Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD v KOWALSKI

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

19 April 2005

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INJUNCTIONS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES - TO RESTRAIN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Application pursuant to s 39 Supreme Court Act to have defendant declared vexatious litigant – Plaintiff seeking stay of appeal in Workers Compensation Tribunal and order that defendant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings in any prescribed court without leave – Majority of proceedings said to be vexatious instituted in Workers Compensation Tribunal – Whether defendant instituted proceedings without reasonable ground – Discussion of relevant principles – Meaning of “proceedings” for purposes of s 39 – Whether vexatious proceedings instituted “persistently” – Order granted.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 39; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 42, s 43, s 63, s 86, s 86A, s 88H, s 89A, s 90, s 91A, s 92D, s 94A, s 95, s 97, s 97B, s 106A, s 114 and s 119; Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) s 5; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 1992 (SA) s 16; Statutes Amendments (Courts) Act 2004 (SA); Supreme Court Rules (SA) r 5, r 11.01 and r 81.10; District Court Rules (SA) r 86.10; Workers Compensation Rules (SA) r 10(1) and r 23, referred to.
Purnell Bros Pty Ltd v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd (1984) 73 FLR 160; Arhill v General Terminal Co Pty Ltd (1990) 23 NSWLR 545; R v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258; Rota v Turkuri [2001] 1 NZLR 715; Kay v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria [2000] 2 VR 436; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Weston [2004] VSC 314; Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481; Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2004] SASC 302, applied.
Attorney-General v Collier [2001] NZAR 137; Brogden v Attorney-General [2001] NZAR 208; ACCC v Shell Co of Australia (1999) 161 ALR 686; Cheney v Spooner (1928) 41 CLR 532; Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"vexatious", "reasonable ground", "proceedings", "persistently"

MITSUBISHI MOTORS AUSTRALIA LTD v KOWALSKI
[2005] SASC 154

BLEBY J:

The Application

  1. The plaintiff applied, by inter partes summons filed on 18 March 2004, for the following relief:

    “1.A declaration that the Defendant has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings as defined by section 39(1) of the Supreme Court Act1935 in that he has persistently instituted proceedings without reasonable ground.

    2.A declaration that the Workers Compensation Tribunal established under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 is a court for the purposes of section 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935.

    3.An order pursuant to section 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 that the Defendant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in any Court (including the Supreme Court, the District Court, the Magistrates’ Court, Workers Compensation Tribunal and the Industrial Court), any application or other document, including any…

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Details
Case
[2005] SASC 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski, the plaintiff sought a declaration under the Supreme Court Act that the defendant was a vexatious litigant and an order that the defendant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave. The proceedings originated from a failed settlement attempt in 1992 between the parties concerning outstanding claims under the Workers Compensation Act 1971 and the Compensation Act. Consent orders were initially made in the Industrial Court, but WorkCover Corporation declined to consent to the orders under the Compensation Act, resulting in the orders being set aside. The defendant sought to reverse the setting aside of the orders, contending that it was done without his instruction or consent.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the defendant had instituted the proceedings without reasonable grounds and whether those proceedings were vexatious. The court considered the meaning of "proceedings" for the purposes of section 39 of the Supreme Court Act and whether the proceedings were instituted "persistently." The plaintiff argued that the defendant's attempt to have the original consent orders reinstated was vexatious and taken without reasonable ground, particularly as the settlement had clearly failed. The court needed to decide whether the defendant's actions met the criteria for being deemed a vexatious litigant.

The court found that the defendant did institute the proceedings without reasonable grounds, as the evidence indicated that the defendant had instructed his solicitors to consent to the setting aside of the orders. The court preferred the evidence of the solicitors over that of the defendant, who was deemed unreliable. The court also found that the circumstances in which the consent orders were set aside did not reveal anything onerous, untoward, or unfair to the defendant. The court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted vexatious proceedings under section 39 of the Supreme Court Act, leading to the grant of the order sought by the plaintiff.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The findings of Thompson DP show that the defendant did institute these particular proceedings without reasonable grounds and hence, for the purpose of s 39 Supreme Court Act, vexatiously.Decision No.13 This is a decision of Judge McCusker of the Industrial Relations Court of South Australia given on 11 April 1997. The circumstances giving rise to this proceeding were that in 1992 the parties attempted to enter into a settlement of all then outstanding claims by Mr Kowalski under both the Workers Compensation Act 1971 and the Compensation Act. In order to implement the settlement, consent orders were required to be made under both Acts. The consent of WorkCover under s 119 of the Compensation Act was also required. A consent order under the 1971 Act was made in the Industrial Court on 27 August 1992. Under that order Mr Kowalski was to be paid $23,000. That sum was paid to Mr Kowalski’s solicitors. WorkCover Corporation declined to consent. As a result, further orders were made in the Industrial Court on 16 June 1993 setting aside the earlier orders and requiring Mr Kowalski to repay to Mitsubishi the sum of $23,000. At the time of the mediation referred to below, the sum of $9,118.45 had not been repaid by Mr Kowalski. Mr Kowalski, in the proceedings before Judge McCusker, contended that the orders were set aside without his instruction or consent. He sought to reverse the setting aside of the orders. The success or failure of Mr Kowalski’s application depended partly upon a finding of fact, namely whether or not he did give instructions to his then solicitors to consent to the setting aside of the orders on 16 June 1993. Judge McCusker heard oral evidence from Mr Kowalski’s former solicitors and from Mr Kowalski himself. The plaintiff claims that the defendant’s attempt, in effect, to have the original consent orders re-instated was vexatious. The plaintiff submits that it was a step taken without reasonable ground in circumstances where the settlement had clearly failed. The plaintiff sought to rely upon the findings by Judge McCusker that Mr Kowalski’s evidence was unreliable to show that Mr Kowalski instituted the proceedings without reasonable grounds. The plaintiff’s argument, as I understand it, is that if the only ground to support the institution of the proceedings was that Mr Kowalski’s solicitors had acted without his instructions and in fact they did have his instructions, then there was no basis for the proceedings. Judge McCusker found that Mr Kowalski did give instructions to his solicitors, preferring the evidence given by the solicitors to the evidence of Mr Kowalski, which he found to be unreliable. Judge McCusker found at p.13 that the circumstances in which the consent orders were set aside disclosed nothing that was “onerous or untoward or unfair to the worker”. He continued: “I have no doubt that the worker felt annoyed with the failure of the settlement more so perhaps it coming in the wake of his reversal in the District Court proceedings. However, while he may have had antagonistic feelings and disappointment I do not regard those as material for my purposes so far as the proceedings he now brings.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established