McPherson and Keane JJA and Chesterman J Separate reasons for judgment for each member of the Court, Keane JJA and Chesterman J concurring as to the orders made, McPherson JA dissenting in part.
ORDER:
1. Appeal against conviction dismissed 2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICULAR OFFENCES – OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – ACTS INTENDED TO CAUSE OR CAUSING DANGER TO LIFE OR BODILY HARM -OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON – where appellant charged under s 317(b) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) with one count of unlawfully transmitting a serious disease with intent and in the alternative with one count of grievous bodily harm under s 320 – where the appellant transmitted the HIV virus to the complainant through acts of sexual intercourse – whether the jury were adequately instructed about whether the appellant intentionally transmitted the HIV infection to the complainant – where jury were instructed ‘intent’ and ‘intention’ carry their ordinary meaning – meaning of intention – whether the transmission of a disease is an event which occurs “by accident” under s 23(1)(b) of the Code – whether verdict reasonable – whether trial judge erred in not directing the jury on the absence of evidence of motive in the Crown case
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – APPEAL BY CONVICTED PERSON – APPLICATIONS TO REDUCE SENTENCE – WHEN REFUSED GENERALLY – whether sentence of 10 years and 6 months manifestly excessive – where sentence imposed considered to be at the lower end of the sentencing discretion
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading R v Reid
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
R v Reid [2006] QCA 202
Case
[2006] QCA 202
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of R v Reid involved the appellant being charged under the Queensland Criminal Code with transmitting a serious disease, HIV, to the complainant through sexual intercourse. The appellant was charged under section 317(b) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) for unlawfully transmitting a serious disease with intent, and alternatively, under section 320 for grievous bodily harm. The appellant argued that the jury had not been properly instructed on the meaning of intent and whether the transmission of the disease could be considered accidental. The case also examined whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
The court was required to determine whether the jury had been adequately instructed about the meaning of 'intent' and 'intention', and whether the transmission of HIV could be considered an accidental event under section 23(1)(b) of the Code. Additionally, the court considered whether the verdict was reasonable and whether the trial judge erred in not directing the jury on the absence of evidence of motive in the Crown case.
The court found that the jury had been adequately instructed on the meaning of 'intent' and 'intention', and that the transmission of HIV was not an accidental event under the Code. The court held that the verdict was reasonable and that there was no error in the trial judge's instructions to the jury. The court also found that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, as it was considered to be at the lower end of the sentencing discretion.
The appeal against the conviction was dismissed, and the application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal against conviction dismissed
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence