R v Suppiah

Case [2018] SASCFC 11


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v SUPPIAH

[2018] SASCFC 11

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

23 February 2018

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MANSLAUGHTER - OTHER ACTS OR OMISSIONS RESULTING IN DEATH

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MURDER - ALTERNATIVE VERDICTS - DIRECTIONS TO JURY

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS - STATEMENTS - VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS - FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY - DETERMINATION OF ADMISSIBILITY

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - NEW TRIAL - IN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR GROUNDS - IN GENERAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING MISCARRIAGE - MISDIRECTION

Appeal against conviction for murder.

The victim was stabbed in the abdomen with a kitchen knife in the course of an altercation between the appellant and the victim.  The prosecution case was that no other person was involved in the stabbing.  The defence case was that Boby Mahalingam grabbed the appellant’s hand and deliberately or accidentally caused the victim to be stabbed. 

The prosecution called as a witness Jega Selvanayagam, who gave evidence that approximately three weeks after the stabbing he asked the appellant why he killed or murdered the victim and the appellant said that on that morning the victim had called him a ladyboy.  The appellant objected to admission of this evidence and Jega gave evidence on the voir dire.  The Judge admitted the evidence.

The appellant appeals on the grounds that:

1.  the Judge erred in his directions as to the dangerous act element of the alternative offence of manslaughter;

2.  the Judge erred in admitting the evidence of Jega, or in the alternative, failing to exclude the evidence of Jega;

3.  the Judge failed to adequately direct the jury as to Jega’s evidence;

4.  the Judge erred in his directions as to specific intent required to prove murder and the     relevance of intoxication thereto;

5.  the Judge erred in his directions as to the burden of proof;

6.  the Judge failed to adequately present the defence case.

Held:

(1)  Although the Judge erred in directing the jury on the elements of manslaughter that a dangerous act is one exposing the deceased to an appreciable risk of injury rather than an appreciable risk of serious injury, the error was not material to the jury’s finding that the appellant was guilty of murder (at [62]) per Blue J and [155] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).

(2)  The Judge did not err in admitting the evidence of Jega or in declining to exclude the evidence (at [73] and [88] per Blue J and [187] and [207] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).

(3)  The Judge’s directions in relation to Jega’s evidence were not inadequate (at [93]) per Blue J and [219] per Hinton J (Kourakis CJ agreeing)).

(4)  The Judge’s directions in relation to intention to kill…

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R v Suppiah [2018] SASCFC 11
Case
[2018] SASCFC 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, R v Suppiah, appealed against his convictions for murder and manslaughter. The dispute concerned alleged errors in the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the elements of manslaughter, the admissibility and use of a witness's evidence concerning an alleged confession, and the legal requirements for proving murder. The appeal was heard by Kourakis CJ, Blue and Hinton JJ.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. Firstly, whether the trial judge erred in his directions on the proof of the fourth element of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, specifically by failing to direct the jury in terms of serious injury or harm. Secondly, whether the judge erred in admitting the evidence of witness Jega, or alternatively, in failing to exercise his discretion to exclude it. Thirdly, whether the judge failed to adequately warn the jury about the dangers of relying on Jega's evidence as an admission and to direct them on its permissible and impermissible uses. Fourthly, whether the judge erred in his directions regarding the specific intent required to prove murder. Finally, the court considered whether the judge erred in his directions on the burden of proof and in failing to adequately present the defence case.

Regarding the manslaughter direction, the court found that while the judge may have erroneously identified one element, this error was not material to the appellant's conviction for murder, and therefore this ground of appeal was not established. Concerning Jega's evidence, the appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove the statement was voluntary, given the appellant's state of vulnerability at the time. However, the court noted that at trial, senior counsel for the appellant explicitly accepted that no issue of voluntariness arose after the evidence of Dr Raeside was given, and did not pursue this contention. In the absence of any suggestion of incompetence of trial counsel, the court found no error of law on this point, meaning the appellant had to establish a miscarriage of justice. The court did not explicitly address the remaining grounds of appeal in the provided text.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant appeals and seeks permission to appeal against the convictions on the grounds that:1.the Judge erred in his directions as to the proof of the fourth element of the alternative offence of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act in that his Honour failed to direct the jury in terms of serious injury or harm;[1]2.the Judge erred in admitting the evidence of the witness Jega; alternatively, the Judge erred in failing to exercise his discretion to exclude the evidence;[2]3.alternatively the Judge erred in failing to adequately warn the jury of the dangers of acting upon Jega’s evidence as an admission and/or failed to direct the jury adequately as to its permissible and impermissible use;[3] 4.the Judge erred as a matter of law in relation to his directions as to specific intent required to prove murder;[4]5.the Judge erred in his directions as to the burden of proof and in repeating the prosecution argument without correction as to the proper application of the burden of proof;[5]6.the Judge erred in failing to adequately present the defence case.[6][1] Ground 5.[2] Ground 2.[3] Ground 2A.[4] Ground 1.[5] Ground 3.[6] Ground 4.Background The appellant came to Australia in 2012 as a refugee from Sri Lanka. In July 2013 he moved into in a house at 9 Griffiths Street Elizabeth South where he lived together with other Sri Lankan refugees. The deceased (known as Sathees) came to Australia in June 2013 as a refugee from Sri Lanka. He moved into the house at 9 Griffiths Street. Biratheev Mahalingam (known as Boby), his wife Hemalatha Biratheev (known as Hema) and their elder daughter came to Australia in 2013 as refugees from Sri Lanka. In October 2013 they moved into a house at 8 Griffiths Street across the road from 9 Griffiths Street. They lived there together with other Sri Lankan refugees. In November or December 2013, the deceased moved from 9 Griffiths Street into 8 Griffiths Street. Sripalan Fernando (known as Sripalan or Sri) moved into 8 Griffiths Street and shared a room with the deceased. Ilayarasa Tharmakulasingam (known as Ilayaraja) and Kathirgamayogeswaran Vryamuthu (known as Sothi) also moved into 8 Griffiths Street. On the morning of 16 January 2014 the deceased parked his car in the driveway at 9 Griffiths Street and collected a sack of cans and bottles from the occupants. At about 6.40 pm in the afternoon the deceased was washing his car in his own driveway at 8 Griffiths Street. Ilayaraja was talking to him while he was washing his car. In the afternoon at about 3.30pm Kirubakaran Ramalingam (known as Kiruba) and the appellant came back to 9 Griffiths Street and drank vodka and soda. At one point the appellant used a knife (the knife) to cut up an apple for those present in the house. The blade of the knife was approximately 30 centimetres long. At about the 6.40 pm the appellant walked across the road with the knife and approached the deceased. The appellant and deceased were being observed by Ilayaraja and by Hema who was looking out of the lounge room window. Hema came out of the front door when she saw the appellant cross the road. Hema gave evidence that the appellant said to the deceased in an angry tone “You think you're a big person. Just because you've got a car, do you think you're a big shot, do you think you are bigger just because you've got a car?” Ilayaraja heard the appellant use an angry tone of voice but did not know what he said. The appellant pushed (according to Ilayaraja) or punched (according to Hema) the deceased in the chest with his right hand a few times.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Although the trial judge erroneously identified one of the elements of manslaughter, this error was not material to the conviction of the appellant of murder. This ground of appeal is not established.Jega’s evidence of conversation with appellantAdmissibility The appellant contends that the Judge erroneously admitted the evidence of Jega’s telephone conversation with the appellant in February 2014 because it was not proved to be voluntary and the Judge ought to have excluded it in the exercise of the “general fairness or Christie discretion.”[35][35] Ground 2. Evidence was given on the voir dire by Jega in the nature of a Basha inquiry. He gave evidence that during the telephone conversation:… I ask him, 'Why you kill [Kethees]?',[36] because he say - he say that morning, that morning Sathees came home, collect bottles, then - some things, then he's bring to outside, that time call him a ladyboy and shemale.[36] The transcript read “Sathees” but it is common ground that Jega said “Sathees”. In cross-examination on the voir dire, Jega was asked whether the reason why he asked the question was that he had been told this by someone else and he agreed. Jega said that at the beginning of the conversation that the appellant asked Jega to visit him; Jega said that he could not; the appellant said that everybody had left him; Jega said “God bless you. Look after yourself”; the appellant said “I'm very sad, everybody has left me”; and Jega said “This was a mistake you didn't intend to do. Take care of yourself and take care of your body very well and yourself very well”. Dr Raeside gave evidence on the voir dire which is referred to below. The appellant did not give evidence on the voir dire.Voluntariness The appellant contends that, the onus lying on the prosecution, the prosecution failed to discharge its onus of proving voluntariness. He points to the fact that he was detained in Glenside Hospital at the time of the telephone conversation because he was a suicide risk, having made what appeared to be a suicide attempt, had been prescribed anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medication, was in a state of desperation and vulnerability and his statement to Jega was on its face inconsistent with his statements to Jega and others on the evening of 16 January 2014 suggesting an aberration indicative of the absence of a free choice. Evidence of a confession is inadmissible as a matter of law if not made voluntarily.[37] The onus lies upon the prosecution to prove that a confession was made voluntarily once the issue is raised.[38] [37] Tofilau v The Queen [2007] HCA 39; (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [2] per Gleeson CJ, [28]-[30] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, [123]-[124] per Kirby J and [245] per Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ.[38] Hough v Ah Sam [1912] 15 CLR 452 at 457 per Barton J cited with approval in MacPherson v The Queen [1981] 147 CLR 512 at 519 per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J. In the present case senior counsel for the appellant at trial explicitly accepted that, following the evidence given by Dr Raeside, no issue of voluntariness arose and eschewed a contention that the appellant’s statement to Jega was not voluntary. There is no suggestion on appeal of incompetence of trial counsel. No issue of error of law therefore arises: the appellant must establish a miscarriage of justice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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