CRIMINAL APPEAL OF VICTORIA. Criminal Law-Evidence-Admissibility-Onu of proof-Voluntary statement by
accusedDiscretion of trial judge- " Confession" not to be rejected on ground that promise or threat held out unless judge " "is of opinion that the inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt - -Evidence Acts MELBOURNE, 1928-1946 (No. 3674-No. 5183) (Vict.), S. 141.
Section 141 of the Evidence Act 1928 (Vict.) provides: ' No confession which is tendered in evidence shall be rejected on the ground that a promise or threat has been held out to the person confessing, unless the judge is of opinion that the inducement was really calculated to cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made."
Held that S. 141 applies only to confessions, i.e., statements which amount to admissions of actual guilt of the crime in question. It applies to compel the admission of some confessions which the common law would regard as non-voluntary, i.e., confessions induced by a threat or promise by a 1953/N.S.W) person in authority but it applies only to cases in which the common law referred would have rejected the confession as non-voluntary on the sole ground that 86 b.L.R. 376 it induced such threat or not to cases common
was by promise, in which the Reg to (1982) 2 law would have rejected the confession as non-voluntary on any other ground. Within the field not covered by S. 141, the modern common law CONSA 15/CLR 2. allows in the case of statements made by accused persons to police officers, whether confessions or not, a discretion to reject evidence of such state- ments; but, in all cases to which it applies, S. 141 is imperative and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion in any relevant sense. No question of discretion can arise unless the statement in question is a voluntary state- [NOTE :-On the 27th day of February 1951 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refused special leave to appeal from this decision.]
ment in the common-law sense. If it is non-voluntary, it s-usject to S. 141-legally inadmissible. If it is voluntary, circumstances may be proved which call for the exercise of discretion but there is no onus on the Crown to show a reason for the exercise of the discretion in favour of admitting the statement. The discretion rule represents an exception to a rule of law, and it is for the accused to bring himself within the exception. The question for the presiding judge in considering the exercise of the discretion is whether in all the circumstances it would be unfair to use the statement against the accused, regard being had to the propriety of the means by which the statement was obtained. If there has been some impropriety in the obtaining of the statement, it is relevant…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Lee [1950] HCA 25
Case
[1950] HCA 25
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *R v Lee* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria. The original trial had resulted in the conviction of Jean Lee, Robert David Clayton, and Norman Andrews for murder, with all three sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeal, by a majority, had quashed these convictions and ordered a new trial. The High Court granted special leave to the Crown to appeal this decision.
The central legal issues before the High Court concerned the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police officers. Specifically, the court had to determine the scope and application of section 141 of the *Evidence Act 1928* (Vict.) and its interaction with the common law "discretion rule" regarding the exclusion of evidence obtained through improper police conduct. The court was required to consider whether a trial judge possessed a discretion to reject voluntary statements made by an accused, and if so, the nature of that discretion and the onus of proof in its exercise.
The High Court reasoned that section 141 of the *Evidence Act* applies only to "confessions," meaning statements that amount to admissions of guilt. It compels the admission of certain confessions that would otherwise be inadmissible at common law due to inducements, unless the judge believes the inducement was likely to cause an untrue admission. However, section 141 does not preclude the common law discretion to reject evidence. This discretion allows a judge to exclude even voluntary statements if their admission would be unfair to the accused, considering the means by which they were obtained. The court clarified that the onus is not on the Crown to prove the absence of unfairness; rather, it is for the accused to demonstrate grounds for exclusion under this discretion. The court found that the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred in their application of this discretion, particularly by focusing on whether the impropriety was likely to cause an untrue admission, which it considered an irrelevant consideration for the exercise of discretion.
The High Court allowed the Crown's appeal, reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria, and restored the convictions and sentences of the original trial.