintiff before any prohibited drug would be ingested or disposed of.

There would be limited opportunity for other police officers to detect any prohibited drug on the plaintiff once inside the festival.

The defendant further pleaded that the suspicion of seriousness and urgency was reasonably held due to:

The above-mentioned matters.

The seriousness at law of certain offences of drug supply and/or possession.

A history of recorded drug possession, use, supply, and overdoses at the Splendour in the Grass festival in previous years.

On 8 December 2022, the plaintiff filed a Reply to the Defence to the ASoC. The Reply denied that the factors relied upon by the defendant to justify the police officers’ conduct constituted reasonable grounds to exercise the respective powers conferred by LEPRA. The plaintiff pleaded that even in combination, the circumstances particularised by the defendant could not constitute reasonable grounds to exercise the power conferred by s 21 of LEPRA. With respect to the strip search, the plaintiff denied that the grounds relied upon were reasonable grounds to suspect that a strip search was necessary and that there was seriousness and urgency in the circumstances to make the strip search necessary.
The plaintiff denied that the limitation defence was made out. It was pleaded that the plaintiff’s claim for aggravated and exemplary damages did not “relate to the … personal injury of a person” within the meaning of s 11(1) of the Limitation Act.
On 27 January 2023, the defendant filed a Notice of Motion which sought an order, pursuant to s 166 of the CPA, that the proceedings no longer continue as representative proceedings under Pt 10 of the CPA. On 16 March 2023, the defendant’s Notice of Motion to declass the proceedings was heard by Garling J and judgment was reserved.
On 13 December 2023, Garling J made orders that the Notice of Motion seeking to declass the proceedings be dismissed with costs. Garling J found that there were likely to be common questions of fact or law raised by the proceedings and, if resolved, these would likely be applicable more broadly than just to the plaintiff alone: Meredith v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1546 (“Meredith”) at [63], [75], [82].
Contrary to the defendant’s submissions, Garling J held that given the estimated number of potential group members and the significant number of common questions of fact and law, the representative action was likely to be more effective, efficient and in the interests of justice than each claimant pursuing individual proceedings: Meredith at [71]-[77], [83]-[84].
On 30 March 2023, a Further Amended Statement of Claim (“FASoC”) was filed which included the subheading “Conduct of State Relevant to Exemplary Damages”. Under this subheading, the plaintiff pleaded that in the period from 22 July 2016 to 21 July 2022, most music festivals in NSW were policed by substantial detachments from the NSWPF for the purpose of, amongst other things, detecting prohibited substances. The plaintiff further particularised that between at least 2016 and 2019, the NSWPF carried out strip searches of attendees as a matter of routine rather than in circumstances lawfully justified by the provisions of LEPRA.
On 26 May 2023, the defendant filed a Defence to the FASoC addressing the pleadings under the subheading “Conduct of State Relevant to Exemplary Damages”.
On 17 July 2023, the defendant filed a Notice of Motion seeking an extension of time to produce documents under discovery, amongst other case management orders. On 23 August 2023, Garling J made consent orders pertaining to discovery.
On 18 October 2024, the defendant served on the plaintiff’s solicitors a subpoena to produce a list of names and other identifying information of people who had become clients or registered their personal information for the purpose of the proceedings and those who had opted out of the proceedings.
On 31 October 2024, the plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion to set aside the above subpoena. On 19 November 2024, Garling J made orders that the subpoena be set aside with costs. The defendant failed to establish a legitimate forensic purpose for accessing the relevant information: Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.3) [2024] NSWSC 1499 (“Meredith No.3”) at [36]. His Honour held that the determination of answers to the common questions did not (at that stage) require any identification of the individual group members.
On 20 February 2025, Garling J handed down his Honour’s judgment with respect to a Notice of Motion filed by the defendant on 12 December 2023 which sought to strike out parts of the FASoC or alternatively, allow the plaintiff to re-plead them: Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.4) [2025] NSWSC 13 (“Meredith (No.4)”).
The defendant had submitted that the pleadings concerning the police conduct giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages were too vague and did not pinpoint any material facts. The defendant took issue with the pleadings claiming that “Senior Officers” were responsible for the training and supervision of police officers rather than pointing to precise conduct of an individual officer.
Garling J refused (with the exception of one sub-paragraph), to strike out the relevant pleadings and did not agree with the contention that they were an abuse of process: Meredith (No.4) at [31]-[54].
On 21 March 2025, the plaintiff was granted leave to include further particulars to paragraph 73, headed “Particulars of Aggravated Damages”, of the FASoC filed on 30 March 2023. The further particulars relate to specific conduct of the defendant during the course of the proceedings with respect to the plaintiff.
Following this protracted history, the defendant filed an Amended Defence to the FASoC on 28 March 2025, approximately five weeks before the matter was listed for hearing before me. The defendant’s position has radically changed.
The defendant admits that the strip search of the plaintiff was not lawfully authorised by s 31 of LEPRA. Put another way, the defendant concedes that it cannot establish that all the requirements under s 31(b) of LEPRA were satisfied. The defendant admits that the searching police did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the strip search of the plaintiff was necessary for the purposes of the search. However, the defendant denies that there was no seriousness and urgency of the circumstances which made the strip search necessary.
The defendant admits multiple pleadings that had previously been denied or in respect of which no admission was made. The defendant concedes that by virtue of the unlawful strip search, the plaintiff has made out a battery, assault, and false imprisonment. The defendant accepts that an award of general compensatory damages should be made. However, the defendant resists any award of exemplary damages and, in relation to the claim for aggravated and exemplary damages, maintains its Limitation Act defence.
[Redacted].
A Notice of Motion to set aside the subpoena was listed before Garling J on 21 March 2025.
Two days before that hearing, the defendant consented to the plaintiff’s application to set aside the subpoena. Garling J made an order to set aside the subpoena on 21 March 2025.
The proceedings commenced before me by way of hearing on 5 May 2025. The only witness called in the proceedings was the plaintiff. She gave evidence on a discrete topic relating to her claim for aggravated damages resulting from the conduct of the proceedings.
A Second Further Amended Statement of Claim (“SFASoC”) was filed on 6 May 2025 pursuant to orders made by Garling J on 21 March 2025 granting leave to the plaintiff to add further particulars of aggravated damages relating to the defendant’s conduct of the proceedings.
Closing arguments were finalised on 16 May 2025.
Notwithstanding the radical change in the defendant’s position and the concession that the strip search to which the plaintiff was subjected was not lawfully justified, the defendant has extended no apology whatsoever to the plaintiff. The absence of an apology is confounding. In circumstances where the defendant has accepted that the strip search was unlawful, the absence of an apology is akin to an “own goal”.

Legal principles of general applicability

The onus

In the Amended Defence, the defendant makes a number of admissions but has not pleaded to particulars. There is no requirement to plead to particulars: Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2012] NSWSC 1026 at [43], citing Pinson v Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72 at 75. I accept that the absence of a pleading specifically to an individual particular cannot be taken to be an admission.
The defendant does not by the Amended Defence seek to establish lawful justification for the conduct of the searching police officers. The defendant admits that the conduct was unlawful, and therefore tortious, and that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages. In the absence of a suspicion on reasonable grounds, compliance with the safeguards in ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA cannot establish lawful justification, thereby rendering unnecessary the plaintiff’s proof of any breach of those sections on the issue of liability. However, as will be seen, whether (and to what extent) searching officers breached ss 32 and 33 is relevant to the question of damages.
The onus is on the plaintiff to establish those factors relied upon to justify the quantum of compensatory damages sought and any additional award by way of aggravated or exemplary damages.

Inferences

It is uncontroversial that “all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted”: Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; (1774) 98 ER 969 at 970. The defendant is in the unique position to identify all relevant documents relating to systemic materials concerning the training and supervision of police officers in exercising their powers of search, and in particular, in conducting strip searches.
The plaintiff does not suggest that the absence of documentary evidence on any particular issue is sufficient to “convert conjecture and suspicion into inference”: Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu (2019) 266 FCR 83; [2019] FCAFC 133 at [56]; ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at 412; [2012] HCA 17 at [165]-[166]. Rather, the plaintiff submits that in the absence of clear evidence from the defendant contradicting any inference which is available from the material relied upon by the plaintiff, for any particular fact in dispute, the Court may more readily draw the inference proposed by the plaintiff. That is a correct statement of principle.
Furthermore, an unexplained failure by a party to adduce evidence, which it may be expected to have been in that party’s interest to adduce, may lead to an inference that the evidence would not have assisted that party’s case: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 320-321; [1959] HCA 8. Inferential reasoning may involve a conclusion that it would be natural for one party to produce a witness, rather than the other. The natural inference occurs where the witness might be regarded as in the “camp” of one party so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him or her: Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201-202.

The evidence

The plaintiff’s account of the factual circumstances relating to the strip search is set out in her witness statement dated 21 November 2023. That account was not challenged in cross-examination. I make two observations in respect of the plaintiff’s witness statement. The first is that it should be taken as having provided a full account of her interactions with the searching police officers. In closing submissions, it was accepted on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff’s statement was “a complete statement of the plaintiff’s evidence on these topics”.
The second observation relates to the defendant’s repeated submissions that the plaintiff’s statement “is silent” as to whether the searching police informed her that she would be required to remove clothing during the search or whether they informed her of relevant matters in compliance with the ss 32 and 33 safeguards. The defendant submits that the absence of a positive denial by the plaintiff means that “[t]here is no direct evidence to support a finding that this did not occur”.
This submission is misconceived. The plaintiff does not have to positively deny something to support a finding that it did not occur. The plaintiff’s account, as contained in her witness statement, attests to her interactions with the searching police officers. Those interactions did not include a conversation between the plaintiff and any of the searching police officers about the requirement to remove her clothing, the reason that she had to remove her clothing, or requests for her cooperation.
The plaintiff has not been challenged in respect of that account. It has not been put to her that the searching police officer informed her about the requirement to remove her clothing or informed her as to why it was necessary to remove her clothing. The plaintiff does not have to positively deny a proposition that something took place in order to establish that it did not. Rather, her witness statement, being a full account of her interactions with the searching police officers, encompasses the entirety of those interactions.
The plaintiff was called in the proceedings to give evidence about her claim for aggravated damages arising from the conduct of the proceedings. She was subjected to brief cross-examination on that discrete topic.
The plaintiff also relies upon the evidence of Sean Rood, which is contained in his witness statement dated 8 December 2023. Mr Rood is the plaintiff’s partner. His account is not challenged.
In addition, the plaintiff relies upon documentary evidence largely relevant to the claim for exemplary damages. The documentary evidence is made up of a large volume of material relating to the education and training of police officers including training in respect of person searches and strip searches (Exhibit 2).
The documents produced by way of discovery are set out in the affidavit of the plaintiff’s solicitor Rory John Walsh, dated 2 May 2025. They include documents under Discovery Category 7 which relate to “All training and education materials provided, prior to Splendour 2018, to those police officers who interacted with the Plaintiff at Splendour 2018 relating to: (a) person/general searches; (b) strip searches; and (c) use of drug detection dogs”. One hundred and forty-five documents responsive to Category 7 were provided by the defendant’s solicitors.
These documents include those concerning the training provided by the Police Academy; Mandatory Continuing Police Education Package; document extracts from the NSWPF Handbook or NSWPF Code of Practice for CRIME; and standalone articles, case summaries, standard operating procedures, computer messages, infographics, flyers, and journal extracts.
The documents produced in response to Discovery Category 17 relate to “all training and education materials provided by NSWPF to police officers (excluding NSWPF Handbook) … from 22 July 2018 to 22 July 2022 relating to: (a) person searches; (b) strip searches; and/or (c) use of drug detection dogs”. One hundred and thirty-two documents were produced.
The documents include a Police Academy training video; Police Academy modules; documents relating to a “Music Festivals Fundamentals” training program; Mandatory Continuing Education Programs; and further standalone articles, workshop materials, PowerPoints, fact sheets, stickers, videos, computer messages, briefing materials, and intranet resources.
Under Discovery Category 8, the defendant produced the NSWPF Handbook on person searches and strip searches in operation as at July 2018, limited to the cover page, index and sections dealing with personal/general searches, strip searches, and drug detection dogs, as well as the parts which were provided to the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (“LECC”) for Operation Brugge.
Under Discovery Category 10, the defendant produced “All versions, or parts thereof, of the NSWPF Handbook and Code of Practice for CRIME in existence as at the date of Splendour 2018 music festival in relation to person searching (including strip searches) and/or the use of drug detection dogs which were provided to: (a) [the] Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) … and/or (b) The NSW State Coroner’s Inquest into the death of six patrons at NSW Music Festivals (Inquest)”.
Discovery Category 3 produced 12 documents relating to “All directives, operational orders, joining instructions or similar documents, and any records or trainings or briefings created for or provided to searching, drug detection dog, and “user-pays” police at Splendour 2018”.

The statements of searching police officers identified by the defendant were served on the plaintiff on 28 March 2024 and 5 April 2024. The statement of Senior Constable George (“SC George”) was signed on 28 March 2024. She stated that she is aware that LEPRA requires seriousness and urgency in order to conduct a strip search. She does not remember the plaintiff and does not remember searching her. SC George did not make a notebook entry in relation to a search of the plaintiff. She did not make a Computerised Operational Policing System (“COPS”) event entry in respect of any such search.
Senior Constable Jarnet (“SC Jarnet”) made a statement dated 27 March 2024. He stated that he did not remember the plaintiff and could only comment on things that he would typically take into account when considering whether someone might have drugs in their possession. The redacted witness statement in evidence does not state what those considerations were. He did not make a notebook or COPS event entry in relation to the search of the plaintiff.
Senior Constable Petrie (“SC Petrie”) made a statement on 29 March 2024. He does not recall the plaintiff. He does not recall being involved in any search of the plaintiff. He did make a notebook entry in respect of the search of the plaintiff but did not recall making the notebook entry.
The relevant notebook entry records a time of 12:20pm. It records the plaintiff’s name, date of birth, address, and telephone number. It also records an alleged representation made by the plaintiff, namely “I had a smoke with a joint this morning”. There is no further detail about the circumstances of the search.
SC Petrie subsequently made a COPS event entry at 19:52 or 7:52pm on 20 July 2018 in respect of the search of the plaintiff. Relevantly, the entry states:

“was searched with nothing found
Primary reason:
SUSPECTED POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL DRUG
Additional comments:
DRUG DOG ‘SEEBY’ INDICATED POSSIBLE DRUG. POI SEARCHED BY S/C DANIELLE GEORGE. Nil find.
‘I had a smoke with a joint this morning’.”

There is no other record of the circumstances relating to the search of the plaintiff. There is no record of any observations by police about her appearance or demeanour. Other than the alleged representation noted above, there is no record of any conversation between any of the searching police officers and the plaintiff.
There is a factual dispute about whether the plaintiff made the representation “I had a smoke with a joint this morning”. That factual dispute can be conveniently dealt with now. Other than the notation in the notebook, which is repeated in the COPS event entry, SC Petrie had no recollection of the plaintiff or his dealings with her. I pause to observe that similar representations to that allegedly made by the plaintiff appear in seven separate entries in SC Petrie’s notebook between 12:00pm and 5:40pm in respect of different searches.
The plaintiff denies that she said the words attributed to her. In her witness statement, the plaintiff gave a full account of her interactions with police on 20 July 2018. The plaintiff stated that she was not under the influence of any drugs and that she had not been asked by a police officer if she had taken any drugs. That evidence is unchallenged. Furthermore, in her evidence before me, the plaintiff stated:

“… I didn’t say that so that’s putting words into my mouth, non-existent words and I don’t talk like that, I don’t articulate my words like that. That comes across as you know an old grandad who’s found his grandson’s marijuana stash in the garage. Those aren’t my words, I didn’t say that and that’s a lie.”

I have formed the view that the plaintiff is both a credible and reliable witness. She is supported by the unchallenged evidence of Mr Rood that neither he nor the plaintiff had consumed drugs. I have no hesitation in accepting the plaintiff’s account that she did not make the representation attributed to her in SC Petrie’s notebook.
Contrary to the defendant’s submissions, the plaintiff’s assertion that the words attributed to her are untrue do not constitute an express allegation of fraud or dishonesty falling into a “special status in civil litigation”. Furthermore, the determination of this factual dispute is not a positive finding that SC Petrie deliberately lied. It is an acceptance of the plaintiff’s evidence that she did not say those words. Given the number of searches conducted and the perfunctory record keeping, the inclusion of those words in SC Petrie’s notebook may simply have been a mistake.
There is no unfairness whatsoever to the author of the notebook entry. The defendant was well aware of the plaintiff’s position in light of the pleadings and the contents of her witness statement. Unsurprisingly, SC Petrie was not called by the defendant given his total lack of recollection about his interactions with the plaintiff.
Insofar as the searching police officers’ statements refer to their awareness of the LEPRA requirements or otherwise refer to their usual practice, the redacted versions of their statements in evidence are conspicuously silent as to what their usual practice was or their specific knowledge as to how the LEPRA provisions apply to strip searches.
The defendant has not called any witnesses. The defendant relies upon a number of documents including NSWPF training, educational, and operational materials (Exhibit 4).
As indicated earlier, the documentary evidence largely relates to the education and training of police officers generally and in respect of strip searches. That evidence is primarily relevant to the claim for exemplary damages and will be comprehensively summarised when I come to consider that claim.
A number of factual matters are agreed between the parties and are contained in the “Statement of Agreed Facts” (Exhibit 3). Although the defendant agrees with the facts contained in this document, this is not to be taken as agreement that those facts are relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings. Those facts are relevant in large part to the claim for exemplary damages and will be reproduced in this judgment when I come to consider that issue.
In light of the way the matter has proceeded, the defendant does not dispute material aspects of the plaintiff’s account. To the extent that I am required to make factual findings about particulars of the plaintiff’s pleadings, I will do so in due course. For present purposes, I proceed on the following account of the interactions between the plaintiff and the searching police officers on 20 July 2018, which I have found established by the plaintiff.

The events on 20 July 2018

In July 2018, the plaintiff was 27 years old. The plaintiff has no criminal record and, before the events in question, had never been taken into police custody for the purpose of a search or for any other purpose.
Between 20 and 22 July 2018, SITG 2018 was held at North Byron Parklands in New South Wales. Police officers from various units attended including General Duties officers from across the Northern Region and the Drug Detection Dog (“DDD”) Unit.
The following diagram taken from the statement of Sgt Kentwell dated 28 March 2024 (with the red circle added by the plaintiff) provides a general reference to the location of the campground gate at which part of the DDD operation was deployed:

The DDD operation was staffed by approximately 60-70 police officers out of a total composite detachment of about 340 officers. Its target was “illegal drugs being supplied and used within the main entertainment and camping areas”. It can readily be inferred that police were deployed with an expectation that they would be conducting strip searches. This is made plain by the level of planning and the infrastructure that was put in place, including the DDD operation teams and setting up the Police Searching Area. The COPS entries for the festival also reveal that a pro-forma COPS event was developed, which further supports the inference that the NSWPF expected to be conducting searches.
On 19 July 2018, the day before the festival commenced, the plaintiff arrived and set up camp at North Byron Parklands with a large group of friends and her partner, Sean Rood. She had purchased a ticket for the event along with a camping ticket, the total cost of which was $552.57.
On the first day of the festival, between 11:40am and 12:00pm, the plaintiff approached the front entrance gate to the festival grounds with her friends and her partner. She was excited for the first day of the festival and was looking forward to seeing an artist who had been the 2018 Triple J Unearthed winner.
The plaintiff made her way to the entrance when she noticed a police dog near her. The police dog sniffed in the plaintiff’s direction before moving away from her. Shortly after, the plaintiff was stopped from entering the festival by a police officer. The officer tapped the plaintiff on her shoulder and said words to the effect of, “The dog has detected drugs on you. If you follow me, we need to conduct a search”. The plaintiff does not recall whether the officer identified himself by name, the name on the officer’s badge, or if he was wearing a badge.
In light of the fact that the searching police were in uniform there was no requirement for police to tell the plaintiff that they were police officers: s 202(1)(a) of LEPRA. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot recall whether the officer identified himself by name. I cannot therefore make a positive finding that the officer did not inform the plaintiff of his name: s 202(1)(b) of LEPRA. For the reasons set out below I am satisfied that the searching police did not inform the plaintiff of the reason for the exercise of the power: s 202(1)(c) of LEPRA.
The plaintiff felt apprehensive and frightened about what was happening. By his words and actions, the plaintiff believed that she had to comply with the directions of the police officer and could not refuse to go with him. The defendant identified SC Jarnet as the police officer handling the drug detection dog named “Seeby”.
The defendant identified SC Petrie as a police officer who also spoke to the plaintiff and directed her to the police inspection area.
The plaintiff was separated from her friends and directed to a makeshift police inspection area. The temporary structure consisted of three-walled “cubicles”. The front of the cubicle was open and had a screen approximately 1.5 m high. Between the screen and the cubicles was a walkway used to lead people in and out of the cubicles. The plaintiff was directed to hand her bag over to an officer who took it out of her sight as she was directed into one of the cubicles by a female police officer. The female police officer entered and there was a brief verbal exchange to the effect of:

Female officer: “Do you have any drugs on you? If you have anything on you, now is the chance to hand it over”.
Plaintiff: “I do not have any drugs on me”.

The plaintiff does not recall if the officer identified herself by name, the name on the officer’s badge, or if the officer was wearing a badge. The Defence to the FASoC identified the female police officer as SC George.
An issue arises as to whether I can be satisfied that SC George has been correctly identified as the female police officer who conducted the strip search of the plaintiff. SC George made no notebook or COPS event entry in respect of the strip search of the plaintiff. The notebook entry made by SC Petrie does not refer to the name of the searching officer for the plaintiff (the only reference to SC George is in the COPS event entry). As noted earlier, SC Petrie’s notebook entry concerning the plaintiff was recorded as commencing at 12:20pm.
SC George’s notebook entries on the same day indicate that at 11:50am she was at Gate 4 with an “unknown … located on ground”. Immediately after is another entry in SC George’s notebook at 12:35pm with the details of a different person and at 12:43pm a further entry in relation to another person. The plaintiff submits that it is highly unlikely that SC George was the searching police officer, given that it is agreed upon that the detention of the plaintiff was 30 minutes and the timeline indicates that SC George was involved in another person’s search during that time.
The evidence as to the identity of the female officer is less than satisfactory. However, in my view, the identity of the female officer is not in itself significant. The pertinent matters relate to the interactions between the searching police officer and the plaintiff. I am prepared to proceed on the basis that it was SC George who conducted the strip search of the plaintiff.
The apparent inconsistency in the records highlights a larger problem relating to poor record keeping and in particular, the failure to record pertinent matters justifying the plaintiff’s strip search. That failure is telling and relevant to a broader issue. The absence of any reference to the statutory preconditions such as necessity, urgency, or seriousness, in the notebooks or COPS event entries discovered for SITG 2018, is one of several factors that demonstrates the extent of non-compliance on the part of searching officers.
The Statement of Agreed Facts (Exhibit 3) states that the entries in the police notebooks of every police officer who conducted a strip search at SITG 2018 were discovered by the defendant in these proceedings. None of the notebooks contained any entry identifying:

Whether any consideration was given to what circumstances made a strip search necessary, following after or instead of a s 21 LEPRA person search;

Whether, and if so what, there was any seriousness or urgency that rendered the strip search necessary;

Whether any reasons for the strip search being conducted were provided to the individual being searched, before the search was conducted; and

Whether any of the safeguards in ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA had been complied with.

This circumstance, taken together with other evidence, leads to the irresistible inference that the police officer who conducted the strip search did not turn her mind to the statutory preconditions under s 31(b) of LEPRA.
The female police officer began an ordinary person search of the plaintiff. She patted down the plaintiff by running her hands along the plaintiff’s outstretched arms and then along her body from torso to legs. The plaintiff was wearing a singlet top with her bare arms exposed. She was wearing high waisted three-quarter shorts that came to her knees, and boots. In conducting the pat down search, the female officer touched the plaintiff’s bare skin along her arms and on the lower half of her legs.
The officer directed the plaintiff to remove her shoes and socks. The plaintiff was then directed to pull down her top. She was not wearing a bra. She complied with the direction, pulling down her top and exposing her breasts. The police officer directed the plaintiff with words to the effect of, “Lift your breasts up, lean forward and then drop your breasts”.
The plaintiff complied with the direction and the female officer leaned down and looked at the area under the plaintiff’s breasts.
A further verbal exchange occurred between the female police officer and the plaintiff as follows:

Female officer: “Have you inserted anything?”
Plaintiff: “No, but I have a tampon in”.
Female officer: “If you’re lying, you will be kicked out of the festival”.
Plaintiff: “I am not lying. I am on my period”.

The plaintiff’s fear was heightened. She felt threatened. She did not want to be removed from the event. She believed that she must comply with the directions of the police officer. The plaintiff was extremely frightened that the police officer was going to perform a cavity search, and she recalled thinking, “I am going to have to let this woman insert her hands into my vagina or she is going to kick me out of the festival”.
Following this exchange the female police officer directed the plaintiff to remove her clothing from the lower half of her body, saying words to the effect of, “Pull down your shorts and your underpants”.
The plaintiff complied and pulled down her shorts and underwear. She recalled feeling disgusted that another woman was putting her through this. She felt like vomiting.
The female officer then said words to the effect of, “Pull out the tampon and show it to me”. The tone of the officer’s voice was commanding and even though the plaintiff was extremely upset and uncomfortable, she felt that she had no choice but to comply.
The plaintiff pulled slightly on the string of the tampon whilst the female police officer bent down and looked towards the plaintiff’s vagina. The plaintiff did not want to pull the tampon fully out of her body as she did not want blood to go everywhere. She felt degraded. The plaintiff was also postpartum at the time of the search.
With the plaintiff’s shorts and underwear around her knees, she was given further directions by the female officer to the effect of, “Turn around so that your back is towards me and bend right over”.
Whilst the plaintiff was bending over, a male police officer entered the cubicle, without warning, holding the plaintiff’s bag. He gave the bag to the female police officer and said words to the effect of, “Nothing found in the bag”. The plaintiff does not believe the male officer identified himself by name. The plaintiff does not recall the name on the officer’s badge or if he was wearing a badge.
The plaintiff felt “totally embarrassed and humiliated”. She scrambled to pull her underwear and shorts up so that she could cover herself. At this point the plaintiff was feeling angry and nauseous. She said something to the effect of, “I have nothing on me, can I leave?”.
The female police officer responded, saying something to the effect of, “No, you can’t leave yet. We have to take your details in case you get pulled aside for another search, which wouldn’t look good for you”.
The plaintiff scrambled to put her shoes and socks on. She felt dishevelled and rushed. She was directed out of the cubicle by the female officer who then directed the plaintiff to provide her driver’s licence to a male police officer. She complied and presented her driver’s licence to a police officer who recorded her details in a notepad. The plaintiff was then told she could leave the police inspection area and she entered the festival.
The plaintiff was detained for approximately 30 minutes.
No drugs or other prohibited items were found on the plaintiff or in her bag.
The plaintiff returned to her friends and her partner who had waited for her just inside the festival grounds. The plaintiff told her friends that she had been strip searched. She was embarrassed and felt like she “was in shock”.
The plaintiff accessed a toilet cubicle where she removed and disposed of the tampon that was still sitting uncomfortably inside her following the search. She recalled struggling to open the packaging of the new tampon because her hands were shaking.

Elements of the torts alleged

The plaintiff alleges that the conduct of the searching police amounted to an assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiff alleges a battery constituted by the searching police officer conducting a pat down search of her body.
The particulars of the assault are as follows:

Being forced to go into the search area within the Police Inspection Area;

Being forced to remove her top, expose her breasts, and lift up her breasts for inspection by the female police officer;

Being forced to remove her outer clothes and underpants for inspection of her lower body by the female police officer;

Being forced to remove (or partially remove) a tampon from her vagina for inspection by the female police officer;

Being forced to turn around and expose her back and bare buttocks for inspection by the female police officer;

Being forced to bend over for inspection by the female police officer;

By the male police officer entering the cubicle while the plaintiff was partially bent over;

Being forced to dress herself in front of the female police officer;

Having her bag removed from her and taken out of her sight;

Being subjected to the strip search at the same time as she believed her bag was searched; and

Being forced to provide her driver’s licence to the police and have those details recorded.

The particulars of the false imprisonment, alleging that the plaintiff was completely deprived of her liberty for a period of approximately 30 minutes, are as follows:

For the duration of the period commencing with the plaintiff being directed to the Police Inspection Area by the police officer with the police dog to the time at which she was forced to go into the cubicle; and

Whilst the plaintiff:

Was deprived of the possession of her bag;

Was being subjected to an ordinary search;

Was being strip searched.

For the period during which the plaintiff was forced to provide (and have recorded) her driver’s licence details until the time that she was directed to leave the Police Inspection Area.

The torts are admitted, and their elements are not in dispute. The elements, therefore, need only brief mention.
It is accepted that assault has two elements, namely, that the defendant’s conduct must be such as to cause the plaintiff to apprehend unlawful physical contact and the plaintiff must be put in apprehension of such unlawful contact: see R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 at 472; Dowse v State of New South Wales (2012) 226 A Crim R 36; [2012] NSWCA 337 at [41].
Battery requires that a defendant directly causes physical contact with the plaintiff, unless the defendant proves that he or she was “utterly without fault”: Croucher v Cachia (2016) 95 NSWLR 117; [2016] NSWCA 132 at [21].
False imprisonment involves the unlawful arrest or detaining of any person: see Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; (1988) 34 A Crim R 364. False imprisonment occurs where there is an intentional, total, and direct restraint on a person’s liberty. It is a tort of strict liability, in that intent is irrelevant: Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48 (“Ruddock”) at [140] (Kirby J in dissent, but not on this point).
Imprisonment includes circumstances where a person is led to hold a belief that if they attempted to leave, they would be compelled to remain: see Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; [1971] HCA 33 (“Watson v Marshall”). Relatedly, a person’s liberty is constrained where, while acceding to a police officer’s direction, he or she does so with a justifiable apprehension that refusal would be met with compulsion: State of New South Wales v Exton (2017) 270 A Crim R 182; [2017] NSWCA 294 at [40]-[46].
The defendant concedes that the plaintiff did not consent to being searched or strip searched. The plaintiff’s evidence that she believed she had to comply with the police officers’ directions is not disputed.

The position of the parties

The plaintiff’s pleadings allege that the strip search was not lawfully authorised by s 31 of LEPRA in that the searching police did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the strip search was necessary for the purposes of the search and there was no seriousness and urgency of the circumstances which made the strip search necessary.
The plaintiff alleges that she was not informed prior to the strip search of the name of the police officer and their place of duty, the reason for the strip search, and that the plaintiff would be required to remove her clothing or why it was necessary to do so. The plaintiff also alleges that she was not asked for her cooperation.
The plaintiff further alleges that the strip search was not conducted in an area that provided reasonable privacy nor was it the least invasive kind of search practicable in the circumstances, involving a search of her genital area and breasts in circumstances where the searching officer did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that it was necessary for the purposes of the search. It is also alleged that the plaintiff was questioned during the strip search.
The plaintiff asserts that the police officers failed to comply with safeguards contained in ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA. In the absence of any lawful justification and in the absence of the plaintiff’s consent, the police officers’ conduct constituted a battery, assault, and false imprisonment.
The plaintiff does not claim personal injury damages within the meaning of Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (“Civil Liability Act”). Instead, the plaintiff claims compensatory damages, aggravated damages, and exemplary damages.
The claim for aggravated damages is twofold. First, there is a claim for aggravated damages relating to the special humiliation occasioned by reason of the unlawful and unjustifiable actions of the police officers during the strip search. Second, there is a claim for aggravated damages flowing from the conduct of the proceedings.
The plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages, in part, relates to the conduct of searching police officers which is said to have been performed in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights and feelings. The essential proposition is that exemplary damages are warranted because senior officers failed to exercise reasonable care and skill to ensure that police officers were adequately trained and supervised in the performance of their duties (conducting strip searches) according to law.
The plaintiff pleads that exemplary damages are warranted to reflect society’s disapprobation of such conduct, to mark the Court’s condemnation of such behaviour and to act as a salutary deterrent.
The defendant admits that the searching police officer did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the strip search was necessary for the purposes of the search. On that basis, the defendant admits the cause of action and accepts that the plaintiff was the victim of a battery, assault, and false imprisonment, entitling her to compensatory damages. However, in determining damages, the defendant disputes some of the contentions advanced by the plaintiff.
The defendant does not concede that there was no seriousness and urgency of the circumstances to make the strip search necessary (s 31(b) of LEPRA). In respect of the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances, the defendant essentially relies upon statistics relating to the number of seizures of prohibited substances by police at music festivals and the number of overdoses and deaths attributed to the use of prohibited drugs at music festivals. The defendant submits that “seriousness” is “effectively self-evident” in the context of strip searches at music festivals.
The defendant contends that the evidence does not support a finding that the strip search was conducted in circumstances that were not serious or urgent. Furthermore, the defendant submits that the plaintiff has not established non-compliance with a number of the safeguards in ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA in her claim for aggravated damages.
The plaintiff’s entitlement to exemplary damages is hotly contested by the defendant. A significant portion of the hearing was dedicated to the evidence and submissions relating to this topic. It will therefore be necessary to set out the evidence which the plaintiff relies on in some detail when I come to consider the claim for exemplary damages.

The issues to be determined

Although the defendant no longer disputes the plaintiff’s individual claim arising out of the strip search to which she was subjected on 20 July 2018, there remain factual and legal issues to be determined which include the following:

The legal principles and the interpretation of relevant LEPRA provisions.

The factual and legal contest relating to the plaintiff’s claim for damages.

The answers to the common questions.

Legal principles and interpretation – LEPRA

Powers of search – LEPRA

To the extent that it is necessary to say so, the following analysis applies to police powers to conduct strip searches in the field.
LEPRA was assented to on 29 November 2002 and commenced in stages in 2004 and 2005. The Second Reading Speech to the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Bill 2002 (NSW) sheds some light on the purpose of the legislation: New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 at 4846.

“The bill represents the outcome of the consolidation process envisaged by the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service to help strike a proper balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the protection of individual rights. This bill constitutes significant law reform. It radically simplifies the law in relation to law enforcement powers, setting out in one document the most commonly used criminal law enforcement powers and their safeguards. Previously complex and diverse law enforcement powers and responsibilities once buried in numerous statutes and casebooks have been consolidated into the bill so that the law is now easily accessible to all members of the community.”

Section 21 of LEPRA grants a police officer the power to stop, search, and detain a person if that officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has something in their possession or under their control which meets the criteria set out in the section. It provides:

21   Power to search persons and seize and detain things without warrant (cf Crimes Act 1900, ss 357, 357E, Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, s 37)
(1) A police officer may, without a warrant, stop, search and detain a person, and anything in the possession of or under the control of the person, if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that any of the following circumstances exists—
(a)  the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control anything stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained,
(b)  the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control anything used or intended to be used in or in connection with the commission of a relevant offence,
(c)  the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control in a public place a dangerous article that is being or was used in or in connection with the commission of a relevant offence,
(d)  the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control, in contravention of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985, a prohibited plant or a prohibited drug.

(2) A police officer may seize and detain—
(a)  all or part of a thing that the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds is stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, and
(b)  all or part of a thing that the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds may provide evidence of the commission of a relevant offence, and
(c)  any dangerous article, and
(d)  any prohibited plant or prohibited drug in the possession or under the control of a person in contravention of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985,
found as a result of a search under this section.

In the Second Reading Speech, s 21 is discussed in general terms as follows (New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 at 4846):

“Part 4 of the bill details the powers of search and seizure without warrant. Police powers to conduct personal searches have been significantly simplified without reducing or increasing existing powers, so that police are able to readily understand the types of search that they may undertake, and the community can understand more readily the powers that police have in this respect. A regime of three tiers of searches has been adopted, and safeguards have been introduced to ensure that civil liberties are upheld and that the integrity of the police process is not compromised.”

The three-tiered personal search model included a regime of frisk, ordinary, and strip searches. The distinction between a frisk search and an ordinary search has since been removed.
It is apt to note that the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service in 1997 came across “a number of incidents where private citizens were the subject of unlawful assaults and serious abuses of police powers”. The Royal Commission also observed that the powers entrusted to police are “very substantial”. The Royal Commission’s recommendations and findings included the consolidation of police powers in new legislation, with the following objectives:

● help strike a proper balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the protection of individual rights;
● assist in ensuring clarity in areas where uncertainty exists, and reduce the possibility of abuse of powers through ignorance; and
● assist in the training of police.
(Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (Final Report, 1997) vol 2)

The overarching principles that apply to the construction of provisions of LEPRA recognise and emphasise two fundamental points. First, a strip search constitutes a highly invasive incursion on a subject’s personal liberty. Second, any power depriving the person of their liberty must be strictly construed: Zaravinos v State of New South Wales; State of New South Wales & Ors v Zaravinos (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320 at [23] citing Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 292, 296; [1986] HCA 88 (“Williams v The Queen”) and Smith v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1980) 147 CLR 134 at 139; [1980] HCA 49; George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 110-1; [1990] HCA 26 (“George v Rockett”); State of New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32.

Suspicion on reasonable grounds

Section 21 of LEPRA identifies the circumstances in which a police officer may conduct an ordinary search of a person without a warrant. Section 30 prescribes what a police officer may do in performing such a search. Importantly, s 21(1) requires the searching officer to hold a suspicion on reasonable grounds that one of the four circumstances in s 21(a)-(d) exist.
Section 31 of LEPRA provides additional requirements for the circumstances in which a strip search may be carried out. Relevantly, s 31(b) sets out the requirements for a strip search ‘in the field’ rather than an ‘in custody’ strip search provided for under s 31(a).
A strip search is defined in s 3 of LEPRA as follows:

3 Interpretation
…
strip search means a search of a person or of articles in the possession of a person that may include—
(a) requiring the person to remove all of his or her clothes, and
(b) an examination of the person’s body (but not of the person’s body cavities) and of those clothes.

Section 31 provides as follows:

31 Strip searches
A police officer may carry out a strip search of a person if—
…
(b) in the case where the search is carried out in any other place—the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the strip search is necessary for the purposes of the search and that the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances make the strip search necessary.

Suspicion on reasonable grounds is a requirement of both ss 21 and 31. It is a requirement that appears in a number of other LEPRA provisions, e.g., ss 11, 14, 22, 27, 36 and 37. The legal principles relevant to suspicion on reasonable grounds are well settled.
In R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540, Smart AJ (Spigelman CJ and Simpson J agreeing) summarised the legal principles relating to “reasonable suspicion” at [53] (albeit before the commencement of LEPRA):

“[53] These propositions emerge:

(a) A reasonable suspicion involves less than a reasonable belief but more than a possibility.. There must be something which would create in the mind of a reasonable person an apprehension or fear of one of the state of affairs covered by s.357E. A reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
(b) Reasonable suspicion is not arbitrary. Some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. A suspicion may be based on hearsay material or materials which may be inadmissible in evidence. The materials must have some probative value.
(c) What is important is the information in the mind of the police officer stopping the person or the vehicle or making the arrest at the time he did so. Having ascertained that information the question is whether that information afforded reasonable grounds for the suspicion which the police officer formed. In answering that question regard must be had to the source of the information and its content, seen in the light of the whole of the surrounding circumstances.”

The principles applicable to the state of mind required to have reasonable grounds to either suspect or believe certain matters for the purpose of issuing a warrant or arresting a person may overlap: Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336 at [15]. While suspicion may include an element of surmise or speculation, there must be a factual basis to ground the suspicion: State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194 at [115]-[118]; George v Rockett at 112.
In Hrdavec v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 52, the Court (Bell P, Basten and White JJA) reiterated that the test for establishing a “suspicion on reasonable grounds” involves both a subjective and objective element:

“[16] It has been pointed out on many occasions that the long-standing test of a suspicion based on reasonable grounds involves both a subjective and an objective element. A suspicion is something less than a belief that the person has committed an offence. If challenged, the officer must be able to demonstrate some factual basis for holding the suspicion, being a basis which a reasonable person would accept as providing support for the suspicion, whether or not such a person would necessarily draw the relevant inference.
[17] In State of New South Wales v Robinson the High Court accepted that the purpose of an arrest must be to bring the person before an authorised officer as soon as practicable to be dealt with according to law, an obligation found in s 99(3). The State had submitted that, because that purpose involved the more demanding test of reasonable and probable cause, that is, an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based on reasonable grounds, before a charge could be laid, it was not consistent with permitting arrest based on suspicion. Therefore the officer must be entitled to arrest without having an intention to charge the person with an offence. That argument was rejected by the majority in Robinson in the following terms:
‘[115] Reasonable suspicion requires an arresting constable to have reasonable grounds for suspicion of guilt. This is less than reasonable and probable cause for prosecution. The former is the necessary intention at the time of arrest. The latter is the necessary intention when making a decision to prefer a charge and then preferring it. Contrary to the submissions of the State of New South Wales, the requirement of an intention to charge at the time of arrest does not import, to the time of arrest, a requirement to have the mental state required at the time of charging. All that it means is that there is an intention to meet the requirements for charging at the time of charging, which is to take place as soon as is practicable after the arrest, unless it emerges after the arrest that there is not sufficient basis to bring a charge. And in that circumstance, the arrest should be discontinued pursuant to s 105.’”

(Footnotes omitted.)

A consideration of whether a police officer holds a suspicion on reasonable grounds involves a two-step process. Firstly, a police officer must have the relevant suspicion, that is, a subjective state of suspicion. Unlike the requirement for reasonable grounds, a challenge to the existence of a suspicion will only be available where it can be shown that the suspicion was manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or not bona fide: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [133]; State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88 at [13]; AD v State of NSW (2023) 308 A Crim R 367; [2023] NSWCA 115 at [25]-[28].

An assessment of whether systemic failures have been established by the plaintiff requires consideration of the evidence relating to events leading up to 2018. That is the proper context in which to view the LLU Report and the inferences that can be drawn from it.
The evidence reveals a significant increase in the number of strip searches of attendees at music festivals in New South Wales between 2014 and 2018. The increase is demonstrated in the following table contained in the Statement of Agreed Facts (Exhibit 3):

Year

Strip searches

Strip searches where a drug was found

Strip searches where a firearm or firearm accessory was found

Strip searches where a knife or sharp cutting instrument was found

Strip searches where other prohibited articles were found

2014

2,952

744

3

66

5

2015

4,832

1,103

9

115

18

2016

4,685

1,136

6

102

9

2017

4,792

1,335

2

99

19

2018

5,526

1,553

1

93

29

The statistics reveal that the increase in the number of strip searches in the field between 2014 and 2015 was over 60% (from 2,952 to 4,832). There was also an increase of more than 80% from 2014 to 2018 (from 2,952 to 5,526). The majority of all strip searches in the field in that period were of attendees at music festivals.
The NSWPF introduced the LLU as part of its Leadership and Capability Command in mid-2018. It is reasonable to infer that the purpose of the LLU, in general terms, was to consider what changes to practice and training may be made in the face of complaints and issues being raised about strip searches.
It is an agreed fact that while 143 strip searches were conducted at SITG 2018, this number dropped to 16 strip searches at SITG 2019. This was a reduction of nearly 90%. This is notable in light of the significant changes made to the Operational Orders for SITG 2019, summarised at [613]-[618], and the other measures introduced post-2018, such as the Music Festival Fundamentals.
The following acknowledgements in the LLU Report are relevant. Firstly, in October 2018 LECC launched an investigation into the practices of the NSWPF concerning the conduct of strip searches in response to specific complaints and advocacy from community organisations.
Secondly, the 2013 Mardi Gras after party generated a significant number of complaints against police, with most relating to attendees being strip-searched. Indeed, as a result of these complaints the NSWPF developed the 22-point plan to improve policing strategies and in particular, the exercise of powers relating to strip searches at future Mardi Gras events. Importantly, the plan included assignment of a senior police officer of or above the rank of Sergeant to monitor, advise, supervise, and process all strip/ordinary searches at the searching tent areas allocated. It must have been apparent to senior officers from as early as 2013 that there were issues arising from the conduct of strip searches by the NSWPF.
Thirdly, the LLU Report contains a table identifying a number of civil cases based on allegedly unlawful strip searches launched against the NSWPF between 2011 and 2018. There was an increase from two cases in 2015 to seven cases in 2016 and 2017. Thirty-two complaints in relation to strip searches were received by Professional Standards between 2016 and 2018. Material produced under subpoena contains eight complaints received by the NSWPF’s Customer Assistance Unit between 2016 and 2018 regarding strip searches.
In addition, although of less weight, a number of media articles featuring complaints from the public and discourse surrounding NSWPF strip search practices were published between 2001-2018. These articles are not relied upon for hearsay purpose but rather as evidence of public comment about strip searches reported in the media that it might be inferred the NSWPF was aware of.
That senior officers were aware (from no later than October 2018) that at least between 2016 and 2018, there developed a practice or pattern of conduct by police officers carrying out strip searches of attendees at music festivals in circumstances which did not always comply with the provisions of LEPRA, is a reasonable inference to draw. During this period and until about 2019, NSWPF education, training, and supervision in respect of the relevant LEPRA provisions pertaining to strip searches, was wholly inadequate. This was far from a situation where the training, education, and supervision was sufficient but later improved.
The evidence establishes that whilst some training was offered prior to 2018, it was clearly deficient and wholly inadequate in educating police officers as to the legal requirements for conducting strip searches. The substantial failures must be assessed in the context of the NSWPF routinely mounting DDD operations at music festivals, knowing and planning for high numbers of strip searches to be conducted. I acknowledge that the ambit of the evidence of training and education produced was in response to a category of discovery that only called for documents relating to the training of the three officers who interacted with the plaintiff at SITG 2018. However, as set out above, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am satisfied that this represents the general training of a police officer during this period. Regardless, the operational orders, briefings and directives for the various festivals and events summarised above were the standard orders provided to all police officers deployed to the relevant events.
The evidence makes it clear that senior members of the NSWPF routinely implemented the infrastructure for strip searches at festivals and large events. They did so in the absence of proper (or in most cases, any) instructions or directions in the operational orders as to how to conduct strip searches in compliance with LEPRA. They did so against a backdrop of piecemeal and wholly insufficient education and training on the statutory pre-requisites and safeguards for strip searches. The NSWPF was made aware of the prevalence of unlawful strip searches at large events as early as Mardi Gras 2013. Strip searches were the subject of complaints to Professional Standards and civil claims against the NSWPF. Despite this, the NSWPF did not see fit to improve their approach to festivals (other than Mardi Gras) until post-2018. Police officers must be held to a high standard in the exercise of their extraordinary powers and their adherence to the safeguards implemented by Parliament. Strip searches are inherently invasive and intrusive. The complete silence on strip searches that is observable in the majority of the operational orders and briefings for festivals prior to 2019, in the face of the regularity at which they were occurring, is wholly inadequate. There is no evidence to indicate that the improvements introduced from 2019 onwards were not available to senior members of the NSWPF to implement earlier.
Ultimately, I have concluded that the conduct of searching police not only constituted an unlawful strip search of the plaintiff (as conceded by the defendant) but amounted to a gross failure to comply with the requirements and safeguards of LEPRA. Furthermore, these failures to lawfully exercise the relevant powers, were a product of a conspicuous deficiency in the training, education, and monitoring of police officers in the exercise of their powers to conduct a strip search, resulting in a flagrant disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. These failures are compounded by the fact that senior officers were authorising, organising, and planning drug detection operations at music festivals as a matter of routine, which clearly included the strip searching of attendees.

To what extent do the improvements in training, education and supervision post-2018 mitigate the punitive and deterrent effect of exemplary damages?

The improvements made by the NSWPF to training and education post-2018 are set out at [603]-[648]. In summary they include the introduction of the “Music Festival Fundamentals” online education package, the Person Search Manual, and clearer and more detailed instructions on the statutory requirements and safeguards in operational orders for festivals such as SITG 2019 and Field Day 2020. Officers can also no longer self-verify COPS event entries that relate to a person search and monthly audits of COPS events entries containing a strip search are required.
Although there is limited or no evidence as to how and to what extent these improvements and other recommendations set out in the LLU Report have been implemented, I am satisfied that the defendant has (subsequent to 2018) taken more seriously the need to adequately train, educate and supervise police officers in respect of the exercise of power in conducting strip searches. Those improvements mitigate the punitive and deterrent effect of exemplary damages in more than a “small way”.
That said, the failures of senior police to adequately train, educate, instruct, and monitor police officers in the exercise of their powers to conduct strip searches at music festivals, in the period between at least 2016 and 2018, was egregious. That strip searches involve a significant intrusion on the privacy and bodily integrity of the individual is universally understood including by senior members of the NSWPF.
Music festivals held in New South Wales between 2016 and 2018 were policed by substantial detachments from the NSWPF for the purpose of, amongst other things, detecting prohibited substances in the possession of attendees. Senior officers were aware that strip searches were to be conducted for the purpose of detecting prohibited substances in the possession of attendees. The infrastructure to support such operations included, but were not limited to, the deployment of the DDD unit and construction of makeshift search areas.
The evidence establishes that the Operational Orders provided at music festivals failed to clearly instruct police about the LEPRA requirements. These failures must be assessed in the context of senior police officers being aware of complaints about the way in which police conducted strip searches. In the case of the complaints made about strip searches at Mardi Gras, senior police sought to address those complaints by formulating the 22-point plan (a plan that did not necessarily reflect best practice but demonstrated some attempt to improve the procedures adopted in the conduct of strip searches). The question remains as to why these limited improvements were not deployed more widely to music festivals in general where strip searches were being conducted.
Having considered the evidence closely, and notwithstanding the improvements that have been implemented post-2018, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established her entitlement to exemplary damages.

Can the Court quantify and award exemplary damages at this stage having regard to the nature of the proceedings as representative proceedings?

Having determined that the plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages, and that the objectives of punishment and deterrence are mitigated by virtue of the improvements that the NSWPF has implemented, the question remains as to whether the Court should quantify and make an award of exemplary damages at this stage of the proceedings.
The defendant contends that whilst I can determine the plaintiff’s entitlement to exemplary damages, the quantum of exemplary damages cannot be assessed at this stage of the proceedings. The defendant relies on Walumba Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 (“Walumba Lumba”). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held as follows at [167]:

“The Court of Appeal identified at para 123 of their judgment a further point which militated against awards of exemplary damages to the appellants. Where there is more than one victim of a tortfeasor’s conduct, one award of damages should be made which should be shared between the victims, rather than separate awards of exemplary damages for each individual: see Riches v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] QB 256. This is because the purpose of the award is to punish conduct rather than compensate the claimants. In Riches, the victims of the tort were a small class who were all before the court. But where (as in the present case) there is potentially a large number of claimants and they are not all before the court, it is not appropriate to make an award of exemplary damages: see AB v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507, 527B-D per Stuart-Smith LJ and p 531D-E per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. Unless all the claims are quantified by the court at the same time, how is the court to fix and apportion that punitive element of the damages? If the assessments are made separately at different times for different claimants, how is the court to know that the overall punishment is appropriate? The Court of Appeal were right to regard this a further reason why it was not appropriate to award exemplary damages in the present case.”

Mr Sexton SC points out that the plaintiff’s claim of $50,000 in exemplary damages, if applied across the class, would add up to $150 million in exemplary damages. The defendant submits that there will come a point where the State has been “adequately deterred and punished” and no further exemplary damages are warranted.
The plaintiff submits that Walumba Lumba is not binding on this Court, and I would treat the decision with caution because the law on exemplary damages in the UK has significantly departed from that in Australia, at least since Uren. The plaintiff also submits that Walumba Lumba can be distinguished from the plaintiff’s claim. In Walumba Lumba, the question of entitlement to exemplary damages arose from a “single act”, namely, the invariable application of a single policy to all persons within the class. In the present case, the plaintiff makes a personal claim that “relies to some extent on a common factual sub-stratum”. However, the ultimate question in the present matter is the relevance of that set of common circumstances (inappropriate training and direction) to the plaintiff’s individual case. The plaintiff submits that this depends upon the extent to which it can be inferred that the absence of proper training and supervision had a causative role in the circumstances in which intentional torts were committed on her. Thus, the plaintiff submits that Walumba Lumba has no application to the present matter.
The plaintiff contends that there is no reason to deprive the plaintiff of an award of exemplary damages to the extent it is referable to a systemic issue that might be shared by other claims. The plaintiff submits that an individual award of exemplary damages depends on the facts of a particular case and the relationship between the circumstances relied upon (including shared circumstances) and the precise nature of the person’s case.
The plaintiff relies on Nixon v Philip Morris (Aust) Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 453; [1999] FCA 1107. This case concerned the analogous federal class actions regime. The decision related to an application to strike out the applicant’s statement of claim, so no assessment of damages was undertaken. However, Wilcox J said as follows at [119]:

“During discussion on 17 June, the senior counsel who then appeared for Philip Morris contended there was an inherent difficulty in awarding damages in a representative proceeding: until compensatory damages had been assessed in respect of all claimants, the Court would not be able to determine whether or not it was appropriate to add something to any claim by way of exemplary damages. Counsel had in mind the principle that, in determining whether it is appropriate to award exemplary damages – and, if so, how much – a court must consider the effect on the defendant of liability for compensatory damages. However, counsel who appeared on 27 July did not pursue this argument. They accepted that each group member’s claim was distinct; if exemplary damages are available, the principle to which I have referred must be applied in relation to each group member. I think this concession is correct. A defendant cannot answer X’s claim for exemplary damages by showing it has incurred a heavy damages liability to Y, in respect of the same or similar conduct.”

The respondent successfully appealed to the Full Court on other grounds: see Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon (2000) 170 ALR 487; [2000] FCA 229. On appeal, Sackville J said as follows with respect to the issue of exemplary damages:

[185] … I think it better to defer dealing with this issue until a properly pleaded representative claim is made in which exemplary damages are sought in the accrued jurisdiction of the Court. A fortiori, if the proceedings are not to continue as representative proceedings, as Spender and Hill JJ propose, it is inappropriate to deal with the question of exemplary damages until it arises in a properly pleaded representative claim.
[186] … This should not be taken, however, as necessarily implying any disagreement with the reasoning of the primary Judge on this issue.”

I note that the Federal Court did not finally deal with the issue of whether exemplary damages should be awarded in representative proceedings until compensatory damages have been assessed in respect of all claimants. I have not been able to find a case that squarely decides this point. I have also not been able to find an example of an Australian Court awarding exemplary damages in representative proceedings. There is some force in the defendant’s contention that the Court should not make an award of exemplary damages at this stage.
Although the plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages, I have concluded that it would not be appropriate to quantify or make an award of exemplary damages at this stage for the following reasons.
Firstly, while I have some sympathy for the plaintiff’s position, I do not accept the argument that it is “nonsensical” that an award of exemplary damages cannot be made until all group members’ claims are considered. The plaintiff’s submission that an individual award of exemplary damages depends on the facts of the particular case and the relationship between the circumstances relied upon (including shared circumstances) and the precise nature of the person’s case, in my view, ignores the fundamental nature of exemplary damages which are punitive and deterrent rather than compensatory.
Secondly, I have no evidence about the number of members in the class or the details of their claims. Having regard to the submission made by Mr Sexton SC (that if I award $50,000 in exemplary damages as contended for by the plaintiff, the State would be liable for $150,000,000 in total for exemplary damages alone) I deduce that there are about 3,000 registered members in the class. I note that at the time of Garling J’s judgment on 19 November 2024, approximately 2,316 individuals had registered as members of the class: Meredith (No.3) at [10].
If I were to make an award of exemplary damages based upon the systemic (and common) failure by senior officers to adequately train, educate, and monitor police officers in the exercise of their powers to conduct strip searches, it seems to me that all successful claimants would potentially be entitled to the same or similar quantum of exemplary damages. The unlawfulness of each strip search and the extent of non-compliance with statutory provisions would very likely flow from the common systemic failure. In those circumstances, there would come a point at which the punitive and deterrent effect of exemplary damages would expire.
Thirdly, the plaintiff has been unable to point to any authority (and I have not been able to find any authority) that could persuade me that exemplary damages can be quantified and awarded to a lead plaintiff in representative proceedings.

The following table sets out the award of damages to the plaintiff:

Head of Damages	Quantum
Battery	$3,000
Assault	$25,000
False Imprisonment	$15,000
Aggravated damages (including for the conduct of the proceedings)	$50,000
Exemplary damages
Total	$93,000

Orders

For the reasons outlined above, I make the following orders:

Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $93,000 plus pre-judgment interest.

Direct the parties to confer and agree as to the quantum of interest payable.

Defer for later assessment the quantum of exemplary damages for the plaintiff.

The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the ordinary basis unless a party shows an entitlement to some other costs order.

Common Questions

I turn now to answer the common questions.
In these questions:

“31(b) strip search” means a strip search of the kind described in s 31(b) of LEPRA.

“LEPRA” means the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW).

“Ordinary search” means a search of the kind described in s 21 of LEPRA.

Interpretation of LEPRA

In order to form the necessary state of mind to conduct a 31(b) strip search, does a police officer need to consider s 21 first before considering the criteria in s 31(b) of LEPRA?

Answer: Yes

Are the necessary criteria in s 31(b) of LEPRA for carrying out a 31(b) strip search the following:

The police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the strip search is necessary for the purposes of the search; and

The police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the seriousness of the circumstances make the strip search necessary; and

The police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the urgency of the circumstances make the strip search necessary.

Answer: Yes

In determining whether a “strip search is necessary for the purposes of the search”, does a police officer need to conclude that an ordinary search is insufficient in order to form the reasonable suspicion required for the exercise of the power to conduct the 31(b) strip search?

Answer: Yes

Assuming reasonable grounds for suspicion of the existence of a circumstance in LEPRA s 21(1)(d), is an officer’s state of mind that any contravention of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 is ‘serious’ capable of also providing reasonable grounds for suspicion of the state/s of mind required to perform a 31(b) strip search?

Answer: No

Does failure by a Police Officer to have the required state/s of mind identified in s 31(b) of LEPRA render a 31(b) strip search purportedly undertaken pursuant to that provision unlawful?

Answer: Yes

Does non‐compliance by a Police Officer with a provision contained in s 32 of LEPRA in conducting a 31(b) strip search make that search unlawful?

Answer: Yes, unless it is established that it is not reasonably practicable to comply in the circumstances.

Does non‐compliance by a Police Officer with a provision contained in s 33 of LEPRA in conducting a 31(b) strip search make that search unlawful?

Answer: Yes, unless it is established that it is not reasonably practicable to comply in the circumstances.

Directions concerning a person’s body

Does “genital area” in the meaning of s 32(6) of LEPRA include a person’s anal area?

Answer: Yes

To what extent did ss 31, 32 or 33 of LEPRA empower a police officer to ask or direct that a Group Member bend over or otherwise move his or her body to facilitate visual inspection of the genital area during the course of a 31(b) strip search?

Answer: LEPRA does not empower a police officer to direct (as opposed to request) a group member to bend over or otherwise move his or her body to facilitate visual inspection of the genital area during a nonconsensual strip search.

Did LEPRA otherwise empower a police officer to direct or force a Group Member to bend over or otherwise move his or her body to facilitate visual inspection of the genital area in the course of a 31(b) strip search, and in what circumstances?

Answer: There is no implied power to direct a group member to bend over or otherwise move his or her body to facilitate visual inspection of the genital area in the course of a nonconsensual strip search.

To what extent did ss 31, 32 or 33 of LEPRA empower a police officer to ask or direct a Group Member to lift their breasts or otherwise touch or interact with his or her naked body to facilitate visual inspection during the course of a 31(b) strip search?

Answer: Sections 31, 32 and 33 do not empower a police officer to direct (as opposed to request) a group member to lift their breasts or otherwise touch or interact with his or her naked body to facilitate a visual inspection during a nonconsensual strip search.

Did LEPRA otherwise empower a police officer to direct or force a Group Member to lift their breasts or otherwise touch or interact with his or her naked body to facilitate visual inspection during the course of a 31(b) strip search, and in what circumstances?

Answer: LEPRA does not otherwise empower a police officer to direct a group member to lift their breasts or otherwise touch or interact with his or her naked body to facilitate visual inspection during a nonconsensual strip search.

To what extent did ss 31, 32 or 33 of LEPRA empower a police officer to ask or direct that a Group Member interact with a tampon or other item inserted into a body cavity during the course of a 31(b) strip search?

Answer: Sections 31, 32 and 33 of LEPRA do not empower a police officer to direct that a group member interact with a tampon or other item inserted into a body cavity during the course of a nonconsensual strip search.

Does LEPRA otherwise empower a police officer to direct or force a Group Member to interact with a tampon or other item inserted into a body cavity during the course of a 31(b) strip search, and in what circumstances?

Answer: LEPRA does not otherwise empower a police officer to direct a group member to interact with a tampon or other item inserted into a body cavity during a nonconsensual strip search.
There is no implied power under LEPRA to force a group member to interact with their body parts in any of the ways suggested or to interact with a tampon or other item inserted into a body cavity as a strip search must not involve a search of a person’s body cavities or an examination of the body by touch: s 33(4) of LEPRA.

Damages

Could non‐compliance by a Police Officer with a safeguard contained in ss 32 and/or 33 of LEPRA be an aggravating factor in the Court’s assessment of damages of false imprisonment / assault / battery of a person the subject of an unlawful strip search?

Answer: Yes

Conduct of the State relevant to exemplary damages

Were the matters pleaded at paragraph 68A.1 to 68A.3 the case as at July 2018?

Answer: Yes

If so, was the State aware of those matters as at July 2018?

Answer: Yes

In the period between 2016 and July 2018, was there a practice or pattern of conduct by Police Officers of carrying out strip searches of attendees at music festivals as a matter of routine?

Answer: Yes

If so, was the State aware or ought reasonably to have been aware of such a practice or pattern of conduct as at July 2018?

Answer: Yes

Was the State aware that the performance of strip searches was the subject of training given to and supervision of police officers as at July 2018?

Answer: Yes

Did the State exercise reasonable care and skill to ensure the training of the training and supervision of police officers in respect of the correct observance of ss 21 and 31-33 of LEPRA at music festivals was adequate as at July 2018?

Answer: Not in respect of the correct observance of ss 31-33 of LEPRA.

**********

Decision last updated: 01 October 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	Meredith v State of New South Wales (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 1133
Hearing dates:	5 May 2025, 13-16 May 2025
Date of orders:	30 September 2025
Decision date:	30 September 2025
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Yehia J
Decision:	(1) Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $93,000 plus pre-judgment interest. (2) Direct the parties to confer and agree as to the quantum of interest payable. (3) Defer for later assessment the quantum of exemplary damages for the plaintiff. (4) The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs on the ordinary basis unless a party shows an entitlement to some other costs order.
Catchwords:	TORTS – intentional torts – representative proceedings – strip searches at music festivals – cause of action for assault, battery and false imprisonment – lead plaintiff directed to take her clothes off and move her body parts and body to facilitate the search – where defendant changed its position weeks before the hearing date – where defendant now accepts the search was unlawful Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) – the operation of ss 31, 32 and 33 of LEPRA – what is required to satisfy the preconditions of “seriousness” and “urgency” of the circumstances – whether the searching officers failed to comply with the safeguards afforded under ss 32 and 33 of LEPRA – whether there is an implied power to direct that a person being strip searched move their body and/or body parts to facilitate the search – whether “genital area” includes the anus for the purpose of s 32(6) of LEPRA DAMAGES – whether the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) bars the plaintiff from an award of aggravated and exemplary damages – whether the plaintiff is entitled to aggravated damages for the conduct of the proceedings – where the non-compliance with the LEPRA provisions resulted in egregious breaches by the searching police
Legislation Cited:	Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3B(1)(a), 11, 15B Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 157, 166 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW), ss 17, 18, 20, 22, 23 Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (NSW) Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138(1) Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 3, 21, 21A, 27, 28, 30, 31, 31(a), 31(b), 32, 33, 99, 197, 198, 198A, 199, 201, 202, 203, 230 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Act 2013 (NSW) Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), ss 6, 8 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 11(1), 14(1)(b), 18A, 50A, 50C Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 14.22, 14.23
Cases Cited:	AD v State of NSW (2023) 308 A Crim R 367; [2023] NSWCA 115 Adams v Kennedy & Ors (2000) 49 NSWLR 78; [2000] NSWCA 152 Anderson v State of NSW; Perri v State of NSW [2023] NSWCA 160 ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17 Attalla v NSW (2018) 28 DCLR(NSW) 337; [2018] NSWDC 190 Attorney General for New South Wales v XX (2018) 98 NSWLR 1012; [2018] NSWCCA 198 Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (2008) 232 CLR 314; [2008] HCA 9 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1966) 117 CLR 185; [1966] HCA 37 Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221; [1968] ALR 3 Australian Securities and Investments Commission(ASIC) v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; [2012] HCA 17 Bhattacharya v State of New South Wales & Anor [2003] NSWSC 261 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; (1774) 98 ER 969 Bulsey v The State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187 Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 31 Carvana v State of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 254 Cleland v The Queen (1982) 151 CLR 1; [1982] HCA 67 Clifton & Ors v Lewis [2012] NSWCA 229 Costa and Another v The Public Trustee of NSW (2008) 1 ASTLR 56; [2008] NSWCA 223 Cowell v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1988) 13 NSWLR 714; (1988) 34 A Crim R 364 CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Rizzani De Eccher Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1798 Croucher v Cachia (2016) 95 NSWLR 117; [2016] NSWCA 132 DanielFromberg v R (2017) 26 DCLR(NSW) 6; [2017] NSWDC 259 David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 Dell v Dalton (1991) 23 NSWLR 528; [1991] NSWCA 76 Digital Pulse Pty Limited v Christopher Harris and Ors (2002) 166 FLR 421; [2002] NSWSC 33 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Greenhalgh [2022] NSWSC 980 Dowse v State of New South Wales (2012) 226 A Crim R 36; [2012] NSWCA 337 Fair Work Ombudsman v Hu (2019) 266 FCR 83; [2019] FCAFC 133 Fede v Gray by his tutor New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2018) 98 NSWLR 1149; [2018] NSWCA 316 Fenton v Hampton (1858) 11 Moo PCC 347; (1858) 14 ER 727 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26 Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 70 Hall v Fonceca [1983] WAR 309 Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council [2012] NSWSC 1026 Hrdavec v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 52 Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 217 A Crim R 571; [2012] NSWCA 336 Jamieson v R (1993) 177 CLR 574; [1993] HCA 48 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1959] HCA 8 Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; [1987] HCA 47 Louis v Commonwealth (1987) 87 FLR 277 Marshall v Watson (1972) 124 CLR 640; [1972] HCA 27 McLaughlin v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWDC 525 McLaughlin v State of New South Wales (No. 2) [2023] NSWDC 557 Melbourne Steamship Co Ltd v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333; [1912] HCA 69 Meredith v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1546 Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.3) [2024] NSWSC 1499 Meredith v State of New South Wales (No.4) [2025] NSWSC 13 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (2020) 268 CLR 326; [2020] HCA 17 Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181; [2004] HCA 41 New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; [2006] HCA 57 Nixon v Philip Morris (Aust) Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 453; [1999] FCA 1107 Owlstara v State of New South Wales (2020) 285 A Crim R 53; [2020] NSWCA 217 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19 Pham v Commissioner of Victim Rights [2019] NSWSC 1060 Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon (2000) 170 ALR 487; [2000] FCA 229 Pinson v Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank Ltd [1941] 2 KB 72 Pollack v Volpato [1973] 1 NSWLR 653 R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19 R v Phillips (1971) 45 ALJR 467 R v Rondo (2001) 126 A Crim R 562; [2001] NSWCCA 540 Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales; Reyes-Carrion v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWDC 28 Rigby v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 729 Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98; [2001] NSWCA 265 Ruddock v Taylor (2005) 222 CLR 612; [2005] HCA 48 Smith v Corrective Services Commission (NSW) (1980) 147 CLR 134; [1980] HCA 49 Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1 State of New South Wales v Abed (2014) 246 A Crim R 549; [2014] NSWCA 419 State of New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32 State of New South Wales v Dennis [2025] NSWCA 118 State of New South Wales v Exton (2017) 270 A Crim R 182; [2017] NSWCA 294 State of New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168; [2005] NSWCA 445 State ofNew South Wales v Landini [2010] NSWCA 157 State of New South Wales v McLaughlin [2024] NSWCA 137 State of New South Wales v Randall [2017] NSWCA 88 State ofNew South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496; [2003] NSWCA 208 State of New South Wales v Robinson (2016) 93 NSWLR 280; [2016] NSWCA 334 State of New South Wales v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 662; [2017] NSWCA 194 State of New South Wales v Steven Charles Radford (2010) 79 NSWLR 327; [2010] NSWCA 276 State of New South Wales v Williamson [2011] NSWCA 183 State of New South Wales v Williamson (2012) 248 CLR 417; [2012] HCA 57 State of NSW v Delly (2007) 70 NSWLR 125; [2007] NSWCA 303 TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited v Henry Alfred Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333; [2002] NSWCA 82 The Korean Times Pty Ltd & Anor v Un Doc Pak [2011] NSWCA 365 Thompson v Goold & Co [1910] AC 409 Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118; [1966] HCA 40 Walumba Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; [1971] HCA 33 WCX M4-M5 Link AT Pty Ltd v Acciona Infrastructure Projects Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 505 Whitbread & Anor v Rail Corporation NSW & Ors [2011] NSWCA 130 Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71; [1920] HCA 75 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; [1986] HCA 88 XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448; [1985] HCA 12 Yong Jun Qin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155; (1997) 144 ALR 695 Zaravinos v State of New South Wales; State of New South Wales & Ors v Zaravinos (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; [2004] NSWCA 320
Texts Cited:	[Redacted] Harold Luntz and Sirko Harder, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (5th ed, 2021, LexisNexis) M2016-03-Model Litigant Policy for Civil Litigation and [Redacted] New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 17 September 2002 at 4846 [Redacted] Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service (Final Report, 1997) vol 2
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Raya Meredith (Plaintiff) State of New South Wales (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: K Nomchong SC with A Edwards (Plaintiff) J Sexton SC with M Hutchings and C Langford (Defendant) Solicitors: Slater and Gordon Lawyers (Plaintiff) Makinson d’Apice Lawyers (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2022/00214157
Publication restriction:	Non-publication orders were made by Garling J on 21 March 2025 and by Yehia J on 5 May 2025. Non-publication orders made on 21 March 2025 Plaintiff’s notice of motion dated 18 March 2025 … 3. The following material filed in relation to this motion: a) the affidavit of Raya Meredith affirmed on 17 March 2025; b) the affidavit of William Zerno affirmed on 18 March 2025 and its exhibit; and c) the submissions of the Plaintiff served on 20 March 2025, d) be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that: e) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act); and f) the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act). 4. Further to order 3, the following material at the trial of these proceedings: a) paragraph 45 of the statement of Raya Meredith dated 21 November 2023; and b) any further evidence adduced in cross examination or any oral or written submission or transcript concerning the subject matter of that paragraph, be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Act on the basis that: c) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act); and d) the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act). 5. Orders 3 and 4 are to operate until the conclusion of the proceeding, subject to further order. 6. Orders 3 to 4 are to apply throughout the Commonwealth of Australia. Non-publication orders made on 5 May 2025 1. In respect of the following documents filed in these proceedings and listed in Attachment A: (a) NSW Police Notebooks; (b) NSW Police COPS Events; (c) NSW Police SITREP and After Action Reports; (d) Drug Registers; (e) Coronial Reports; (f) Complaints in Tab 428 of the Court Book the names of the Police Officers, save for the following: (i) SC Danielle George (ii) SC Todd Petrie (iii) SC Dave Jarnet (iv) Sgt Malcolm Kentwell (v) Detective Inspector Matthew Woods; and the names of all persons, other than the Plaintiff, listed in those documents be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act). 2. In respect of the witness statement of Raya Meredith dated 31 November 2023 (Tab 44 of the Court Book) the residential address and occupation be subject to a non publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance withs 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act), and the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act). 3. In respect of the witness statement of Sean Rood dated 8 December 2023 (Tab 45 of the Court Book) the residential address and occupation and paragraph 28 be subject to a non-publication order to prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure to the public in accordance with s 7 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (the Act) on the basis that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice (section 8(a) of the Act), and the order is necessary to protect the safety of the plaintiff (section 8(c) of the Act).

Year	Strip searches	Strip searches where a drug was found	Strip searches where a firearm or firearm accessory was found	Strip searches where a knife or sharp cutting instrument was found	Strip searches where other prohibited articles were found
2014	2,952	744	3	66	5
2015	4,832	1,103	9	115	18
2016	4,685	1,136	6	102	9
2017	4,792	1,335	2	99	19
2018	5,526	1,553	1	93	29