1963, May 24.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. This is an application for special leave to appeal from an order made on 24th November 1961 by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, whereby an appeal by the applicant from a conviction of murder was dismissed. The application for special leave to appeal was of course made long out of time, but the Solicitor-General who, as it seemed, was fully apprised of the circumstances, made no objection to the enlarging of the time and it was extended accordingly. The appellant no doubt has been serving his sentence in the meantime but inasmuch as the most serious question arising upon the application is whether the jury should have been directed that they might, if they thought fit, find that the prisoner acted upon provocation reducing the homicide to manslaughter, his imprisonment under sentence may not be as important as might otherwise appear. The sentence for murder, however, is penal servitude for life: (Crimes Act, 1900-1962 (N.S.W.), s. 18 and s. 453). (at p615)

2. The case is a curious one and at the trial, although on the proofs no doubt could exist that the appellant, by the injuries which he inflicted upon the deceased, had killed him, yet there was never any admission on his behalf that it was out of the question for the jury to find a simple verdict of not guilty and thereby acquit him completely. Part of the complaint of the applicant against his conviction is that a question of provocation was not submitted to the jury and therefore was not considered by the tribunal of fact. (at p615)

3. It goes without saying that a distinction must be maintained between the manner in which the Court examines the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether a question of provocation should have been submitted to the jury and the manner in which the Court examines the evidence in considering whether there is material sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the applicant was guilty of homicide amounting, if considered independently of any possible extenuation such as provocation, to murder. Cf. the statement of Lord Devlin for the Privy Council in Lee Chun-Chuen v. The Queen (1963) AC 220, at pp 229, 230 . It was for the jury to decide what weight they would give to the evidence before them as it affected this primary question and since they have decided it against the applicant it is enough to sustain their conclusion so considered if contained in the evidence there is enough reasonably to lead to that conclusion, even if another view might be formed of this…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Parker v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Parker v The Queen [1963] HCA 14
Case: [1963] HCA 14
Decision Date: 24 May 1963

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Parker v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal against a conviction for murder. The appellant, Parker, had been found guilty of the murder of his wife and sentenced to death. The appeal raised significant questions concerning the admissibility of evidence and the proper application of the law relating to self-defence.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether certain evidence, including statements made by the deceased and evidence of the appellant's prior conduct, had been wrongly admitted at trial. Furthermore, the Court had to determine whether the trial judge had adequately and correctly directed the jury on the issue of self-defence, particularly in relation to the appellant's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions in the circumstances.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, found that the admission of certain evidence had prejudiced the appellant's case and that the summing up on self-defence was insufficient. The Court emphasised that for a conviction for murder to stand, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence. It was held that the jury directions had failed to properly convey the onus of proof and the elements of self-defence as established in common law, particularly concerning the subjective belief of the accused regarding the necessity of using force.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for murder, and ordered a new trial.

Orders