Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
EDELMAN, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS  APPELLANT

AND

DAVID JOHN SMITH  RESPONDENT

Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith

[2024] HCA 32

Date of Hearing: 18 April 2024

Date of Judgment: 11 September 2024

M16/2024

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 30 November 2023 and, in its place, the reserved questions of law be answered as follows:

1.Did the meeting infringe the principles of open justice as identified in Alec (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 208?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

2.Did the meeting bring the impartiality of the presiding judge into question?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

3.Did the occurrence of the meeting represent a fundamental irregularity in the trial process, such as to constitute a serious departure from accepted trial processes?

No.

4.If the answer to questions 1, 2 and/or 3 is in the affirmative, is the only remedy for the evidence of the complainant to be taken at a further special hearing conducted before a different judge?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria

Representation

L T Brown SC with S C Clancy and J R Wang for the appellant (instructed by Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic))

P F Tehan KC with G J F Chisholm and B A Myers for the respondent (instructed by James Dowsley & Associates)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GAGELER CJ, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ. This appeal concerns the operation of provisions of Pt 8.2A of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) which apply to criminal proceedings for sexual offences if a witness (including a complainant) is under the age of 18 years or has a cognitive impairment.[1] The grounds of appeal concern whether the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Emerton P, Priest and Macaulay JJA) was correct to hold that a meeting between the complainant, the judge, and counsel for both the prosecution and the accused (the accused being the respondent to this appeal), on the day before the judge presided over a special hearing to take the evidence of the complainant, was: (a) not authorised by s 389E of the Criminal Procedure Act; (b) inconsistent with the principle of open justice; and (c) a fundamental irregularity in the accused's trial that could not be waived.

    [1]Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), s 389A(3). From the commencement of the relevant section of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Sexual Offences and Other Matters)Act 2022 (Vic) on 30 July 2023, those provisions apply to any witness who is a complainant in relation…

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Details
Case
[2024] HCA 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the High Court of Australia against an order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute concerned a meeting held between a judge, counsel for both the prosecution and the accused, and a child complainant, prior to the complainant giving evidence at a special hearing. The accused was charged with sexual offences against a child under 16 years. The meeting was not attended by the accused and was not recorded, and it occurred following a recommendation from an intermediary appointed for the child witness.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the meeting was authorised by section 389E(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), whether it was inconsistent with the principle of open justice, whether it constituted a fundamental irregularity in the trial process, and whether it gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of issues. These questions arose in the context of a case stated by the Court of Appeal, which had previously set aside a conviction in a similar matter due to a private meeting between a judge and a complainant.

The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the meeting was authorised under section 389E(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and did not constitute a fundamental irregularity. While acknowledging that the meeting created a risk of irregularity, the Court found that no such irregularity in fact occurred. This conclusion was influenced by the fact that counsel for the accused had no objection to the meeting and attended it, and that there was no information suggesting anything untoward occurred during the brief introductory meeting. The Court determined that the meeting did not infringe the principles of open justice or bring the impartiality of the presiding judge into question in a way that constituted a fundamental irregularity.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and substituted its own answers to the reserved questions of law. The Court answered that the meeting was an irregularity in relation to the trial, but not a fundamental irregularity. It was unnecessary to answer whether the meeting brought the impartiality of the presiding judge into question, and it was not the case that the only remedy for the complainant's evidence to be taken at a further special hearing conducted before a different judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on 30 November 2023 and, in its place, the reserved questions of law be answered as follows:

1. Did the meeting infringe the principles of open justice as identified in Alec (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 208?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

2. Did the meeting bring the impartiality of the presiding judge into question?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

3. Did the occurrence of the meeting represent a fundamental irregularity in the trial process, such as to constitute a serious departure from accepted trial processes?

No.

4. If the answer to questions 1, 2 and/or 3 is in the affirmative, is the only remedy for the evidence of the complainant to be taken at a further special hearing conducted before a different judge?

It is unnecessary to answer the question as it does not arise in the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal must be allowed. As will be explained, the meeting was authorised under s 389E(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and did not give rise to any fundamental irregularity in the criminal proceeding. Although the meeting created a risk of an irregularity because of what could have occurred at the meeting, no such irregularity in fact occurred. BackgroundThe charge The accused was charged with three offences of sexual assault of a child under 16 years contrary to s 49D(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and one offence of sexual penetration of a child under 16 years contrary to s 49B(1) of that Act. A response filed on behalf of the accused under s 183 of the Criminal Procedure Act indicated that he would be pleading not guilty to all the charges. The meeting Purportedly pursuant to the provisions of Pt 8.2A (Ground rules hearings and intermediaries) of the Criminal Procedure Act, specifically s 389E of that Act, a judge in the County Court of Victoria, Judge Syme, and counsel for both the prosecution and the accused (as well as, we infer, the appointed intermediary) met with and were introduced to the complainant (who was a minor at the time the criminal proceeding was commenced and remained so at the time of the meeting), before the complainant gave evidence at a "special hearing" under Pt 8.2 of the Criminal Procedure Act.[2] The meeting occurred at the offices of the Child Witness Service. The accused was not present at that meeting, and the meeting was not recorded. [2]Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), Pt 8.2, Div 6, provides for special hearings in a criminal proceeding that relates (wholly or partly) to a charge for a sexual offence if at the time the proceeding was commenced the complainant was under 18 years of age or had a cognitive impairment (s 369). The meeting occurred as a result of a recommendation in a report of an intermediary appointed under s 389J(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which recorded that the complainant told the intermediary that it would assist her confidence to meet counsel and the judicial officer in person on the day she was to give evidence if that was possible. At the time of directing that the meeting occur, Judge Syme said that the purpose of the meeting was for the complainant to "say hello", and counsel for the accused confirmed he had no objection to the meeting and that he was content to introduce himself to the complainant at the same time. The accused had not been arraigned at the time of the meeting.[3] [3]Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), s 217.The special hearing The special hearing required to be conducted under s 370 of the Criminal Procedure Act at which the complainant gave evidence, including being cross-examined, occurred before the same judge on the day after the meeting. No mention was made about the meeting during the special hearing. Alec (a pseudonym) v The King After the special hearing, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Priest, Walker and Taylor JJA) published reasons for judgment in Alec (a pseudonym) v The King ("Alec").[4] In that matter the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction of an accused on the ground that a substantial miscarriage of justice occurred because the judge who conducted the special hearing met with the complainant "privately" (that is, in the presence of the intermediary but in the absence of counsel for the prosecution and the accused) in advance of that hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the private meeting between the judge and the complainant was a "fundamental irregularity"[5] which "tainted" the evidence the complainant gave in the special hearing,[6] as it gave rise to a "suspicion [in the sense of an apprehension] of partiality" on the part of the judge.[7] Accordingly, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a re‑trial on the basis that, as set out in s 276(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was satisfied that "as the result of an error or an irregularity in, or in relation to, the trial there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice".[8][4](2023) 72 VR 161.[5]Alec (a pseudonym) v The King (2023) 72 VR 161 at 164 [20].[6]Alec (a pseudonym) v The King (2023) 72 VR 161 at 166 [26].[7]Alec (a pseudonym) v The King (2023) 72 VR 161 at 167-168 [32]-[33].[8]Alec (a pseudonym) v The King (2023) 72 VR 161 at 168-169 [35]-[38].Prosecution applies for questions of law to be reserved

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ EDELMAN J
Although the private meeting was irregular, I do not consider that it was a fundamental irregularity. I reach this conclusion contrary to the approach of the Court of Appeal but recognising that this is a conclusion upon which reasonable minds might differ. The relevant circumstances of this case that militate against a conclusion that the irregularity was fundamental are that: (i) counsel for the accused confirmed in advance of the meeting that he had no objection to the meeting; (ii) counsel for the accused attended the meeting; and (iii) there was no information in the stated case before the Court of Appeal concerning what occurred at the meeting so that no inference can be drawn other than that, as the second judge described the purpose of the meeting, the presiding judge said "hello" to the complainant.Conclusion The appeal should be allowed. Question 1 should be reformulated to reflect the issue as it was treated in oral argument. In place of the answers to each of questions 3 and 4 given by the Court of Appeal, there should be substituted the answer, "No". Therefore, the questions should be answered as follows:1.In light of the principle of open justice was the meeting an irregularity in relation to the trial? Yes.2.Did the meeting bring the impartiality of the presiding judge into question? Unnecessary to answer. 3.Did the occurrence of the meeting represent a fundamental irregularity in the trial process, such as to constitute a serious departure from accepted trial processes? No.4.If the answer to questions 1, 2 and/or 3 is in the affirmative, is the only remedy for the evidence of the complainant to be taken at a further special hearing conducted before a different judge? No. The most crucial point of difference in my reasoning from that of the majority is that I do not accept that s 389E(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act empowered the court to direct that a private meeting take place between the judge, counsel and a witness, in the absence of the accused. The reasoning of the majority has the effect that, unless and until it is amended, s 389E(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act will confer a discretion upon the Victorian judiciary to give directions for private meetings between a judge and a witness but excluding the accused, at least where those private meetings are also attended by counsel. Whether it would be wise for such directions to be given is another question.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ, EDELMAN J

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