D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

RYAN D'ORTA-EKENAIKE  APPLICANT

AND

VICTORIA LEGAL AID & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12

10 March 2005
M61/2003

ORDER

1.        Special leave to appeal granted.

2.Appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter and dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria

Representation:

N A Moshinsky QC with V Ruta for the applicant (instructed by BTE Flynn Murone & Co)

D F Jackson QC with D Masel for the first respondent (instructed by Monahan + Rowell)

N J Young QC with D F Hore-Lacy SC, B G Walmsley SC, G A Devries and G M Hughan for the second respondent (instructed by Beckwith Cleverdon Rees)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ.   There are two principal issues in this matter.  First, should the Court reconsider its decisions in Giannarelli v Wraith[1] that:

    (a)at common law an advocate cannot be sued by his or her client for negligence in the conduct of a case in court, or in work out of court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct of a case in court; and

    (b)in 1891 (the date at which the extent of the liability of a barrister was fixed by the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) ("the LPPA")) an advocate was immune from suit for allegedly negligent acts or omissions committed in court in the conduct of civil or criminal litigation, or committed out of court but leading to a decision affecting the conduct of a case in court?

    Secondly, does the immunity apply to the acts or omissions of a solicitor which, if committed by an advocate, would be immune from suit?

    [1](1988) 165 CLR 543.

  2. The issues arise in an application for special leave referred for argument, as on appeal, before the whole Court.  The application for special leave is brought by a client (the applicant) whose action for negligence against the respondents was summarily terminated on the basis that his statement of claim disclosed no arguable cause of action.

  3. Special leave should be granted but the appeal dismissed with costs.  Giannarelli should not be reopened.  The immunity applies to the particular acts or omissions alleged to have been committed by the second respondent and by an employee of the first respondent.

    The facts alleged by the applicant

  4. In February 1996, the applicant was charged with rape. He sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid ("VLA"), a body corporate established by s 3 of the Legal Aid Act 1978 (Vic). VLA retained the second respondent (Mr McIvor) as the applicant's barrister to appear for the applicant in the Magistrates' Court at the committal proceeding to be held under the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)[2].

    [2]s 56.

  5. At the committal proceeding, the applicant, although not bound to enter a plea, entered…

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Details
Case
[2005] HCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, D'Orta-Ekenaike, sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid (VLA) for a criminal prosecution. VLA retained a barrister, Mr McIvor, to represent the applicant at committal proceedings. The applicant pleaded guilty at the committal but later pleaded not guilty at trial, was convicted, had the verdict quashed on appeal, and was acquitted on retrial. The applicant alleged that VLA and Mr McIvor were negligent in advising him to plead guilty at the committal proceedings, claiming this advice was given at conferences prior to and on the day of the proceedings. The High Court of Australia considered whether the respondents were immune from suit for this alleged negligence.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the doctrine of advocate's immunity from suit for negligence extended to advice given in conferences, and whether the previous High Court decision in *Giannarelli v Wraith* should be reconsidered. The Court also examined the nature of the judicial process, the principle of finality in litigation, and whether statutory provisions or rules regarding abuse of process sufficiently addressed the need for finality without the need for advocate's immunity. The Court considered developments in English and other common law jurisdictions and the relevance of statutory changes since *Giannarelli*.

The High Court held that the advocate's immunity from suit for negligence, as established in *Giannarelli v Wraith*, should not be reopened. The Court reasoned that this immunity is fundamentally linked to the role of advocates within the judicial system and the necessity of ensuring finality in judicial determinations. The immunity protects advocates from being sued for work done in connection with the conduct of a case in court, or work intimately connected with such conduct, including advice given in conferences that is intrinsically linked to the conduct of the case. The Court found that the alleged negligence in this case fell within the scope of this immunity, and that the principles of finality and the integrity of the judicial process outweighed any perceived need to allow such claims.

The High Court granted special leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal with costs. The Court affirmed that the advocate's immunity applies to the specific acts or omissions alleged by the applicant against both the barrister and the employee of Victoria Legal Aid.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Special leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter and dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Special leave should be granted but the appeal dismissed with costs. Giannarelli should not be reopened. The immunity applies to the particular acts or omissions alleged to have been committed by the second respondent and by an employee of the first respondent.The facts alleged by the applicant In February 1996, the applicant was charged with rape. He sought legal assistance from Victoria Legal Aid ("VLA"), a body corporate established by s 3 of the Legal Aid Act 1978 (Vic). VLA retained the second respondent (Mr McIvor) as the applicant's barrister to appear for the applicant in the Magistrates' Court at the committal proceeding to be held under the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)[2].[2]s 56. At the committal proceeding, the applicant, although not bound to enter a plea, entered a plea of guilty. He was committed for trial in the County Court of Victoria. In February 1997, the applicant was presented for trial. On arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty and stood trial. His guilty plea at the committal proceeding was led in evidence. He was convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Victoria. That Court (Winneke P, Brooking JA, Vincent AJA) set aside the verdict, quashed the conviction and directed a new trial[3] on the ground that, although evidence of the applicant's guilty plea at committal had been properly admitted in evidence[4], the trial judge had failed to give sufficient directions about the use that might be made of the plea[5].[3]R v D'Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140.[4][1998] 2 VR 140 at 146.[5][1998] 2 VR 140 at 147. On the applicant's retrial, evidence of his guilty plea at committal was not admitted. He was acquitted. In 2001, the applicant commenced an action against VLA and the barrister, Mr McIvor, in the County Court. The applicant alleged that he had retained VLA as his solicitor to act on his behalf in defending the charge of rape. (The statement of claim does not allege any consideration for this retainer but that may be ignored. It will be assumed that the applicant alleged that there was a contract of retainer.) He alleged that VLA and the barrister each owed him duties to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in acting for him. The pleading is at least consistent with the applicant alleging that the duties were either contractual or duties of care imposed by law, or both. The applicant alleged that the person having the carriage of the matter at VLA (Ms Robyn Greensill) and the barrister, separately or together, advised him that:(a) he "did not have any defence to the charge";(b)if he entered a guilty plea at committal "he would receive a suspended sentence"; and(c)if he did not plead guilty at committal but contested the charge at trial and was found guilty, "he would receive a custodial penalty".This advice was said to have been tendered at a conference in the barrister's chambers held two days before the date appointed for the committal proceeding and again at a further conference at the Magistrates' Court on the day of, but before the commencement of, the committal proceeding. The applicant alleged that "undue pressure and influence" was exerted upon him at this second conference, by both Ms Greensill "on behalf of the VLA" and by Mr McIvor and that, as a result, he entered a guilty plea.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ
What these considerations, and the other historical matters described above, reveal is that attention must be directed to the nature of the role which an advocate (whether barrister, solicitor or both barrister and solicitor) plays in the judicial system.The decision in Giannarelli As indicated earlier, there are two aspects of the Court's decision in Giannarelli which are important in the present matter. First, there was a question about the proper construction of s 10(2) of the LPPA; secondly, there was a question about the common law immunity from suit of participants in the judicial process. A majority of the Court concluded[13] that s 10(2) of the LPPA did not subject a barrister to a common law duty of care in negligence. As Wilson J, with whose reasons in this respect Mason CJ agreed, pointed out[14], s 10(2) of the LPPA was a "fixed‑time" provision[15]; it required consideration of the extent to which, in 1891, a solicitor would have been liable to a client for negligence. The Court in Giannarelli divided over whether the relevant liability to be considered was confined to the liability of a solicitor as advocate or extended to the liability of a solicitor "in the exercise of his functions as a solicitor"[16]. The majority preferred the view that the comparison required by s 10(2), when considering whether an advocate was liable for negligence committed in court or in work intimately associated with work in court, was with the liability that a solicitor‑advocate would have had to a client in 1891 in such circumstances.[13](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 561 per Mason CJ, 570 per Wilson J, 587 per Brennan J, 590 per Dawson J.[14](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 567.[15]Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 4th ed (2002) at 762.[16](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 604 per Toohey J. For our own part, we prefer the construction, adopted by the majority in Giannarelli, that neither s 5 of the 1891 Act nor s 10(2) of the LPPA led to the result that, although in 1891 a solicitor‑advocate would have been immune from suit for in‑court negligence, either the 1891 Act or its subsequent re‑enactments made a barrister liable to suit for such negligence. So to read the relevant provisions of either the 1891 Act or the LPPA would give little or no effect to the words "liable ... to the same extent". But in the end, chief significance must be attached to the fact that a disputed question of construction was finally resolved in Giannarelli. This Court should not depart from that decision without powerful reasons to do so. A mere preference for one construction over the other would not suffice. The second aspect of the decision in Giannarelli which is now important is the conclusion reached about the common law. The conclusion that, at common law, an advocate cannot be sued by his or her client for negligence in the conduct of a case, or in work out of court which is intimately connected with the conduct of a case in court, was consistent with the earlier decisions of the House of Lords in Rondel v Worsley[17] and Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co[18]. No doubt because the arguments advanced in Giannarelli were framed against the background of those two English decisions, a number of matters were considered in the reasons in Giannarelli that have application, or at least greater application, in a divided legal profession where only barristers have a right of audience in superior courts. And because the particular claims made in Giannarelli against the barristers who were sued were framed or treated as claims in negligence, not claims for breach of contract, much of the discussion in the reasons in Giannarelli is directed at the tort of negligence. But, as these reasons will seek to demonstrate, the decision in Giannarelli must be understood having principal regard to two matters:(a)the place of the judicial system as a part of the governmental structure; and(b)the place that an immunity from suit has in a series of rules all of which are designed to achieve finality in the quelling of disputes by the exercise of judicial power.Although reference is made in Giannarelli to matters such as:(a)the supposed connection between a barrister's immunity and an inability to sue the client for professional fees[19];(b)the potential competition between the duties which an advocate owes to the court and a duty of care to the client[20]; and(c)the desirability of maintaining the cabrank rule[21];each was, and should be, put aside as being, at most, of marginal relevance to whether an immunity should be held to exist. The first of these matters, even if it were well founded (and it is not), would be irrelevant to the liability of a solicitor‑advocate and there is no sound basis for distinguishing between advocates according to whether the advocate does or does not have a contract with the client.[17][1969] 1 AC 191.[18][1980] AC 198.[19](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 555 per Mason CJ; In re Le Brasseur and Oakley [1896] 2 Ch 487 at 494; Robertson v Macdonogh (1880) 6 LR Ir 433 at 438; cf Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 at 260‑264.[20](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 556 per Mason CJ, 572‑573 per Wilson J; cf Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 at 231, 251, 272‑273, 282.[21](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 572‑573 per Wilson J; Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198 at 221.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ