Negligence—Duty of care—Breach of duty—Foreseeability of risk of risk of injury—Safe system of work—Conduct of employer—Requirement that employee work in particular system—Whether reasonably foreseeable risk of injury. Appeal—Finding at trial contrary to evidence of witness—Failure by judge to refer to evidence—Ability of appellate court to disregard finding.
Decisions
MASON C.J. I agree with the judgment of McHugh J.
DEANE J. I agree with the judgment of McHugh J.
DAWSON J. I agree with McHugh J.
GAUDRON J. I agree with the judgment of McHugh J.
McHUGH J. The question in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of New South Wales was correct in holding that the trial judge (Mathews J.) had erred in finding that the defendant was negligent in not adequately supervising the work of the plaintiff who was employed by the defendant as a mail officer coder with Australia Post. The nature of the plaintiff's employment
2. The plaintiff commenced employment with the defendant as a coder in May 1974. She was employed in that position until 1979. Her duties required her, while sitting on a chair, to operate a coding machine by means of a keyboard. The chair was made of metal with a padded vinyl or plastic seat and backrest. It had a left-sided armrest, but did not have a right armrest. The machine was about 1800 mm high and 900 mm wide, with a well for the operator's legs, into which a footrest could be placed. The machine had a centrally located window, divided horizontally, at the eye level of a seated operator. Letters were brought to the machine by a conveyor belt. Each letter appeared in the upper half of the window and then fell into the lower half where it was coded by the operator. The keyboard stood on a stand about 340 mm to the right of the centre line of the coding machine. Its height could be adjusted by about 70 mm; it could be rotated through 360 degrees. But the angle of the keying panel, which stood at 20 degrees to the horizontal, could not be altered. The operator depressed the keys of the keyboard to register either the numeric postcode on the letter or an alphabetical code which the operator deduced by studying the address. The keyboard, which Mathews J. said had 19 keys, was for use by the right hand only. All alphabetical coding was effected by pressing two keys simultaneously. Using the keyboard required more skill than that normally required in using a typewriter. The operators were trained to perform 10,000 key strokes per hour, but they worked at their own speed. Each machine was adjusted so that no letter would drop into the window until the previous one had been coded. There was evidence that the average coding rate was about 1,000 to 1,100 letters…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Abalos v Australian Postal Commission [1990] HCA 47
Case
[1990] HCA 47
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr. Abalos against the Australian Postal Commission concerning a claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident. Mr. Abalos alleged that the Commission's employee, driving a postal vehicle, was negligent and caused the accident, resulting in his injuries. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the Commission was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the driver of the postal vehicle was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Specifically, the court had to determine if the driver's deviation from his usual route to visit a friend constituted an act undertaken in the course of his employment, thereby rendering the Australian Postal Commission vicariously liable for his negligence.
The High Court, in its reasoning, applied the principles of vicarious liability. It considered the degree of control the employer exercised over the employee's actions and whether the employee's conduct was so closely connected with his authorised duties that it could be regarded as an unauthorised mode of doing something authorised. The court found that the driver's detour to visit a friend was a significant departure from his employment duties and was not merely a minor deviation. Therefore, the driver was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Full Federal Court. The court held that the Australian Postal Commission was not vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee.