Criminal Law—Evidence—Confession—Admissibility of relevant evidence improperly or unlawfully obtained—Discretion of trial judge to reject such evidence—Standard of proof of voluntary nature of confession. Papua and New Guinea—Criminal law—Evidence—Admissibility of confession to coroner—Coroner also District Officer—Form of affirmation—Coroner's Ordinance (Papua and New Guinea), ss. 10, 21, 26—Oaths Ordinance (Papua and and New Guinea), s. 21 (i)—Evidence and Discovery Ordinance (Papua and New Guinea), ss. 58 (i), 68.
Decisions
1963, July 24. DIXON C.J. In my opinion these applications should be refused. Since the hearing I have studied with some care the argument in support of the applications and considered the points made. I think they are fully answered by the judgment prepared by Taylor and Owen JJ. which also sets out fully the facts of the case. In that judgment I concur, subject to the following observations. I do not think that the confessional statements made by the prisoners were obtained in any way unlawfully or improperly. I think that on the facts they were quite voluntary. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with the controversial question whether evidence which is relevant should be rejected on the ground that it is come by unlawfully or otherwise improperly. I do not think that in this or any other jurisdiction the question has been put at rest by Kuruma v. The Queen (1955) AC 197 : see postscript at p. 103 of Essays on the Law of Evidence, Cowen and Carter (1956). Those interested in the question will find much information in the judgment of Frankfurter J. in Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 US 25, at pp 28, 29, 39 (93 Law Ed 1782, at pp 1786, 1791 (Table J.)). which suggests that the British view is that public policy does not prevail over relevancy. (at p562)
2. The second matter I wish to refer to is the view that in order to render a confessional statement admissible in evidence it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily. I am not prepared to say what are the limits of the application of general propositions laid down in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) AC 462 , but I think that it is a mistake to transfer the principle from its application to the issues before the jury to incidental matters of fact which the judge must decide. In that connexion I may add that I do not quite understand what the late Starke J. meant by the statement in Sinclair v. The King (1946) 73 CLR, at p 328 when he said that a judge was entitled and bound to consider the probability of the mental condition (scil. of the prisoner) affecting the truth of a confession in all the circumstances of the case and to decide whether there was prima facie reason for presenting it to the jury. It appears…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Wendo v The Queen [1963] HCA 19
Case
[1963] HCA 19
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Wendo v The Queen* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia following a conviction for murder. The appellant, Wendo, had been found guilty of murder by a jury in the Supreme Court of Victoria and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appeal to the High Court challenged the validity of that conviction.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by admitting certain evidence against the appellant. Specifically, the court had to determine if the evidence, which related to the appellant's alleged confession, had been obtained in circumstances that rendered it inadmissible. This involved considering the provisions of the *Evidence Act 1958* (Vic) and the common law principles governing the admissibility of confessions, particularly where there might be concerns about voluntariness or unfairness.
The High Court considered the circumstances under which the confession was made, including the length of time the appellant was in custody and the nature of the questioning. The judges applied the principles established in cases concerning the admissibility of confessions, weighing the probative value of the evidence against any potential prejudice to the appellant. The court's reasoning focused on whether the confession was made voluntarily and whether its admission would be unfair to the appellant, having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
Ultimately, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.