BRENNAN J. Special leave to appeal was granted in this case in order to consider the principles governing the duty of a trial judge to state the reasons for his decision. In the event, the case does not raise that problem for consideration. As the reasons of McHugh J. show, the essential findings of fact were made by the trial judge and there was evidence to support them. I agree with his Honour that the appeal must be allowed, the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court set aside and in lieu thereof the appeal to that Court be dismissed.
DEANE J. I agree with the reasons of McHugh J.
DAWSON J. I agree with the reasons of McHugh J.
TOOHEY J. I agree with the reasons of McHugh J. and with the orders his Honour proposes.
McHUGH J. This appeal is brought by a plaintiff in an action for damages in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory against an order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia setting aside judgment in his favour in the action. The Full Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further hearing after concluding that the reasons of Kelly J., the trial judge, did not "clearly reveal his findings of fact in relation to the circumstances of the subject accident". The principal question in the appeal is whether this conclusion of the Full Court was correct.
2. The plaintiff (the appellant) suffered personal injury at about 12.30 pm on 7 July 1982 when a motor cycle he was riding collided with the rear of a car driven by the defendant (the respondent) in Gladstone Street, Fyshwick. Both vehicles were travelling in an easterly direction with the defendant's vehicle ahead of the plaintiff's cycle. The plaintiff estimated that, when he first entered Gladstone Street, the defendant's vehicle was about 100 metres, or on another version 50 metres, ahead of him. The distance which the plaintiff travelled along Gladstone Street before the collision was also the subject of differing estimates, but the greatest estimate was 300 metres. As the defendant approached a store and parking area on the southern (i.e. his right hand) side of the street, he moved "a couple of feet" to the right of the lane in which he was travelling. He gave no indication that he was moving to the right. The defendant's speed was about 15 kilometres per hour. After veering right, the defendant almost immediately turned left for the purpose of entering a parking area on the northern side of the street. The trial judge found that the defendant turned left at an angle of 30 degrees and that the vehicles collided when the front of the defendant's vehicle was almost at the gutter on the northern side of Gladstone Street.
3. The defendant gave evidence that 11 metres…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Jones v Hyde [1989] HCA 20
Case
[1989] HCA 20
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Jones v Hyde*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Jones, and the respondent, Hyde. The case concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a contract for the sale of a grazing property.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the contract, which included a condition precedent relating to the purchaser obtaining finance, was void for uncertainty or for failing to disclose the terms of the finance sought. The court also had to determine whether the vendor had repudiated the contract by their conduct.
The High Court held that the condition precedent requiring the purchaser to obtain finance was not void for uncertainty. Their Honours reasoned that the law implies a term that the purchaser will act honestly and reasonably in seeking finance. Furthermore, the court found that the vendor's conduct did not amount to a repudiation of the contract. The appeal was dismissed.