The King v Fred
[2024] NTSC 78
•17 September 2024
| CITATION: | The King v Fred [2024] NTSC 78 |
| PARTIES: | THE KING |
| v | |
| FRED, Tamsley | |
| TITLE OF COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY |
| JURISDICTION: | SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction |
| FILE NO: | 22336567 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 17 September 2024 |
| HEARING DATE: | 2 September 2024 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Brownhill J |
| CATCHWORDS: |
EVIDENCE – Criminal proceedings – Admissibility of admissions made by the accused – Whether admissions should be excluded pursuant to ss 138, 90 and 137 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act – Admissions
are admissible at trial.
Whether admissions were improperly obtained or obtained in consequence
of an impropriety – Whether the alleged non-compliance with Police spontaneously and voluntarily – Admissions are not evidence obtained
improperly nor in consequence of an impropriety.
Whether admissions had probative value – Admissions went to the accused’s state of mind and related to a fact in issue – Admissions had probative value – Unnecessary to conduct ‘balancing exercise’ required by s 138(1).
Discretion to exclude admissions pursuant to s 90 – Whether there was
unfairness to the accused – The admissions were spontaneous and voluntary
– Unfairness addressed by not providing body worn footage to the Jury –
Admissions are admissible.
Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67, The King v Woods [2023] NTSC 21, The Queen v Bonson [2019] NTSC 22, The Queen v Layt [2018] NTSC 36 referred to.
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) ss 81, 85, 90, 137,
138.
Police General Order Q1: Questioning and investigations
Police General Order Q2: Questioning people who have difficulties with the
English Language – The “Anunga” guidelines.
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Crown: S Ledek Accused: S Ozolins
Solicitors:
Crown: Office of the Director of Public
ProsecutionsAccused: Northern Territory Legal Aid
Commission
Judgment category classification: C
| Judgment ID Number: | Bro2408 |
| Number of pages: | 27 |
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIAAT DARWIN
The King v Fred [2024] NTSC 78
No. 22336567
BETWEEN:
THE KING
Crown
AND:
TAMSLEY FRED
Accused
CORAM: BROWNHILL J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 17 September 2024)
The accused was charged with having sexual intercourse with the
complainant without her consent, contrary to s 192(3) of the Criminal
Code. The offence was alleged to have occurred on 9 November 2023.[1]
The Crown sought to rely on certain admissions made by the accused
after being taken into Police custody. The Defence argued the
admissions were inadmissible or should be excluded under various
provisions of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011
(NT) (‘ENULA’).
On 2 September 2024, I ruled that the admissions were admissible and
not to be excluded. I indicated that I would publish my reasons in due
course. These are my reasons.
Crown case
The Crown case is that the complainant and the accused met on a
dating application in or about October 2023. The accused was a ‘fly in
fly out’ worker who lived in Queensland, but came to Darwin roughly
every two weeks for a two week work shift. The accused and the
complainant had been communicating via the dating application, and
later via text messages, for a few weeks. They went on a first date and
continued to communicate via text messages thereafter. During the text
exchanges, the complainant made clear to the accused that she wished
to be married before living together or having children, and said she
would like to get to know the accused better. By contrast, the accused
often suggested romance, physical intimacy and proposed that the
complainant should stay overnight with him when they next met in
person. They agreed to go on a second date on 9 November 2023. The
day before the second date, the complainant sent a text message to the
accused saying that sex or living together before marriage was a non-
negotiable option for her and maybe she and the accused were just
looking for different things.
At around 6.30pm on 9 November 2023, the complainant and accused
met in the city for their second date. They walked around the
Esplanade and went to a restaurant for dinner. After dinner they walked
to the accused’s hotel room on the Esplanade. Neither had consumed
any alcohol. Inside the room, they sat down and drank some water. The
accused stood up and leant towards the complainant, kissing her on the
lips. She kissed him back. He then pulled her up to stand facing him
and put his arms around her back, pinning her body to his. He pulled
her shirt up and she pulled it down. She asked him to walk her back to
her car, which was parked across the road from the hotel. He said
words to the effect of: ‘Come on, it’s just a hug’. He kissed her quite
forcibly. She repeated several times: ‘No, I don’t want this, let’s go,
walk me to the car’. The accused put the complainant’s hand inside his
shorts and underwear onto his penis and told her to fiddle with him. He
thrust his hips against the complainant and her hand. She felt frozen
with shock. He pulled down her shorts and underwear and she pulled
them back up. He pulled them down again and she pulled them up. He
pulled them down again and removed them from her. He sat her down
on the bed by putting his hand on her shoulder. He put his hands under
her thighs and lifted her further up towards the centre of the bed. She
was lying on her back. He took off his clothes and inserted his penis
into her vagina. The intercourse continued for around 20 minutes, with
him kissing her on the mouth while her mouth was shut. During this
time, she said to him ‘no’ and ‘I want to go home’ and sat up. He said
words to the effect of: ‘Just let me finish’, pushed her back down on
the bed and continued having sex with her until he ejaculated. He went
to the bathroom. The complainant got dressed, grabbed her things and
left the hotel room. She walked to her car and drove home past the
Nightcliff Police Station, which was not open. She went from her home
to the Emergency Department at the hospital, reporting that she had
been raped.
After she left the hotel room and as she drove, the accused called her
several times and she did not answer. He sent her several text messages
asking where she was and saying he was looking for her. She replied
saying: ‘You knew I was angry and didn’t want to have sex with you at
all. Why did you force yourself on me?’ and ‘I said no multiple times
and yet you continued. Why?’
The accused responded asking why the complainant was angry, that it
all started with a good kiss, and he wanted to have a relationship with
her. He also said: ‘Am sorry but we were already there and I just had to
finish. Am sorry if I didn’t make u enjoy. We can be better next time.’
Lead up to the arrest
The following day, the complainant was examined at the Sexual
Assault Referral Centre and gave a recorded interview to Police. She
gave a physical description of the accused, including of some tattoos he had on his arms. She told Police what limited information she had
about the accused, including that he was originally from Papua New
Guinea and was a fly in fly out worker who worked in a mine in the
Northern Territory as an engineer, that he lived in Queensland and was
flying back to Queensland at 6.30pm that day.
Police made various efforts to identify the accused as the complainant
did not know his full name. They had a photograph of him which the
complainant had on her phone. Police went to the airport to apprehend
the accused before he caught the flight.
Arrest and admissions
At 3.25pm, the accused was located by Police detectives sitting outside
the airport terminal. The accused was arrested by two officers. The
arrest, and the exchanges between Police and the accused, were
captured on body worn footage.
[11] The arrest and exchange occurred as follows:
Police: How are you buddy? Accused: Hi. I’m good. Police: Just show us your hands, mate, [handcuffs placed on the accused]. My name’s [name]. This is [name], from the Northern Territory Police, mate. I’m just going to inform you, you’re under arrest, okay? For sexual intercourse without consent. Accused: Which one? Police: Sexual intercourse without consent. All right? So
you were at a hotel, I believe it was last night.Alright? You don’t have to say anything. Anything you say or do is being recorded [gestures to body
worn camera and accused looks at the camera]
and may be used in evidence, okay? Do youunderstand what I’m saying? Accused: Oh, I cannot... Police: Hey, is there anybody you want notified that you’re with the police today? Accused: No. Police: Nah? Okay. Alright. You all good? Accused: I’m good. Police: Okay. Alright. I know it’s scary mate. But [accused moves to stand] stay sat down for us. Do you have any questions about what’s going on? Accused: I was, I was with my girlfriend. Yeah. [Accused is asked to provide identification. He does so. He is asked for his name and where he is flying to. He provides that information. Police tell the accused they will take him to the
Watch house in their car, he asks about his luggage, and is told Police will take care of it. Police have a brief discussion about
‘telling AFP’ and retrieving the accused’s luggage.]
Police: How long have you been in Darwin? Accused: Oh, I’ve, um, been here like two months now. Yeah. So I, I, we will speak at the station, but I sort of
met this girl, ah, we were talking for a bit and then
she agreed to go with me, um, to the hotel. Um,
and we, we started like making out, making out.And actually we were having intercourse, um, but she sort of decided at the middle of intercourse that she, she wanted to like get to the car and I just told her I had to finish before we can, we can
go. That’s all I, I, I said to her. [Other Police arrive and further discussions occur between and he is placed in a paddy wagon.]
The accused was then taken to the Watch house and processed into
custody. At the Watch house, the following exchange occurred:
Police: So, um, I’m going to inform you that you are under arrest. You’ve been arrested today for, uh, sexual intercourse without consent. You don’t have to say anything. Anything you say or do... Accused: [nodding] Mm-hm. Police: ... is being recorded and may be used in evidence,
okay?Accused: Okay. Yep. Police: Um, so as a right of somebody in custody, you
have the uh the right to contact somebody to letthem know you’re with the police today. Is there anybody we can contact to let them know that you
are here?[Accused asks for family back at home, specifically his mother
in Papua New Guinea, to be contacted. Police advise him that
will be facilitated. Police inform the accused that Police will
be seizing his mobile phone to have it forensically analysed,and then he can have it back.]
Police: Okay. Alright. Um, it’s up to you whether you do or not, are you willing to provide your PIN? It may speed the process up, but it’s entirely up to you. Accused: Is it, um, with respect to the conversation I had with the, the one who’s complaining? The complainant? Police: Yes. Accused: Yeah, that’s all right. Police: Yes. So... Accused: We can, we can sort of, um, have a look at it. Cause it, I don’t think it’s, against their will. Cause we, on the message, we, we sort of agreed first and she, she actually agreed to like, for us to be together, um, like have a bit of intimacy and all that.
Accused: Um, and her complaint came after like we’ve, we’ve been through it and in the mid, mid, mid during the, um, activity, um, she decided to stop. So from, from, from my point of view, I don’t see this being against their will. Um, she was upset
about something and she sort of stopped.[There is a discussion about the PIN code. Accused is offered
a recorded interview, which he accepts. There is further
discussion about the accused’s details and personal situation.]
The underlined portions above were the admissions sought to be relied
on by the Crown.
It was not in dispute that those underlined portions were admissible
pursuant to s 81 of the ENULA as admissions or statements made at the
same time and reasonably necessary to understand the admissions. Nor
was it in dispute that those underlined portions were admissible
pursuant to s 85 of the ENULA because the circumstances in which the
admissions were made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of
the admission was adversely affected.
Rather, the Defence argued that the admissions should be excluded
pursuant to ss 138, 90 and 137 of the ENULA.
Exclusion of improperly obtained evidence – s 138, ENULA
The Defence argued that the admissions were obtained improperly or in
consequence of an impropriety within s 138 of the ENULA. The basis
of that argument was essentially because the caution was not
administered in accordance with Police General Orders , and because in
the circumstances it was clear the accused may not have understood his
right to silence.
Failure of Police to comply with Police General Orders may have the
effect that any admissions made by an accused comprise evidence that
was obtained improperly or in consequence of an impropriety within
s 138(1) of the ENULA.[2]
Airport admission
Firstly, the Defence argued that Police General Order Q1, item 2.1 had
not been complied with because the accused was placed in handcuffs
before he was arrested. Item 2.1 states:
Prior to arrest, Police have no authority to exercise any restraint whatsoever upon a person being questioned or to detain the person in any way, whether upon police premises or elsewhere, and the person is free to come and go as they please.
I do not accept that item 2.1 was not complied with. At the time of the
arrest, the accused was not ‘a person being questioned’ within the
meaning of item 2.1. The only question asked of him prior to his arrest
was ‘how are you?’ and the purpose of the Police approaching him was
to arrest him and take him into custody, not to question him. In any
event, the words ‘you’re under arrest’ were stated by the Police officer
to the accused less than six seconds after a handcuff was placed on his
wrist, after the officer had introduced himself and the other officer as
being from the Northern Territory Police, and during the course of the
handcuffing process.
Even if item 2.1 was not complied with (and I do not accept that), I do
not accept that the non-compliance had, or could have had, any bearing
at all upon the voluntariness or truthfulness of the admissions made by
the accused at the airport. The accused’s admission at the airport was
made more than three minutes after he was placed under arrest. I do not
accept that a six second delay between the commencement of the
handcuffing and the words ‘you’re under arrest’ could have had any
impact upon the accused’s decision to tell Police about what had
happened with the complainant the night before.
Secondly, the Defence argued that the Police did not comply with
Police General Order Q1, item 3.1 when administering the caution,
particularly given the accused’s apparent lack of understanding of it.
[22] Item 3.1 states:
A member, before questioning a person who is suspected of committing an offence, should inform the person of the nature of the allegations and caution the person in the following manner:
“I am going to ask you certain questions about [state briefly
nature of inquiry] which will be recorded. You are not
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, butwhatever you do say will be recorded and may be given in
evidence. Do you understand that?”
It is not necessary for the caution to be administered verbatim. that the essence of the caution must be conveyed, that is:
(a) the suspect knows the nature of the allegations; (b) the suspect understands that they don’t have to say anything (they have the right to remain silent);
(c) the suspect understands that what they say will be recorded; (d) the suspect understands that this recording may be used in court.
As Reeves J observed in The King v Woods (at [36]),[3] the purpose of a
caution is, in broad terms, to inform an accused person of three things:
(i) the existence of their right to silence; (ii) the basic content of that
right; and (iii) the consequences of waiving that right. An effective
caution must therefore convey each of these elements.
[24] The caution administered by Police in this proceeding did essentially
contain the words of the caution in item 3.1 above.
Despite that, the Defence argued that in the circumstances, the Police
should have gone further by confirming that the accused did understand
each of the elements of the caution. Defence argued that the Police
should have followed the requirements of Police General Order Q2,
particularly by: (a) in accordance with item 2.2, gathering evidence to
demonstrate whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of theAnunga Guidelines; and (b) in accordance with item 3.1.3, asking the accused to explain what is meant by the caution, phrase by phrase.
[26] Police General Order Q2 states:
General Order Q2 – Questioning people who have difficulties with the English language – The ‘Anunga’ Guidelines
...
2. Persons entitled to the benefit of the Anunga Guidelines
2.1 The guidelines apply to any person being questioned as a
suspect, if that person is not as fluent in English as the
average white person of English descent. Two important
points must be understood by all members:
2.1.1 not only aborigines fall into this category – it extends to migrants and possibly other groups as
well ...
2.2 Investigators must determine, as part of the
investigation, whether or not a particular suspect is
entitled to the benefit of the guidelines. Evidence must
be gathered to demonstrate whether or not a particular
suspect is so entitled. Such evidence might include:
2.2.1 the investigator’s observations of, and dealings and conversation with the suspect;
2.2.2 the suspect’s answers to questions put to the suspect, ...
3. The Guidelines
...
3.1.3 Great care should be taken in administering the
caution when the stage has been reached that it is
appropriate to do so. The suspect should be asked
to explain what is meant by the caution, phrase
by phrase.Questioning should not proceed until it is apparent that the suspect understands the right to remain silent.
...
The Defence argued that the requirement to go further than cautioning
the accused by use of the words set out in Police General Order Q1,
item 3.1 arose because:
a. when informed of the charge, the accused said ‘which one?’;
b. when asked if he understood the caution, the accused said ‘oh, I cannot ...’;
c. when informed of his arrest and cautioned, the accused looked confused;
d. the accused is a Papua New Guinean national, so English was not, or may not have been, his first language.
After the accused said ‘which one?’, the charge was repeated to him
and further details were given, namely that it related to him being at a
hotel the night before. It is more than apparent, from his admission
given later, that the accused understood the nature of the charge,
specifically that it related to his having had sex with the complainant
the night before, and that it related to sex having occurred without her
consent.
It is also clear from the interactions between the accused and the two
Police officers across the next three minutes before he made the
admission at the airport (and later at the Watch house) , that the accused
was ‘as fluent in English as the average white person of English
descent’ (as per the terms of Police General Order Q2). In those three
minutes the accused answered questions and followed instructions
regarding his identification, his transportation and raised with Police
the retrieval of his luggage.
Further, prior to going to the airport to seek the accused, the arresting
officer had been informed (at around 2pm) of an investigation being
undertaken by the Sex Crimes Unit, he reviewed the ‘PROMIS job’,
liaised with members of the Sex Crimes Unit, reviewed ‘Evidence.com’
and the photo of the accused obtained from the complainant, watched
CCTV footage obtained from a supermarket attended by the accused
and the complainant the night before, and was informed by members of
the Sex Crimes Unit that the complainant had stated that the accused
was due to fly to Townsville that day because he was a fly in fly out
mine worker.[4]
By the time the arresting officer became involved in the investigation,
the complainant had completed a recorded interview with Police during
which she disclosed her allegations against the accused, had informed
Police that she had been having communications with the accused bytext messages for a number of weeks prior to 9 November 2023, had
shown the interviewing officer some of those text messages, and had
told the arresting officer that the accused was a mining engineer who
worked with explosives, originally from Papua New Guinea, staying in
north Queensland, working at a mine in the Northern Territory, and
that he socialised with friends with mining connections.
I consider it highly likely that, prior to the accused’s arrest, the
arresting officer had been briefed with those details about the accused
(or sufficient of them) for him to reasonably form the view that the
accused was, despite his Papua New Guinean nationality, a person ‘as
fluent in English as the average white person of English descent ’. This
view would have been confirmed by his observations of, dealings with,
and conversations with the accused after the arrest.
Consequently, I find that the requirements of Police General Order Q2,
item 2.2 were complied with and the accused was not a person falling
within the terms of item 2.1.
I do not accept that the accused’s ‘negative’ response to the question
asking if he understood the caution, and his look of ‘confusion’, were
any sort of indication that he did not understand it. The response was
unfinished and appears to me to convey more surprise or shock at being
arrested for sexual intercourse without consent than a failure to
understand the essential elements of the caution, particularly his rightto remain silent. The accused clearly understood that he was being
recorded as he looked directly at the body worn camera when informed
of that.
In any event, I do not accept that the accused was ‘a person being
questioned as a suspect’ within the meaning of Police General Order
Q2. He was simply a person being arrested. The question which
preceded the accused’s admission was not a question designed to elicit
information from him about a suspected offence, it was simply a
question about his personal circumstances, most probably for the
purpose of putting him at ease as his transportation was arranged. It
appears from the absence of any reliance by the Defence on s 139 of
the ENULA that the Defence accepted that the admissions were not
made ‘during questioning’ at least within the meaning of that
provision.
I find that the admission made by the accused at the airport was
spontaneous and entirely voluntary, and not in any way a consequence
of an impropriety, nor do I find that it was elicited in response to
official Police questioning. While the accused made the admission after
being asked how long he had been in Darwin, that question was not
asked for the purpose of eliciting information about the alleged
offending and the admission was not responsive to that question. There
was nothing about the accused’s manner or the words he said to
suggest that he felt compelled to speak about the allegations. He was
clearly seeking to inform Police that the complainant had consented to
the sexual intercourse and his awareness or understanding of that. He
wished to put to them his side of the story, and elected to do so, in my
view, fully aware that anything he said or did was being recorded and
could be used as evidence in court.
Consequently, the admission made by the accused at the airpor t was
not evidence that was obtained improperly or in consequence of an
impropriety within s 138(1) of the ENULA.
Watch house admission
The Defence repeated the arguments dealt with above in relation to the
Watch house admission, which was made after the accused was re -
cautioned in a similar way to the caution at the airport, and which was
accompanied by the accused nodding and followed by the accused
giving an affirmative response to the caution (‘okay’).
[39] The nodding and affirmative response confirm that the accused had
understood the caution at the airport. The Defence submission that this
may have been some form of gratuitous concurrence is rejected. The
accused’s responses to instructions and requests again disclose that he
was a person as fluent in English as the average white person of
English descent. His use of the words ‘complaint’ and ‘complainant’
indicate a good understanding of English. His questions before his
affirmative response to Police requests for the PIN code to his phoneshow that he understood himself to be giving permission which he was
not compelled to give. He was not simply concurring without actually
agreeing to what was said to him.
Again, I find that the admission made by the accused at the Watch
house was spontaneous and entirely voluntary, and not in any way a
consequence of an impropriety or elicited in response to official Police
questioning. While the accused made the admission after being asked
for the PIN code to his phone, and the officer confirmed that it was
being sought in relation to his communications with the complainant,
he had not been asked anything about those communications. The
admission was not responsive to any request for information about
those communications or their presence on his phone. Again, there was
nothing about the accused’s manner or the words he said to suggest
that he felt compelled to speak about the allegations. He was clearly
seeking to put forward his side of the story, and elected to do so, in my
view, fully aware that anything he said or did was being recorded and
could be used as evidence in court.
For these, and the reasons set out above relating to the airport
admission, the admission made by the accused at the Watch house was
not evidence that was obtained improperly or in consequence of an
impropriety within s 138(1) of the ENULA.
Desirability and undesirability of admitting the admissions
[42] The above conclusions make it unnecessary to consider the balancing
exercise required by s 138(1) of the ENULA, and the matters set out in
s 138(2) to be taken into account.
[43] I will deal with this matter only briefly.
The Defence argued that the admissions had no probative value
because they did not establish or make more likely any fact which the
complainant had not already agreed to in cross-examination about the
complainant wanting to go to her car in the middle of sexual
intercourse, the accused saying he wanted to finish the intercourse
first, and the sexual intercourse resuming without any protest or overt
act from her to indicate that she did not consent thereafter. It was said
that, by virtue of her agreement to them in cross-examination, these
facts were not in dispute.
I reject the submission that the admissions had no probative value.
There were no agreed facts to the effect asserted by the Defence. There
was no indication by way of the Defence opening address that these
facts were not in issue (as opening addresses had not, at the time of the
voir dire, been made). There was no confirmed intention by Defence to
expressly inform the jury that these facts were not in issue. Instead, it was essentially argued that the jury would find these facts on the basis
of the complainant’s agreement to them in cross-examination.
[47] The difficulty with that submission is that the complainant’s evidence-
in-chief (by way of her recorded statement) was that the sex with the
accused was, from the outset, without her consent. Further, she did not,
at any time, agree with the proposition that when the sex resumed after
the accused said he wanted to finish the intercourse, it resumed with
her consent. Furthermore, the accused’s state of mind in relation to the
complainant’s consent to the whole of the sexual intercourse was in
issue.
The fact that the accused told Police that the complainant agreed to
‘intimacy’, that during the sexual intercourse, the complainant wanted
to go to her car, was upset about something and stopped the
intercourse, and that he told her he had to finish the intercourse, so in
his mind the sex was not against her will, must rationally affect the
assessment of the probability that: (a) these things happened; and (b)
the accused was aware of a substantial risk that the complainant was
not consenting and took that risk, or that he did not give any thought to
whether or not she was consenting. As to (a), even if the admissions
are consistent with the complainant’s evidence in cross-examination,
that would make those facts more likely. As to (b), both what the
accused said and the way that he said it in the admissions would clearly
have significant probative value in the jury’s determination about his
state of mind regarding the complainant’s consent to the sexualintercourse.
For these reasons, I reject the Defence submission that the admissions
had no, or very little, probative value (s 138(3)(a)).
I also consider that the admissions were important evidence in the
proceeding (s 138(3)(b)) because they were direct evidence from the
accused about his state of mind, and the accused may or may not have
elected to give evidence in the trial.
Given that there was no suggestion that the impropriety asserted by the
Defence was considerably grave (s 138(3)(d)) or deliberate
(s 138(3)(e)), the probative value of the admissions would have
weighed very heavily in favour of admitting them over the
undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in the way that it was.
Discretion to exclude admissions – ss 90, 137, ENULA
The Defence argued that the admissions should be excluded pursuant to
s 90 of the ENULA which provides that in a criminal proceeding, the
court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission if the evidence is
adduced by the prosecution and, having regard to the circumstances in
which the admission was made, it would be unfair to an accused to use
the evidence.
[53] That question of unfairness requires consideration of whether there was
identified some aspect of the circumstances in which the admissions
were made that revealed why the use of the evidence at the trial of the
accused would be unfair, that is, s 90 focusses upon the fairness of
using the evidence at trial.[5]
This is a distinct question from the reliability of the admissions, which
is the province of s 85 of the ENULA, and the lawfulness and propriety
of the Police conduct, which is the province of s 138 of the ENULA.[6]
I have already found that the admissions were spontaneous and not
elicited in response to official Police questioning. I note that, in The
Queen v Layt [2018] NTSC 36, Grant CJ observed (at [50]) that
generally speaking, where an accused spontaneously makes an
admission to Police in circumstances where the admission is not
elicited in response to official Police questioning, a court will not
exclude an unrecorded admission,[7] and similar considerations arise
where the admission is recorded. I agree with that observation.
The Defence argued that the use of the evidence at trial would be
unfair to the accused within s 90 of the ENULA because the conduct of
the Police brought about an unreliable admission because it presented
an incomplete representation of the way the sexual intercourse between
the complainant and the accused took place. Specifically, it omittedanything about what happened after the accused said he wanted to
finish the intercourse.
Accepting, without deciding, that this kind of argument falls to be
determined under s 90 rather than ss 85 or 138 of the ENULA, I do not
accept that there was some incompleteness which made the admissions
unreliable. The context of the admissions is clear and occurred after the
accused was arrested for sexual intercourse with the complainant
without her consent. The accused sought to inform Police about why
the sex was consensual and why he believed it to be so. If the
admissions are incomplete in that regard, which is doubtful, that is
because the accused did not give a complete version of events, and is
not a consequence of anything done by Police to cut his story short.
The complainant was cross-examined about what occurred both before
and after the accused said he wanted to finish the intercourse. The
accused could give evidence about these matters at trial for exculpatory
purposes if he elected to do so.
[58] Secondly, the Defence argued that had the Police administered the
cautions differently and in the way contemplated by Police General
Order Q2, item 3.1.3 (with the suspect being asked to explain what is
meant by the caution, phrase by phrase), he may not have made any
admissions at all, or may have made them differently. The only basis
for that submission is that prior to receiving legal advice, the accused
was prepared to give a recorded interview with Police and, afterreceiving legal advice, he declined to do so.
Reliance was placed on the observations of three members of the High
Court in The Queen v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159 (at [54]) where
Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ observed that, while unreliability
may be a touchstone of unfairness, it has been said not to be the sole
touchstone, and it may be that no confession might have been made at
all had the police investigation been properly conducted. In so saying,
their Honours cited two earlier observations of members of the High
Court.
The first was in Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 62 ALJR 656 at 662
where Mason CJ found that the police conduct of the interrogation of
the applicants in that case was such to make it unfair to use their
admissions against them and, had the police observed the principles
governing the interrogation of suspects, it might well have transpired
that the statements would not have been made or not made in the form
in which they were (which was initially to deny and then increasingly
to admit to involvement in the offending). Mason CJ observed that
after the investigation reached the accusatory stage when the Police
should have given them a caution and dealt with them as suspects,
Police in the course of a very lengthy interrogation proceeded to induce
the applicants to answer questions by various expedients, such as
attempting to break down the denials of each by reference to
contradictory statements made by the others, which tactics culminatedin the confrontation of one of the applicant’s by the complainants, and
all the while the applicants’ remained at the police station in
circumstances which to them must have seemed compelling and their
detention was unlawful.
The second was in Duke v The Queen (1989) 180 CLR 508 at 513
where Brennan J observed as follows:
The unfairness against which an exercise of the discretion is intended to protect an accused may arise not only because the conduct of the preceding investigation has produced a confession which is unreliable but because no confession might have been made if the investigation had been properly conducted. If, by reason of the manner of the investigation, it is unfair to admit evidence of the confession, whether because the reliability of the confession has been made suspect or for any other reason, that evidence should be excluded. Trickery, misrepresentation, omission to inquire into material facts lest they be exculpatory, cross-examination going beyond the clarification of information voluntarily given, or detaining a suspect or keeping him in
isolation without lawful justification – to name but some
improprieties – may justify rejection of evidence of a confession ifthe impropriety had some material effect on the confessionalist, albeit the confession is reliable and was apparently made in the exercise of a free choice to speak or be silent.
By comparison with those cases, there is absolutely nothing to suggest
that the conduct of the Police towards the accused gave rise to
admissions which would not otherwise have been made or made in the
form that they were.
Thirdly, the Defence argued that the body worn footage depicting the
accused making the admissions was highly prejudicial, showing him in
handcuffs with numerous Police coming and going, and showing the
conversations between Police about his transportation, informing the
‘AFP’ and so on, and in the Watch house with other prisoners and
Police present.
In acknowledgment of the capacity of the body worn footage to
prejudice the jury’s perception of the accused and render the use of the
footage unfair to the accused, the Crown elected to provide evidence of
the admissions to the jury in the form of a transcript, rather than in the
form of video footage, with almost all of the extraneous exchanges
between the accused and Police (including the arrest and cautions)
removed.
On that approach, the only real potential unfairness within s 90 of the
ENULA, of the use of the admissions by the Crown, was removed.
Likewise, this course also removed the only potential danger of unfair
prejudice to the accused within s 137 of the ENULA. Consequently, the
probative value of the admissions was not outweighed by that danger.
Consequently, evidence of the admissions (in the written form the
Crown proposed to elicit it) is not rendered inadmissible by operation
of ss 90 and/or 137 of the ENULA.
Disposition
For the above reasons, on 2 September 2024, I ruled that the
admissions were admissible at the trial.
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| [1] | Criminal Code Criminal Justice Legislation Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2023 (NT), which commenced operation on 25 March 2024. By |
This was prior to the amendments to the made by the committed on or before that date, and the offence provisions as in force before that date continue to apply in relation to offences committed before that date.
[2] See The Queen v Bonson [2019] NTSC 22 at [41]-[50], [56] per Hiley J and the authorities there cited; The King v Woods [2023] NTSC 21 at [39] per Reeves J, citing Bonson.
[3] The King v Woods [2023] NTSC 21 at [36].
[4] Statutory Declaration of Constable First Class Christopher Smith, 10 November 2023.
[5] See Em v The Queen (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [107] per Gummow and Hayne JJ.
[6] Ibid at [109], [112], [121]
[7] Citing Bullock [2005] NSWSC 825.
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