Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 49 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – when summary dismissal under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) may be ordered – whether order for summary dismissal under s 31A is interlocutory – whether leave to appeal should be granted – whether a further opportunity to amend a Further Amended Statement of Claim should be allowed – consideration of interests of justice

Held:  leave to appeal necessary – application for leave dismissed

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 27 and 31A
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170EA

Federal Court Rules O11 r16

Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 (Cth)  

Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616) (2007) 242 ALR 370 referred to
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616) (No 2) [2008] FCA 691 cited
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616) (No 3) [2009] FCA 53 considered
Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243 referred to
Wills v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2009) 173 FCR 284 referred to
Theseus Exploration N.L. v. Foyster (1972) 126 CLR 507 referred to
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 referred to
General Steel Industries Inc. v. Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1964) 112 CLR 125 referred to
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited (2008) 167 FCR 372 referred to
Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd (ACN 114 658 070) v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (ACN 070 396 020) (2006) 236 ALR 720 cited
White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 referred to
Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177; 203 ALR 1 considered
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited [No. 1] (1980) 147 CLR 35 referred to
Hall v The Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 referred to
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Limited [No. 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246 referred to
Pye v Renshaw (1951) 84 CLR 58 referred to
Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213 referred to
Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 referred to
Zoia v Commonwealth Ombudsmen Department (2007) 240 ALR 624 cited
Luck v University of Southern Queensland [2009] 109 ALD 66 followed
Berowra Holdings Pty Limited v Gordon (2006) 225 CLR 364 referred to
Simundic v University of Newcastle [2007] FCAFC 144 referred to
Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 444 referred to
Pham v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCAFC 179 referred to
Owners of The Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404 referred to
Dent v Australian Electoral Commissioner (2008) 249 ALR 523 referred to
Bonnell v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 5) [2008] FCA 991 referred to
Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] 72 ACSR 264 referred to
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Kazimir Kowalski sought leave to appeal against a judgment dismissing his claim against MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd. The court was tasked with determining whether the appeal was competent and if the appeal itself was to be dismissed. The primary issue was whether the judgment of the primary judge, dated 5 February 2009, was interlocutory or final. If interlocutory, the court needed to assess if leave to appeal was required, and if the appeal was otherwise competent. The court examined whether the judgment finally determined the rights of the parties in the principal cause pending between them. It considered the legal effect of the judgment and whether it constituted a final order, which would allow for an immediate appeal without leave.

The Federal Court held that the judgment in question was interlocutory, meaning it did not finally determine the rights of the parties. Therefore, an appeal from this judgment could not proceed unless the Court or a Judge granted leave to appeal under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act. The court concluded that the appeal was incompetent as Kowalski had not obtained the necessary leave to appeal from an interlocutory order. The court further found that Kowalski's application for leave to appeal was without merit and in the interests of justice, the appeal should be dismissed. Consequently, the court ordered that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed, the appeal be dismissed as incompetent, and Kowalski pay the respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal in the ‘Notice of Appeal’ filed 6 February 2009 be dismissed.

2. The purported appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, the Court will make the following orders:1.The application for leave to appeal in the ‘Notice of Appeal’ filed 6 February 2009 be dismissed.2.The purported appeal be dismissed as incompetent.3.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.Background Kazimir Kowalski (‘Mr Kowalski’) was born on 7 August 1947. It would appear that Mr Kowalski was employed by Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited from about January 1964 until 16 March 1994. The Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Fund was originally constituted by a trust deed dated 30 November 1967 which has since been the subject of several amendments. One such amending deed would appear to have been made on 19 August 1999 between Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited and the first respondent. Another amending deed would appear to have been made on 14 December 2000 between Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited and the first respondent and yet another made on 6 December 2002 between Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited and the first respondent. It would appear that Mr Kowalski ceased to perform work for Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited on 16 August 1991. On 20 February 1992 he gave as the reason for his ceasing work ‘due to emotional distress pathologically intense state of anxiety.’ It would not be inappropriate to describe the relationship between Mr Kowalski and Mitsubishi Motors Australia Limited as an acrimonious one. A brief history of the disputation may be found in the judgment of the primary judge of 24 July 2007 (Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (ACN 064 829 616) (2007) 242 ALR 370. That judgment was given in the first instance proceedings No. SAD 11 of 2007. At [1] – [3] the primary judge said:‘[1] This matter has a long history. The applicant, Kazimir Kowalski, has been in dispute with Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (MMAL) from when his employment with that company ceased on 16 March 1994. It is unnecessary for present purposes to outline the very many proceedings he has brought against MMAL and, on occasion, related entities including the present respondent, Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (MMA Super) in various courts and tribunals in South Australia including in two instances actions in the Federal Court – both of which were summarily dismissed: see Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 55 and Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1153 (Kowalski (2002)); affd [2003] FCAFC 18 (Kowalski (FCAFC)). A history of those proceedings (more than forty in number) is contained in the judgment of Bleby J in Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski [2005] SASC 154. In that particular matter he was declared to be a vexatious litigant and has been prohibited from instituting further proceedings against MMAL or a related entity in state courts in South Australia without the leave of the Supreme Court.[2] The present proceedings in this court is in substance the same as that which he sought to institute against MMA Super in the South Australian District Court. The leave he initially obtained to commence that proceeding was subsequently set aside and, on 24 January 2007, it was struck out. Acting, apparently, on the advice of a person who happens to be a lawyer, Mr Kowalski filed the present proceeding on 25 January 2007.[3] The statement of claim (which is presently under challenge) is substantially the same as an amended statement of claim that he had filed in the District Court proceedings. Though the matters pleaded relate essentially to complaints about the conduct of MMA Super in its administration of the superannuation fund in which he claims to have certain entitlements, the manner in which he has sought to bring what is essentially a trusts matter within this Court’s jurisdiction is by pleading a contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TP Act) although he does not in express terms claim relief under either ss 82 or 87 of the Act. However, s 87 was raised in his submissions.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

SPENDER, GRAHAM AND GILMOUR JJ
It remains a matter for a judge hearing a summary dismissal application to exercise some discretion as to whether questions of law that have been raised are so difficult that they ought not to be decided summarily. Are s 31A judgments interlocutory? The question of whether or not the judgment of the primary judge of 5 February 2009 was interlocutory or not is an important one for consideration in this case. If the judgment was interlocutory, an appeal could not be brought from it ‘unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal’ under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act. The usual test for determining whether an order is final or interlocutory is whether the order, as made, finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them. That question is answered by determining whether the legal effect of the judgment is final or not. If the legal effect of the judgment is final, it is a final order; otherwise it is an interlocutory order (see per McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ in Re Luck (2003) 78 ALJR 177; 203 ALR 1 at [4]; see also Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited [No. 1] (1980) 147 CLR 35 (‘Anshun No. 1’) at 38). It may be that the practical effect of an order will be such as to render a further application fruitless unless supported by additional relevant facts, but that does not make an order one which finally determines the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them (per Taylor J, Owen J agreeing in Hall v The Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 (‘Hall v The Nominal Defendant’) at 440-441 and 447; see also per Windeyer J at 444; per Gibbs CJ in Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Limited [No. 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246 (‘Carr v FCA’) at 248 and, per Mason J, as his Honour then was, at 256-257). Re Luck was an appeal from a decision of Gleeson CJ, exercising the original jurisdiction of the High Court to control its own processes. Ms Luck had sought to issue a Writ of Summons in the High Court naming 32 defendants including judges of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Federal Court of Australia, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, medical officers and an unnamed telephonist employed by the Federal Police. McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ summarised the position in that case at [2] of their reasons for judgment as follows:‘[2] … Chief Justice Gleeson held that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against any defendant, a holding with which we entirely agree. Not only does the writ and statement of claim fail to disclose any recognisable cause of action against any individual defendant, but they seek to join as defendants in one action many people who have nothing in common except that the applicant claims that each of them has tortured her.’ The High Court pointed out that it was not necessary to discuss the merits of Ms Luck’s claims in any detail because she was seeking to appeal against an interlocutory order, a class of order that required the grant of leave to appeal, and none had been granted. The High Court ordered that Ms Luck’s appeal be struck out as incompetent. At [12]-[13], McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ said:‘[12] Even if Ms Luck had sought leave to appeal against the decision of Gleeson CJ, we would have refused her application. An application for leave should establish both that the decision, the subject of the proposed appeal, is sufficiently doubtful to warrant a grant of leave and that it is in the interests of the administration of justice for this court to hear it.[13] The writ of summons that Ms Luck attempted to file does not disclose a cause of action against any of the 32 defendants listed. A grant of leave would be futile because an appeal would have no prospect of success.’