Ryan v RSPCA of SA Inc

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

RYAN v RSPCA OF SA INC

[2020] SASC 176

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Livesey

21 September 2020

ANIMALS - VARIOUS STATUTORY PROVISIONS - PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS - OFFENCES - CAUSING UNNECESSARY PAIN AND CRUELLY ILLTREATING

MAGISTRATES - COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS - DUPLICITY, AMBIGUITY AND UNCERTAINTY

Appeal against conviction.

On 3 May 2017 inspectors appointed pursuant to s 28 of the Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) (“the Act”) attended the appellant’s property. The respondent suspected breaches of the Act. Accompanying the inspectors was a veterinarian. The attendance was authorised by a warrant under s 30 of the Act.

During the inspection, a dog was euthanised on site and 26 dogs and 23 chickens were seized. Three of the dogs were later euthanised pursuant to s 34B of the Act.

A complaint was subsequently filed in the Magistrates Court and a trial proceeded in relation to 27 charges of ill-treatment as follows:

1.  Counts 1 to 4 alleged a failure to provide appropriate and adequate veterinary care to four German Shepard dogs;

2.  Counts 5 to 27 alleged a failure to provide appropriate and adequate living conditions and water to 23 Pomeranian dogs.

Following the trial, the Magistrate delivered a verdict of guilty in relation to all 27 counts.

In this Court the appellant appeals against her convictions on four grounds:

1.  In relation to counts 5 to 27, the Magistrate erred in not finding that the charges were bad for duplicity because they alleged two or more offences in a single charge.

2.  The Magistrate failed to properly exercise his discretion by failing to exclude the evidence that was obtained under the search warrant because the warrant did not bear the seal of the Magistrates Court and because it was not obtained or executed in good faith.

3.  The Magistrate did not give proper weight to the evidence given by the appellant.

4.  The Magistrate did not give proper weight to the appellant’s evidence and improperly dismissed what the appellant had said in evidence and in writing.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

1.  Counts 5 to 27 are not bad for duplicity, whether patent or latent duplicity. The charged offences are each of ill-treatment of a specified animal, the particulars of which comprised the matters specified.

2. The Magistrate did not exercise the discretion described in Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 and did not err in finding that the seal was not required and that there was no impropriety in connection with the obtaining or use of the warrant.

3.  The Magistrate did not err in his fact finding, and, in particular, was entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence.

Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA) s 13, s 28, s 30, s 31A, s 31D; Crimes Act 1941 (Cth) s 79; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 76B, s 181, s 182; Fisheries Management Act 2007 (SA); Justices Act 1921 (SA) s 182, s 185; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA)…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASC 176
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves Ryan, the appellant, and RSPCA of SA Inc, the respondent, before the court. The dispute concerns allegations of cruelty to animals under various statutory provisions. The case was heard in the Magistrates Court and subsequently appealed. The central legal issues pertain to the adequacy of the trial Magistrate's assessment of the appellant's evidence and whether the Crown proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court needed to determine if the trial Magistrate appropriately directed himself in considering the appellant's evidence, especially since the respondent's case was largely supported by objective evidence from video and photographs.

The court's reasoning focused on the trial Magistrate's approach to evaluating the appellant's evidence. It was noted that the Magistrate had correctly directed himself on the principles applicable to assessing witness testimony, including the ability to accept parts of a witness's evidence and reject others. The court highlighted that the strength of the respondent's case lay in objective evidence rather than solely on the appellant's testimony. The expert opinion evidence provided additional support for the respondent's case, and any conflicts with the appellant's evidence were resolved in favour of the respondent. The court concluded that the trial Magistrate's directions were appropriate and that the Crown had sufficiently proven the appellant's guilt.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court found that the appellant's complaints about the trial Magistrate's handling of her evidence were unfounded. The findings from the full and fair trial, supported by objective evidence and expert opinion, led to the conclusion that the appellant's guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected all grounds of appeal and affirmed the original decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I reject appeal ground 2.Appeal ground 3 — the appellant’s evidence The appellant complains that the Magistrate failed to give proper weight to her evidence. In the course of a very carefully prepared set of reasons the trial Magistrate was at pains to direct himself about a number of important matters. These included:[79]1. In finding facts, I am not bound to accept or reject the evidence of a witness in total. I can accept part of a version told by one witness and part of a story told by another witness even on the opposite side to come to a conclusion and finding of fact. I can accept part of a witness’ evidence, and reject the rest.[80]2. An accused person does not have to give evidence on oath to support their own defence. However, if she does so and enters the witness box, she does not have to prove her innocence. …[81] 3. Where the defendant has put herself forth as a witness she is to be assessed as any other witness and is not to be given any consideration different from that.[82]4. Her evidence is to be assessed as any other witness and if I believe the evidence of the accused, I must acquit. Secondly, if I have difficulty accepting the evidence of the accused, but think it might be true, I must acquit. Third, if I do not believe the accused, then I should put her testimony to one side. The question will remain however, has the Crown, upon the basis of evidence that I accept, prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt?[83] [79] Reasons [21]-[36]. [80] Reasons [31].[81] Reasons [33]. [82] Reasons [34].[83] Reasons [35] (emphasis in original). It might be said, with respect, that the first and second sentences in the fourth of the directions set out above did not necessarily meet all of the issues that arose on the evidentiary contest in this case. Having said that, it was nonetheless entirely appropriate for the trial Magistrate to direct himself formally in these terms. The strength of the respondent’s case really lay in the objective record provided by the video and photographs which depicted the condition of the animals, and the pens in which they were kept, during the attendance on 3 May 2017. On this evidence, it may not have mattered whether the Magistrate did believe the appellant’s evidence. Of course, as it turned out, the appellant made various concessions under cross-examination which were not only accepted, but which were probative of her guilt. I refer by way of example to the passage set out at paragraph 26 of these reasons. Quite apart from the objective evidence to which I have referred, there was also expert opinion evidence (summarised below). To some extent that conflicted with the appellant’s evidence, but in other respects that expert evidence stood alone. In so far as some findings depended upon the resolution of a direct clash between the oral evidence called by the parties, the approach of the High Court as described in Johnson v The Queen could be applied:[84]The jury was correctly directed to consider each count separately; that it was not incumbent on the appellant to prove anything; and that if it did not accept his evidence in some respects, or at all, it did not follow that he should be found guilty of the charge under consideration. Consistently with those directions, the jury must have been satisfied of the truthfulness and reliability of VW’s account of each of the offences. Necessarily, that satisfaction required the jury to exclude the reasonable possibility that the appellant's evidence in respect of each offence was true.[84] Johnson v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 106, [63] (the Court).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Insofar as the appellant simply reactivates her complaint about the approach of the trial Magistrate to her evidence, generally, I again reject it. Conclusion Whereas the appellant maintains that on 3 May 2017 the respondent found at her property “alert, bright dogs, with proper body scores, of proper weight” with “no evidence of the requisite distress required for the charges” that assertion was irrelevant regarding the Pomeranian dogs and is contrary to the evidence regarding the German Shepherd dogs and the findings actually made following a full and fair trial of the issues. In my opinion the appellant’s four grounds of appeal, as reformulated, must be rejected and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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