Georganas v Barkla

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
GEORGANAS v BARKLA
[2021] SASC 47
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Livesey

PROCEDURE - STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY - VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS, PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS - VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
Since 2011 the respondent has instituted over thirty proceedings, primarily in Western Australia, but also in the Federal Court and High Court which are all concerned in one way or another with the respondent’s worker’s compensation claim in 2010.
Orders have been made in the Western Australian and Federal jurisdictions prohibiting the respondent from instituting further proceedings without leave due to his persistent and vexatious litigation of what is referred to as the Form 3B issue.
The applicant is the Federal parliamentary representative of the respondent. On 4 July 2019, the respondent lodged a claim in the Magistrates Court due to the applicant’s alleged failure to respond to a letter sent by the defendant on the Form 3B issue.
The applicant seeks declaratory relief and orders prohibiting the respondent from instituting “any proceeding" in any court or tribunal of this State without leave pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Act). In the alternative, the applicant seeks the same relief pursuant to this Court’s inherent jurisdiction or power.
The applicant also invited this Court to exercise the powers and functions of a Magistrate under the Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) and the Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA).
Held per Livesey J, dismissing the s 39 application and making orders in the exercise of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction so as to prevent the respondent pursuing or commencing proceedings against the applicant or others re-litigating or concerning, whether directly or indirectly, the Form 3B issue.
1.To declare a person to be a vexatious litigant and make an order under s 39 of the Act represents a serious incursion on that person’s right of access to the courts. The Court is only empowered to consider exercising its discretion to make an order where the requirements of s 39 are clearly satisfied.
2.Where the respondent has commenced one proceeding, or possibly two sets of proceedings, in courts or tribunals of this State he has not "persistently instituted vexatious proceedings" within the meaning of s 39 of the Act and the exercise of the statutory discretion does not arise. Observations made as to whether other processes were "proceedings". It is a matter for Parliament whether the definition of “proceedings” in s 39 should be broadened so as to permit the Court to take into account proceedings commenced in any Australian court or tribunal.
3.As no South Australian Act or rules of court relevantly limit or circumscribe this Court’s inherent jurisdiction, the exercise of this Court’s inherent power extends beyond the power to restrain the commencement of new applications in existing proceedings and permits an order to be made restraining the initiation of new proceedings, at least where they represent an attempt to re-litigate, or are otherwise concerned with, an issue or proceeding which has been finally determined.
4.The exercise of this Court’s inherent power also permits an order restraining the respondent from commencing new proceedings which comprise an abuse of process in other courts and tribunals of this State, at least where this Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over those other courts and tribunals.
5.The exercise of the Court’s inherent power in this way is exceptional and should be reserved for clear cases. Ordinarily, applications to stay or dismiss proceedings as an abuse should be made in the court or tribunal where those proceedings will be heard.
6.Here, the Magistrates Court claim raises no cause of action known to the law and is an attempt by a claim in damages to collaterally attack the many decisions that have put the Form 3B issue to rest. In the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to make an order staying the Magistrates Court claim.
7.Because the respondent has made it clear that he intends to persist with his litigation campaign, it is also appropriate to make an order that, subject to obtaining leave from a Judge of this Court, the respondent is restrained from commencing new proceedings in the courts or tribunals of this State where they attempt to re-litigate, or are otherwise concerned with, whether directly or indirectly, the Form 3B issue.
8.There is no good reason to exercise the powers of a Magistrate under the Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) and the Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA) where the applicant has had the opportunity to seek an order in the Magistrates Court and orders can be made in this Court in the exercise of this Court's inherent powers.

Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 193, r 53; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Magistrates Act 1983 (SA) s 22; Judicial Administration (Auxiliary Appointments and Powers) Act 1988 (SA), referred to.
Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] SASC 173; Assistant Commissioner Michael James Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1; Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425; Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88; Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311; Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484; Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19; Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168; Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246; In Re Connolly Brothers Limited [1911] 1 Ch 731; John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154; NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (2016) 260 CLR 546; von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Co [2005] 1 Qd R 681; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, discussed.
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55; Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49; Attorney-General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008; Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1; Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28; Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath Senior [2001] VSC 269; Attorney-General for Western Australia v Barkla [2016] WASC 298; Attorney-General v Van Reesma (1986) 43 SASR 170; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29; Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2015] HCASL 40; Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; Braeside Bearings Pty Ltd v HJ Brignall and Associates [1996] 1 VR 17; Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909; Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 208; CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390; Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; Cardus v Lavrick [2020] FamCA 579; CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 259 CLR 339; Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd v Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd (No 5) (1997) 18 WAR 334; Clayton v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 347; Cocker v Tempest (1841) 7 M & W 502; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322; Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254; Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713; Dalle-Molle (by his next friend Public Trustee) v Manos (2004) 88 SASR 193; Devlin v Collins (1984) 37 SASR 98; Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1; Director of Public Prosecutions v Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Ltd (2012) 41 VR 81; EMI Limited v Pandit [1975] 1 WLR 302; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320; Fuller v Field (1994) 62 SASR 112; Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190; Gold Lynx v Gold Scene Pty Ltd (1984) 59 ALR 343; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. 527 U.S. 308 (1999); Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486; Hasler v Singtel (2014) 87 NSWLR 609; Holland v Sammon (1972) 4 SASR 1; Hollidge v Pomeroy [2014] SASC 45; Hunter v Chief Constable [1982] AC 529; Hunter v Leahy (1999) 91 FCR 214; In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21; In re Millane [1930] VLR 381; Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cuneen (2015) 256 CLR 1; Iraqi Ministry of Defence v Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A. ("The Angel Bell") [1981] 1 QB 65; J N Taylor Holdings v Bond (1993) 59 SASR 432; Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612; Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; James v Medical Board of South Australia (2006) 95 SASR 445; Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75; Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810; Jorgenson v Jorgenson [2016] QSC 193; Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153; Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370; Labaj v Hambleton [2011] QCA 17; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; Lord Kinnaird v Field [1905] 2 Ch 306; Lyons v Legalese Pty Ltd (2016) 126 SASR 232; Manolakis v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] SASC 193; Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509; McDonald v South Australia [2013] SASC 31; Miller v Ryan [1980] 1 NSWLR 93; Mills v Cooper [1967] 2 QB 459; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302; National Australia Bank Ltd & Argus v Zollo [2008] SASC 93; National Australia Bank v Zollo [2008] SASC 93; Newcombe v Medical Board (SA) (2007) 96 SASR 564; Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 1 WLR 1093; Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133; P & C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board for the State of New South Wales [1973] 2 NSWLR 366; Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & Ors [2020] QCA 47; Pivovaroff v Chernabaeff (1978) 16 SASR 329; Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769; Prescott v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal [2009] SASC 309; PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2015) 258 CLR 1; Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378; Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay [1982] 1 NSWLR 264; Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; Simsek v MacPhee (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs) (1982) 148 CLR 636; Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540; Tarasenko v Boylan (1992) 58 SASR 587; The King v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258; The Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App. Cas 210; Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335; UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77; Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd (2013) 306 ALR 256; Watson v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1987) 8 NSWLR 685; Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741; Westwill v Heath [2010] SASC 358; Willi v Banks; Willi v Brodsky [2018] QSC 284; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Willis v Earl Beauchamp (1886) 11 PD 59; Workcover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, considered.

GEORGANAS v BARKLA
[2021] SASC 47
LIVESEY J:
Introduction

By summons dated 16 August 2019 Mr Steve Georganas (the applicant) has made a “vexatious litigant application”, seeking declaratory relief and orders prohibiting Mr Geoff Barkla (the respondent) from instituting “any proceeding” in any court or tribunal of this State “without permission of the Court” pursuant to s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Act).
Alternatively, the applicant seeks the same relief from this Court pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction or power. As will be seen, I am only prepared to make orders in the exercise of this Court’s inherent powers.
Vexatious litigant declarations
Since 2011, the respondent has instituted over thirty proceedings, primarily in Western Australia, but also in the Federal Court and High Court of Australia.[1] These proceedings all relate in one way or another to the respondent’s workers compensation claim which followed stress injuries sustained at work in Geraldton, Western Australia, in 2010.
[1] A list of decisions in prior proceedings is in Schedule A to these reasons.
On 21 September 2016, the Attorney-General for Western Australia, the Honourable Michael Mischin MLC, obtained an order pursuant to s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) prohibiting the respondent from instituting any proceedings unless he first obtained the leave of a court or tribunal, as the case requires.[2]
[2] Attorney-General for Western Australia v Barkla [2016] WASC 298 (Le Miere J).
On 20 December 2018, Allianz obtained an order pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) prohibiting the respondent from instituting proceedings in the Federal Court.[3]
[3] Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070 (Charlesworth J).
These orders were made because the respondent has persistently and vexatiously litigated his view that the workers compensation insurer of his former employer failed to give him notice by way of a Form 3B pursuant to s 57A(3) of the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (now repealed) (the Form 3B issue).
The respondent’s campaign over the Form 3B issue has brought him before the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia on seven occasions. His attempt to obtain special leave to appeal after one of these hearings was refused by the High Court on the papers.[4]
[4] Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2015] HCASL 40 (Kiefel and Keane JJ).
Disposition of the vexatious litigant application
The vexatious litigant application in this case is a response to the respondent’s commencement of one proceeding against the applicant in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 4 July 2019 (the Magistrates Court claim). That claim discloses no cause of action known to the law and is properly described as frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court within the meaning of r 193 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), now r 70.3 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA). It is, therefore, liable to be struck out, dismissed or stayed, presumably with costs.
However, the applicant elected not to take the conventional course of seeking relief in the Adelaide Magistrates Court. He came straight to this Court, relying on the vexatious litigant legislation. That is problematic because s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (the Act) cannot be invoked unless the respondent has “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” in a court or tribunal of this State.
Where the respondent has commenced only one proceeding in a court or tribunal of this State, or possibly two sets of proceedings, he cannot be said to have “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” in courts or tribunals of this State. The language of s 39 may be contrasted with the broader scope of provisions in other jurisdictions which permit orders to be made where a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal.[5]
[5] For example, see s 37AO(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):
Accordingly, and though the Magistrates Court claim is properly described as vexatious, I do not have the power to exercise the discretion conferred by s 39 of the Act to make the orders sought.
The vexatious litigant application must be dismissed.
Disposition of the application made under this Court’s inherent power
Before the trial of this matter, I invited the applicant to consider, as an alternative, the scope of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction or power. Although the applicant did not formally apply to amend his application, the respondent was on notice before the trial of this alternative means of supporting the orders sought by the applicant.
The applicant handed up a bundle of case extracts at the hearing, and after the hearing provided a written submission concerning this aspect of his case.[6] The applicant submitted:
… the orders that are sought are orders of an extreme nature that directly go to the core of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction in the sense that s. 39 and its complementary inherent power equivalents are directed to a central function of the Supreme Court which is to safeguard the proper administration of justice in South Australian courts.
[6] At the trial on 11 May I requested submissions relevant to the exercise of inherent powers over the Magistrates Court claim. These were supplied on 18 May 2020, addressing the extracts which had been “cut and pasted” from the following cases: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; National Australia Bank Ltd & Argus v Zollo [2008] SASC 93; Prescott v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal [2009] SASC 309; Labaj v Hambleton [2011] QCA 17; Jorgenson v Jorgenson [2016] QSC 193; Palmer Leisure Coolum Pty Ltd v Magistrates Court of Queensland & Ors [2020] QCA 47; Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484 and Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88.
The respondent was given an opportunity to respond to this submission. As will be seen, over a century ago developments in the inherent jurisdiction to restrain new applications and proceedings occurred at around the same time as the introduction of the first vexatious litigant legislation in England. However, I doubt whether these are “complementary … equivalents”, though their effect can be similar, because the statutory jurisdiction is only indirectly concerned with this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction or power, being more naturally concerned with declarations regarding “the status of a vexatious litigant”.[7] Nonetheless, considered developments in other jurisdictions over the last forty years demonstrate that this Court has a broad, inherent power to prevent an abuse of process in this Court, as well as in other courts or tribunals over which this Court has supervisory jurisdiction.[8]
[7] von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Co [2005] 1 Qd R 681, [16] (Keane JA, with whom McPherson JA and Philippides J agreed). Cf Garrett v Mildara Blass [2009] SASC 19, [18]-[19] (Layton J).
[8] See particularly Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246, 250-252 (McHugh JA, with whom Street CJ and Priestley JA agreed); Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, 390-392 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Co [2005] 1 Qd R 681, 684-688 (Keane JA, with whom McPherson JA and Philipides J agreed), relying on Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168, Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484, 497-498 and Bhamjee v Forsdick [2004] 1 WLR 88, 93.
In Australia, however, that inherent power is not so broad as to support the orders sought by the applicant in this case. Whilst this Court’s inherent power extends beyond proceedings already commenced in this Court, and can on occasion be used to prospectively prevent new proceedings being continued or commenced in this Court and in inferior courts or tribunals of this State, it cannot support a prohibition against the institution of any proceeding per se in any court or tribunal of this State. That kind of prohibition is only supported by s 39 of the Act, in cases where the statutory preconditions to the availability and exercise of the requisite discretion have been satisfied. Otherwise, under the inherent power, greater circumspection and specificity is required so as to demonstrate, for example, that the new proceeding involves the re-litigation of an issue or proceeding, or is otherwise concerned with an issue or proceeding, which has been finally determined.

The respondent has made it clear that he intends to persist with his litigation campaign. During the hearing, he told me that he would do so. He has, in addition, inundated my staff and others with emails which accuse me and others of various kinds of unlawful conduct and other wrongdoing, and threaten me and others with legal action of various kinds.[9] That correspondence continues.
[9] A list of the correspondence is in Schedule B to these reasons.
The Court and its resources must be preserved and protected against the time, trouble and cost associated with addressing and responding to proceedings and applications which are without any legal merit or purpose.
There has, in recent times, been a greater willingness to look to the Court’s inherent powers to protect against vexatious behaviours by a select minority of surprisingly energetic litigants. They are usually unrepresented.[10] Some are best described as querulous.[11] These powers ought only be exercised in clear cases, mindful of the fundamental right of access to the courts and tribunals of this State. There is however no recognised right to engage in vexatious litigation, to engage in unnecessary and threatening correspondence, or to otherwise embark on an abuse of the processes of the courts and tribunals of this State.[12] That is not to deny the right of litigants to protection where they have become the targets of vexatious litigants. What it emphasises is that provisions such as s 39 of the Act and this Court’s inherent power incorporate an important public element, which looks beyond the interests of the particular parties in particular litigation. The “normative judgment” involved in the exercise of the Court’s inherent power must take into account the “public interest in the timely and efficient administration of civil justice”.[13] Accordingly, and in appropriate cases, orders can be fashioned to restrain litigants from commencing litigation or applications which attack or concern specified issues or parties. To do otherwise risks an unnecessary waste of the scarce judicial and public resources available to manage and adjudicate meritorious disputes.
[10] Raising a series of complexities and pressures that require careful management, as has been recognised in many cases, see, for example, Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 and Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375. See Re F (2001) 161 FLR 189 regarding guidelines suggested by the Family Court.
[11] See, for example, Thomson v Tremco Pty Limited [2019] QCA 18, [35]-[46] (Morrison JA, with whom Sofronoff P and Gotterson JA agreed).
[12] Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.
[13] UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77, [70] (Gageler J).
Given the history of the respondent’s litigation concerning the Form 3B issue, and the terms of the Magistrate’s Court claim, this appears to be a clear case for the exercise of this Court’s inherent powers. Accordingly, and not without some hesitation, I am prepared to declare that the Magistrates Court claim is vexatious and ought to be stayed as an abuse of process. Contrary to the case presented, that is not because it seeks to relitigate the Form 3B issue. The Magistrates Court claim does not seek to relitigate the Form 3B issue; it is concerned with that issue because it purports to render the applicant liable in damages for failing to publicly raise it. In so doing, it raises no cause of action known to the law, and attempts by a claim in damages to collaterally attack the many decisions which have laid the Form 3B issue to rest.[14]
[14] Hunter v Chief Constable [1982] AC 529, 541B (Lord Diplock).
Where the respondent has made it clear that he intends to persist with litigation regarding the Form 3B issue, and given the nature of his ongoing correspondence threatening a range of people, I am also prepared to make an order by way of injunction prohibiting the respondent from instituting new proceedings against the applicant, as well as an order by way of injunction prohibiting the respondent from instituting new proceedings against any other entity or person in a court or tribunal of this State challenging or concerning the Form 3B issue, whether directly or indirectly, unless he first obtains the leave of a Judge of this Court.
Though English cases refer to orders with a two-year limitation, the respondent’s litigation campaign has exceeded a decade and in these circumstances I do not think that an order which is time limited would be appropriate.
So as to ensure that the resources of this Court and other courts and tribunals of this State are not wasted by having to address the respondent’s ongoing proceedings and applications, I will direct that should he wish to commence proceedings or make an application in a South Australian court or tribunal, challenging or concerning the Form 3B issue, whether directly or indirectly, he must first correspond only with the Registrar of this Court, who will then determine whether and how to deal with what the respondent proposes.
It will be a matter for the Registrar to manage the correspondence as well as to determine whether new proceedings or applications or other documents are managed under r 53 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (now r 32.3 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA)) or are otherwise referred to a Judge to consider the question of leave.
My reasons for making these orders follow.
The structure of these reasons
These reasons are set out as follows:
Introduction
Vexatious litigant declarations
Disposition of the vexatious litigant application
Disposition of the application made under this Court’s inherent power
The structure of these reasons
The orders sought on the vexatious litigant application
The Magistrates Court claim
The workers compensation claim and the Form 3B issue
Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)
The historical context – vexatious litigant legislation
Persistently instituted vexatious proceedings?
(1) Persistently instituted
(2) Vexatious
(3) Proceedings
Other “proceedings” apart from the Magistrates Court claim?
The District Court proceedings – never instituted
Notice to Admit, subpoenas, application for permission to issue subpoenas
The attempt to file a Cross-Action by Counterclaim
Conclusion on the application made under s 39 of the Act
The inherent jurisdiction or power
The English authorities
The recent Australian authorities
Conclusions on the inherent jurisdiction
Other matters
Conclusion
Appendix A – List of Prior Proceedings
Appendix B – List of Correspondence
The orders sought on the vexatious litigant application
The orders sought by the applicant on the vexatious litigant application are as follows:
The Court grant declaratory relief in the following terms:
1.1The defendant has instituted and concluded proceedings in the Western Australian and Federal Court jurisdictions as set out in the affidavit of Julietta Kinnear sworn on 16 August 2019 that are vexatious proceedings as defined by the Act.
1.2 The defendant has recently commenced a further proceeding in the Adelaide Magistrates Court which:
1.1.1Discloses no reasonable cause of action for the purposes of Rule 193(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (‘the Rules’);
1.1.2Carries no reasonable prospect of success;
1.1.3Can reasonably be considered an attempt to re-litigate the decided issues from the Western Australian and Federal Court proceedings;
1.1.4Is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of Rules 117 and 193 of the Rules.
That the defendant, Geoff Barkla, be prohibited from instituting in prescribed Courts any proceeding, as defined by the Act, without permission of the Court;
In the alternative, and on the same grounds, that the defendant, Geoff Barkla, be prohibited from instituting in prescribed Courts and proceeding, as defined by the Act, arising from, in relation to or ancillary to a workers compensation claim in Western Australia filed by the defendant on or about 5 November 2010 against his employer, G4S Custodial Services without permission of the Court.
That the proceedings brought in the Adelaide Magistrates Court, Action No. AMCCI-19-2661, by the defendant against the plaintiff be stayed.
As can be seen from proposed order 1.1, the vexatious litigant application was made on the assumption that the many proceedings commenced in Western Australia and the Federal Court were “vexatious proceedings as defined by the Act”.
That assumption is wrong.
By s 39(6) the term “proceedings” is defined to mean “civil or criminal proceedings instituted in a prescribed court”. A “prescribed court” is defined in a manner confined to courts or tribunals of this State. A Western Australian court or tribunal and the Federal Court are not “prescribed court[s]” as defined. None of them are courts or tribunals of this State. A proceeding in Western Australia or the Federal Court cannot therefore be regarded as “proceedings” for the purposes of s 39(1) of the Act.
There is another unusual feature of this vexatious litigant application. At the time it was made, the respondent had commenced only one proceeding in this State. It is not possible to regard the institution of one proceeding as the persistent institution of proceedings in courts or tribunals of this State. It follows that at the time the application was made it was misconceived and doomed to fail.
Ordinarily, vexatious litigant applications are made only with the benefit of numerous “proceedings” (as defined) which have been dismissed or otherwise determined, representing a clear catalogue of failure and wasted expense. Whilst that is so in this case, that has occurred in other jurisdictions, beyond the scope of s 39 of the Act.
A final unusual feature of this vexatious litigant application is that it has been made without the benefit of any order made by the court or tribunal in which the proceeding was commenced. Rather than invite the Magistrates Court to strike out, dismiss or stay the claim, the applicant seeks those orders for the first time in this Court. As a general rule, and save in the clearest of cases, litigants should not be encouraged to come directly into this Court. Ordinarily, any application to strike out, dismiss or stay should first be made in the court or tribunal where the trial of the proceeding would ordinarily take place.[15]
[15] Watson v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1987) 8 NSWLR 685, 703B (Priestley JA, with whom Street CJ and Hope JA agreed).
The Magistrates Court claim
By the Magistrates Court claim commenced on 4 July 2019, the respondent seeks $70,000 from the applicant. It is pleaded as follows:
The Plaintiff is aggrieved by the Defendant’s acts of omissions and breaches of Statutory laws including but not limited to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Civil Liabilities Act 1936 and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 and the Criminal Code Act 1995. [sic]
The plaintiff then pleads the following seven “facts”:
Fact 1. The Plaintiff wrote to the Defendant on the 11^th October 2016.
Fact 2. The Defendant has never responded to the Plaintiff’s letter.
Fact 3. The Defendant’s acts of omissions has caused a detriment / loss to the Plaintiff.
Fact 4. The Defendant’s acts of omissions has caused damage to the Plaintiff by way of physical, psychological and financial loss.
Fact 5. The Defendant failed in his duty of care to show the Plaintiff reasonable care.
Fact 6. The Defendant failed to do his duty to represent the Plaintiff in a timely and fair manner.
Fact 7. The Defendant has breached the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 and the Civil Liabilities Act 1936 and the Criminal Code Act 1995.
The Plaintiff seeks to have the Court decide if the Defendant has in fact breached Statutory written laws under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.
The respondent does not deign to explain how the legislation to which he refers can be invoked, nor why the seven “facts” give rise to any cause of action or other right known to the law.
At its heart, the Magistrates Court claim concerns the applicant’s alleged failure to respond to the respondent’s letter dated 11 October 2016 by which he sought the applicant’s assistance “as [his] Federal representative”. That assistance was sought in connection with the respondent’s long-running dispute with his former employer and its insurer over the esoteric Form 3B issue concerning his workers compensation claim. That claim was first made in Western Australia as long ago as 2010.
The workers compensation claim and the Form 3B issue
The respondent remains concerned that Allianz did not issue a “Form 3B” notifying him that liability for his stress claim was disputed. Rather, the insurer issued a “Form 3C”, notifying him that it was unable to form a view about his claim. Subsequently, it finalised investigations, accepted his claim and commenced payments. The respondent told me that “back payments” of compensation were then made. Those payments continued for the period permitted by the Act, after which they stopped. The respondent also told me that he has finally resumed full time work in South Australia and, though the pay is not what he was formerly receiving, he enjoys his work.
I do not propose to set out all of the letter dated 11 October 2016. It is a letter written to a member of the Federal Parliament concerning a State issue, being the Form 3B issue. It is a confusing combination of legal assertions and questions, ranging across the legislation already mentioned, before culminating in the following request:
Sir, I would really appreciate your help in this matter as the Attorney General WA Minister Mischin has failed repeated attempts to answer my questions. I ask you to write a letter to the Hon: Michael Mischin please asking the following questions:
…
Sir, as these matters are paramount to my health and well being of not only me but also my children, I request an urgent response (On or before 23^rd October 2016) please?
I thank the Hon: Steve Georganas for his service and time as my Federal Representative and I look forward to your expedient response.
(emphasis in original)
The applicant responded by letter dated 17 November 2016, advising that he had made representations to the Commonwealth Attorney-General “on your behalf” who had, in turn, referred the correspondence to the Western Australian Attorney-General. The applicant concluded with the suggestion that the respondent seek independent legal advice.
As a part of this response, the applicant attached a letter which he had received from the Western Australian Attorney-General dated 11 November 2016. In part, that letter advised:
Mr Barkla has commenced, or attempted to commence, some 24 legal proceedings in Western Australia in relation to his 2010 worker’s compensation claim.
The issues concerning that claim have been repeatedly and finally considered by various courts in this State as a result of Mr Barkla’s continuous attempts to re-litigate those issues. On that basis, further action in relation to those matters will not be undertaken.
I note on 21 September 2016, the Supreme Court of Western Australia made orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 2002 (WA) prohibiting Mr Barkla from instituting any proceedings unless he first obtains the leave of a court or tribunal.
In the court’s reasons for decision, it is observed that Mr Barkla continuously re-litigates matters that have already been settled and does so absent any legal grounds, evidencing an unwillingness to take into account and respect the finality of court decisions: Attorney General for Western Australian v Barkla [2016] WASC 298 [67].
A copy of the last-mentioned decision was attached to the response.
Given his predilection for disputation, it is unsurprising that the respondent was dissatisfied with this response. Further correspondence followed. It culminated in an email dated 1 May 2019 with the subject heading “I request that you raise these issues in Parliament re Allianz”, demanding a response by Friday, 3 May 2019. The respondent’s email continued:
Sir, at the rally today i heard you say that you will stand up for workers rights, then why do you discriminate against me? Why do you not stand up for me and my rights? (My Daughter a witness was just to the left of me).
If you fail to respond again I will be at every speakers event that you are at over the next 2 weeks and I intend to speak up and hand out fliers with the following videos. Sir, I will do everything I can to make sure you lose the elections because you’re not doing what the Australian tax payers pay you to do “Represent We the People”. you are allowing me to be Abused by Allianz and other Government Agencies.
Thank you for your time.
I look forward to your response.
(emphasis in original)
Presumably it was the absence of any response to this email that led to the commencement of the Magistrates Court claim against the applicant.
Section 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)
The Court’s statutory power to declare a litigant vexatious and to prohibit vexatious proceedings is conferred by s 39 of the Act which is in the following terms:
39—Vexatious proceedings
(1)If, on the application of the Attorney-General or any other interested person, the `   court is satisfied that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the court may make either or both of the following orders:
(a)     an order prohibiting the person by whom the vexatious proceedings were instituted from instituting further proceedings, or further proceedings of a particular class, without permission of the court;
(b)     an order staying proceedings already instituted by that person.
(2)Where it appears to a prescribed court that there are proper grounds for an    application under this section, it may refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration.
(3)An order under this section remains in force (subject to variation by the court)—
(a)     if a period for the operation of the order is fixed—until the expiration of that period or the revocation of the order (whichever first occurs);
(b)if no such period is fixed—until revocation of the order.
(4)Where an order is made under this section, a copy of the order must be published in the Gazette.
(5)For the purposes of this section, proceedings are vexatious—
(a)if instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior   purpose; or
(b)if instituted without reasonable ground.
(6)In this section—
prescribed court means—
(a)the Supreme Court; or
(b)any other court of the State; or
(c)the South Australian Employment Tribunal; and
(d)any other tribunal of the State prescribed by the regulations;
proceedings means civil or criminal proceedings instituted in a prescribed court.
There is no relevant tribunal prescribed by regulation.
The Supreme Court’s discretion to declare that a litigant is vexatious and to make orders under s 39 first depends upon proof of the existence of the matters addressed in s 39(1). Section 39 envisages a two-stage process. At the first stage, an applicant must demonstrate that the respondent has persistently instituted “proceedings” within the meaning of s 39(6) and the proceedings are “vexatious” within the meaning of s 39(5). The concept of “proceedings” is defined by s 39(6) to mean proceedings instituted in a “prescribed court”, being one of the specified courts or tribunals of this State.
When addressing this first stage, the Court cannot take into account proceedings in any other Australian court or tribunal when determining whether the requirements of the Act are satisfied. The existence or outcome of other Australian court or tribunal proceedings may, however, assist the conclusion that the local proceedings are vexatious because the point in issue has been repeatedly instituted or conclusively determined elsewhere.[16]
[16] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J).

At the second stage, having determined that the respondent has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings, the applicant must then persuade the Court that, in all the circumstances, it is proper for the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of making an order which is within the scope of s 39(1).[17]
[17] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 33 (Perry J); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [58] (Debelle J).
The historical context – vexatious litigant legislation
The original version of s 39 was introduced in 1935 in the following terms:
39. (1) If, on an application made by the Attorney-General under this section, the court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the Supreme Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons, the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall, without the leave of the court or a judge thereof, be instituted by him in any court, and such leave shall not be given unless the court or judge is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings.
(2) If the person against whom an order is sought under this section is unable on account of poverty to retain counsel, the court shall assign counsel to him.
(3) A copy of any order made under this section shall be published in the Government Gazette.
The progenitor provision was the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (56 & 60 Vict c 51).[18] As Lord Halsbury explained during the Second Reading in the House of Lords, the bill was introduced in England to curb Mr Alexander Chaffers,[19] who had pressed more than 40 unsuccessful civil actions against, amongst others, the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the incumbent and a former Lord Chancellor, the Speaker of the House of Commons, the trustees of the British Museum, the solicitors to the Treasury and other luminaries:[20] “the time had arrived when some sort of stop should be put to such proceedings”.[21]
[18] Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311, 315-317 (Barwick CJ and McTiernan J), where the introduction of counterpart legislation across the States was explained.
[19] Michael Taggart, ‘Alexander Chaffers and the Genesis of the Vexatious Actions Act 1896’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 656-684. The first case was Ex Parte the Attorney-General; Re Alexander Chaffers (1897) 76 LT 351; 45 WR 365 which held that actions before the Act commenced could be taken into account. Chaffers was a notorious bankrupt lawyer, earlier instrumental in destroying the career of Sir Travers Twiss. This followed the scandal of a libel action in which Lady Twiss was exposed as a prostitute, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, ‘The Justification of King Leopold II’s Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss’ in Shannaugh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (ed), Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire (Palgrave Macmillian US, 2010).
[20] Attorney-General v Van Reesma (1986) 43 SASR 170, 172 (O’Loughlin J).
[21] Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311, 315 (Barwick CJ and McTiernan J).
There are a number of matters to note about the history and operation of s 39.
First, the section confers an “extreme” remedy,[22] which is not granted lightly as it “seriously abridges the right of the subject to … redress in the Courts of law”.[23]
[22] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 484 (Roden J).
[23] In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21, 34 (Kennedy LJ); Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2007) 242 ALR 370, 380 [44] (Finn J). To similar effect: “it is … a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts”: Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321, 323 (Kirby J).
Secondly, the provision is applied having regard to the “fundamental principle” that every person has:[24]
... a fundamental right … of access to a court to seek remedies as a consequence of an alleged infringement of his or her rights.
[24] Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153, [58]; Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909, 977 (Lord Diplock).
In consequence, the vexatious litigant legislation has usually been construed strictly. For example, in In re Boaler the question was whether the general words of the English provision should be construed broadly, so as to include criminal as well as civil proceedings. That interpretation was rejected by the English Court of Appeal, which held that it only applied to civil proceedings. As Scrutton LJ explained:[25]
One of the valuable rights of every subject of the King is to appeal to the King in his Courts if he alleges that a civil wrong has been done to him, or if he alleges that a wrong punishable criminally has been done to him, or has been committed by another subject of the King. This right is sometimes abused and it is, of course, quite competent to Parliament to deprive any subject of the King of it either absolutely or in part. But the language of any such statute should be jealously watched by the Courts, and should not be extended beyond its least onerous meaning unless clear words are used to justify such extension.
… the presumption against the interference with the vital rights and liberties of the subject entitles, even compels, me to limit the words to the meaning which effects the least interference with those rights.
[25] In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21, 36 (Scrutton LJ).
Subsequently, Australian courts took a different view, construing the provision as applicable to criminal as well as civil proceedings.[26] Nonetheless, it remains appropriate to construe s 39 having regard to the “principle of legality”:[27]
Statutes are construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and freedoms at common law. The common law presumption against the parliamentary intention to infringe upon such rights and freedoms has been described as an aspect of a “principle of legality” which governs the relationship between parliament, the executive and the courts. The presumption is of long standing and has been restated over many years. It can be taken to be a presumption of which those who draft legislation, regulations and by-laws are aware. To apply it is to act conformably with legislative intention as explained by this Court in Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld).
(citations omitted)
[26] In Victoria, the local counterpart at the time, s 33 of the Supreme Court Act 1928 (Vic), was construed as extending to criminal proceedings. The Full Court was no doubt influenced by the fact that s 33 had been introduced in 1928 to curb Mr Rupert Frederick Millane, who had commenced a large number of criminal proceedings: see, eg, In re Millane [1930] VLR 381. That approach was followed in South Australia, Attorney-General v Van Reesma (1986) 43 SASR 170 (O’Loughlin J), before the issue was put beyond doubt by the 1987 amendment which removed the reference to “habitually” in s 39(1) and introduced s 39(6) which extended the meaning of “proceedings” to “both civil and criminal proceedings”: (No 80 of 1987).
[27] See, eg, Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1, [42] (French CJ); Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196, [29] (French CJ); [171]-[173] (Kiefel J), [307]-[314] (Gageler and Keane JJ); Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cuneen (2015) 256 CLR 1, [54] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ).
Whilst s 39 represents a clear legislative intention to restrict, and potentially to abrogate, what is otherwise a fundamental right of access to the courts and tribunals of this State, that right of access is not absolute.[28] Section 39 represents the striking of a balance between that right of access and the need to protect other litigants, the courts and the community from the time, trouble and cost associated with being unduly vexed by proceedings which are, for example, “without reasonable grounds”.
[28] Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540, [7] (Perry J).
In my view, the evident legislative policy is that it is only where the “stringent requirements” of the section are clearly satisfied that the Court is then empowered to consider exercising its discretion to make a declaration and order which represents a serious incursion on a person’s right of access to the courts.[29]
[29] Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378, [52] (Sackville J).
Thirdly, initially, an application under the vexatious litigant legislation could only be made by the Attorney-General,[30] reflecting the questions of public policy raised by s 39 applications.[31] In South Australia, it was not until 1995 that the words “or any other interested person” were added to s 39(1), broadening the category of applicants beyond the Attorney-General.[32] The cases do not address in any detail what constitutes an “interested person” for the purposes of s 39. Usually it seems to have been regarded as sufficient that the applicant is a target of the respondent’s litigation.[33] Presumably the cases on standing in other contexts are of relevance.[34] There has been no suggestion in this case that the applicant is not an “interested person”, given that he is the target of the Magistrates Court claim commenced by the respondent.
[30] Though, in 1987, the Judges of this Court sought the power to act on their “own motion”, that was rejected in favour of a power to refer matters to the Attorney-General.
[31] Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.
[32] Statutes Amendment (Courts) Act 1995 (SA), p 1065.
[33] See, eg, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [63] (Debelle J).
[34] See, eg, Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493, 526-528 (Gibbs J)
Fourthly, in Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (Inglis), the High Court held that this kind of legislation was necessary because there was otherwise no relevant inherent power to prospectively restrain vexatious litigants from commencing new actions:[35]
In our opinion, it is not surprising that the courts do not appear (so far as we have been able to discover) to have taken the further step of intervening in a summary way to prevent the commencement, except by leave, of actions and other proceedings by a particular person or persons but have limited themselves to exercising their powers in relation to proceedings which have been taken in a court and have thus been placed under its control. It may be that the exercise of supervision, by means of a requirement that leave should be obtained for the bringing of proceedings, could have been justified logically as a proper safeguard against abuse of the court's process in cases where it was shown to be probable that a person would continue bringing groundless proceedings. But, in our opinion, it is apparent that the courts, both in England and in this country, have declined to regard themselves as having power to do so, except where such power has been conferred upon them by an Act of Parliament or by rules promulgated under statutory authority.
[35] Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis (1974) 131 CLR 311, 314-315 (Barwick CJ and McTiernan J).
In light of decisions in other jurisdictions,[36] and later in Australia, I shall return to consider the breadth of the Court’s inherent power, as well as whether the inherent power of the Court is as confined as was assumed in Inglis.
[36] See, eg, Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484.
Fifthly, in the application of this provision, courts have usually paid careful regard to the fact that the respondents have, almost invariably, been unrepresented litigants. This entails a number of considerations. They include that greater latitude has, on occasion, been given to respondents notwithstanding what might be regarded as inappropriate or offensive language and behaviour because of the assumption that they are stressed by an unfamiliar environment.[37] Allowance has also been made for unfamiliarity with the relevant practice and procedures applicable to court proceedings. This may mean that some allowance is made for the manner in which, and mode by which, respondents articulate their cases. Courts have therefore usually been “careful to ensure that, buried within the papers, there is not some arguable point” in proceedings commenced without the benefit of legal advice and which ostensibly appear to be without merit.[38]
[37] Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts [2007] SASC 173, [240] (Anderson J); Wentworth v Graham (2003) 57 NSWLR 741, [24] (Ipp JA and Brownie AJA); Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria [2008] FCAFC 29, [10] (Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ); Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070, [84]-[85] (Charlesworth J).
[38] See for example Atkins v Hughes [2019] SASCFC 49, [39] (Kourakis CJ, Kelly and Parker JJ).
Sixthly and finally, where the exercise of discretion has been enlivened, it has usually been exercised with the benefit of a finding that, absent an order, the respondent will continue to persistently initiate vexatious proceedings which will continue to put other parties to costs which are usually irrecoverable.[39] A familiar feature is that the vexatious litigant lacks the means with which to meet adverse costs orders. In addition, though this is not invariable, the Court has tended to confine discretionary relief to particular parties, reserving the broadest relief for cases where the Attorney-General has applied for an order under the Act.
[39] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich [2003] SASC 322, [60] (Debelle J).
Persistently instituted vexatious proceedings?
The qualifying criteria for the exercise of discretion have been considered in numerous decisions of this Court. The discretion under s 39 is only enlivened where:
an application is made by the Attorney-General or any other interested person; and
the Court is satisfied that a person has:
2.1.“persistently instituted”;
2.2.“proceedings” in South Australian courts or tribunals;
2.3.that are “vexatious” in that;
2.3.1. they were instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay, or for any other ulterior purpose; or
2.3.2.they were instituted without reasonable grounds.
The phrase “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” requires a finding to be made about each of three matters: (1) persistently instituted; (2) vexatious; and (3) proceedings.
It is convenient to address each in turn.
(1) Persistently instituted
The word “persistently” is to be given its ordinary meaning.[40] As a matter of ordinary language, particularly given its place within the composite statutory phrase when read as a whole, the term cannot be satisfied by the institution of only one proceeding. As has be seen, the relevant proceedings are only those which have been commenced in one or more specified South Australian courts or tribunals.[41]
[40] Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] SASC 173, [83] (Anderson J).
[41] Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378, [54]; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [276]-[278] (Bleby J) citing Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492 and Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 208, [21], respectively. See also Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425, [8], [283]; Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19; Andrew Garrett Wines ResortsPty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] SASC 173, [83]‑[84].
Whilst this requirement is, as a matter of ordinary language, conceivably satisfied by the commencement of a small number of proceedings, it is difficult indeed to regard only one or two sets of proceedings as satisfying the requirements of the section. That is particularly so when giving proper weight to the fundamental nature of the important right of any person to commence proceedings and the principle of legality, earlier mentioned. Nonetheless, each case must depend on its particular facts and circumstances.
The authorities on the meaning of “persistently” in s 39 were addressed by Bleby J in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski:[42]
What constitutes institution of such proceedings ‘persistently’ will not depend merely on the number of them but, just as importantly, on their character, their lack of any reasonable ground and the way in which they have been conducted. A litigant may be said to be persisting in litigating though the number of separate proceedings he or she brings is quite small if those proceedings clearly represent an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined against that person, particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying. The Court may also take into account the development of a pattern of behaviour involving a failure to accept an inability in law to further challenge decisions in respect of which the appeal process has been exhausted, or attacking a range of defendants drawn into the widening circle of litigation solely because of an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed.
[42] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [277].
What these authorities show is that the requirement of persistence is not merely satisfied by the number of proceedings which have been instituted. Something more is usually required.
Under s 37AO(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the requirement is that “a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals”. As to this, Davies J explained in Attorney-General (NSW) v Wilson:[43]
It would not be sufficient, therefore, to point to the fact that a litigant had instituted even a number of vexatious proceedings. If the adverb “frequently” could not be used in connection with the sum of them, no order can be made under s 8. That is a significant matter because it is a serious thing to deprive litigants of their access to the courts, a right which might be thought to be an inherent right for persons living in a democratic society under the rule of law …
(citations omitted)
[43] Attorney-General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008, [11] (Davies J).
That is, more must be shown than merely a particular number of proceedings. Whether vexatious proceedings have been “persistently instituted” turns on matters of evaluation, circumstance and degree.[44] In Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski, Blue J explained:[45]
Factors to be taken into account in assessing persistence include the number of proceedings, their character, the way in which they were conducted, the extent to which they represent attempts to re-litigate issues already conclusively determined and the extent of extravagant allegations which are not substantiated.
(citations omitted)
[44] Attorney-General (SA) v Burke (1997) 190 LSJS 28, 35 (Perry J).
[45] Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1, [1979] (Blue J).
Accordingly, it has been said many times that the requisite persistence may be shown even though the number of proceedings is “quite small”, particularly where those proceedings seek to relitigate that which has already been decided adversely to the respondent.[46] So, in Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn, it was concluded that Ms Piepkorn acted persistently not only because of the number of vexatious claims, but also because of her stubborn attempt to re-litigate issues already determined against the same or related parties, together with the lack of any reasonable grounds or discernible cause of action in many of her claims, and her inability to accept the cost orders and judgments made against her.[47]
[46] Brogdon v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 809, [21] (Thomas, Keith and Blanchard JJ); Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154 (Bleby J); Fuller v Toms [2013] FCA 1422, [77] (Barker J); Soden v Croker (No 2) (2016) 334 ALR 540, [25] (Perry J).
[47] Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425, [283] (Layton J).

When considering the issue of persistence in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski, Bleby J specifically took into account that Mr Kowalski was continuing to attempt to re-litigate issues previously determined against him on grounds rejected on previous occasions. He also took into account the demonstrated unwillingness or inability of Mr Kowalski to accept the decisions made on his claims for compensation which were conclusively and repeatedly determined against him.[48]
[48] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [278].
Likewise, in Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd, Anderson J explained why he regarded Mr Garrett’s conduct as “persistent”:[49]
When things finally started to mount up against him and he started to get decisions which went against him Mr Garrett then chose to attempt to re-litigate the same matters under different guises.
Again, when he perceived that the masters and judges of this court were regularly making findings against him he chose to transfer his attention to the Federal Court, where although there were some subtle differences, the same type of allegations were made and the same catchcries were heard.
I find specifically that he did not have reasonable grounds for instituting the many proceedings already referred to. I find that he has persistently instituted these proceedings vexatiously.
He has also been persistent in seeking redress from NAB by way of compensation to him in the sum of tens of millions of dollars as a means of his attempt to restore his financial position and that of his businesses.
Mr Garrett has clearly chosen to use the various proceedings, described by me earlier, as a means of venting his anger and frustration. He has incorporated in his submissions both written and oral an overall allegation of corruption and conspiracy by NAB and its officers. Those unfounded allegations have ballooned out to include many legal practitioners and accountants, including receivers and liquidators.
[49] Andrew Garrett Wines ResortsPty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] SASC 173, [230]-[234] (Anderson J).
A similar attitude from Mr Garrett was taken into account by Layton J when determining the requirement of “persistence” in Garrett v Mildara Blass. Her Honour noted that while the Court was only being asked by an interested party to consider evidence in one action, as well as only two other proceedings in which it was directly involved, Mr Garrett was attempting to resurrect issues which had been determined against him by the Federal Court.[50]
[50] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [355].
In Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski, Blue J concluded that:[51]
… Mr Kowalski instituted 63 vexatious proceedings over the course of 12 years. He instituted those proceedings in the Workers Compensation Tribunal, the Disciplinary Tribunal, the Magistrates Court, the District Court and this court. In many of those cases, he instituted appeals from the first instance decision. In several of those cases, Mr Kowalski sought to re‑litigate issues already conclusively determined against him. In several of those cases, Mr Kowalski made extravagant allegations which were not substantiated.
[51] Attorney-General (SA) v Kowalski [2014] SASC 1, [1981] (Blue J).
Likewise, in Workcover Corporation of South Australia v Moore-McQuillan, Blue J made an identical finding regarding 63 vexatious proceedings over a 16-year period.[52]
[52] Workcover Corporationof South Australia vMoore-McQuillan [2016] SASC 191, [992] (Blue J).
Whilst s 39 no longer contains the word “habitually”, nor a requirement of “frequently”, it may be doubted whether, in context, there is much difference between those words and “persistently” – all incorporate the concept of repetition. Nonetheless, the use of the word “persistence” is apt, additionally, to suggest features of “determination” or a “degree of stubbornness”,[53] particularly where the case is one concerning the re-litigation of a point already adversely decided.
[53] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492 (Roden J), cited in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [276] (Bleby J); Workcover Corporation of South AustraliavMoore-McQuillan [2017] SASC 191, [990]-[991] (Blue J).
(2) Vexatious
Next, whether proceedings are “vexatious” must be addressed by reference to the definition contained in s 39(5). That is to say, there must be evidence which enables the finding that proceedings were instituted for the purpose of harassing, annoying, causing delay or for “any other ulterior purpose”. Alternatively, it will be sufficient if the evidence enables the finding that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable grounds.
Unsurprisingly, both limbs of the definition of “vexatious” are concerned with categories which are often considered to represent an abuse of process of the court.
It will often be necessary to make findings regarding the first limb of the definition of “vexatious” by reference to inferences drawn from the circumstances as a whole, rather than by recourse to any admission made by the respondent. It is rare for respondents in cases such as these to recognise, or admit to, any ulterior or other proscribed purpose. Where the issue is whether proceedings have been commenced for an ulterior purpose, that will often call for an approach similar to that undertaken by the Court in connection with that species of abuse of process which is concerned with the attempt to obtain an outcome foreign to the purpose for which a legal right or remedy is conferred.[54]
[54] Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509.
In many cases, particularly where there is a large number of proceedings, it is necessary for the Court to carefully consider each of those proceedings so as to make findings under either or both limbs of the definition. Sometimes the manner in which proceedings have been litigated, as well as the language used in, or in connection with, the proceedings assists in making the requisite findings.
(3) Proceedings
The definition of “proceedings” expressly incorporates both civil and criminal proceedings, where instituted in a “prescribed court”.
It has been held that this term should be construed broadly and so as to embrace not merely new actions, but also applications within actions and appeals, particularly where relief akin to substantive relief is sought, such as joining an additional party,[55] or where they seek to reverse, qualify or re-litigate rulings or determinations previously made.[56] In some cases it is evident that a respondent has been reluctant to incur the cost of a filing fee and so has adopted the expedient of simply making what is, at least in form if not in substance, an interlocutory application in an existing proceeding.
[55] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492 (Roden J); Attorney-General (SA) v Piepkorn [2005] SASC 425; Attorney-General (SA) v Garrett [2009] SASC 19.
[56] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [56] (Bleby J).
Other “proceedings” apart from the Magistrates Court claim?
At the hearing on 11 May 2020 I was provided with a helpful chronology which set out the history of the various Western Australian and Federal Court proceedings, as well as the Magistrates Court claim commenced in South Australia.
In essence, the applicant submitted that there were many more proceedings than simply the Magistrates Court claim. The applicant relied upon:
1.   A Summons and Statement of Claim said to have been issued out of the District Court of South Australia against the Western Australian Attorney-General, Minister Michael Mischin on 29 August 2016;
2.   The Magistrates Court claim already mentioned, issued on 4 July 2019;
3.   A Notice to Admit facts issued in the Magistrates Court claim on       12 July 2019;
4.   The attempted filing of a Cross-Action by Counterclaim in the Supreme Court in response to the vexatious litigant application on   12 September 2019;
5.   A Notice to Admit issued in the Supreme Court proceeding on 26 September 2019;
6.   A second Notice to Admit issued in the Supreme Court proceeding on 23 November 2019;
7.   The issuing of subpoenas against the applicant to produce documents on 23 December 2019 (which subpoena was set aside);
8.   The issuing of a subpoena against the applicant to attend to give evidence on 23 December 2019 (which subpoena was set aside); and
9.   The application for permission to issue subpoenas against various witnesses (which application was, ultimately, not proceeded with) during April 2020.
The suggested categories of processes are: District Court proceedings; Notices to Admit, subpoenas and an application for permission to issue subpoenas; and a Cross-Action by Counterclaim. Plainly, the applicant hoped that these would demonstrate the requisite degree of persistence by the respondent. The issue is whether these processes, excluding, of course, the Magistrates Court claim, can properly be described as “proceedings”.
Upon analysis, none of the additional processes, save perhaps the Cross-Action can properly be regarded as “proceedings” for the purposes of determining whether the respondent had “persistently instituted vexatious proceedings” within the meaning of s 39 of the Act.
I will address each relevant category.
The District Court proceedings – never instituted
When questioned about the District Court proceedings, counsel conceded that there was no evidence that they had ever been filed, nor that there had been any attempt to file them.
The closest the evidence came to suggesting that a District Court action had been commenced is an email from the respondent which was addressed to Minister Mischin as well as the District Court Civil Registry on 29 August 2016.[57] As is the respondent’s practice, this email was copied to a large number of recipients, including members of Western Australian courts, the Adelaide branch of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia. The email attaches what are described as “draft” documents. These include the District Court Summons and Statement of Claim. The email enquires whether there are “any other documents that need to be filed,” after which appear the following words:
I intend to file these documents before COB Wednesday 31^st August 2016 please advise urgently if I need to file any other documents for this matter to proceed to hear?
Should the District Court SA “deny” me and my human civil rights to file these documents I am not responsible for my actions and then I will have my trail by Jury [sic] with the Court and the Attorney General and others as parties to this matter.
[57] Page 82 of the exhibits to the affidavit of Julie Kinnear affirmed 16 August 2019.
There is then a reference to clause 5 of the Australian Constitution.
No email or other record suggests that any document was ever filed and there is no evidence that there was any attempt to file the District Court proceedings. Had those proceedings been filed, they would clearly have been liable to be struck out as vexatious because, yet again, the respondent wished to agitate his concern about the absence of a Form 3B notice. The Statement of Claim is, otherwise, unintelligible and fails to disclose any cause of action known to the law.
However, in circumstances where there is no evidence of filing, nor even of an attempt to file, this cannot be regarded as a “proceeding” which has been “instituted” in a “prescribed court” within the meaning of s 39(1) of the Act.
Notice to Admit, subpoenas, application for permission to issue subpoenas
When counsel was asked whether there was any authority to support the proposition that a Notice to Admit, a subpoena or an application for permission to issue subpoenas could be regarded as “proceedings”, I was told that the “argument is, by extension … an interlocutory step that affects or may determine substantive issues”.[58] Reliance was placed upon the following passages from Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd:[59]
[58] T28.10
[59] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [122]-[124] (Layton J).
A number of authorities have discussed whether the taking of interlocutory proceedings in the course of an action would amount to “instituting proceedings”.[60]
[60] Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedlar [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, [4] (Yeldham J); Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314, [13]; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, [492] (Roden J); Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154, [44]-[57] and, more recently, Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 361.
In summary, those authorities indicate that a person will be regarded as having “instituted proceedings” for the purposes of the Act if the person invokes the jurisdiction of the Court by:
·    filing an originating process;
·    making a counterclaim in a proceeding;
·    appealing from a final determination in a proceeding;
·    seeking to set aside a determination in a matter which is in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined;
·    filing an interlocutory application or an appeal which is in substance an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined;
·    filing an interlocutory proceeding which seeks substantive relief, such as seeking to bring in an additional party into proceedings.
The Attorney-General, in his written submissions, has outlined a number of examples of interlocutory applications which have been held to be proceedings for the purposes of the Act by other courts.[61] The examples given of interlocutory applications which have in the particular circumstances said to constitute the institution of a proceeding have included:
·    an application to bring an additional party into the proceedings;[62]
·    an application to be joined as a party and to be substituted as the plaintiff.[63]
[61] Attorney-General’s Submissions, [23] (Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19).
[62] Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 492; Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bankand Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 361-2, 364.
[63] Andrew Garrett Wines Resorts Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd and Other Actions (2007) 248 LSJS 349, 369, 377.
In this case, there can be no suggestion that the attempt to have the respondent answer various factual and legal assertions through the medium of a Notice to Admit is, of itself, “an attempt to appeal or re-litigate a matter otherwise finally determined”. Certainly, it is a step taken in aid of that objective, but it does not itself represent “a vehicle by which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked”.[64]
[64] Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302, [36] (Duggan J) citing Braeside Bearings Pty Ltd v HJ Brignall and Associates [1996] 1 VR 17, 20.
In the case of each of the Notices to Admit, the subpoenas and the application for permission to issue subpoenas, the jurisdiction of the Court had already been invoked. In the case of the Notice to Admit in the Magistrates Court claim, the respondent had already commenced proceedings and was apparently seeking answers to his Notice to Admit in order to prove various matters on which he relied. In the case of the Supreme Court proceedings, it was of course the applicant who had invoked this Court’s jurisdiction and, that having been done, the respondent was seeking answers or documents and evidence which he believed would support his defence.
Whilst it cannot be doubted that the threat to issue District Court proceedings, as with the Notices to Admit, the subpoenas and the application to issue subpoenas, put the applicant to time, trouble and costs, probably unnecessarily, it cannot be said that by these processes the jurisdiction of the relevant court was invoked in the sense that anything was instituted. Unlike other cases, these processes were not being used, in effect, as a new proceeding or as a form of appeal so as to determine substantive rights or interests.
The attempt to file a Cross-Action by Counterclaim
That then leaves the failed attempt to file a Cross-Action by Counterclaim. The issue is whether an attempt to file a document, which is rejected by the Registry, can be said to amount to the “institution” of a “proceeding”.
Although the applicant advanced no submission concerning an “attempt”, the same issue was considered in Garrett v Mildara Blass.[65] The argument in that case was that where Mr Garrett had done all that was required to be done in order to file a document, it could be said that he had “instituted” a “proceeding” for the purposes of s 39(1) of the Act.
[65] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [128]-[134] (Layton J).
The Attorney-General in that case argued that proceedings had been instituted even where the Court rejected the document pursuant to r 53 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), where it could be said under that rule it was “an abuse of the process of the Court [because] it contains matter that is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious”. There are two procedures under that rule. The first is where the Registrar refers the matter to a Judge or Master and, if the Judge or Master so directs, the Registrar must reject the document. Alternatively, under r 53(4), if it appears to the Court that a document “that is an abuse of the process of the Court has been filed in the Court”, the Court may itself direct that the document “be struck from the file”.
Layton J considered two authorities which were against the proposition that attempting to institute a proceeding which has been rejected under r 53 (or similar) amounted to the “institution” of a “proceeding”. The first was Jones v Skyring,[66] where Toohey J considered whether the lodging of certain documents amounted to proceedings being “issued” pursuant to the High Court Rule Order 63, rule 6. In that case, the respondent sought to lodge a document seeking the issue of a writ of certiorari on a number of occasions. A High Court Judge, pursuant to the High Court rule, Order 54, rule 4(3), had previously directed the Registrar to “refuse to issue these proceedings without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained”.[67] Toohey J held that the lodging of a further document which on its face did not seek leave in accordance with that direction, and was thereby rejected by the registry, did not amount to the institution of proceedings. By contrast, if an application was made seeking leave to issue a writ, that would amount to the institution of proceedings.
[66] Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810, 813-814.
[67] Jones v Skyring (1992) 66 ALJR 810, 811.
Secondly, in Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath Senior,[68] Ashley J (as he was) ordered that the Registrar refuse to seal any document constituting an originating process when the form or content of the document showed that the proceedings would be irregular or an abuse. Ashley J held that when the respondent subsequently lodged documents without seeking the leave of the Court, the respondent had not instituted a proceeding, but had simply unsuccessfully attempted to file documents. Ashley J however accepted that a different approach applied to a subsequent application in which leave was sought.
[68] Attorney-General (Vic) v Horvath Senior [2001] VSC 269, [129]-[130].
Layton J drew a distinction between these cases and those under r 53 where the applicant “invokes the jurisdiction of the Court before a document has been accepted for filing ... [even though] this process is arguably administrative rather than judicial”.[69] Respectfully, it is difficult to see how the jurisdiction of the Court has been invoked where a document has been rejected before it is filed. That is reinforced, I think, by the fact that any decision made under r 53 has ordinarily been regarded as administrative rather than judicial in character.[70] It follows that I am not convinced that proceedings have been instituted where there has been an attempt to file them but they are rejected or struck from the file under r 53 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA).
[69] Garrett v Mildara Blass Ltd [2009] SASC 19, [133]-[134]
[70] There is, therefore, no right of appeal: McDonald v South Australia [2013] SASC 31, [6]-[7] (Sulan J).

8. Attempt to file writ of summons in District Court against CEO of WorkCover WA – Leave to commence proceedings refused by Birmingham DCJ on basis proceedings no materially different to those struck out in [2013] WADC 90 (no written reasons) 19.08.2013

9. Further attempt to file writ of summons in District Court against WorkCover WA Corporation saying he was denied procedural fairness because of actions of Arbitrator Nunn. Leave to commence proceedings refused by Birmingham DCJ on basis proceedings no materially different to those struck out in [2013] WADC 90 (no written reasons) 19.08.2013

10. Mr Barkla attempted to file an appeal notice against the declaration of Arbitrator Nunn alleging he was denied right to have agreed Statement of Facts.
Bowden DCJ refused leave to file on ground attempt to relitigate matters previously before the court. (No formal written reasons for decision) 11.10.2013

11. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited
[2013] WASCA 240
McClure P, Murphy JA 17.12.2013

Decision of Arbitrator Nunn rejecting application for increase to prescribed payment amounts for Mr Barkla (decision not available) 6.12.2013

12. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd
[2014] WADC 23
McCann DCJ
Leave for opportunity to amend pleadings 19.02.2014

13. Barkla v WorkCover WA
[2014] WASCA 40
Pullin JA, Newnes JA 21.02.2014

14. Barkla v G4S Custodial Services Pty Ltd
[2014] WADC 36
McCann DCJ (on the papers) 26.03.2014

15. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd
[2014] WADC 113
Staude DCJ 28.08.2014

16. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd & G4S Custodial Services
[2014] WASCA 192 8.10.2014

17. Barkla v WorkCover WA
[2014] WADC 159
Sleight DCJ 21.11.2014

18. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [No. 2]
[2014] WASCA 222
Newnes JA, Murphy JA 10.11.2014

Appeal notice in District Court filed against decision of Arbitrator Paparone of WorkCover re Form 3B issue. Leave to appeal refused – ex-tempore reasons by Goetze DCJ 23.02.2015

19. Re the Hon Justice Newnes; Ex parte Barkla
[2014] WASC 488
McKechnie J 17.12.2014

20. Re Registrar Lind Bush; Ex parte Barkla
[2014] WASC 488
McKechnie J 17.12.2014

Originating summons filed in District Court naming WorkCover as respondent claiming breach of legal duty by use of deceit, falsehood and trickery. Proceedings truck out as abuse of process by Heron CDJ (no written decision) 27.02.2015

21. Barkla v Allianz & Anor
[2015] HCASL 40
Kiefel, J 9.04.2015

22. Barkla v Bush
[2015] WADC 46
Levy DCJ 1.05.2015

23. Barkla v Justice David Wallace Newnes
[2015] WASCA 120
McClure P, Buss JA, Mazza JA 16.06.2015

Decision of Acting Court of Appeal Registrar’s decision not to accept documents including interrogatories) (no written reasons available) 20.08.2015

24. Barkla v Allianz Australia
[2015] WASCA 210
Newnes JA, Murphy JA 14.10.2015

25. Barkla v Civitella
[2016] WADC 3
Davis DCJ 20.01.2016

26. Barkla v Colbran
[2015] FCA 1470
Besanko J 21.12.2015

27. Barkla v Civitella
[2016] WASCA 71
Newnes JA, Murphy JA 22.04.2016

28. Barkla v Civitella [No. 2]
[2016] WASCA 111
Buss JA, Newnes JA 23.06.2016

29. Attorney-General for WA v Barkla
[2016] WASC 298 21.09.2016

30. An application under Section 6 of the vexatious proceedings restriction Act – ex parte Barkla
[2017] WASC 102
Tottle J 13.04.2017

31. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited
[2018] FCA 2070
Charlesworth J 20.12.2018

32. Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited
[2018] FCA 563
White J 18.04.2018

Appendix B – List of Correspondence

Date Subject Notes

Thursday, 29 April 2021
5:29AM I Predicted Right yet Again LOL Re Magistrates Court refuses to file Court Docs By way of service you have been served Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts - AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again - I make more Predict... Email to AFP regarding Zoe Bettison MP’s response to the Notice to Admit

Thursday, 22 April 2021
3:54PM Magistrates Court refuses to file Court Docs By way of service you have been served: Re: Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories Email to Zoe Bettison regarding sealed interrogatories and failure to respond to affidavit of facts

Friday, 16 April 2021
1:36PM Re: Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories Email to Zoe Bettison regarding sealed interrogatories

Friday, 16 April 2021
10:25AM Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories Email to Elizabeth Magistrates Court regarding sealed interrogatories

Monday, 12 April 2021 11:30AM By way of service please see attached Court Sealed Notice to Admit Facts and Interrogatories of today’s date Re: Barkla v Bettison – CIV-21-002139 Email to Adrian Tisato and Zoe Bettison attaching Notice to Admit Facts

Tuesday, 6 April 2021 10:05AM Proving High Level Government Corruption – I seek the Protection of my Safety – Please help? Email to AFP regarding Vicky Chapman’s “refusal” to answer two questions.

Wednesday, 24 March 2021 10:58AM OPI has NO INTEGRITY and Neither does the South Australian Government What a JOKE you people are Re: Our reference 2021/003592 Email to Emily Lyons regarding failure to reply to earlier questions and claims.

Thursday, 18 March 2021 4:00PM Attorney General Vicky Chapman No Accountability Email to Auditor-General alleging lack of accountability by the Attorney-General (SA).

Wednesday, 10 March 2021 2:42PM Zoe Bettison You have now been served CIV-21-002139 – To the AFP I predict that Justice Mark Livesey will make his Decision before the hearing of this matter to … Email to Zoe Bettison serving claim against her.

Monday, 1 March 2021 3:02PM Proving Julie Kinnear Dishonestly causing Harm, Damage and Loss to me and my case/s by Deceptive Conduct (Omission/s). I Predict that she will Omit to0 answer … Email to Julie Kinnear requiring her respond to the twelve “facts” within in 14 days.

Monday, 15 February 2021 5:39PM
Lying or Deception by Ommission/s: Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla Email to Sally Gooch, Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas alleging that their failure to reply to earlier questions proves lying or deception by omission.

Friday, 5 February 2021 11:09AM Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla Email to Sally Gooch, Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas requiring answers to questions.

Wednesday, 3 February 2021 Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla Email to Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas requesting answer to one question.

Tuesday, 26 January 2021 1:12PM Until Justice Mark Livesey makes his decision in SCCIV 1008 of 2019 Georganas v Barkla – NO Facts have been Refuted by Steve Georganas Email to AMC refusing to participate in further AMC proceedings until Livesey J makes his ruling in SCCIV-19-1008.

Thursday, 10 September 2020 11:02AM Inter App and Affidavit of Facts – I predict – Steve Georganas MP By way of service Email to Steve Georganas and the AMC attaching interlocutory application and affidavit of facts.

Saturday, 29 August 2020 10:11AM Thank you for sealing My Statutory Declaration of Facts – Which have NOT been Contested by Steve Georganas LOL Fwd: Regarding AMCCI-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GOERGANAS Email to AMC thanking Magistrate Schulz for sealing Statutory Declaration of Facts.

Tuesday, 25 August 2020 3:26PM I will prove at the 28^th August 2020 hearing that the Respondent Steve Georganas is DISHONESLTLY Obtaining a Benefit/s by DECEPTICE Conduct. Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear regarding claims against Steve Georganas.

Tuesday, 25 August 2020 3:06AM Re: Why are you refusing to Seal my Stat Dec? 6^th August 2020? As request Please Seal Amended Stat Dec By way of Service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCI-19-2661 GEOFF BARKLA v STEVEN GEORGANAS Email to AMC regarding failure to seal Statutory Declaration of Facts dated 6 August 2020.

Friday, 21 August 2020 8:54AM Part 3 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020 Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.

Friday, 21 August 2020 8:44AM Part 2 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020 Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.

Friday, 21 August 2020 8:42AM Part 1 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020 Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.

Thursday, 20 August 2020 8:32AM
To the AFP I predict that Magistrate Schultz will Adjourn the 28^th August 2020 Hearing due to the fact that Steve Georganas CANNOT Win Email to AFP, Agent Dave Brain, Attorney-General and Magistrate Schulz regarding the AMC matter.

Monday, 17 August 2020 7:13AM In an effort to end this dispute I offer you a compromise COB 19^th August 2020 Email to Allianz and Steve Georganas offering to end the dispute in exchange for 8 years of unpaid wages.

Friday, 14 August 2020 6:53AM Re: Why are you refusing to Seal my Stat Dec? As requested Please Seal Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS Email to AMC asking why they have not sealed his Statutory Declaration of Facts filed on 6 August 2020.

Wednesday, 12 August 2020 6:09AM As requested Please Seal Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS Email to AMC requesting they seal the attached Statutory Declaration of Facts.

Thursday, 6 August 2020 2:45PM Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS Email to AMC, Steve Georganas and Julie Kinner serving Amended Statutory Declaration of Facts.

Wednesday, 5 August 2020 12:37PM Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear serving Statutory Declaration of Facts.

Thursday, 30 July 2020 3:50pm Re: I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought Reply to Jason from AMC requiring answers to questions within 14 days as stated in the letter

Thursday, 30 July 2020 3:16pm Re: I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought Reply to Jason from AMC regarding answers to six questions sent to the Court and Magistrate Schulz

Thursday, 30 July 12:43pm I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought Email to AMC, Magistrate Schulz and AFP Agent Dave Brian with attached letter to Magistrate Schulz regarding “Notice seeking information”

Thursday, 23 July 2020 12:33pm By way of service Affidavit of Facts and Interlocutory Application You Cannot Win – Fwd: In relation to AMCCI-19-2661 GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached sealed Interlocutory Application and 2^nd attached sealed Affidavit of facts (20) only

Tuesday, 21 July 2020 4:04pm The Truth is Steve Georganas cannot Win – AMC please seal Affidavit of Facts & Interlocutory Application dated 21^st July 2020 – If anything Happens to me, Steve Georganas has the motive and means #EXPOSED Email to Jason from AMC and Steve Georganas regarding filing documents online

Tuesday, 14 July 2020 2:31pm
Exposed – by way of service Affidavit of Facts AMCCI-19-2661 Barkla v Georganas – I predict that Steve Georganas will NOT dispute the truth of the facts herein Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Affidavit of Facts AMCCI-19-2661

Tuesday, 7 July 2020 11:51am EXPOSED – So you admit the truth of the Facts herein? – Fact is Zoe Bettison is Fully Aware of Justice Liversey Breaches of Law/s Fwd: By way of service Notice to admit facts – I intend to have you removed from Office for your Breaches of Statutory law/s Email to Zoe Bettison and Cathy Perry regarding a failure of reply to attached Notice to Admit Facts

Wednesday, 1 July 2020 3:17pm It keeps getting Bigger – I remind Mr Steve Georganas that he has until COB 13^th July 2020 to dispute these Statutory Declaration of Facts in writing. Re: Georganas v Barkla | Magistrates Court Action AMCCI-19-2661 Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear in response to a letter regarding Magistrate Court matters

Tuesday, 30 June 2020 2:52pm By way of Service Stat Dec of Facts twenty 20 only AMCCI 19 -2661 Barkla v Georganas Fwd: Stat Dec Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Magistrates Court “Sealed” Statutory Declaration of Facts

Tuesday, 23 June 2020
9:26 am EXPOSED Judicial Corruption by way of Sworn Affidavit Re: Georganas v Barkla | Supreme Court Action No. SCCIV 1008 of 2019 Email to Julie Kinnear regarding sworn affidavits

Monday, 22 June 2020 6:26am
Exposed More Unproven False Allegations Yet again I predicted right LOL – Fwd: Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response Email to Julie Kinnear regarding letters sent and not responded to

Wednesday, 17 June 2020 5:14pm Fwd: Please stamp the attached doc filed and return please provide me with a copy of Orders made on the 8^th May 2020 Email to Associate requesting that attached document be stamped “filed” and returned and copy of orders made on 8 May 2020

Tuesday, 16 June 2020 12:45pm I am Innocent of your False claims Steve Georganas – Notice to Admit Facts will prove it – Any ruling against me (and undisputed facts) will be the BIGGEST Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA and your name is on it Steve Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Notice to admit facts and “undisputed” Sworn Affidavit of Facts

Monday, 15 June 2020
7:50 am Notice to admit facts Complaint Re Justice Mark Livesey Deprivation of Liberty – To the AFP I predict yet again I will not hear a thing Zippo Narda Nothing Zero No response Re: JCC Reference 2020/000056 Email to Hon: Bruce Lander QC with attached Notice to admit facts

Thursday, 11 June 2020
10:19 am Which matter does this number relate to please? Re: Matter Number 2020/004835 Email to OPI and ICAC regarding complaints

Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:55pm
Justice Mark Livesey Fails to answer nine questions Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43 Blank email

Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:50pm I predicted Right yet again No answer Zippo Zero Nothing Narda – Proving Im right Re: Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response Blank email

Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:45pm U predicted Right No answer Nothing Zippo Zero Re: Exposed I predict that the Chief Justice will refuse to answer one (1) question – As he has previously refused to answer two (2) questions Blank email

Wednesday, 10 June 2020 3:34pm Please be advised soon I will be out the front of your Office with a sign that reads “ZOE BETTISON MP is CORRUPT all those cars driving past and those going to the MC and to see you – So they might know you don’t represent the People of Ramsey – Re: St …
Email that reads

ZOE BETTISON MP is CORRUPT

Tuesday, 9 June 2020 9:21 am By way of service Notice to admit facts – I look forward to seeing you in Court should you again fail in your duty to up hold the law Email to Hon: Vicky Chapman with attached Notice to admit facts

Tuesday, 9 June 2020 9:11 am By way of service Notice to admit facts – I intend to have you removed from Office for your Breaches of Statutory law/s Email to Zoe Bettison with attached Notice to admit facts

Thursday, 4 June 2020 7:25am We see you Re: Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety – Re: SA Police knowing at my door last night refused to give names Email containing YouTube links (ICAC, Police State, Quiet)

Tuesday, 2 June 2020 11:18am Still No answer – Are Allianz Bribing you? – Re: Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions Email to Zoe Bettison regarding response to letter dated 12 May 2020

Tuesday, 2 June 2020 10:10am Leon Byer Please Help I Fear for my Safety due to Government Corruption Re: Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety Email to “Keon” Byner requesting to be talk on his show regarding Corruption and Oppression of the Government

Friday, 29 May 2020 2:37pm Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety – Re: SA Police knowing at my door last night refused to give names Email to AFP and Agent David Brian regarding SA Police

Thursday, 28 May 2020 9:24am Yet again another offer to Compromise – 12 noon tomorrow Email to Steve Georganas seeking a compromise

Wednesday, 27 May 2020 2:38pm Serious Judicial Misconduct – Gross Miscarriage of Justice – Deprivation of Liberty by Hon: Vicky Chapman – SCCIV 1008 of 2019 Georganas v Barkla Email to Hon: Steven Marshall Premier of SA regarding letters sent to Hon: Vicky Chapman and Zoe Bettison re Australian Human Rights Act

Wednesday, 27 May 2020 9:25am Exposed – corruption Re: Correspondence from Ombudsman SA – 2020/02144 Email in response to Mr Wayne Lines regarding email to Ombudsman

Wednesday, 20 May 2020 7:03am Obvious and Clear Abuse of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – This is the biggest Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA
Email to Bruce Lander QC regarding an investigation

·    Letter attached from Mr Barkla

·    Letter from Julie Kinnear

Monday, 18 May 2020
1:37pm LOL The Biggest Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA Re: Georganas v Barkla Email to Supreme Court chambers regarding plaintiff admitting breaches of the Criminal Code Act

Monday, 18 May 2020
9:36am Would the Hon: Zoe Bettison, write and ask the Chief Justice Why he refuses to answer two (2) questions please? Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Chief Justice and Parliament seeking answers to Mr Barkla’s questions

Monday, 18 May 2020
8:47am Exposed – I predict that the Chief Justice will refuse to answer one (1) question – As he has previously refused to answer two (2) questions Email to Chief Justice with attached letter seeking answer to a question

Thursday, 14 May 2020 6:28pm The TRUTH The Whole TRUTH and Nothing but the TRUTH – AG Afraid to answer TWO (2) Questions Email to Attorney-General and Zoe Bettison regarding refusal to answer questions and disgraceful conduct

Wednesday, 13 May 2020
6:30 am
Re: Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions Email to Attorney-General and Zoe Bettison threatening complaints with ICAC

Tuesday, 12 May 2020
5:31pm Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions Email to Zoe Bettison regarding breaches of the Criminal Code Act

Monday, 11 May 2020
3:46pm Orders and Transcript of todays Hearing Please? & clarify a few things Email to chambers seeking orders and transcript and regarding the Attorney-General answering two questions

Monday, 11 May 2020
2:58pm Please stamp the attached doc filed and return and please provide me with a copy of Orders made on the 8^th May 2020 Email to chambers requesting a document regarding sub questions of law be stamped as filed

Monday, 11 May 2020
2:54am Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43 Email to chambers and Julie Kinnear regarding attached letters to Justice Livesey and Julie Kinnear

Wednesday, 6 May 2020
7:26am Justice Livesey Ruling on One Act while Breaching another Act Email to chambers regarding Justice Livesey breaching the Australian Human Rights Commission Act and s30 of the Supreme Court Act

Tuesday, 5 May 2020
6.23 am

I predict The Court will Adjourn Monday’s Hearing in Order to Pervert Justice – Justice Matk Livesey is trying to get me to a Dr so they can try and write me off as a nutter because they can’t beat me at the attached Laws Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public …

Letter attached to Julie Kinnear regarding the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act – Clause 5

Monday, 4 May 2020
6:32pm Re: Urgent Request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General Email to Zoe Bettison asking that she confirm the correct letter was sent to the Attorney-General and stating he will go see her if there is no response

Sunday, 3 May 2020
10:46 am
Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43
Email to chambers with letter attached to Justice Mark Livesey regarding an order made to see a GP or psychologist

Saturday, 2 May 2020
12:59pm
Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response Email to Julie Kinnear with letter attached to Justice Mark Livesey regarding an order made to see a GP or psychologist

Thursday, 30 April 2020
7.23 am
Re: Urgent request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General

Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Attorney-General

·    Written Opening Submissions of facts of the Defendant

Thursday, 30 April 2020
7.19 am
Urgent request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General
Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Attorney-General regarding two questions

·    Letter attached to A-G Vicky Chapman dated 20 April 2020 seeking answers to two questions

·    Letter attached to Attorney-General’s office dated 23 April 2020

·    Letter attached to Ms Julie Kinnear dated 6 April 2020 asking 45 questions

·    Letter attached from Ms Julie Kinnear dated 8 April 2020

Wednesday, 29 April 2020
4:34 pm Not seeking an investigation I am seeking Answers to two questions – Re: My Apologies I thank the Hon: Member for Ramsey for her response – Attorney General has breached My Civil and Political Rights to freedom of Expression -20AGO1187 – Final Response
Letter to Zoe Bettison regarding answers from Attorney-General

·    Email correspondence between Mr Barkla and Zoe Bettison regarding information pursuant to the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 Schedule 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 19.2 Freedom of Expression

·    Letter attached to Attorney-General ‘Submissions” and “Statutory Laws”

Wednesday, 29 April 2020
1:51 pm

Apologies I thank the Hon: Member for Ramsey for her response – Attorney General has breached My Civil and Political Rights to freedom of Expression -20AGO1187 – Final Response

Email correspondence between Mr Barkla and Zoe Bettison

·    Letter attached to Chief Justice Kourakis regarding “Submissions” and “Statutory Laws”

·    Submissions and Statement of Grounds

Tuesday, 28 April 2020
3:53 pm My Complaint Re: Judge Mark Livesey?
Email to Office of Public Integrity asking for a response of a complaint made on 19 April 2020

·    Screenshot of ICAC complaint page from the internet

Tuesday, 28 April 2020
3:44 pm Breaches of Civil and Political Rights – Statutory Officers Committee
Email to Guy Dickson regarding letter to Attorney-General’s office, breaching statutory rights

Tuesday, 28 April 2020
3:28 pm Attorney General Vicky Chapman Breaches of Statutory Law/s – Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee
Email to Hon: Dennis Gary Edward Hood, Hon: Justin Eric Hanson & Hon: Frank Pangallo

·    Letter attached from Attorney-General’s office in reply to emails dated 20 April 2020

·    Letter attached to Chief Justice Kourakis regarding “Submissions” and “Statutory Laws”

·    Submissions and Statement of Grounds

Monday, 20 April 2020
6:59 am
Abuse of Public Office by justice Liversey
Email to Chief Justice Kourakis

·    Letter attached to Julie Kinnear dated 6 April 2020 requesting answers to 45 questions

Date	Subject	Notes
Thursday, 29 April 2021 5:29AM	I Predicted Right yet Again LOL Re Magistrates Court refuses to file Court Docs By way of service you have been served Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts - AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again - I make more Predict...	Email to AFP regarding Zoe Bettison MP’s response to the Notice to Admit
Thursday, 22 April 2021 3:54PM	Magistrates Court refuses to file Court Docs By way of service you have been served: Re: Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories	Email to Zoe Bettison regarding sealed interrogatories and failure to respond to affidavit of facts
Friday, 16 April 2021 1:36PM	Re: Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories	Email to Zoe Bettison regarding sealed interrogatories
Friday, 16 April 2021 10:25AM	Factual Evidence of Massive Government Corruption between MPs and the Courts – AFP I Predicted Right Yet Again – I make more Predictions Re: Interrogatories	Email to Elizabeth Magistrates Court regarding sealed interrogatories
Monday, 12 April 2021 11:30AM	By way of service please see attached Court Sealed Notice to Admit Facts and Interrogatories of today’s date Re: Barkla v Bettison – CIV-21-002139	Email to Adrian Tisato and Zoe Bettison attaching Notice to Admit Facts
Tuesday, 6 April 2021 10:05AM	Proving High Level Government Corruption – I seek the Protection of my Safety – Please help?	Email to AFP regarding Vicky Chapman’s “refusal” to answer two questions.
Wednesday, 24 March 2021 10:58AM	OPI has NO INTEGRITY and Neither does the South Australian Government What a JOKE you people are Re: Our reference 2021/003592	Email to Emily Lyons regarding failure to reply to earlier questions and claims.
Thursday, 18 March 2021 4:00PM	Attorney General Vicky Chapman No Accountability	Email to Auditor-General alleging lack of accountability by the Attorney-General (SA).
Wednesday, 10 March 2021 2:42PM	Zoe Bettison You have now been served CIV-21-002139 – To the AFP I predict that Justice Mark Livesey will make his Decision before the hearing of this matter to …	Email to Zoe Bettison serving claim against her.
Monday, 1 March 2021 3:02PM	Proving Julie Kinnear Dishonestly causing Harm, Damage and Loss to me and my case/s by Deceptive Conduct (Omission/s). I Predict that she will Omit to0 answer …	Email to Julie Kinnear requiring her respond to the twelve “facts” within in 14 days.
Monday, 15 February 2021 5:39PM	Lying or Deception by Ommission/s: Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla	Email to Sally Gooch, Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas alleging that their failure to reply to earlier questions proves lying or deception by omission.
Friday, 5 February 2021 11:09AM	Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla	Email to Sally Gooch, Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas requiring answers to questions.
Wednesday, 3 February 2021	Re Proving the Biggest FRAUD in the History of the Supreme Court of South Australia SCCIV 1008 of 2019 STEVE GEORGANAS v Geoff Barkla	Email to Julie Kinnear and Steve Georganas requesting answer to one question.
Tuesday, 26 January 2021 1:12PM	Until Justice Mark Livesey makes his decision in SCCIV 1008 of 2019 Georganas v Barkla – NO Facts have been Refuted by Steve Georganas	Email to AMC refusing to participate in further AMC proceedings until Livesey J makes his ruling in SCCIV-19-1008.
Thursday, 10 September 2020 11:02AM	Inter App and Affidavit of Facts – I predict – Steve Georganas MP By way of service	Email to Steve Georganas and the AMC attaching interlocutory application and affidavit of facts.
Saturday, 29 August 2020 10:11AM	Thank you for sealing My Statutory Declaration of Facts – Which have NOT been Contested by Steve Georganas LOL Fwd: Regarding AMCCI-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GOERGANAS	Email to AMC thanking Magistrate Schulz for sealing Statutory Declaration of Facts.
Tuesday, 25 August 2020 3:26PM	I will prove at the 28^th August 2020 hearing that the Respondent Steve Georganas is DISHONESLTLY Obtaining a Benefit/s by DECEPTICE Conduct.	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear regarding claims against Steve Georganas.
Tuesday, 25 August 2020 3:06AM	Re: Why are you refusing to Seal my Stat Dec? 6^th August 2020? As request Please Seal Amended Stat Dec By way of Service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCI-19-2661 GEOFF BARKLA v STEVEN GEORGANAS	Email to AMC regarding failure to seal Statutory Declaration of Facts dated 6 August 2020.
Friday, 21 August 2020 8:54AM	Part 3 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020	Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.
Friday, 21 August 2020 8:44AM	Part 2 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020	Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.
Friday, 21 August 2020 8:42AM	Part 1 of 3 Please confirm that magistrate Schulz receives attached pages 1 o 17 inclusive – By way of service Re Interlocutory Application set down for the 28^th August 2020	Email to AMC serving Interlocutory Application.
Thursday, 20 August 2020 8:32AM	To the AFP I predict that Magistrate Schultz will Adjourn the 28^th August 2020 Hearing due to the fact that Steve Georganas CANNOT Win	Email to AFP, Agent Dave Brain, Attorney-General and Magistrate Schulz regarding the AMC matter.
Monday, 17 August 2020 7:13AM	In an effort to end this dispute I offer you a compromise COB 19^th August 2020	Email to Allianz and Steve Georganas offering to end the dispute in exchange for 8 years of unpaid wages.
Friday, 14 August 2020 6:53AM	Re: Why are you refusing to Seal my Stat Dec? As requested Please Seal Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS	Email to AMC asking why they have not sealed his Statutory Declaration of Facts filed on 6 August 2020.
Wednesday, 12 August 2020 6:09AM	As requested Please Seal Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS	Email to AMC requesting they seal the attached Statutory Declaration of Facts.
Thursday, 6 August 2020 2:45PM	Amended Stat Dec Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS	Email to AMC, Steve Georganas and Julie Kinner serving Amended Statutory Declaration of Facts.
Wednesday, 5 August 2020 12:37PM	Re: By way of service Statutory Declaration of Facts You Cannot Win – In relation to AMCCi-19-2661 – GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear serving Statutory Declaration of Facts.
Thursday, 30 July 2020 3:50pm	Re: I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought	Reply to Jason from AMC requiring answers to questions within 14 days as stated in the letter
Thursday, 30 July 2020 3:16pm	Re: I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought	Reply to Jason from AMC regarding answers to six questions sent to the Court and Magistrate Schulz
Thursday, 30 July 12:43pm	I seek information from the AMC & Magistrate Schulz – to the AFP I Predict that neither the Court & Magistrate Schulz will NOT provide the information sought	Email to AMC, Magistrate Schulz and AFP Agent Dave Brian with attached letter to Magistrate Schulz regarding “Notice seeking information”
Thursday, 23 July 2020 12:33pm	By way of service Affidavit of Facts and Interlocutory Application You Cannot Win – Fwd: In relation to AMCCI-19-2661 GEOFF BARKLA v STEVE GEORGANAS	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached sealed Interlocutory Application and 2^nd attached sealed Affidavit of facts (20) only
Tuesday, 21 July 2020 4:04pm	The Truth is Steve Georganas cannot Win – AMC please seal Affidavit of Facts & Interlocutory Application dated 21^st July 2020 – If anything Happens to me, Steve Georganas has the motive and means #EXPOSED	Email to Jason from AMC and Steve Georganas regarding filing documents online
Tuesday, 14 July 2020 2:31pm	Exposed – by way of service Affidavit of Facts AMCCI-19-2661 Barkla v Georganas – I predict that Steve Georganas will NOT dispute the truth of the facts herein	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Affidavit of Facts AMCCI-19-2661
Tuesday, 7 July 2020 11:51am	EXPOSED – So you admit the truth of the Facts herein? – Fact is Zoe Bettison is Fully Aware of Justice Liversey Breaches of Law/s Fwd: By way of service Notice to admit facts – I intend to have you removed from Office for your Breaches of Statutory law/s	Email to Zoe Bettison and Cathy Perry regarding a failure of reply to attached Notice to Admit Facts
Wednesday, 1 July 2020 3:17pm	It keeps getting Bigger – I remind Mr Steve Georganas that he has until COB 13^th July 2020 to dispute these Statutory Declaration of Facts in writing. Re: Georganas v Barkla \| Magistrates Court Action AMCCI-19-2661	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear in response to a letter regarding Magistrate Court matters
Tuesday, 30 June 2020 2:52pm	By way of Service Stat Dec of Facts twenty 20 only AMCCI 19 -2661 Barkla v Georganas Fwd: Stat Dec	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Magistrates Court “Sealed” Statutory Declaration of Facts
Tuesday, 23 June 2020 9:26 am	EXPOSED Judicial Corruption by way of Sworn Affidavit Re: Georganas v Barkla \| Supreme Court Action No. SCCIV 1008 of 2019	Email to Julie Kinnear regarding sworn affidavits
Monday, 22 June 2020 6:26am	Exposed More Unproven False Allegations Yet again I predicted right LOL – Fwd: Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response	Email to Julie Kinnear regarding letters sent and not responded to
Wednesday, 17 June 2020 5:14pm	Fwd: Please stamp the attached doc filed and return please provide me with a copy of Orders made on the 8^th May 2020	Email to Associate requesting that attached document be stamped “filed” and returned and copy of orders made on 8 May 2020
Tuesday, 16 June 2020 12:45pm	I am Innocent of your False claims Steve Georganas – Notice to Admit Facts will prove it – Any ruling against me (and undisputed facts) will be the BIGGEST Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA and your name is on it Steve	Email to Steve Georganas and Julie Kinnear with attached Notice to admit facts and “undisputed” Sworn Affidavit of Facts
Monday, 15 June 2020 7:50 am	Notice to admit facts Complaint Re Justice Mark Livesey Deprivation of Liberty – To the AFP I predict yet again I will not hear a thing Zippo Narda Nothing Zero No response Re: JCC Reference 2020/000056	Email to Hon: Bruce Lander QC with attached Notice to admit facts
Thursday, 11 June 2020 10:19 am	Which matter does this number relate to please? Re: Matter Number 2020/004835	Email to OPI and ICAC regarding complaints
Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:55pm	Justice Mark Livesey Fails to answer nine questions Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43	Blank email
Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:50pm	I predicted Right yet again No answer Zippo Zero Nothing Narda – Proving Im right Re: Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response	Blank email
Wednesday, 10 June 2020 4:45pm	U predicted Right No answer Nothing Zippo Zero Re: Exposed I predict that the Chief Justice will refuse to answer one (1) question – As he has previously refused to answer two (2) questions	Blank email
Wednesday, 10 June 2020 3:34pm	Please be advised soon I will be out the front of your Office with a sign that reads “ZOE BETTISON MP is CORRUPT all those cars driving past and those going to the MC and to see you – So they might know you don’t represent the People of Ramsey – Re: St …	Email that reads ZOE BETTISON MP is CORRUPT
Tuesday, 9 June 2020 9:21 am	By way of service Notice to admit facts – I look forward to seeing you in Court should you again fail in your duty to up hold the law	Email to Hon: Vicky Chapman with attached Notice to admit facts
Tuesday, 9 June 2020 9:11 am	By way of service Notice to admit facts – I intend to have you removed from Office for your Breaches of Statutory law/s	Email to Zoe Bettison with attached Notice to admit facts
Thursday, 4 June 2020 7:25am	We see you Re: Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety – Re: SA Police knowing at my door last night refused to give names	Email containing YouTube links (ICAC, Police State, Quiet)
Tuesday, 2 June 2020 11:18am	Still No answer – Are Allianz Bribing you? – Re: Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions	Email to Zoe Bettison regarding response to letter dated 12 May 2020
Tuesday, 2 June 2020 10:10am	Leon Byer Please Help I Fear for my Safety due to Government Corruption Re: Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety	Email to “Keon” Byner requesting to be talk on his show regarding Corruption and Oppression of the Government
Friday, 29 May 2020 2:37pm	Weaponizing the SA Police against a Law Abiding Citizen to Intimidate – I fear for my safety – Re: SA Police knowing at my door last night refused to give names	Email to AFP and Agent David Brian regarding SA Police
Thursday, 28 May 2020 9:24am	Yet again another offer to Compromise – 12 noon tomorrow	Email to Steve Georganas seeking a compromise
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 2:38pm	Serious Judicial Misconduct – Gross Miscarriage of Justice – Deprivation of Liberty by Hon: Vicky Chapman – SCCIV 1008 of 2019 Georganas v Barkla	Email to Hon: Steven Marshall Premier of SA regarding letters sent to Hon: Vicky Chapman and Zoe Bettison re Australian Human Rights Act
Wednesday, 27 May 2020 9:25am	Exposed – corruption Re: Correspondence from Ombudsman SA – 2020/02144	Email in response to Mr Wayne Lines regarding email to Ombudsman
Wednesday, 20 May 2020 7:03am	Obvious and Clear Abuse of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – This is the biggest Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA	Email to Bruce Lander QC regarding an investigation · Letter attached from Mr Barkla · Letter from Julie Kinnear
Monday, 18 May 2020 1:37pm	LOL The Biggest Fraud in the History of the Supreme Court SA Re: Georganas v Barkla	Email to Supreme Court chambers regarding plaintiff admitting breaches of the Criminal Code Act
Monday, 18 May 2020 9:36am	Would the Hon: Zoe Bettison, write and ask the Chief Justice Why he refuses to answer two (2) questions please?	Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Chief Justice and Parliament seeking answers to Mr Barkla’s questions
Monday, 18 May 2020 8:47am	Exposed – I predict that the Chief Justice will refuse to answer one (1) question – As he has previously refused to answer two (2) questions	Email to Chief Justice with attached letter seeking answer to a question
Thursday, 14 May 2020 6:28pm	The TRUTH The Whole TRUTH and Nothing but the TRUTH – AG Afraid to answer TWO (2) Questions	Email to Attorney-General and Zoe Bettison regarding refusal to answer questions and disgraceful conduct
Wednesday, 13 May 2020 6:30 am	Re: Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions	Email to Attorney-General and Zoe Bettison threatening complaints with ICAC
Tuesday, 12 May 2020 5:31pm	Please be advised of Hon: Zoe Bettison & Hon: Vicky Chapman Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s4.3 Omissions	Email to Zoe Bettison regarding breaches of the Criminal Code Act
Monday, 11 May 2020 3:46pm	Orders and Transcript of todays Hearing Please? & clarify a few things	Email to chambers seeking orders and transcript and regarding the Attorney-General answering two questions
Monday, 11 May 2020 2:58pm	Please stamp the attached doc filed and return and please provide me with a copy of Orders made on the 8^th May 2020	Email to chambers requesting a document regarding sub questions of law be stamped as filed
Monday, 11 May 2020 2:54am	Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43	Email to chambers and Julie Kinnear regarding attached letters to Justice Livesey and Julie Kinnear
Wednesday, 6 May 2020 7:26am	Justice Livesey Ruling on One Act while Breaching another Act	Email to chambers regarding Justice Livesey breaching the Australian Human Rights Commission Act and s30 of the Supreme Court Act
Tuesday, 5 May 2020 6.23 am	I predict The Court will Adjourn Monday’s Hearing in Order to Pervert Justice – Justice Matk Livesey is trying to get me to a Dr so they can try and write me off as a nutter because they can’t beat me at the attached Laws Re: Exposed – Abusee of Public …	Letter attached to Julie Kinnear regarding the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act – Clause 5
Monday, 4 May 2020 6:32pm	Re: Urgent Request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General	Email to Zoe Bettison asking that she confirm the correct letter was sent to the Attorney-General and stating he will go see her if there is no response
Sunday, 3 May 2020 10:46 am	Exposed – Abusee of Public Office by Justice Mark Livesey – Violations of the Criminal Code Act 1995 s142 & Crimes Act 1914 s43	Email to chambers with letter attached to Justice Mark Livesey regarding an order made to see a GP or psychologist
Saturday, 2 May 2020 12:59pm	Un-Truths Exposed – I predict Crickets Zippo Nothing Narda No response	Email to Julie Kinnear with letter attached to Justice Mark Livesey regarding an order made to see a GP or psychologist
Thursday, 30 April 2020 7.23 am	Re: Urgent request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General	Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Attorney-General · Written Opening Submissions of facts of the Defendant
Thursday, 30 April 2020 7.19 am	Urgent request as I need two questions answered by the Attorney General	Email to Zoe Bettison requesting she write to the Attorney-General regarding two questions · Letter attached to A-G Vicky Chapman dated 20 April 2020 seeking answers to two questions · Letter attached to Attorney-General’s office dated 23 April 2020 · Letter attached to Ms Julie Kinnear dated 6 April 2020 asking 45 questions · Letter attached from Ms Julie Kinnear dated 8 April 2020
Wednesday, 29 April 2020 4:34 pm	Not seeking an investigation I am seeking Answers to two questions – Re: My Apologies I thank the Hon: Member for Ramsey for her response – Attorney General has breached My Civil and Political Rights to freedom of Expression -20AGO1187 – Final Response	Letter to Zoe Bettison regarding answers from Attorney-General · Email correspondence between Mr Barkla and Zoe Bettison regarding information pursuant to the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 Schedule 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 19.2 Freedom of Expression · Letter attached to Attorney-General ‘Submissions” and “Statutory Laws”
Wednesday, 29 April 2020 1:51 pm	Apologies I thank the Hon: Member for Ramsey for her response – Attorney General has breached My Civil and Political Rights to freedom of Expression -20AGO1187 – Final Response	Email correspondence between Mr Barkla and Zoe Bettison · Letter attached to Chief Justice Kourakis regarding “Submissions” and “Statutory Laws” · Submissions and Statement of Grounds
Tuesday, 28 April 2020 3:53 pm	My Complaint Re: Judge Mark Livesey?	Email to Office of Public Integrity asking for a response of a complaint made on 19 April 2020 · Screenshot of ICAC complaint page from the internet
Tuesday, 28 April 2020 3:44 pm	Breaches of Civil and Political Rights – Statutory Officers Committee	Email to Guy Dickson regarding letter to Attorney-General’s office, breaching statutory rights
Tuesday, 28 April 2020 3:28 pm	Attorney General Vicky Chapman Breaches of Statutory Law/s – Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee	Email to Hon: Dennis Gary Edward Hood, Hon: Justin Eric Hanson & Hon: Frank Pangallo · Letter attached from Attorney-General’s office in reply to emails dated 20 April 2020 · Letter attached to Chief Justice Kourakis regarding “Submissions” and “Statutory Laws” · Submissions and Statement of Grounds
Monday, 20 April 2020 6:59 am	Abuse of Public Office by justice Liversey	Email to Chief Justice Kourakis · Letter attached to Julie Kinnear dated 6 April 2020 requesting answers to 45 questions

(1) This section applies if the Court is satisfied:

(a) a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or

(b) a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.

.

8.	Attempt to file writ of summons in District Court against CEO of WorkCover WA – Leave to commence proceedings refused by Birmingham DCJ on basis proceedings no materially different to those struck out in [2013] WADC 90 (no written reasons)	19.08.2013
9.	Further attempt to file writ of summons in District Court against WorkCover WA Corporation saying he was denied procedural fairness because of actions of Arbitrator Nunn. Leave to commence proceedings refused by Birmingham DCJ on basis proceedings no materially different to those struck out in [2013] WADC 90 (no written reasons)	19.08.2013
10.	Mr Barkla attempted to file an appeal notice against the declaration of Arbitrator Nunn alleging he was denied right to have agreed Statement of Facts. Bowden DCJ refused leave to file on ground attempt to relitigate matters previously before the court. (No formal written reasons for decision)	11.10.2013
11.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2013] WASCA 240 McClure P, Murphy JA	17.12.2013
Decision of Arbitrator Nunn rejecting application for increase to prescribed payment amounts for Mr Barkla (decision not available)	6.12.2013
12.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2014] WADC 23 McCann DCJ Leave for opportunity to amend pleadings	19.02.2014
13.	Barkla v WorkCover WA [2014] WASCA 40 Pullin JA, Newnes JA	21.02.2014

14.	Barkla v G4S Custodial Services Pty Ltd [2014] WADC 36 McCann DCJ (on the papers)	26.03.2014
15.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2014] WADC 113 Staude DCJ	28.08.2014
16.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd & G4S Custodial Services [2014] WASCA 192	8.10.2014
17.	Barkla v WorkCover WA [2014] WADC 159 Sleight DCJ	21.11.2014
18.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [No. 2] [2014] WASCA 222 Newnes JA, Murphy JA	10.11.2014
Appeal notice in District Court filed against decision of Arbitrator Paparone of WorkCover re Form 3B issue. Leave to appeal refused – ex-tempore reasons by Goetze DCJ	23.02.2015
19.	Re the Hon Justice Newnes; Ex parte Barkla [2014] WASC 488 McKechnie J	17.12.2014
20.	Re Registrar Lind Bush; Ex parte Barkla [2014] WASC 488 McKechnie J	17.12.2014
Originating summons filed in District Court naming WorkCover as respondent claiming breach of legal duty by use of deceit, falsehood and trickery. Proceedings truck out as abuse of process by Heron CDJ (no written decision)	27.02.2015

21.	Barkla v Allianz & Anor [2015] HCASL 40 Kiefel, J	9.04.2015
22.	Barkla v Bush [2015] WADC 46 Levy DCJ	1.05.2015
23.	Barkla v Justice David Wallace Newnes [2015] WASCA 120 McClure P, Buss JA, Mazza JA	16.06.2015
Decision of Acting Court of Appeal Registrar’s decision not to accept documents including interrogatories) (no written reasons available)	20.08.2015
24.	Barkla v Allianz Australia [2015] WASCA 210 Newnes JA, Murphy JA	14.10.2015
25.	Barkla v Civitella [2016] WADC 3 Davis DCJ	20.01.2016
26.	Barkla v Colbran [2015] FCA 1470 Besanko J	21.12.2015
27.	Barkla v Civitella [2016] WASCA 71 Newnes JA, Murphy JA	22.04.2016
28.	Barkla v Civitella [No. 2] [2016] WASCA 111 Buss JA, Newnes JA	23.06.2016
29.	Attorney-General for WA v Barkla [2016] WASC 298	21.09.2016

30.	An application under Section 6 of the vexatious proceedings restriction Act – ex parte Barkla [2017] WASC 102 Tottle J	13.04.2017
31.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 2070 Charlesworth J	20.12.2018
32.	Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2018] FCA 563 White J	18.04.2018

[2021] SASC 47

30 April 2021