Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 4) - [2024] SASCA 113

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
KEANE v WOOLWORTHS GROUP LTD (No 4)
[2024] SASCA 113
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Stanley and the Honourable Auxiliary Justice Hall)
20 September 2024
PROCEDURE
STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY
VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
This is an appeal by Mr Keane against a “vexatious litigant declaration” and associated orders made on the application of Woolworths pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).
The evidence before the primary judge showed that Mr Keane had become obsessed with the circumstances in which his employment with Woolworths was terminated nearly four years ago. His unfair dismissal claim was soon followed by a negotiated settlement, which resulted in the payment by Woolworths of a sum of money to him.
Mr Keane then instituted over 30 unsuccessful applications in the Fair Work Commission, an unsuccessful application for judicial review in the Federal Court (together with attempts to appeal the unsuccessful outcome), six proceedings in the Magistrates Court, and around seven unsuccessful or attempted applications in the Supreme Court. Generally, these were dismissed but, in some instances, they were rejected or abandoned.
Mr Keane is not legally represented.
The first stage for the primary judge, and this Court, was to determine whether Woolworths had demonstrated that Mr Keane had “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” within s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) where only proceedings instituted in a South Australian court or tribunal were within the statutory definition. The second stage was to consider whether in all of the circumstances it was proper for the court’s discretion to be exercised in favour of making the declaration and orders sought.
HELD (by the Court), allowing the appeal for the limited purpose of amending the terms of one of the orders made by the primary judge, but otherwise dismissing the appeal with costs:
1.Mr Keane’s appeal grounds and written and oral submissions did not attack the findings made, nor the declaration and orders made, by the primary judge.
2.The obligation in this Court to conduct a rehearing, and the fact that Mr Keane is not legally represented, combine to require that consideration be given to whether the declaration and orders made in this case were properly made.
3.It has been necessary to review each of the proceedings and applications, and the evidence surrounding them.
4.Whilst there is some scope to question the reliance placed by the primary judge on some of the material before her Honour, the proper conclusion on the whole of the material is that the requirements of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) were clearly satisfied, and the exercise of discretion to make a declaration and orders in the terms they were made was open.
5.Observations made about the elements of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), the inherent powers of the court, and an order restricting the way in which Mr Keane may correspond with the Supreme Court. Observations also made about proceedings commenced in the Court of Appeal, had it been necessary to re-exercise discretion afresh.

6. Order 3 of the primary judge to be amended to read:
I order that Thomas Courtney Keane be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court or Tribunal of the State of South Australia without the permission of this Court pursuant to s 39(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).

Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 28; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 43; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 345, 365, 394, 587(1), 589, 773, 739; Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AO(2); Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) s 4; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) ss 39, 39(1), 39(1)(a), 39(4), 39(5), 39(5)(a), 39(5)(b), 39(6), 50; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 28; Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 32.3(1)(c), 51.1, 85(1), 212.5(1), 218.17, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1; Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19; Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154; Woolworths Group Ltd v Keane [2024] SASC 12; WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, discussed.
Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd & Ors (2020) 137 SASR 117; Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349; Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49; Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28; Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425; Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29; Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070; Braeside Bearings Pty Ltd v HJ Brignall and Associates (Boronia) [1996] 1 VR 17; Brogdon v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 809; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322; Cook v Flaherty [2021] SASC 73; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; Davies v The Queen [2021] SASCA 26; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Doerr v Gardiner [2023] QCA 160; Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Flowers v Finlayson (No 2) [2023] SASCA 12; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Fuller v Toms [2013] FCA 1422; Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19; Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90; GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; GM v Department of Human Services [2024] SASCA 93; Groom v Police (2015) 252 A Crim R 332; Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd & Ors [2024] SASCA 80; Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375; Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedlar [1976] 1 NSWLR 478; In re Becker [1975] 1 WLR 842; In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21; Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 1148; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 1592; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 3003; Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 2) [2024] SASCA 39; Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd (No 3) [2024] SASCA 87; Keane v Woolworths Group Ltd [2024] SASCA 15; Keane v Woolworths Ltd [2023] FCA 379; Martincic & Anor v Ethnic Broadcasters Inc [2024] SASCA 33; McLennan v McCallum [2010] WASCA 45; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438; Mr K v The Employer [2021] FWC 2132; Mr K v The Employer [2021] FWCFB 3162; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 1341; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 152; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 456; Nanosecond Corporation Pty Ltd v Glen Carron Pty Ltd (2018) 132 SASR 63; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; Pavitt v The Queen (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; Pitt v Commissioner for Consumer Affairs [2021] SASCA 24; Police (SA) v Mahon (2022) 141 SASR 374; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419; R v Geoffrey (A Pseudonym) [2024] SASCA 40; Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378; Re Attorney‑General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321; Re F (2001) 161 FLR 189; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367; Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1; SJ Berry Pty Ltd v McEntee (2022) 142 SASR 31; Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540; State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Limited (In Liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 306; Steven Moore (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30; Testel Australia Pty Ltd v Goulding [2023] SASCA 116; Thomas v Nash (2010) 107 SASR 309; Thomson v Tremco Pty Limited [2019] QCA 18; Trezise v South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2024] SASCA 100; UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481; Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Woolworths Group Ltd v Keane (No 2) [2024] SASC 13; Woolworths Group Ltd v Keane [2024] SASC 12; Woolworths v Keane (No 2) [2024] SASC 13; WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191; Young v The King [2024] SASCA 47, considered.

KEANE v WOOLWORTHS GROUP LTD (No 4)
[2024] SASCA 113
Court of Appeal – Civil: Livesey P, Stanley and Hall AJJA
THE COURT:
Introduction

This is an appeal by the appellant, Mr Keane, against what may be described as a “vexatious litigant declaration” and associated orders made on 2 February 2024 on the application of the respondent, Woolworths. These were made pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Supreme Court Act), in the following terms:[1]
I declare that Thomas Courtney Keane has instituted vexatious proceedings as defined in s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), by persistently instituting proceedings without reasonable grounds.
I order that Thomas Courtney Keane be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of the State of South Australia without the permission of this Court pursuant to s 39(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).
I order that the proceedings commenced by Mr Keane in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 27 January 2023 (file number CIV-23-000689) are permanently stayed pursuant to s 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).
[1] Woolworths Group Ltd v Keane [2024] SASC 12 (Reasons), see Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47 [23]-[24] (Livesey J) (as he was).
The primary judge also directed that, should Mr Keane wish to commence proceedings or make an application in a South Australian court or a tribunal, he must first correspond with the Registrar of the Supreme Court who will then determine whether and how to deal with what Mr Keane proposes.[2]
[2] Reasons, [156]-[157].
The evidence before the primary judge showed that Mr Keane had become pre-occupied, to the point of obsession, with the circumstances in which his employment with Woolworths was terminated nearly four years ago. His unfair dismissal claim was soon followed by a negotiated settlement, which resulted in the payment by Woolworths of a sum of money to Mr Keane.
Mr Keane has since sought to re-open and re-litigate issues relating to the termination of his employment, together with claims he conducted an intimate relationship with a fellow employee. Mr Keane has repeatedly raised his concerns about what he said were unfounded claims that he had been involved in sexual harassment, about the investigation by Woolworths into allegations of his misconduct at work, and about the involvement of various Woolworths employees, Woolworths’ solicitors, one or more unions, South Australia Police (SAPOL), and others. By and large, almost all of the proceedings commenced by Mr Keane have been dismissed or abandoned.[3]
[3] Annexure A comprises a listing of all proceedings, applications and processes commenced by Mr Keane.
For the reasons that follow, the vexatious litigant declaration and orders were appropriately made, but the appeal should be allowed for the limited purpose of varying the terms of one of the orders. These reasons are set out as follows:
Introduction
The Notice of Appeal
The approach of the Court of Appeal
Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act
Standing to apply
Persistently instituted
Proceedings
Vexatious
The exercise of discretion
The inherent powers of the court
Findings made regarding the vexatious litigant application in this case
Overview of the various proceedings commenced by Mr Keane
The proceedings in greater detail
Subsequent applications made by Mr Keane
The reasons of the primary judge
Determination of the appeal
Other issues relating to the declaration and orders?
Conclusions
Annexure A: Table of Proceedings
Annexure B: Thomas Courtney Keane v Woolworths Group Limited (CIV‑24‑001255)
The Notice of Appeal
Mr Keane is not legally represented. By Notice of Appeal dated 12 February 2024, he advances the following grounds:
1. The Justice allowed the “vexatious litigant” application to continue despite Woolworths Group Limited lying to the previous judicial officer, Magistrate Vosso [sic, Vozzo] of the Magistrates Court of South Australia, about material particulates [sic] and events.
2. Woolworths Group Limited was allowed to continue misrepresenting issues, and the Justice made no effort to hold them accountable for their comments in relation to the evidence at hand.
3. The originating application against Mr. Keane was a vexatious abuse of the Courts process after that Magistrate had refused to throw Mr. Keane’s application out and Woolworths Group Limited and their representation had been caught dishonestly representing Woolworths Group Limited’s actions during that time.
4. The Justice’s decision included errors of fact that were provided in the evidence submitted to the Justice, including the grounds for the defamation claim.
5. The Justice ignored and or stuck-out [sic, struck-out] evidence supporting the fact that Woolworths Group Limited had fraudulently misrepresented issues, and defamed Mr. Keane before the Fair Work Commission to secure the “settlement agreement” they are relying on.
6. The Justice was an employee of South Australia Police, at the time that South Australia Police was unlawfully interfering with the Fair Work Commission proceedings and aiding Woolworths Group Limited who were committing offences against Mr Keane, and abusing Mr. Keane’s rights to a Fair and impartial hearings before the Fair Work Commission.
7. The justice made comments indicating and underpinning the appellants entire lawsuit, then proceeded to undermine all of those comments in her decision.
As may be seen, the complaints made by Mr Keane are expressed in very general terms, and not by reference to particular findings or particular evidence.
Whilst it was necessary for the Court to assist Mr Keane to understand the issues and endeavour to avoid misunderstanding or confusion it was, at the same time, necessary to refrain from advising him or acting in a way that might undermine this Court’s impartiality.[4]
[4] Martincic & Anor v Ethnic Broadcasters Inc [2024] SASCA 33, [21]-[24] (Livesey P) citing Gassy v The King [2023] SASCA 90, [33]-[37] (Livesey P, David JA and Stein AJA).
The approach of the Court of Appeal
On an appeal by way of rehearing under s 50 of the Supreme Court Act, or s 43 of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), and r 218.17 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (Uniform Civil Rules), Mr Keane must demonstrate error of a kind which warrants the intervention of this Court so as to disturb the judgment of the primary judge.[5]
[5] Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518-519 (Mason and Deane JJ); Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, 203-204 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ).
This Court may not intervene to substitute its own view as if it were hearing the matter afresh.[6] It is necessary to determine whether the findings made by the primary judge were affected by material error.[7] In many cases the identification of error will be affected by the way the parties chose to conduct their litigation, for they are generally bound by their conduct of the earlier hearing and confined to the issues they litigated in it.[8]
[6]     Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, 7 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ): ‘It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish’.
[7]     Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518-519 (Mason and Deane JJ): ‘According to our conception of the appellate process, the existence of an error, whether of law or fact, on the part of the court at first instance is an indispensable condition of a successful appeal’.
[8]     Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481, 483 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ): ‘It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so’.
The obligation in this Court to conduct a real review of the trial record and evaluate the primary judge’s reasons may warrant this Court drawing its own inferences and conclusions.[9] Where, as in a case like the present, the primary judge relied on a volume of documentary evidence, it may be open to the appeal court to draw inferences or conclusions from documents and primary findings of fact which are not disputed or which are not affected by error.[10]
[9] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ). See also Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472.
[10] Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Limited (In Liq) (1999) 73 ALJR 306.
Nonetheless it is necessary to recognise the “natural limitations” in an appellate review which proceeds “wholly or substantially on the record”.[11] The appeal court must proceed without the advantages available to the primary judge to evaluate the credibility of any witness and to experience the “feeling” of the conduct of the trial, which cannot always be “fully shared” from a reading of the evidence on the page.[12]
[11] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, [23] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
[12] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, [23] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
In “some, quite rare, cases” even where the facts fall short of being “incontrovertible” the appeal court may decide that the conclusion of the primary judge was “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.[13] In that kind of case should the appeal court find on its own review, making all due allowance for the advantages available to the primary judge, that material error is disclosed, the appeal court cannot “shrink from giving effect” to its own conclusion.[14]
[13] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, [28]-[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
[14] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, [28]-[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
It is always necessary for the appeal court and the parties on appeal to recognise that the identification of error by an appellant is “not merely important, it is essential”.[15]
[15] SJ Berry Pty Ltd v McEntee (2022) 142 SASR 31, [36] (Livesey P). See generally, Pitt v Commissioner for Consumer Affairs [2021] SASCA 24, [114]-[118]; Doerr v Gardiner [2023] QCA 160, [65]-[70]; Testel Australia Pty Ltd v Goulding [2023] SASCA 116, [26]-[31].

Consistently with recent authority in the High Court,[16] whether what may be described as the qualifying criteria in s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act have been satisfied must be determined according to the “correctness standard”,[17] whereas whether there was an error made in the exercise of the discretion conferred once the qualifying criteria are made out must be determined according to the principles described in House v The King.[18]
[16] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541, 563 [49] (Gageler J); GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857, [15] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ), [95]-[96] (Steward J) and [161]-[162] (Gleeson J); Steven Moore (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30, [3], [26]-[27] Gageler CJ, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ) (regarding an interlocutory appeal against a ruling about the exclusion of evidence under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)). See also: R v Geoffrey (A Pseudonym) [2024] SASCA 40, [65] (Livesey P, Bleby and David JJA) (regarding an interlocutory appeal concerning whether the evaluative judgment involved in determining whether evidence has “strong probative value” having “regard to the particular issue or issues arising at trial” within s 34P(2)(b) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA)); Young v The King [2024] SASCA 47, [119]-[142] (Doyle JA with whom Kourakis CJ agreed), [157] (David JA) (regarding the ‘discretion’ in Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54); Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd & Ors [2024] SASCA 80, [47]-[48] (Livesey P, Doyle and Bleby JJA) (regarding whether a plea is tenable and whether leave to amend should be granted); GM v Department of Human Services [2024] SASCA 93, [3]-[4] (regarding the meaning of a statutory phrase).
[17] Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, 551-552.
[18] House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).
Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act
Before addressing the evidence in this case, and the findings made, it is appropriate to address the nature of the jurisdiction available to the court. Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act is in the following terms:
39 – Vexatious proceedings
(1)If, on the application of the Attorney-General or any other interested person, the court    is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the court may make either or both of the following orders:
(a)     an order prohibiting the person by whom the vexatious proceedings were instituted from instituting further proceedings, or further proceedings of a particular class, without permission of the court;
(b)     an order staying proceedings already instituted by that person.
(2)Where it appears to a prescribed court that there are proper grounds for an application under this section, it may refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration.
(3)An order under this section remains in force (subject to variation by the court) –
(a)     if a period for the operation of the order is fixed – until the expiration of that period or the revocation of the order (whichever first occurs).
(b)     if no such period is fixed – until revocation of the order.
(4)Where an order is made under this section, a copy of the order must be published in the Gazette.
(5)For the purposes of this section, proceedings are vexatious –
(a)     if instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or
(b)     if instituted without reasonable ground.
(6)In this section –
“prescribed court” means –
(a)     the Supreme Court; or
(b)     any other Court of the State; or
(c)     the South Australian Employment Tribunal; and
(d)     any other tribunal of the State prescribed by the regulations;
“proceedings” means civil or criminal proceedings instituted in a prescribed court.
The history behind the present iteration of the South Australian vexatious litigant provision has been reviewed elsewhere.[19] Broadly, a two-stage process is involved in the application of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act:[20]
… At the first stage, an applicant must demonstrate that the respondent has persistently instituted “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39(6) and the proceedings are “vexatious” within the meaning of s 39(5). The concept of “proceedings” is defined by s 39(6) to mean proceedings instituted in a “prescribed court”, being one of the specified courts or tribunals of this State.
When addressing this first stage, the Court cannot take into account proceedings in any other Australian court or tribunal when determining whether the requirements of the Act are satisfied. The existence or outcome of other Australian court or tribunal proceedings may, however, assist the conclusion that the local proceedings are vexatious because the point in issue has been repeatedly instituted or conclusively determined elsewhere.[21]
At the second stage, having determined that the respondent has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the applicant must then persuade the Court that, in all the circumstances, it is proper for the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of making an order which is within the scope of s 39(1).[22]
[19] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [50]-[63].
[20] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [47]-[49].
[21] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J).
[22] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 33 (Perry J); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [58] (Debelle J).
The analysis of the first stage under s 39(1) may be addressed by reference to the following elements:[23]
[23] Georganis v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [64]-[65].
The discretion under s 39 is only enlivened where:
1.     an application is made by the Attorney-General or any other interested person; and
2.     the Court is satisfied that a person has:
2.1    “persistently instituted”;
2.2    “proceedings” in South Australian courts or tribunals;
2.3    that are “vexatious” in that;
2.3.1.they were instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or
2.3.2.     they were instituted without reasonable grounds.
The phrase “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” requires a finding to be made about each of three matters: (1) persistently instituted; (2) vexatious; and (3) proceedings.
The meaning of the terms in s 39(1), particularly the meaning of the composite phrase “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings”, must commence with the ordinary meaning of the words used, when read as a whole. That meaning will be informed by their statutory context having regard to the evident statutory purpose. In particular:[24]
Whilst s 39 represents a clear legislative intention to restrict, and potentially to abrogate, what is otherwise a fundamental right of access to the courts and tribunals of this State, that right of access is not absolute.[25] Section 39 represents the striking of a balance between that right of access and the need to protect other litigants, the courts and the community from the time, trouble and cost associated with being unduly vexed by proceedings which are, for example, “without reasonable grounds”.
… the evident legislative policy is that it is only where the “stringent requirements” of the section are clearly satisfied that the Court is then empowered to consider exercising its discretion to make a declaration and order which represents a serious incursion on a person’s right of access to the courts.[26]
[24] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [57]-[58].
[25] Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540, [7] (Perry J).
[26] Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378, [52] (Sackville J).
The cases on s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act demonstrate that the putative vexatious litigant is, almost invariably, not legally represented:[27]
… courts have usually paid careful regard to the fact that the respondents have, almost invariably, been unrepresented litigants. This entails a number of considerations. They include that greater latitude has, on occasion, been given to respondents notwithstanding what might be regarded as inappropriate or offensive language and behaviour because of the assumption that they are stressed by an unfamiliar environment.[28] Allowance has also been made for unfamiliarity with the relevant practice and procedures applicable to court proceedings. This may mean that some allowance is made for the manner in which, and mode by which, respondents articulate their cases. Courts have therefore usually been “careful to ensure that, buried within the papers, there is not some arguable point” in proceedings commenced without the benefit of legal advice and which ostensibly appear to be without merit.[29]
[27] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [57]-[58].
[28] Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, [240] (Anderson J); Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741, [24] (Ipp JA and Brownie AJA); Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29, [10] (Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ); Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070, [84]-[85] (Charlesworth J).
[29] See for example Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49, [39] (Kourakis CJ, Kelly and Parker JJ).
It has been necessary to proceed with these considerations in mind, making due allowance for the difficulties Mr Keane appeared to encounter, particularly with understanding and navigating the legal processes applicable to this case.
As will be seen, Mr Keane was anxious to ‘right the wrongs’ that he perceived have been done to him rather than address whether the decision made by the primary judge contained any appealable error. Indeed, it was precisely because the primary judge refused to consider the merits of the termination of his employment with Woolworths, and refused to address his allegation that he was falsely accused of sexual wrongdoing and then subjected to harassment by SAPOL, that Mr Keane says the decision under appeal is wrong.
Because Mr Keane did not address the elements of the case made against him, it will be necessary to address these in order to be satisfied on an appeal by way of rehearing that the vexatious litigant declaration and orders were appropriately made.
Standing to apply
No issue was or could be raised about the standing of Woolworths as an “interested person” to apply for an order under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.[30] Woolworths and its employees, or former employees, have repeatedly been the targets of proceedings instituted by Mr Keane, though other parties have also been targeted.
[30] By s 4 of the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA), “person” is defined to include “a body corporate as well as an individual”. See also WorkCover Corporation of South AustraliavMoore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [328]-[335] (Blue J); Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [59].
Persistently instituted
Whether vexatious proceedings have been “persistently instituted” turns on matters of evaluation, circumstance and degree.[31] The term “persistently” has been considered on a number of occasions.[32] In Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski, Bleby J held that the requirement of persistence was not merely satisfied by the number of proceedings instituted:[33]
What constitutes institution of such proceedings ‘persistently’ will not depend merely on the number of them but, just as importantly, on their character, their lack of any reasonable ground and the way in which they have been conducted. A litigant may be said to be persisting in litigating though the number of separate proceedings he or she brings is quite small if those proceedings clearly represent an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined against that person, particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying. The Court may also take into account the development of a pattern of behaviour involving a failure to accept an inability in law to further challenge decisions in respect of which the appeal process has been exhausted, or attacking a range of defendants drawn into the widening circle of litigation solely because of an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed.
[31] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J).
[32] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [276]-[278] (Bleby J). See also Attorney‑General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425, [8], [283] (Layton J); Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, [83]‑[84] (Anderson J); Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19 (Layton J); Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [67]‑[79].
[33] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [277] (Bleby J).
Similarly, in Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski, Blue J explained the features relevant to the assessment of persistence:[34]
Factors to be taken into account in assessing persistence include the number of proceedings, their character, the way in which they were conducted, the extent to which they represent attempts to re-litigate issues already conclusively determined and the extent of extravagant allegations which are not substantiated.
(Citations omitted.)
[34] Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1, [1979] (Blue J).
Whilst the use of the word “persistence” suggests repetition it may, additionally, suggest “determination” and a “degree of stubbornness”.[35]
[35] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492 (Roden J), cited in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [276] (Bleby J); WorkCover Corporation of South AustraliavMoore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [990]-[991] (Blue J); Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [79].
The requisite persistence may be shown even though the number of proceedings is “quite small”, particularly where they seek to relitigate that which has already been decided adversely.[36] In many cases, the issue of persistence will be determined by reference to at least a handful of proceedings commenced in South Australian courts or tribunals, if not many more.[37]
[36] Brogdon v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 809, [21] (Thomas, Keith and Blanchard JJ); Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 (Bleby J); Fuller v Toms [2013] FCA 1422, [77] (Barker J); Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540, [25] (Perry J).
[37] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [355] (Layton J), in that case the Court was asked to consider perhaps three proceedings, albeit attempting to resurrect issues which had been determined adversely by the Federal Court.
In Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski, Blue J considered 63 vexatious proceedings instituted over the course of 12 years, and in Workcover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan, his Honour again considered 63 vexatious proceedings, this time instituted over a 16-year period.[38] By contrast, in Georganas v Barkla, Livesey J rejected the proposition that the institution of one proceeding, or possibly two sets of proceedings, could be described as having “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” in courts or tribunals of this State.[39]
[38] WorkCover Corporationof South Australia vMoore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [992] (Blue J).
[39] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [10], [67]-[68].
On the meaning of “instituted”, it is now clear that though the term is apt to be ambiguous, it should be construed broadly and will “encompass the full gamut of the prosecution of a proceeding from beginning to end”, even if “it never reaches final hearing and determination and even if the Court ultimately holds that it does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought”.[40] So, it has usually been held that it is sufficient if a proceeding has been filed seeking substantive relief,[41] whether or not the proceeding takes the form of a claim or originating application, or even an interlocutory application,[42] because these may represent “a vehicle by which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked”.[43]
[40] WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [365]-[366] (Blue J).
[41] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [123] (Layton J)
[42] Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), r 51.1.
[43] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302, [36] (Duggan J) citing Braeside Bearings Pty Ltd v HJ Brignall and Associates (Boronia) [1996] 1 VR 17, 20.
Short of filing, however, there is a question whether an attempt to file a proceeding is sufficient, including where it is rejected by the Registry or the court because it comprises an abuse of process.[44] Whilst a broad approach has been taken to attempts to file documents, at least where the litigant has done all that was required to be done in order to file a document,[45] there is scope to question whether that view is correct.[46]
[44] See, for example, Trezise v South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2024] SASCA 100, [4]-[6].
[45] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [128]-[134] (Layton J). Cf Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810, 811-814 (Toohey J); Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath, Senior [2001] VSC 269, [129]-[130] (Ashley J, as he then was).
[46] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [100]-[106], “… it is difficult to see how the jurisdiction of the Court has been invoked where a document has been rejected before it is filed”.
It is not necessary to come to a concluded view on that issue in this case.
Proceedings
A broad view has also been taken as to what comprises a “proceeding”, even where the process takes the form of an interlocutory application. In Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd, Layton J addressed the issue in the following way, helpfully offering a number of examples where substantive issues were raised for determination or where substantive relief was sought:[47]
[47] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [122]-[124] (Layton J).
A number of authorities have discussed whether the taking of interlocutory proceedings in the course of an action would amount to “instituting proceedings”.[48]
[48] Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedlar [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, [4] (Yeldham J); Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314, [13]; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, [492] (Roden J); Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [44]-[57] and, more recently, Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 361.
In summary, those authorities indicate that a person will be regarded as having “instituted proceedings” for the purposes of the Act if the person invokes the jurisdiction of the Court by:
·filing an originating process;
·making a counterclaim in a proceeding;
·appealing from a final determination in a proceeding;
·seeking to set aside a determination in a matter which is in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined;
·filing an interlocutory application or an appeal which is in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined;
·filing an interlocutory proceeding which seeks substantive relief, such as seeking to bring in an additional party into proceedings.
The Attorney-General, in his written submissions, has outlined a number of examples of interlocutory applications which have been held to be proceedings for the purposes of the Act by other courts.[49] The examples given of interlocutory applications which have in the particular circumstances said to constitute the institution of a proceeding have included:
·an application to bring an additional party into the proceedings;[50]
·an application to be joined as a party and to be substituted as the plaintiff.[51]
[49] Attorney-General’s Submissions, [23] (Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19).
[50] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492; Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bankand Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 361-2, 364.
[51] Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 369, 377.

In WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan, Blue J emphasised the need to address substance over form, together with whether the application is concerned with substantive rights or issues, as opposed to whether it addressed matters merely incidental to an action:[52]
[52] WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [358]-[360] (Blue J).
In determining whether a particular type of application falls within the concept of a proceeding within the meaning of section 39, given the use of that term in the section, the question ought to be assessed as a matter of substance rather than form or the name applied to the particular type of application.[53]
[53] Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, 488 (Yeldham J); Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 491-492 (Roden J).
The following general principles can be derived from the wording, context and evident purpose of section 39:
1.An action in which a party seeks a final determination of a justiciable issue or the exercise of any like power vested in the court (whether by way of action, cross action or third party action) is a “proceeding”.[54]
[54] This is essentially the concept embodied in the definition of “action” in r 28 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA).
2.An appeal from a judgment or order is a separate “proceeding” to the original application in respect of which the judgment or order was made (whether the appeal is to a different court or to the same court in which the original judgment or order was made).[55]
[55] See Inre Becker [1975] 1 WLR 842, 845 (Eveleigh J, with whom Bridge and Wien JJ agreed); Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, 488 (Yeldham J).
3.An application to set aside a judgment or order which is substantively similar to an appeal should be treated in the same way as an appeal against the judgment or order would be treated.[56]
4.An application which is interlocutory in nature relating to a matter incidental to the action as opposed to substantive rights is generally not a “proceeding”.[57]
5.Even though an interlocutory application of the type referred to in 4 is not a “proceeding”, nevertheless an appeal from (or application to set aside) an order on such an interlocutory application is a “proceeding”.
Application of the fourth and fifth general principles suggests that typically (subject to any unusual features in a particular case):
1.An application to a judicial officer to disqualify himself or herself on the ground of apprehended bias is not a proceeding.
2.An application for an adjournment or stay of proceedings or execution is not a proceeding.
3.An appeal against an order made on a disqualification, adjournment or stay application is a proceeding.
4.An application for leave or permission or an extension of time to appeal is the initiating step in an appellate proceeding and is a proceeding.
[56] See Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, 488 (Yeldham J).
[57] See Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, 488 (Yeldham J).
In Georganas v Barkla, the need to address the substance rather than the form of the process was again emphasised, together with the evident desire of litigants to avoid the filing fee associated with a new action by relying on interlocutory applications made in existing actions:[58]
The definition of “proceedings” expressly incorporates both civil and criminal proceedings, where instituted in a “prescribed court”.
It has been held that this term should be construed broadly and so as to embrace not merely new actions, but also applications within actions and appeals, particularly where relief akin to substantive relief is sought, such as joining an additional party,[59] or where they seek to reverse, qualify or re-litigate rulings or determinations previously made.[60] In some cases it is evident that a respondent has been reluctant to incur the cost of a filing fee and so has adopted the expedient of simply making what is, at least in form if not in substance, an interlocutory application in an existing proceeding.
[58] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [84]-[85].
[59] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492 (Roden J); Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425 (Layton J); Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19 (Layton J).
[60] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [56] (Bleby J).
The South Australian vexatious litigant provision is narrower than provisions operating in some other jurisdictions because s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act depends on the identification of “proceedings” commenced in South Australian courts or tribunals, rather than proceedings commenced in any Australian jurisdiction.
It is a matter for the Parliament whether the reach of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act should be broadened by permitting the court to take into account, as a matter of fact, the persistent institution of proceedings commenced in any Australian jurisdiction.[61]
[61] As, for example, applies under s 37AO(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); Reasons, [120]; Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [10], [225].
Vexatious
Whether proceedings are “vexatious” must be addressed by reference to the two limbs of definitions contained in s 39(5) of the Supreme Court Act. There must be evidence which enables the finding that proceedings were instituted for the purpose of harassing, annoying, causing delay or for “any other ulterior purpose”. Alternatively, it will be sufficient if the Court can conclude that the proceedings were instituted “without reasonable grounds”.
The first limb (s 39(5)(a)) will usually be addressed by reference to circumstantial evidence rather than admissions made by the litigant. Few vexatious litigants would admit, or perhaps recognise, that their litigation is intended to harass or annoy. Indeed, the proscribed purpose will usually be discerned by inference from what was done together with what was said by the litigant about what was done and why it was done. From these circumstances the court can then determine the litigant’s purpose. The requisite approach is similar to that undertaken by the Court in connection with determining an abuse of process, especially when concerned with an attempt by a litigant to obtain an outcome foreign to the purpose for which a legal right or remedy is conferred.[62]
[62] Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509.
In the case of the second limb (s 39(5)(b)), it will usually be a relatively straight forward exercise to determine whether proceedings were instituted “without reasonable grounds”. That must usually be addressed objectively, and by reference to the outcome or likely outcome of the litigation, including whether it is seeking to disturb a settled ruling. In some cases, the fact that there is a long list of unsuccessful proceedings will speak for itself. The approach required of the Court is similar to that which is applied when determining whether strike-out, dismissal or summary judgment should be ordered under the Uniform Civil Rules, on the ground that there is no reasonable basis for the claim or defence.[63]
[63] Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Hallett Concrete Pty Ltd & Ors (2020) 137 SASR 117, [26]-[28] (Doyle J).
Even if a proceeding has been abandoned or withdrawn by a litigant, that may not necessarily prevent a finding that it was instituted without reasonable grounds. Again, an objective assessment of what was instituted may reveal that it was foredoomed to fail and likely to have been dismissed because it was commenced without reasonable grounds.
The most common case is probably where the vexatious litigant appears to be using the proceedings to challenge an outcome which has been finally determined adversely to the litigant, even if the ruling was not made in a South Australian court or tribunal. Whether the proceeding was, or was likely to be, dismissed will usually be clear from the terms of what was sought. Often, the litigant will simply keep asking for a different outcome, without regard to the need to demonstrate material error or any principled reason for the intervention of the court or tribunal. Rarely will the vexatious litigant be too concerned with the principle of finality.[64]
[64] D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; McLennan v McCallum [2010] WASCA 45, [80]-[88] (Buss JA, with whom McClure P and Newnes JA agreed).
Where there is a large number of proceedings, it will be necessary for the court to carefully consider each proceeding so as to make findings under either or both limbs of the definition.
Sometimes the manner in which the proceedings have been litigated, as well as the language used in connection with their litigation, will assist the court when making the requisite finding of vexation. The persistent pursuit of extravagant, unfounded or scandalous claims may be associated with language that reveals a determination to be vindicated, regardless of any adverse ruling and the terms in which that may have earlier been made. There are examples of cases where litigants have made it clear that they intend to persist with their vexatious litigation notwithstanding a large number of adverse outcomes.[65]
[65] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [17]; Polites Investments Pty Ltd v Russell [2022] SASC 9, [75]‑[76] (David J, as she then was).
Having said that, it is necessary to guard against finding vexation simply because the litigant, particularly an unrepresented litigant, has been unnecessarily rude or belligerent when dealing with others, particularly the court or tribunal in which proceedings have been commenced.
In most cases, the serious outcome and consequences of a declaration that a person is a vexatious litigant will mandate that it is only where the requirements of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act are clearly satisfied that the court will be empowered to consider exercising its discretion to make a declaration and associated orders.[66]
[66] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [58], set out earlier.
The exercise of discretion
Finally, should the requirements of s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act be satisfied, it is necessary to consider the exercise of discretion. It is an extreme remedy, not granted lightly.[67] When contemplating the exercise of discretion, consideration must usually be given to the need for an order to be made, as well as the breadth of the order that should be made:[68]
… where the exercise of discretion has been enlivened, it has usually been exercised with the benefit of a finding that, absent an order, the respondent will continue to persistently initiate vexatious proceedings which will continue to put other parties to costs which are usually irrecoverable.[69] A familiar feature is that the vexatious litigant lacks the means with which to meet adverse costs orders. In addition, though this is not invariable, the Court has tended to confine discretionary relief to particular parties, reserving the broadest relief for cases where the Attorney-General has applied for an order under the Act.
[67] In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21, 34 (Kennedy LJ); Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 484 (Roden J); Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370, 380 [44] (Finn J). “[I]t is … a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts”: Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321, 323 (Kirby J).
[68] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [63].
[69] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [60] (Debelle J).
Once any declaration and orders are made, they must be published in the Gazette.[70]
[70] Section 39(4), Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).
The first order which was made in this case was of the broadest kind. It prevents the commencement of any litigation against anyone in any State courts or tribunals without the permission of the Supreme Court. It is not limited to the party seeking the vexatious litigant declaration and orders, nor to parties associated with that party. It is not limited in subject matter to the issues the subject of the various proceedings and rulings which have been made over the years since Mr Keane’s litigation first commenced in early 2021. The second order concerns the permanent stay of defamation proceedings which are the subject of the appellant’s re‑instatement application, which was part-heard by Magistrate Vozzo in the Magistrates Court at the time a stay was first ordered by the primary judge.
It will be necessary to consider the exercise of discretion and the reasons given for it by the primary judge.
The inherent powers of the court
The breadth of the court’s inherent powers was considered in Georganas v Barkla, where the order by way of injunction which was made was narrower in scope than an order under s 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act.[71] In that case it was observed that there had recently been a greater willingness to exercise power so as to address and respond to proceedings and applications which are without any legal merit or purpose:[72]
The Court and its resources must be preserved and protected against the time, trouble and cost associated with addressing and responding to proceedings and applications which are without any legal merit or purpose.
There has, in recent times, been a greater willingness to look to the Court’s inherent powers to protect against vexatious behaviours by a select minority of surprisingly energetic litigants. They are usually unrepresented.[73] Some are best described as querulous.[74] These powers ought only be exercised in clear cases, mindful of the fundamental right of access to the courts and tribunals of this State. There is however no recognised right to engage in vexatious litigation, to engage in unnecessary and threatening correspondence, or to otherwise embark on an abuse of the processes of the courts and tribunals of this State.[75] That is not to deny the right of litigants to protection where they have become the targets of vexatious litigants. What it emphasises is that provisions such as s 39 of the Act and this Court’s inherent power incorporate an important public element, which looks beyond the interests of the particular parties in particular litigation. The “normative judgment” involved in the exercise of the Court’s inherent power must take into account the “public interest in the timely and efficient administration of civil justice”.[76] Accordingly, and in appropriate cases, orders can be fashioned to restrain litigants from commencing litigation or applications which attack or concern specified issues or parties. To do otherwise risks an unnecessary waste of the scarce judicial and public resources available to manage and adjudicate meritorious disputes.
[71] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [16]-[22]; [209]-[214].
[72] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [18]-[19].
[73] Raising a series of complexities and pressures that require careful management, as has been recognised in many cases, see, for example, Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 and Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375. See Re F (2001) 161 FLR 189 regarding guidelines suggested by the Family Court.
[74] See, for example, Thomson v Tremco Pty Limited [2019] QCA 18, [35]-[46] (Morrison JA, with whom Sofronoff P and Gotterson JA agreed).
[75] Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.
[76] UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77, [70] (Gageler J).
The order made in that case prohibited the respondent from instituting new proceedings against the applicant, or any other entity or person, in a court or tribunal of this State, challenging or concerning the issue which had been vexatiously agitated, whether directly or indirectly, unless the respondent first obtained the leave of a Judge of the Supreme Court.
An order was also made restricting the way in which the respondent could correspond with the Supreme Court:[77]
So as to ensure that the resources of this Court and other courts and tribunals of this State are not wasted by having to address the respondent’s ongoing proceedings and applications, I will direct that should he wish to commence proceedings or make an application in a South Australian court or tribunal, challenging or concerning the Form 3B issue, whether directly or indirectly, he must first correspond only with the Registrar of this Court, who will then determine whether and how to deal with what the respondent proposes.
It will be a matter for the Registrar to manage the correspondence as well as to determine whether new proceedings or applications or other documents are managed under r 53 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (now r 32.3 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA)) or are otherwise referred to a Judge to consider the question of leave.
[77] Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47, [23]-[24].
The primary judge did not find it necessary to exercise the inherent powers of the court in this case but indicated that, if it had been necessary, she would have had no hesitation in making an order by way of injunction.[78] The primary judge nonetheless made an order restricting the way in which the respondent could correspond with the Supreme Court.[79]
[78] Reasons, [145].
[79] Reasons, [157].
Findings made regarding the vexatious litigant application in this case
It is common ground that Mr Keane commenced employment with Woolworths in May 2011. Between August and December 2020, complaints were made about Mr Keane’s conduct at work, which apparently included complaints of sexual harassment by him. There was an investigation into these workplace allegations.
Mr Keane’s employment with Woolworths was terminated for misconduct on 22 December 2020.
Whilst the evidence is far from clear, it would appear that SAPOL became involved. Mr Keane has always maintained that he was unfairly treated and that there was no substance in any of the complaints made.
Overview of the various proceedings commenced by Mr Keane
Briefly, on 8 January 2021 Mr Keane’s first unfair dismissal application was filed with the Fair Work Commission pursuant s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Fair Work Act). Mr Keane sought the re-instatement of his employment and compensation for lost wages. There followed a conciliation conference and a settlement agreement.
The existence of that settlement and its continued operation is essential to understanding why Mr Keane’s subsequent litigation has been regarded as both vexatious and an abuse of process.
Because there was some dispute about the settlement, there was then a “determinative conference” after which the Commissioner who presided issued a decision dismissing the unfair dismissal application because a binding settlement had been reached. The settlement and subsequent dismissal of that application prevented Mr Keane pursing another unfair dismissal application. Mr Keane appealed that decision to the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission. The Full Bench refused permission to appeal.
After permission to appeal was refused, Mr Keane commenced numerous proceedings in the Fair Work Commission, the Federal Court, the Magistrates Court, and the Supreme Court, generally directed to challenging the dismissal of his unfair dismissal application.
This was reflected in over 30 unsuccessful applications in the Fair Work Commission,[80] an unsuccessful application for judicial review in the Federal Court (together with attempts to appeal the unsuccessful outcome),[81] six proceedings in the Magistrates Court,[82] and around seven unsuccessful or attempted applications in the Supreme Court.[83] Generally, they were dismissed but, in some instances, they were rejected or abandoned.[84]
[80] Annexure A, “proceedings” 1 to 32.
[81] Annexure A, “proceedings” 33 to 35.
[82] Annexure A, “proceedings” 36 to 41.
[83] Annexure A, “proceedings” 42 to 49.
[84] Reasons, [4].

These various processes are tabled in Annexure A to these reasons. As the primary judge recorded:[85]
It is this conduct that is the basis of the application currently before this Court. Woolworths contends that the [vexatious litigant] order should be made on the basis that, given Mr Keane’s pattern of behaviour. The order was necessary to prevent the continued abuse of the Court’s processes. It is further contended that in the absence of such an order, the irresistible inference is that Mr Keane will continue in his pattern of conduct at the considerable expense of both Woolworths and the Courts.
[85] Reasons, [5].
There is an issue about whether and to what extent these processes may be described as “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.
As will be seen, since commencing his appeal, Mr Keane made four unsuccessful applications in the Court of Appeal.
More detail about this litigation follows, drawn largely from the reasons of the primary judge and the reasons given for dismissing the applications made in the Court of Appeal.
The proceedings in greater detail
On 8 January 2021, the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association (the SDA) filed an application on behalf of Mr Keane with the Fair Work Commission, alleging unfair dismissal.
On 18 March 2021, the parties participated in a member assisted conciliation conducted by a Commissioner. Ultimately, there was an agreement to resolve the unfair dismissal application. The Commissioner put the parties into a joint session and recorded what was being said, after which the terms and conditions of the agreement were outlined. The primary judge found that Mr Keane was aware of the terms of settlement and agreed to them.[86]
[86] Reasons, [16].
On 19 March 2021, the solicitor for Woolworths sent Mr Keane an email attaching the settlement agreement which reflected the agreed terms.
However, on 29 March 2021, Mr Keane sent an email to Woolworths and to the Commissioners with an “amended and more equitable contract that has been signed.” Mr Keane purported to make numerous changes, as well as increasing the settlement payment from just under $23,000 to just under $23 million.[87]
[87] Reasons, [18].
The unfair dismissal application was then listed for a further conference on 9 April 2021. Before the conference, Woolworths filed an application seeking to dismiss it pursuant to s 587(1) of the Fair Work Act on the basis of the binding settlement reached on 18 March 2021. On 9 April 2021, another Commissioner conducted a conference, described as a “determination conference”, at which evidence was called. On 19 April 2021, the Commissioner issued a decision dismissing the unfair dismissal application on the basis that there was a binding settlement:[88]
In my view, the terms of the binding settlement are clearly contained in the transcript and no further document need be prepared and as such, the parties should then implement the agreed terms without delay.
[88] Mr K v The Employer [2021] FWC 2132, [27] (Commissioner Platt).
On 4 March 2021, Mr Keane lodged an appeal. On 6 July 2021, he lodged a further appeal. These were heard by the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission on 5 August 2021. On 12 August 2021, the Full Bench refused permission to appeal,[89] and explained:[90]
We have had full regard to the appellant’s submissions and appeal grounds. In those submissions, the appellant makes a number of complaints about the conduct of the respondent and others including the alleged unfairness of his termination. However, this is not a rehearing of the alleged unfairness of the appellant’s termination. The present matter concerns an appeal against a decision that the appellant had entered into binding settlement of the matter.
Little or no attempt was made to challenge the actual decision under appeal and to demonstrate that there was a public interest that should persuade us to grant permission to appeal, having regard to issues of fact or law. The notices of appeal and submissions, written and oral, do not identify any matter which satisfies the public interest test.
Voluminous material was provided by Mr Keane which the Full Bench has considered. Regrettably, the material filed by Mr Keane has not addressed the issue at the heart of this appeal.
[89] Reasons, [21]-[22]; Mr K v The Employer [2021] FWCFB 3162, [5]
[90] Reasons, [24]; Mr K v The Employer [2021’ FWCFB 3162, [14], [16]-[17].
The primary judge recorded that Woolworths submitted to her that, from this point, Mr Keane “must have known or become very rapidly aware that” he had reached the end of the legitimate processes available to him.[91] The primary judge went on to record that, “regrettably” Mr Keane thereafter constantly and consistently failed to appreciate the legal issues under consideration and the limitations in the remedies available to him.[92]
[91] Reasons, [23].
[92] Reasons, [25].
It is probably not strictly necessary to address all of Mr Keane’s applications that followed in the Fair Work Commission, which are described in detail by the primary judge.[93] As the primary judge recognised, none were “proceedings” in a State court or tribunal within the scope of s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.
[93] Reasons, [26]-[51].
Soon, Mr Keane turned his attention to the State courts.
On 1 October 2021, Mr Keane filed his first proceeding in the Magistrates Court. This was a negligence claim, brought against an employee of Woolworths who had been Mr Keane’s supervisor. The basis of the negligence claim was that she had been involved in the process that led to Mr Keane’s dismissal.[94] On 22 October 2021, Woolworths wrote to Mr Keane threatening an application for security for costs. Mr Keane then discontinued it.[95]
[94] Reasons, [52].
[95] Reasons, [54].
On 7 October 2021, Mr Keane filed a second proceeding in the Magistrates Court, this time pressing a claim for defamation against another employee of Woolworths. After Woolworths filed an interlocutory application to have the matter struck-out, on 29 November 2021 Mr Keane discontinued it.
During October 2021, Mr Keane engaged in correspondence with Woolworths and a Commissioner in the Fair Work Commission, demanding to be able to have a hearing or go back to work.[96] Mr Keane was told by the Commissioner that no order would be made to reinstate employment, and this was soon followed by a third unfair dismissal application in the Fair Work Commission.[97]
[96] Reasons, [59]-[61].
[97] Reasons, [62].
On 15 December 2021, Mr Keane commenced a third proceeding in the Magistrates Court, this time against Woolworths and naming the Fair Work Commission as an interested party.[98] Mr Keane sought to have his contractual obligations honoured and his job “returned”. On 21 January 2022, Woolworths successfully applied for dismissal pursuant r 85(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules.[99]
[98] Reasons, [63].
[99] Reasons, [63].
Between January and April 2022, Mr Keane filed a fourth unfair dismissal application in the Fair Work Commission and a notice of appeal in the Fair Work Commission. In May 2022, Mr Keane filed a fifth unfair dismissal application. The appeal did not proceed, and the fifth unfair dismissal application was dismissed.[100] In the course of her reasons for that decision, the Commissioner explained:[101]
The Applicant must accept that the Commission can no longer deal with his dismissal. Further application for a remedy for unfair dismissal will, to the extent that the Commissioner has power to do so and to the extent they go to same dismissal, will [sic] be dismissed.
[100] Reasons, [65]-[66].
[101] Reasons, [66]; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 1148, [10].
On 7 June 2022, Mr Keane filed a fourth Magistrates Court proceeding, this time seeking damages for negligence against another employee of Woolworths, together with re-instatement of his employment. This employee had played a role in the investigation which culminated in Mr Keane’s dismissal. That proceeding was dismissed on 18 August 2022 on the ground that it was an abuse of process and there was no reasonable basis for prosecuting the action.[102]
[102] Reasons, [67].
During June 2022, Mr Keane filed two further applications in the Fair Work Commission, and both were dismissed on 22 June 2022, with the Commissioner explaining:[103]
Mr Keane’s conduct in relation to multiple applications to the Commission is now taking on all the characteristics of being vexatious. He is aware that his application in relation to his dismissal has been dealt with to finality. This has been pointed out to him in various decisions made by the Commission. Mr Keane’s constant applications do no more than use the valuable resources of the Commission, taking those resources from legitimate applications and calls on the Commission’s time.
Mr Keane’s application has been dealt with by the Commission. The Commission will not have him reinstated into his employment. There is no more for the Commission to do.
[103] Reasons, [68]; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 1592, [17]-[18] (Commissioner Bissett).
On 13 July 2022, Mr Keane filed an originating application seeking judicial review in the Federal Court concerning the Fair Work Commission proceedings. Mr Keane sought orders for compensation and re-instatement.[104] The first return of the judicial review application was heard by O’Sullivan J on 8 November 2022.
[104] Reasons, [69].
On 2 May 2023, O’Sullivan J dismissed the application for judicial review, observing that Mr Keane had focussed on the merits of his unfair dismissal even though he had been told that this was not the proper purpose of his judicial review application. O’Sullivan J recorded that Mr Keane’s submissions were directed to what he described as “a conspiracy against him” by Woolworths, SAPOL, the Australian Defence Force and Adelaide University.[105]
[105] Reasons, [84]; Keane v Woolworths Ltd [2023] FCA 379, [28], [40] (O’Sullivan J).
Before that, on 28 October 2022, Mr Keane had filed a sixth unfair dismissal application which was dismissed on 14 November 2022 by Commissioner Bissett who explained, with some exasperation:[106]
The circumstances have not changed with the effluxion of time. The applicant needs to accept that the Commission cannot and will not consider any application in which he seeks a remedy for unfair dismissal in relation to the termination of his employment from the Respondent in December 2020. His application was settled by agreement between the parties in early 2021. The settlement agreement was recorded, and transcript laid out in the subsequent decisions. The Commission does not have the power to hear his application or to order his re-instatement with the Respondent absent any order from a court of competent jurisdiction that we should do so.
… The matter is closed. The continued attempts by the Applicant to have matters related to his dismissal heard will not change that fact or result in the Commission further hearing from him on this matter.
[106] Reasons, [72]; K v The Employer [2022] FWC 3003, [20] (Commissioner Bissett).
On 14 November 2022, Mr Keane filed an application for the Commission to deal with a lawful termination dispute pursuant to s 773 of the Fair Work Act which, whilst in a different form, was in substance the same as previous applications.[107] After the parties were given an opportunity to make written submissions, on 25 November 2022 this application was dismissed.[108]
[107] Reasons, [73]. The primary judge described this as the sixth application concerning unfair dismissal.
[108] Reasons, [75].
On 25 November 2022, Mr Keane filed two further applications in the Fair Work Commission, being a seventh unfair dismissal application and an application for the Commission to deal with a dispute in accordance with a dispute resolution procedure pursuant s 739 of the Fair Work Act.[109] This was essentially another application to deal with a dispute resolution procedure seeking re-instatement pursuant to s 345 of the Fair Work Act, albeit seeking a stay of the first unfair dismissal decision, re-instatement of employment and, again, compensation. On 21 December 2022, these applications were both dismissed.[110]
[109] Reasons, [76].
[110] Reasons, [76].
On 11 January 2023, Mr Keane filed an eighth unfair dismissal application, which was dismissed on 23 January 2023.[111]
[111] Reasons, [77]; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 152.
On 27 January 2023, Mr Keane commenced a fifth Magistrates Court proceeding, seeking damages for defamation from another employee of Woolworths, together with re-instatement of his employment. This employee was the person central to the issues that resulted in the workplace investigation into Mr Keane’s conduct. On 23 June 2023 the primary judge stayed that claim, pending the outcome of the vexatious litigant application made by Woolworths pursuant s 39 of the Supreme Court Act.
The submission of Woolworths about this fifth Magistrates Court proceeding was that, regardless of the outcome of the vexatious litigant application, these defamation proceedings were foredoomed to fail because they did not disclose a legitimate cause of action and because seeking the remedy of re-instatement represented an abuse of process.[112] No specific finding was made by the primary judge about this submission.
[112] Reasons, [78].
On 5 February 2023, Mr Keane filed two further applications in the Fair Work Commission, being a general protections application involving dismissal, pursuant to s 365 of the Fair Work Act, and an application seeking interim orders requiring re-instatement, pursuant to s 589 of the Fair Work Act. The primary judge regarded the first of these as effectively a ninth unfair dismissal application. These were both dismissed.[113]
[113] Reasons, [79]-[80]; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 456.
On 20 April 2023, Mr Keane filed an application seeking re-instatement of employment pursuant to s 345 of the Fair Work Act being, effectively, a tenth application for unfair dismissal.[114] Again, this application was dismissed.[115] The Commissioner found that the application was not properly made and had no reasonable prospect of success.
[114] Reasons, [81].
[115] Reasons, [82]-[83]; Mr K v The Employer [2023] FWC 1341.
On 9 May 2023, Mr Keane filed a sixth Magistrates Court proceeding, seeking orders against the SDA requiring, amongst other matters, that he be provided with legal assistance in connection with his unfair dismissal applications. On 16 November 2022, that proceeding was struck out as vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of process.[116]
[116] Reasons, [88]-[89].
Between March 2022 and January 2023, Mr Keane made six attempts to file documents in the Supreme Court Registry. On each occasion, the documents were rejected by the Deputy Registrar or rejected following a direction given by a Master of the Supreme Court or a Master of the District Court.
Mr Keane filed a notice of appeal or review in relation to a decision by the Deputy Registrar to reject an originating application on 5 April 2022, which had sought orders for discovery before action. After hearing from Mr Keane, the District Court Master dismissed the application for review on the basis that Mr Keane was seeking to re-litigate issues determined by the Fair Work Commission which comprised an abuse of process.[117]
[117] Reasons, [90]-[91].
After Woolworths filed its vexatious litigant application under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act, Mr Keane attempted to file further applications. The application filed on 26 May 2023, which sought re-instatement of employment with Woolworths, was dismissed on 23 June 2023.[118] On 28 June 2023, Mr Keane filed an application to join the SDA to the vexatious litigant application, which was dismissed.[119]
[118] Reasons, [92].
[119] Reasons, [93].
On 19 July 2023, Mr Keane attempted to file a proceeding in the Supreme Court, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation against Woolworths and the SDA, and claiming damages in an amount exceeding $650,000. Mr Keane was told by the primary judge that this and other applications had not been accepted for filing and were not formally before the Court. The primary judge warned that, were the documents to be filed in their current form, they would be struck out.[120]
[120] Reasons, [95].
On 1 September 2023, Mr Keane filed a further interlocutory application in the vexatious litigant application proceeding, seeking an interim order for re‑instatement and directing Woolworths to confirm that it had presented false and misleading evidence to the Commission, inducing a fraudulent contract.[121] The primary judge dismissed that application on the basis that it, like the earlier interlocutory application, comprised an abuse of process because it represented another attempt to obtain relief that Mr Keane had previously, unsuccessfully attempted to obtain from the Fair Work Commission.[122]
[121] Reasons, [96].
[122] Reasons, [100].
On 14 September 2023, the primary judge refused to grant leave to issue a number of draft subpoenas because no legitimate forensic purpose had been identified.[123]
[123] Reasons, [101]-[102].
On 19 September 2023, Mr Keane filed a third interlocutory application, again seeking re-instatement and damages.[124] On 5 October 2023, the primary judge struck it out on the basis that it was vexatious and an abuse.[125]
[124] Reasons, [103].
[125] Reasons, [110].
On 15 December 2023, after the primary judge had reserved her decision on the vexatious litigant application, Mr Keane attempted to file a statement of claim alleging fraudulent misrepresentation against Woolworths, associated with the loss of his employment. In his covering letter addressed to the Registrar, Mr Keane said:[126]
This claim attached is in part to force the respondents to address the issues they have caused in my life, but also to force them to actually address issues in any further court proceedings without blatantly lying about issues.
Being forced into undisclosed background clauses have [sic] been extremely damaging to myself, detrimental to those around me, and has caused years of anguish due to the misconduct of these parties and their self-involvement in my life having falsified rape allegations against me.
I also view the continuation of my unemployment to be the continuation of the criminal offence that was committed against me (fraudulent rape allegations) and for this to be an issue that can and should be remedied at the soonest possible date.
I am genuinely seeking a pre-trial hearing within the year of 2023 to address my employment status and resolve, in-part, the criminal aspect of false rape allegations I have been forced to suffer for a protracted period of time.
I do not wish to be a victim of these false rape allegations any longer, I wish to return to my lawful and gainful employment in my community.
I strongly urge the Courts to address this matter at the soonest possible date, as I have suffered for years while the respondents blatantly lie about their conduct, and the respondents still will not conceded or even admit that they had made my fair work hearings about a sexual assault they themselves had fictionalised, they in-fact refuse to even address this concern, despite it being extremely relevant to the damage caused by these respondents.
[126] Reasons, [111].
The Registrar rejected the statement of claim for filing on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, scandalous or an abuse of the processes of the Court within r 32.3(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Rules.[127]
[127] Reasons, [111], [113].
During the hearing before the primary judge, Woolworths relied on other conduct by Mr Keane, which included various interactions between Mr Keane and staff of Woolworths. The evidence was that on at least 64 occasions Mr Keane had called the Woolworths People Advisory Line, demanding that his employment be reinstated.[128]
[128] Reasons, [115].

Annexure B: Thomas Courtney Keane v Woolworths Group Limited (CIV‑24‑001255)
Correspondence from Mr Keane

Date Method From To Brief Summary of Content

2 February 2024

Judgment

McDonald J

Published.

I declare that Thomas Courtney Keane has instituted vexatious proceedings as defined in s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), by persistently instituting proceedings without reasonable grounds.

I order that Thomas Courtney Keane be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of the State of South Australia without the permission of this Court pursuant to s 39(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).

I order that the proceedings commenced by Mr Keane in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 27 January 2023 (file number CIV‑23-000689) are permanently stayed pursuant to s 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)

1

19 February 2024 at 7.24 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Communicating that there was an error when initially uploading documents to the CourtSA portal. Attaching relevant documents.

22 February 2024

Decision

Livesey P

Published.

Application dismissed.

1. Whether the defamation proceedings should re-commence is in large measure bound up with whether the vexatious litigant declaration should have been made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). That must await the outcome of the appeal.

2.       The appellant did not demonstrate any genuine case for urgency and accordingly the appeal must be listed for hearing before the Court of Appeal in the usual way.

2

23 February 2024 at 3.17 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Requesting the appeal book be submitted electronically and that the Court bring forward the appeal hearing date from September 2024. Advising reasons for requesting to the hearing date be brought forward.

3

26 February 2024 at 2.15 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane and L Viant

Advising that the Court heard from the parties before setting the appeal date and that the Court is not able to accommodate an earlier date for the Court of Appeal hearing. Advising that Mr Keane rejected the respondent’s offer to assist him and if he has reconsidered his position, to advise whether he is asking the Court to invite the respondent to take the carriage of the filing and service of the appeal books in this matter.

4

8 March 2024 at 3.30 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Lengthy email detailing Mr Keane’s concerns regarding alleged behaviour by SAPOL and his current Court proceedings. Requesting that the Court direct Registry to accept an application he had filed.

5

8 March 2024 at 11.46 am

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane

Advising that the Court cannot provide legal advice. Advising that the terms of McDonald J’s orders must be followed. Providing contact details for Legal Services Commission.

6

26 March 2024 at 1.04 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Advising that the application filed on 22 March 2024 is pseudo urgent due to SAPOL’s repeated prosecutions against him. Requesting that a hearing of the applications proceed with some urgency.

7

26 March 2024 at 1.40 am

Email

Thomas Keane

McDonald J Chambers and L Viant

Requesting McDonald J withdraw her judgment. Indicating that he will be conducting the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and seeking default judgment against the respondent.

8

26 March 2024 at 3.56 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane and L Viant

Listing the interlocutory application filed on 22 March 2024.

9

26 March 2024 at 4.12 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Enquiring whether the Court has listened to audio evidence submitted by Mr Keane.

10

26 March 2024 at 5.30 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane

Confirming Chambers have not received any audio and confirming hearing date.

11

26 March 2024 at 6.23 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Explaining delivery of audio to Registry.

12

28 March 2024 at 8.52 am

Email

McDonald J Chambers

Thomas Keane

Noting the matter is now before the Court of Appeal and that is the appropriate forum in which to raise his concerns.

28 March 2024

Decision

Livesey P

Published.

Application dismissed.

1.       There is a fundamental difference between the hearing and determination of an appellate proceeding and the hearing and determination of the primary proceeding against which the appeal has been taken.

2. The material the subject of the present application is concerned with re‑litigating the case against Woolworths in connection with the termination of the appellant’s employment, and its aftermath. It is not concerned with whether a vexatious litigant declaration and associated orders should have been made pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).

3.       It cannot be said that the application and the various orders sought are “ancillary to the hearing and determination of the appellate proceeding” within the meaning of r 212.5(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).

13

30 March 2024 at 10.24 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

McDonald J Chambers

Informing chambers that it is “unconscionable” that McDonald J has not withdrawn her judgment, that her actions were grossly negligent and requesting McDonald J address him on why she felt “entitled to legitimately pretend [his] issues were not genuine, and made a judgment in clear contradiction to the evidence she had before her”.

14

30 March 2024 at 4.17 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers, L Viant and Attorney-General’s Department

Requesting explanations as to why he is “forced to continue with an entire appeal, considering how clearly wrong in fact, Justice McDonalds decision was, and considering that [he] was correct in [his] application before the courts”.

15

2 April 2024 at 9.22 am

Email

McDonald J Chambers

Thomas Keane and L Viant

Confirming receipt. Noting as per email on 28 March 2024, the matter is now before the Court of Appeal and as such that is the appropriate forum in which to raise his concerns.

16

5 April 2024 at 5.01 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane, L Viant and Attorney-General’s Department

Confirming receipt of Mr Keane’s email and requesting that he remembers McDonald J’s direction. Confirming that should he wish to commence proceedings or make an application in a South Australian Court or Tribunal, he must first correspond only with the Registrar of this Court, who will then determine whether and how to deal with what he proposes.

17

24 June 2024 at 4.54 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Requesting Livesey P explain why the Court is allowing the respondent to “viciously attack [him] with rape allegations, force [him] out of employment, make false police reports, and then be allowed to pretend that didn’t happen?”.

Requesting that the Court overturn McDonald J’s judgment.

18

25 June 2024 at 10.29 am

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane

Confirming the date of the appeal hearing and attaching the Record of Outcome dated 22 February 2024 which outlines the relevant timetabling orders for this matter.

19

28 June 2024 at 11.20 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Requesting an urgent hearing regarding an injunction against the respondent “immediately seeking re-in statement of employment”. Requesting the Court acknowledge “the evidence before it? And allow [him] some relief after multiple years of allowing the respondent to commit fraud against [him] for absolutely no reason”.

20

28 June 2024 at 11.29 am

Phone

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Mr Keane said he recently sent an email but forgot to include respondent. He has re-sent email to include respondent.

He is requesting an urgent injunction against Woolworths based on abuse of process and fraud. Mentioned interests of justice.

Requested we please acknowledge receipt of email.

21

28 June 2024 at 2.28 pm

Phone

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Requested confirmation Chambers had received his email. Chambers confirmed they would send confirmation of receipt upon the email being viewed by Acting Chief Justice Livesey.

Mr Keane said that he is fully aware that the Court is assisting the respondent, and he is “not having it”.

22

28 June 2024 at 4.21 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane

Confirming receipt of email.

23

28 June 2024 at 4.00 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Requesting the Court “please inform parties if it is going to continue allowing Woolworths group to blatantly continue abusing the judicial process?” and seeking “immediate re-instatement”.

24

3 July 2024 at 3.20 pm

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Requesting an order for “re‑instatement and full disclosure, at the soonest possible date”.

25

3 July 2024 at 3.20 pm

Phone

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Called regarding the contents of the email sent and requested “immediate orders made on the day and he would like to be notified of any further concerns as to why the President has not made the orders”.

26

4 July 2024 at 12.53 pm

Email

Livesey P Chambers

Thomas Keane and L Viant

Confirming the date of appeal hearing. Communicating that “absent new affidavit evidence addressing any new issue, the Court of Appeal is not prepared to make any further orders concerning the existing orders made by McDonald J before the hearing” and that “any application you seek to make before this date should be made in the General Division of the Supreme Court. Please ensure the orders made by McDonald J on 2 February 2024 are complied with”.

Enclosed JusticeNet contact information.

25 July 2024

Judgment

Doyle JA

Published.

Application dismissed.

No proper basis for the various allegations and complaints made has been identified. But further, and in any event, the allegations and complaints made by the applicant are not legitimately ancillary to the hearing and determination of the applicant’s appeal.

27

25 July 2024

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Advising that an objection will be listed and that he would like to proceed with his defamation claim and return to work. Further claims against the Court.

28

30 July 2024 at 10.14 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Querying why the Court is not acknowledging retaliation by SAPOL, or evidence against the respondent etc.

29

30 July 2024 at 10.29 am

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Asserting the matter was not litigated and that the respondent made false rape allegations. Querying why the court is not acknowledging “basic evidence”.

30

3 September 2024 at approx. 10.30 am

Phone

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Mr Keane advised that he is very concerned regarding the Court’s email to the respondent dated 2 September 2024 re the provision of a short supplementary appeal book with relevant transcript. He advises that he has provided evidence that the respondent has attempted to mislead the court and has previously provided fraudulent transcript and as such is very concerned with this direction from the Court.

Chambers advised that it would be more appropriate to put his concerns in an email.

31

10 September 2024 at 3.40 pm

Phone

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers

Advising he has a pressing issue in which Police are involved and the District Court has accepted. He advised that the Supreme Court is suggesting both lower courts have made no finding whatsoever. He further advised that there is no evidence produced which reflects the interaction with police including two years of prosecution stemming from discovery application with Woolworths and SAPOL. He advised that he is in the process of putting something in writing which is very urgent and relevant. He further claims that Doyle JA did not understand and that this raises a conflict as Livesey P already accepted evidence showing police involvement in this matter. He said it is clear from correspondence that the Court and Woolworths are “chummy”.

Chambers advised Mr Keane to put his concerns in writing and email chambers and the respondent as it is not appropriate for the Court to discuss a matter with one party without the other present.

32

11 September 2024

Email

Thomas Keane

Livesey P Chambers and L Viant

Lengthy, four-page letter complaining of behaviour by SAPOL and the Courts.*

Date	Method	From	To	Brief Summary of Content
2 February 2024	Judgment	McDonald J	Published.	I declare that Thomas Courtney Keane has instituted vexatious proceedings as defined in s 39(5)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), by persistently instituting proceedings without reasonable grounds. I order that Thomas Courtney Keane be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any Court of the State of South Australia without the permission of this Court pursuant to s 39(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). I order that the proceedings commenced by Mr Keane in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 27 January 2023 (file number CIV‑23-000689) are permanently stayed pursuant to s 39(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)
1	19 February 2024 at 7.24 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Communicating that there was an error when initially uploading documents to the CourtSA portal. Attaching relevant documents.
22 February 2024	Decision	Livesey P	Published.	Application dismissed. 1. Whether the defamation proceedings should re-commence is in large measure bound up with whether the vexatious litigant declaration should have been made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). That must await the outcome of the appeal. 2. The appellant did not demonstrate any genuine case for urgency and accordingly the appeal must be listed for hearing before the Court of Appeal in the usual way.
2	23 February 2024 at 3.17 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Requesting the appeal book be submitted electronically and that the Court bring forward the appeal hearing date from September 2024. Advising reasons for requesting to the hearing date be brought forward.
3	26 February 2024 at 2.15 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane and L Viant	Advising that the Court heard from the parties before setting the appeal date and that the Court is not able to accommodate an earlier date for the Court of Appeal hearing. Advising that Mr Keane rejected the respondent’s offer to assist him and if he has reconsidered his position, to advise whether he is asking the Court to invite the respondent to take the carriage of the filing and service of the appeal books in this matter.
4	8 March 2024 at 3.30 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Lengthy email detailing Mr Keane’s concerns regarding alleged behaviour by SAPOL and his current Court proceedings. Requesting that the Court direct Registry to accept an application he had filed.
5	8 March 2024 at 11.46 am	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane	Advising that the Court cannot provide legal advice. Advising that the terms of McDonald J’s orders must be followed. Providing contact details for Legal Services Commission.
6	26 March 2024 at 1.04 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Advising that the application filed on 22 March 2024 is pseudo urgent due to SAPOL’s repeated prosecutions against him. Requesting that a hearing of the applications proceed with some urgency.
7	26 March 2024 at 1.40 am	Email	Thomas Keane	McDonald J Chambers and L Viant	Requesting McDonald J withdraw her judgment. Indicating that he will be conducting the Judicial Conduct Commissioner and seeking default judgment against the respondent.
8	26 March 2024 at 3.56 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane and L Viant	Listing the interlocutory application filed on 22 March 2024.
9	26 March 2024 at 4.12 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Enquiring whether the Court has listened to audio evidence submitted by Mr Keane.
10	26 March 2024 at 5.30 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane	Confirming Chambers have not received any audio and confirming hearing date.
11	26 March 2024 at 6.23 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Explaining delivery of audio to Registry.
12	28 March 2024 at 8.52 am	Email	McDonald J Chambers	Thomas Keane	Noting the matter is now before the Court of Appeal and that is the appropriate forum in which to raise his concerns.
28 March 2024	Decision	Livesey P	Published.	Application dismissed. 1. There is a fundamental difference between the hearing and determination of an appellate proceeding and the hearing and determination of the primary proceeding against which the appeal has been taken. 2. The material the subject of the present application is concerned with re‑litigating the case against Woolworths in connection with the termination of the appellant’s employment, and its aftermath. It is not concerned with whether a vexatious litigant declaration and associated orders should have been made pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). 3. It cannot be said that the application and the various orders sought are “ancillary to the hearing and determination of the appellate proceeding” within the meaning of r 212.5(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).
13	30 March 2024 at 10.24 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	McDonald J Chambers	Informing chambers that it is “unconscionable” that McDonald J has not withdrawn her judgment, that her actions were grossly negligent and requesting McDonald J address him on why she felt “entitled to legitimately pretend [his] issues were not genuine, and made a judgment in clear contradiction to the evidence she had before her”.
14	30 March 2024 at 4.17 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers, L Viant and Attorney-General’s Department	Requesting explanations as to why he is “forced to continue with an entire appeal, considering how clearly wrong in fact, Justice McDonalds decision was, and considering that [he] was correct in [his] application before the courts”.
15	2 April 2024 at 9.22 am	Email	McDonald J Chambers	Thomas Keane and L Viant	Confirming receipt. Noting as per email on 28 March 2024, the matter is now before the Court of Appeal and as such that is the appropriate forum in which to raise his concerns.
16	5 April 2024 at 5.01 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane, L Viant and Attorney-General’s Department	Confirming receipt of Mr Keane’s email and requesting that he remembers McDonald J’s direction. Confirming that should he wish to commence proceedings or make an application in a South Australian Court or Tribunal, he must first correspond only with the Registrar of this Court, who will then determine whether and how to deal with what he proposes.
17	24 June 2024 at 4.54 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Requesting Livesey P explain why the Court is allowing the respondent to “viciously attack [him] with rape allegations, force [him] out of employment, make false police reports, and then be allowed to pretend that didn’t happen?”. Requesting that the Court overturn McDonald J’s judgment.
18	25 June 2024 at 10.29 am	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane	Confirming the date of the appeal hearing and attaching the Record of Outcome dated 22 February 2024 which outlines the relevant timetabling orders for this matter.
19	28 June 2024 at 11.20 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Requesting an urgent hearing regarding an injunction against the respondent “immediately seeking re-in statement of employment”. Requesting the Court acknowledge “the evidence before it? And allow [him] some relief after multiple years of allowing the respondent to commit fraud against [him] for absolutely no reason”.
20	28 June 2024 at 11.29 am	Phone	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Mr Keane said he recently sent an email but forgot to include respondent. He has re-sent email to include respondent. He is requesting an urgent injunction against Woolworths based on abuse of process and fraud. Mentioned interests of justice. Requested we please acknowledge receipt of email.
21	28 June 2024 at 2.28 pm	Phone	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Requested confirmation Chambers had received his email. Chambers confirmed they would send confirmation of receipt upon the email being viewed by Acting Chief Justice Livesey. Mr Keane said that he is fully aware that the Court is assisting the respondent, and he is “not having it”.
22	28 June 2024 at 4.21 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane	Confirming receipt of email.
23	28 June 2024 at 4.00 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Requesting the Court “please inform parties if it is going to continue allowing Woolworths group to blatantly continue abusing the judicial process?” and seeking “immediate re-instatement”.
24	3 July 2024 at 3.20 pm	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Requesting an order for “re‑instatement and full disclosure, at the soonest possible date”.
25	3 July 2024 at 3.20 pm	Phone	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Called regarding the contents of the email sent and requested “immediate orders made on the day and he would like to be notified of any further concerns as to why the President has not made the orders”.
26	4 July 2024 at 12.53 pm	Email	Livesey P Chambers	Thomas Keane and L Viant	Confirming the date of appeal hearing. Communicating that “absent new affidavit evidence addressing any new issue, the Court of Appeal is not prepared to make any further orders concerning the existing orders made by McDonald J before the hearing” and that “any application you seek to make before this date should be made in the General Division of the Supreme Court. Please ensure the orders made by McDonald J on 2 February 2024 are complied with”. Enclosed JusticeNet contact information.
25 July 2024	Judgment	Doyle JA	Published.	Application dismissed. No proper basis for the various allegations and complaints made has been identified. But further, and in any event, the allegations and complaints made by the applicant are not legitimately ancillary to the hearing and determination of the applicant’s appeal.
27	25 July 2024	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Advising that an objection will be listed and that he would like to proceed with his defamation claim and return to work. Further claims against the Court.
28	30 July 2024 at 10.14 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Querying why the Court is not acknowledging retaliation by SAPOL, or evidence against the respondent etc.
29	30 July 2024 at 10.29 am	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Asserting the matter was not litigated and that the respondent made false rape allegations. Querying why the court is not acknowledging “basic evidence”.
30	3 September 2024 at approx. 10.30 am	Phone	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Mr Keane advised that he is very concerned regarding the Court’s email to the respondent dated 2 September 2024 re the provision of a short supplementary appeal book with relevant transcript. He advises that he has provided evidence that the respondent has attempted to mislead the court and has previously provided fraudulent transcript and as such is very concerned with this direction from the Court. Chambers advised that it would be more appropriate to put his concerns in an email.
31	10 September 2024 at 3.40 pm	Phone	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers	Advising he has a pressing issue in which Police are involved and the District Court has accepted. He advised that the Supreme Court is suggesting both lower courts have made no finding whatsoever. He further advised that there is no evidence produced which reflects the interaction with police including two years of prosecution stemming from discovery application with Woolworths and SAPOL. He advised that he is in the process of putting something in writing which is very urgent and relevant. He further claims that Doyle JA did not understand and that this raises a conflict as Livesey P already accepted evidence showing police involvement in this matter. He said it is clear from correspondence that the Court and Woolworths are “chummy”. Chambers advised Mr Keane to put his concerns in writing and email chambers and the respondent as it is not appropriate for the Court to discuss a matter with one party without the other present.
32	11 September 2024	Email	Thomas Keane	Livesey P Chambers and L Viant	Lengthy, four-page letter complaining of behaviour by SAPOL and the Courts.*

* Letter from Mr Keane dated 11 September 2024
Dear President Livesey, and the Court Administration Authority of South Australia Complaints Team.
From,
Mr. Thomas Courtney Keane.
Dear President Livesey, and the CAA.
I have repeatedly attempted to bring to the courts attention the years with of harassment that has occurred both inside and outside of court, by South Australia Police.
The court has allowed Woolworths Group Limited to repeatedly involve law enforcement against me, during my attempts at litigation, and has evidence of this occurring. It has not been addressed.
The court has evidence that this behaviour from South Australia Police to such a historical extent, that is originated and commenced during the fair work hearings the respondent is claiming to have settled.
Employment hearings, in which I was charged for stalking, for continuing with a Fair Work Commission hearing that I did not even commence.
the SDA SA/NT did, inappropriately, incorrectly and void of mention to any of issues I have proven they knew to have existed. - Another issue the court is refusing to address but for the purpose of this correspondence, I digress.
South Australia Police has repeatedly made and acted or otherwise been involved in very serious allegations accusing me of extremely serious criminal offence against women.
I made a discovery application on April 1^st 2022, naming South Australia Police and Woolworths Group Limited, seeking Letisha L Bell give evidence regarding her involvement, either willing or otherwise, in what was happening to our life. This was not a prejudicial application in nature.
Without disclosing this to me, a hearing occurred with South Australia Police and a warrant was made for my arrest, on the basis that I was domestically abusing the person I was attempting to bring to court to give evidence against, in part, South Australia Police.
It appears this filing occurred the same day as mine.
This prosecution became multiple prosecutions, lasting two years and spanning over 40 hearings.
Not once did the court make a genuine effort to protect any of the rights I am entitled to.
All of my attempts to just address the allegations, and how outrageous South Australia Police’s behaviour towards me has been, were met with further allegations and prejudice.
I saw the inside of a jail cell, I was arrested repeatedly, I was detained to the state for multiple years.
The only evidence South Australia Police had, exonerated me of the crime I was accused of.
Not a single enquiry against any party has been allowed to proceed, and when a proper application was made in the correct court, it was railroaded for multiple years, without explanation and obviously commenced with no genuine prospects of a successful prosecution.
No reason has been given for these parties repeatedly making outrageously injurious, public allegations of offences against women.
I have provided the court statements from these women, and despite any anger or involvement in a crime either may have, neither made a single criminal allegation against me, or accused me of one, proving just how baseless and intentionally damaging these attacks have been.
I have also provided the court evidence of multiple judicial officers falsifying the court records.
Despite how outrageous this statement is, it remains both true, uncontested and unresolved.
I legitimately have to live the life you are presiding over, and a supermarket has been allowed to fictionalise, report, act on, and now deny making very serious rape allegations that I have very genuinely suffered.
I do not know why this man took these actions against me, I am attempting to address that.
In nearly all of my attempts to address the fact that I have been very publicly and falsely accused of raping a women I could not have raped, I have been harassed by South Australia Police with repeated false allegations, or legitimately been charged with offences, for attempting to participate in hearings.
This has reached a point of brazenness where my criminal record reflected a conviction, despite the court records reflecting those same charges as dropped.
I am writing this letter out of great concern for these hearings as,
President Livesey has already accepted evidence that South Australia Police started charging me, during my Fair Work Hearings, an issue obviously not addressed at those hearings, nor a party appropriately disclosed to me.
I have also provided the court evidence that Commissioner, now deputy president Hampton, blatantly lied to me on repeated occasion, during those hearings.
I understand this evidence is inflammatory.
It still needs to be addressed.
As does South Australia Police’s repeated baseless actions claiming I am attacking women, where no evidence or even claim exists.
Is there a reason the court has refused to address any of these concerns, during all of my attempts to prevent these parties from tearing apart my life?
Everything I have earned, worked for, loved and cherished has been forced from me on a make-believe premise that I suddenly went from no criminal record, a normal person, to suddenly hating women and raping them ect …
This legitimately happened, and was even occurring a second time during the commencement of these very hearings.
None of the evidence the respondent is submitting, discloses their involvement with South Australia Police, something that the court already has record of occurring, and has made findings on.
I write all of this, to express a deep and obvious objection with the respond’s submissions, on the basis that I have addressed the repeated, baseless prosecutions and charges by South Australia Police with the respondent multiple times, they have acknowledged this, or had it acknowledged for them, multiple times, and yet it remains unaddressed for the purpose of “if Mr. Keane’s “vexatious litigant” status should be removed.”
submissions they are being allowed to digitally make, after I made it clear to the court that I could not afford to print the several-thousand pages I need too, and was disallowed to make digitally myself.
What is going on…
My entire life has been torn apart for no reason,
I am owed compensation,
I want to go back to work.
My life could be irreparably damaged if these allegations are not rightfully deemed impossible and therefore fraudulent, an easily accomplished objective that would rectify years of damages, and prevent years more.
The court has refused to conduct a single enquiry into a single issue I have presented at this point in time.
What is going on…
I am being made to repeatedly suffer very public, very sexual humiliation, and the court is pretending that isn’t happening, while making me appear before the lessor court, repeatedly address those concerns, only for the superior court to then claimed they didn’t happen, then claimed it did again… and has now made me wait the better part of a year… for evidence that serves absolutely no purpose but show just how serious this issue is, and just how much the court has gone out of it’s way, refusing to acknowledge it.
All the court has done is inflict needless harm onto my life, attempted to lie to me about my rights to litigate this matter. I was trying to recover and reclaim what was taken from me, not be damaged further. I am clearly pointing out that none of these issues have been addressed, and very much exist and remain problematic.

I very much get the feeling I am being treated like an idiot, for standing up for myself and protecting my life,
By the very people employed and supposedly motivated to do so.
Could the court please respond to any of my very serious, very legitimate complaints, and could the court please deal with these very serious issues. I have to live this life. I didn’t do anything to harm anyone. I want to go back to work. How is attempting to pretend this didn’t happen, such as Justice McDonald has done, anything but obviously damaging to myself and the courts integrity.
Please allow me to address these issues in good faith, immediately.
I clearly am very serious about addressing these issues, and repairing the damage that has been inflicted onto my life.
The courts time-frame of responding to complaints has long since elapsed, and there are genuine issues that are unaddressed, some as serious as convictions being wrongfully recorded against me…
Please cease any notion that what is happening is acceptable or appropriate or that I am a willing participant in, my life has been destroyed and that was clearly the objective of the respondent.
I am genuinely seeking justice.
I am genuinely trying to recover my employment, something nobody had the right to take from me under a fraudulent basis.
It is no exaggeration that restoring my rights to these things is easily accomplished, and absolutely justified at this point in time.
The repeated attacks I have suffered, were clearly not professionally justified or appropriately motivated.
I make no comment about Justice Doyle’s actions or comments other then to say,
I would suggest that holding a hearing without my participation and pretending not to understand a document the Master of the District court both understands and refused to throw out, is clearly an extremely clear example of the conduct I am seeking cease.
Kind regards,
Thomas Courtney Keane.