Commonwealth of Australia v Sanofi

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GORDON A-CJ,
EDELMAN, STEWARD, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

SANOFI (FORMERLY SANOFI-AVENTIS) & ORS        RESPONDENTS

Commonwealth of Australia v Sanofi

[2024] HCA 47

Date of Hearing: 4 & 5 September 2024
Date of Judgment: 11 December 2024

S169/2023

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

J T Gleeson SC and F T Roughley SC with G Watson Keesing and M F Caristo for the appellant (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)

J C Sheahan KC with J J Hutton SC, S Fitzpatrick and B K Lim for the respondents (instructed by Jones Day)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

GORDON A-CJ, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ.  

Introduction

  1. The important point of law in this appeal is to reaffirm the limited circumstances in which this Court should review findings of fact made by a primary judge, which were not disturbed by the intermediate appellate court. The principled approach taken by this Court, reaffirmed in these reasons, is common to many ultimate appellate courts in the common law tradition. That principle is that, absent special or exceptional circumstances such as plain injustice or clear error, this Court will not engage in a detailed review of concurrent factual findings of lower courts. This approach applies a fortiori to concurrent findings of facts and counter-facts that are made as steps towards an ultimate finding of facts. The principle is a pragmatic one based upon an important need for triage. For every appeal that is heard by an ultimate appellate court, with a limited capacity to hear appeals, another appeal (or, as in this case, sometimes more) will not be heard.

  2. This appeal does not concern any individual rights, nor expose any plain injustice or clear error.

  3. The first respondent, which collectively with the other respondents may be described as "Sanofi", held a patent in a number of jurisdictions including Australia in respect of the drug clopidogrel which is usually prescribed to patients who have suffered, or are at risk of suffering, a heart attack or stroke. Sanofi earned annual worldwide revenue from sales of clopidogrel equivalent to more than $1 billion. Clopidogrel had been supplied by Sanofi in Australia in tablet form since 1998 and it was first listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS") on 1 November 1999.

  4. The Apotex group of companies was at all material times a substantial manufacturer and distributor of generic medicines worldwide. It developed a generic clopidogrel product which it sought to bring to market in Australia. On 25 September 2007, Sanofi gave the usual undertaking as to damages in support of an interlocutory injunction granted by Gyles J of the Federal Court of Australia that prevented Apotex Pty Ltd ("Apotex" or "Apotex Australia") from competing with Sanofi by manufacture and sale of a generic competitor to Sanofi's patented drug, clopidogrel.…

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Details
Case
[2024] HCA 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth of Australia appealed to the High Court of Australia against decisions of the lower courts concerning an undertaking as to damages. The dispute arose from an interlocutory injunction obtained by Sanofi, which prevented the manufacture or sale of generic pharmaceutical products. The Commonwealth sought compensation for losses allegedly suffered because these generic products were not listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS") as a result of the injunction.

The High Court was required to determine the standard of review applicable to concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, particularly when an ultimate appellate court is asked to disturb such findings. The Court also considered the onus of proof in relation to loss arising from an undertaking as to damages, and whether the Commonwealth had discharged its onus in proving that the generic products would have been listed on the PBS but for the interlocutory injunction.

The Court applied the well-established principle that an ultimate appellate court should not disturb concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of special or exceptional circumstances, such as plain injustice or clear error. The Court noted that the Commonwealth's appeal did not meet this standard, as it did not concern individual rights, injustice, or clearly wrong findings. The Court found that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated that the lower courts made clear errors or caused plain injustice by failing to address its case on its merits. The Court also indicated that the Commonwealth had not discharged its onus of proof regarding the counter-factual scenario of PBS listing.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The position then is this. There are concurrent findings of fact by the primary judge and the Full Court. In this appeal, the Commonwealth, by its oral submissions, seeks for this Court to review and evaluate a vast body of evidence, much of which is in conflict, where the findings of fact and counter-fact of the primary judge have been relevantly confirmed by a unanimous Full Court.[16] It is therefore necessary, at the outset, to address the applicable standard of review by an ultimate appellate court. And as will be explained, this appeal did not meet that standard ‑ it does not concern any individual rights, any injustice and the findings are not clearly wrong. Any assessment of the Commonwealth's collateral attack upon the concurrent findings of fact in the courts below would have required a far more complete copy before this Court of the record (of evidence, transcript and submissions) showing how the Commonwealth ran its case in the courts below. That material was not before this Court because the Commonwealth had, properly, attempted to confine the scope of factual dispute on this appeal.[17] In any event, even on the material before this Court, it is not open, based on the Commonwealth's notice of appeal to this Court and the notice of appeal to the Full Court, for a new case to be developed involving a third set of findings of facts and counter-facts. [16]South Australia v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161 at 167.[17]See [49] below. Appellate review of facts It is a well-established principle that an ultimate appellate court — a second appellate court — "should not, in the absence of special reasons such as plain injustice or clear error"[18] (also referred to as "special circumstances"[19] or "compelling circumstances"[20]), disturb concurrent findings of fact.[21] That principle is "long standing". Its importance has not diminished, but rather increased, "in the circumstances of modern litigation".[22][18]Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 634 (emphasis added).[19]Waltons Stores(Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 434-435.[20]New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486 at 534 [153]. [21]The Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258 at 274; see also at 262; South Australia v Johnson (1982) 42 ALR 161 at 167; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 434-435; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 634; Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 at 471 [43]; Kozarov v Victoria (2022) 273 CLR 115 at 134 [49].[22]Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330 at 334 [5]. That principle reflects, and is rooted in, the nature of an appeal to this Court. An appeal to an intermediate court of appeal is, typically, an appeal by way of rehearing.[23] Under s 73 of the Constitution, an appeal to this Court is different; it is a "strict" appeal concerned with error.[24] In the appeal before this Court, the "strict" appeal is brought after the appellant has had a trial of the issues of fact and law following which the primary judge made findings of fact, and then after that, the appellant has had an appeal to the intermediate court of appeal, by way of rehearing, where the intermediate court made substantially the same relevant findings of fact as the primary judge made. As Gleeson CJ said in Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer,[25] "[i]n an appeal of this nature, the function of this Court, as a second appellate court and a court of final resort, is not simply to give a well-resourced litigant a third opportunity to persuade a tribunal to take a view of the facts favourable to that litigant". [23]See, eg, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 27, 30AI; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 37N; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 44; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 51; Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld), s 29(3); Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 765(1); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 19D; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 409; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 46; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 10(3); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 40; Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA), O 65, r 8. [24]See, eg, Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 at 267; Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330 at 378-379 [164].[25](2007) 234 CLR 330 at 334 [5].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, the absence of Dr Sherman could not found an inference that was adverse to the Commonwealth's case.[404] In particular, his absence could not be used to support a finding that he would have instructed Apotex Australia to recant what it told Gyles J and abandon its stated intention to launch. Like the absent witness, Mr Robb, considered in Hellicar, there is no basis for concluding that it was likely that, if called, Dr Sherman might have either disowned Mr Millichamp's and Mr Catterns' statements to Gyles J or provided some plausible basis upon which Apotex Australia could have abandoned its stated intention to launch at risk without attracting any sanction for doing so.[405] Without evidence of that kind, the Commonwealth was entitled to succeed on this part of its case.[404]Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at 413 [168], 432 [232].[405]Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345 at 413 [168]. Conclusion Neither the primary judge nor the Full Court properly addressed the Commonwealth's case. To the extent that "concurrent" factual findings were made that were materially adverse to the Commonwealth's case, the standard of review for each has been emphatically met in that there was both "clear error" as well as a "plain injustice"[406] to the Commonwealth in that its case was not addressed on its merits. The Commonwealth overwhelmingly demonstrated that, had the injunction been refused, Apotex Australia would have sought and obtained a PBS listing of its clopidogrel products with effect from 1 April 2008 and launched at risk. Ground 2 of the Commonwealth's appeal should be upheld. For the reasons given by Jagot J, Sanofi's notice of contention should be rejected. [406]Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 at 633-634. The orders proposed by Jagot J should be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.