MASON C.J.: The facts of this matter are set out in the judgments of the other members of the Court. However, in order to deal with the central thrust of the applicants' case - the challenge to the reception into evidence of the police interrogation of the applicants - I need to reiterate some of the history of the police interrogation and refer to the ruling of the trial judge after the hearing of the voir dire. At the trial counsel for Ayliffe and Storhannus challenged the admissibility of the statements made by their clients on the grounds that the statements were not voluntary and that, even if voluntary, they were improperly obtained and should be excluded in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. The trial judge overruled the challenge on both grounds. The applications by Ayliffe and Storhannus for special leave to appeal ultimately sought to establish that the trial judge erred in overruling the challenge so far as it related to the statements made by these applicants, so it is necessary to examine his Honour's reasons with a view to ascertaining whether he was in error and whether any error gives rise to a special leave point.
2. No objection was made on behalf of Van der Meer to the reception into evidence of the statements made by him to the police. The absence of an objection at the trial to the reception of his statements constitutes a serious obstacle to the success of Van der Meer's application, the more so because Van der Meer, who alone of the applicants gave evidence at the trial, relied strongly in his defence on the exculpatory character of his statements.
3. The history of events at the Mareeba police station on 3 February 1984 began when Sergeant Dickson, who was in charge of the station on that day, saw Mrs W and Mr M at about 5.30 a.m. and heard their complaint that she had been raped by four men and he had been assaulted earlier that morning. The complainants did not know the four men. However, they knew that one of them was called "Moose" by his companions. At about 9.35 a.m. Dickson encountered Ayliffe who had just arrived at the police station, expecting to be driven to Atherton where he was to give evidence as a police witness in an unrelated case. Dickson asked Ayliffe some general questions and then proceeded to Ayliffe's home. There Dickson found Van der Meer and Mayo and, after asking them some general questions, brought them back to the police station. In response to one question Dickson ascertained from Mayo that he was known as "Moose".
4. On his return to the police station Dickson interviewed Ayliffe, Mayo and Van der Meer in turn, beginning with Ayliffe at 10.15 a.m. and continuing with Mayo at 10.35 a.m. and…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Van Der Meer v The Queen
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Van Der Meer v The Queen [1988] HCA 56
Case
[1988] HCA 56
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Van Der Meer, against his conviction for conspiracy to import a prohibited substance. The applicant had been found guilty by a jury in the Supreme Court of Victoria and subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which dismissed his appeal. The High Court then granted special leave to appeal.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by admitting evidence of the applicant's prior convictions. Specifically, the court had to determine if this evidence was improperly used to establish the applicant's propensity to commit the offence charged, thereby contravening the rule against character evidence being used to prove guilt.
The High Court held that the admission of the prior convictions was an error of law. The majority reasoned that the evidence of prior convictions was not relevant to proving any element of the offence of conspiracy charged, nor was it admissible under any exception to the general rule against character evidence. The evidence was presented in a manner that invited the jury to infer guilt based on the applicant's past criminal conduct, rather than on the evidence relating to the conspiracy itself. The court affirmed that evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible to prove that an accused committed the offence charged, unless it possesses a specific relevance beyond mere propensity.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.