Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 48 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd [2011] FCAFC 159

Citation: Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd [2011] FCAFC 159
Appeal from: Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318
Parties: KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 007 870 395, MMAL STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND PTY LTD ACN 064 829 616 and AMP STAFF SUPERANNUATION FUND ACN 008 414 104; KAZIMIR KOWALSKI v WARWICK SODEN (IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGISTRAR OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)
File number(s): SAD 70 of 2011
SAD 71 of 2011
Judges: JACOBSON, SIOPIS AND NICHOLAS JJ
Date of judgment: 8 December 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to appeal from orders of primary judge refused by a single judge – appeal listed before Full Court at the time leave was refused – question as to the status of the appeal in light of the refusal of leave – whether single judge had power to hear application for leave to appeal once appeal had been assigned to Full Court – single judge not functus in application for leave to appeal where application is part heard at the time appeal assigned to Full Court

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious litigants –whether an order declaring appellant a vexatious litigant is interlocutory or final in nature – such an order is interlocutory

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious litigants –appeal from order made pursuant to FederalCourt of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 21 and 23 and Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 21 rr 1 and 2 declaring appellant to be a vexatious litigant – relevant principles discussed – meaning of ‘proceeding’ within s 4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – discussion of what is a ‘vexatious proceeding’ – whether appellant has instituted proceedings ‘habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds’ – whether the primary judge properly exercised her discretion in declaring appellant to be a vexatious litigant

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 4 and 25
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 84
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 39
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 21
Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), s 14
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 21 rr 1, 2, 4 and 5
Cases cited: Attorney-General (Cth); ex parte Skyring; Re (1996) 135 ALR 29
Attorney-General (NSW) v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481
Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300
Brogden v Attorney-General (NZ) [2001] NZAR 809
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1980) 147 CLR 246
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Heinrich (No 2) [2003] SASC 436
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423
Harrington v Harrington (1981) 155 CLR 317
Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478
Jones Lang Lasalle (Qld) Pty Limited v Dart [2005] FCA 1614
Jones v Skyring (1992) 109 ALR 303
Josephson v Walker (1914) 18 CLR 691
Kay…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd involves Mr Kowalski, a litigant who has a history of numerous claims against Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited, and Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd, a company against which Mr Kowalski has filed multiple proceedings. The primary dispute in this case centres around Mr Kowalski's litigation activities, which led to him being declared a vexatious litigant by the Supreme Court of South Australia. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary judge, Flick J, made orders regarding Mr Kowalski's ability to continue litigation against Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd. The legal issues in this case revolve around the refusal of leave to appeal from the orders of the primary judge by a single judge, the status of the appeal once it was assigned to the Full Court, and whether Mr Kowalski should be declared a vexatious litigant. The court also needed to determine the nature of the order declaring Mr Kowalski a vexatious litigant, whether it is interlocutory or final, and the criteria for such a declaration.

The court considered the legal principles and authorities surrounding the remedy of declaring a person a vexatious litigant, which is an extreme measure that restricts their access to the court. The court noted that while the remedy is drastic, it serves an important purpose in protecting the court's processes from unwarranted usurpation of time and resources. In this case, the court needed to examine whether Mr Kowalski's actions met the criteria for being a vexatious litigant, such as instituting proceedings habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds. The court also assessed whether the primary judge properly exercised her discretion in declaring Mr Kowalski a vexatious litigant.

The court concluded that the single judge did not become functus when the appeal was assigned to the Full Court, meaning that the single judge still had the power to hear the application for leave to appeal. The court also determined that the order declaring Mr Kowalski a vexatious litigant was interlocutory in nature, as it did not finally resolve the dispute between the parties. Furthermore, the court found that the primary judge had properly exercised her discretion in declaring Mr Kowalski a vexatious litigant, based on his history of instituting numerous claims against Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd without reasonable grounds. The Full Court ultimately dismissed Mr Kowalski's appeals and upheld the orders made by the primary judge.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Notwithstanding his Honour’s orders, we heard full argument on the merits of the appeal as well as argument on the competency of the appeal and the effect of the orders made by Flick J. The Mitsubishi Parties were granted leave to file notices of objection to the competency of the appeal out of time.Factual Background The primary judge said at [3] that Mr Kowalski did not take issue with the factual background stated in the submissions of the Registrar and the Mitsubishi Parties. In the hearing before us, Mr Kowalski challenged that statement. Whether or not Mr Kowalski did take issue with the description of the factual narrative, it is clear that it is accurately stated in the primary judge’s reasons. As her Honour observed, the events which resulted in Mr Kowalski’s long history of litigation began with his employment by Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited (“Mitsubishi”). From 1989 onwards, Mr Kowalski brought numerous claims against Mitsubishi in the Workers’ Compensation Tribunal and the District Court of South Australia seeking compensation for alleged work related injuries. Central to most of Mr Kowalski’s proceedings in the Federal Court, and in other courts and tribunals is the effect of a document entitled Heads of Agreement dated 27 October 1998. The terms of that document are described in [6] of the primary judge’s reasons and are set out in full in the judgment of a Full Court in Kowalski v Trustee, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited [2003] FCAFC 18 at [7]. The Heads of Agreement were made between Mr Kowalski and Mitsubishi following upon a mediation between them. The Heads of Agreement recited that Mr Kowalski and Mitsubishi had reached agreement on the resolution of all issues between them and wished to record the terms of settlement. Paragraph 1 of the Heads of Agreement stated that Mr Kowalski agreed to accept the sum of $200,000 in full and final settlement of any entitlements he may have to superannuation, sick leave, compensation and damages arising out of or in the course of his employment with Mitsubishi. Significantly, Mr Kowalski agreed, in consideration for the payment, not to initiate any legal proceedings with any court, tribunal or body in respect of the matters set out in paragraph 1 of the Heads of Agreement. Notwithstanding the terms of the Heads of Agreement, and in spite of his receipt of the sum of $200,000 paid pursuant to the executed document, Mr Kowalski brought numerous proceedings against the Mitsubishi parties, not only in the Federal Court but in the State Courts of South Australia, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, the Legal Practitioners’ Disciplinary Tribunal and a number of other tribunals. On 19 April 2005 Mitsubishi succeeded in obtaining a declaration from Bleby J in the Supreme Court of South Australia that Mr Kowalski is a vexatious litigant. His Honour made orders prohibiting Mr Kowalski from instituting further proceedings against Mitsubishi or a related entity in the Supreme Court and other State Courts of South Australia; see Mitsubishi Motors Aust Limited v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Stone J said that in those circumstances she did not consider that “a fair-minded observer” would have a reasonable apprehension of bias.The judgment of Flick J In his introduction to his reasons for judgment, Flick J referred to the Notices of Motion filed by Mr Kowalski in each appeal seeking an order that the orders made by Stone J “be stayed pending the final determination of the applicant’s appeal”. His Honour then set out the terms of the orders made by Stone J under O 21 rr 1 and 2 before turning to a consideration of the provisions of O 21, including in particular O 21 r 5. That rule provides that if the Court has made an order under O 21 r 1 or r 2 against any person, the person may be given leave to institute or continue a proceeding only if the Court is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of process and there is a prima facie ground for the proceeding. Flick J considered that an initial question arose as to whether Mr Kowalski needed leave under O 21 r 5 to file the Notices of Appeal which he had already filed against the orders of the primary judge. He then said at [16]:It is ultimately concluded that leave was probably required to even file the Notices of Appeal but that it is unnecessary to express any more concluded view because such leave as is required so as to permit Mr Kowalski to appeal from an interlocutory decision should be refused. In coming to the view that the orders of Stone J were interlocutory, Flick J said at [29] that:Notwithstanding some decisions to the contrary, it is concluded that in this Court an order declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant and requiring that person to obtain the leave of the court to institute or continue a proceeding is unquestionably an interlocutory order. His Honour gave a number of reasons for coming to the view that he should refuse leave to appeal. The principal reason was that he considered that the content of the Notices of Appeal indicated that Mr Kowalski had no real prospects of success on appeal. Flick J rejected a submission from Mr Kowalski that his Honour was functus because, after the hearing of the Notices of Motion, and prior to Flick J’s judgment, the appeals were listed for hearing before a Full Court. His Honour made orders dismissing Mr Kowalski’s Notices of Motion and refusing leave to appeal in each case. The relevant principles The relevant principles and the authorities from which they are drawn are stated comprehensively in the reasons of the primary judge. We will endeavour to reduce the principles to the following propositions. First, the remedy for which O 21 rr 1 and 2 provides is an extreme remedy. It denies a person against whom an order is made a fundamental right that every member of our society has of access to a court to seek remedies as a consequence of an alleged infringement of his or her rights: Wentworth at 484; Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378 at [51] (Sackville J) (“Ramsey v Skyring”). Second, nevertheless, provisions such as O 21 r 1 give effect to an important counter-veiling policy. This is that the Rules are designed to protect the Court’s processes against unwarranted usurpation of its time and resources and to avoid loss to those who face actions which lack substance: Ramsey v Skyring at [52]; Jones v Skyring (1992) 109 ALR 303 at 312 (Toohey J) (“Jones v Skyring”).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established