Criminal Law (Q.)—Criminal responsibility—Person not responsible for event which occurs by accident—Manslaughter—Death not reasonably foreseeable—Whether accidental—The Criminal Code (Q),s. 23.
Orders
Application for special leave to appeal refused.
Decisions
MASON CJ, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ This is an application by the Crown for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Queensland quashing the respondent's conviction on a charge of unlawful killing and ordering that there be a new trial on that charge. It is well established that special leave should be granted to the Crown in such a case only in very exceptional circumstances ((1) R. v. Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; Reg. v. Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110.).
2. The outcome of the case depends upon the application and interpretation of the words "an event which occurs by accident" in the context of s.23 of the Criminal Code (Q.). That question is essentially one of statutory construction, the answer to which does not depend upon an important point of principle. As Dixon CJ observed in Vallance v. The Queen ((2) (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 61; see also Kaporonovski v. The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 at 220 per Walsh J ("each case presents a different problem").), with reference to s.13 of the Criminal Code (Tas.) (a provision comparable to s.23):
"(I)t is only by specific solutions of particular difficulties raised by the precise facts of given cases that the operation of such provisions as s.13 can be worked out judicially".
3. The words of the section are inherently susceptible of bearing the meaning placed upon them by the Court of Appeal of Queensland. The interpretation given to the section by that Court is one which favours the individual and reflects accepted notions of culpability and responsibility for criminal conduct. Moreover, it is an interpretation which derives support from comments made in some judgments of this Court, particularly Gibbs J (with whom Stephen J agreed) in Kaporonovski v. The Queen ((3) (1973) 133 CLR 209.).
4. In these circumstances, the case is not one in which it would be appropriate to grant special leave to enable the Crown to challenge an order of a State Court of Appeal quashing a conviction and ordering that there be a new trial. The consequence is that the interpretation placed by the Court of Appeal on s.23 remains unaffected in that State.
5. Special leave to appeal should be refused.
BRENNAN J An indictment charging the respondent with the manslaughter of Alan John Bankier in Toowoomba on 28 March 1992 was presented to the Supreme Court of Queensland sitting in Toowoomba. After a trial before Mackenzie J and a jury, the respondent was convicted. The death of the deceased was the result of a fight in a bar. Eyewitnesses claimed to have…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading R v Van Den Bemd
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
R v Van Den Bemd [1994] HCA 56
Case
[1994] HCA 56
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Van Den Bemd, which concerned the interpretation of s 41(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The appellant had been convicted of offences under the Act, and the central dispute revolved around whether the trial judge had erred in directing the jury regarding the elements of those offences.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the prosecution bore the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant had acted with a particular state of mind, specifically knowledge or recklessness, in relation to certain elements of the offences charged under s 41(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). This involved determining the mens rea required for the offences created by that section.
The Court held that s 41(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) did not require the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with knowledge or recklessness as to the falsity of the statement or the omission. Instead, the section imposed strict liability in relation to the falsity of the statement or the omission. The Court reasoned that the language of the section did not suggest a requirement for a guilty mind concerning the truthfulness of the statement or the completeness of the information provided. The appeal was dismissed.