SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v SUPPIAH
[2018] SASCFC 11
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Hinton)
23 February 2018
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MANSLAUGHTER - OTHER ACTS OR OMISSIONS RESULTING IN DEATH
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS - DIRECTIONS TO JURY
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS - STATEMENTS - VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS - FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY - DETERMINATION OF ADMISSIBILITY
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - NEW TRIAL - IN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR GROUNDS - IN GENERAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING MISCARRIAGE - MISDIRECTION
Appeal against conviction for murder.
The victim was stabbed in the abdomen with a kitchen knife in the course of an altercation between the appellant and the victim. The prosecution case was that no other person was involved in the stabbing. The defence case was that Boby Mahalingam grabbed the appellant’s hand and deliberately or accidentally caused the victim to be stabbed.
The prosecution called as a witness Jega Selvanayagam, who gave evidence that approximately three weeks after the stabbing he asked the appellant why he killed or murdered the victim and the appellant said that on that morning the victim had called him a ladyboy. The appellant objected to admission of this evidence and Jega gave evidence on the voir dire. The Judge admitted the evidence.
The appellant appeals on the grounds that:
1. the Judge erred in his directions as to the dangerous act element of the alternative offence of manslaughter;
2. the Judge erred in admitting the evidence of Jega, or in the alternative, failing to exclude the evidence of Jega;
3. the Judge failed to adequately direct the jury as to Jega’s evidence;
4. the Judge erred in his directions as to specific intent required to prove murder and the relevance of intoxication thereto;
5. the Judge erred in his directions as to the burden of proof;
6. the Judge failed to adequately present the defence case.
Held:
(1) Although the Judge erred in directing the jury on the elements of manslaughter that a dangerous act is one exposing the deceased to an appreciable risk of injury rather than an appreciable risk of serious injury, the error was not material to the jury’s finding that the appellant was guilty of murder (at [62]) per Blue J and [155] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).
(2) The Judge did not err in admitting the evidence of Jega or in declining to exclude the evidence (at [73] and [88] per Blue J and [187] and [207] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).
(3) The Judge’s directions in relation to Jega’s evidence were not inadequate (at [93]) per Blue J and [219] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).
(4) The Judge’s directions in relation to intention to kill…
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- R v Suppiah [2018] SASCFC 11
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- [2018] SASCFC 11
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine several legal issues. Firstly, whether the trial judge erred in his directions on the proof of the fourth element of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, specifically by failing to direct the jury in terms of serious injury or harm. Secondly, whether the judge erred in admitting the evidence of witness Jega, or alternatively, in failing to exercise his discretion to exclude it. Thirdly, whether the judge failed to adequately warn the jury about the dangers of relying on Jega's evidence as an admission and to direct them on its permissible and impermissible uses. Fourthly, whether the judge erred in his directions regarding the specific intent required to prove murder. Finally, the court considered whether the judge erred in his directions on the burden of proof and in failing to adequately present the defence case.
Regarding the manslaughter direction, the court found that while the judge may have erroneously identified one element, this error was not material to the appellant's conviction for murder, and therefore this ground of appeal was not established. Concerning Jega's evidence, the appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove the statement was voluntary, given the appellant's state of vulnerability at the time. However, the court noted that at trial, senior counsel for the appellant explicitly accepted that no issue of voluntariness arose after the evidence of Dr Raeside was given, and did not pursue this contention. In the absence of any suggestion of incompetence of trial counsel, the court found no error of law on this point, meaning the appellant had to establish a miscarriage of justice. The court did not explicitly address the remaining grounds of appeal in the provided text.
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