FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McGrory v Horizon One Recruitment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 153
File number(s): QUD 569 of 2023 Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 4 March 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A(2) of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and 26.01 of Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – alternative application for entirety of statement of claim to be struck out pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) with no leave to replead – principles concerning summary judgment under s 31A of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where there is no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding – summary judgment entered for respondent against applicant – where almost all of statement of claim includes frivolous or vexatious material, fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and is embarrassing – meaning of “embarrassing” in relation to pleadings – where no utility in allowing the applicant to replead – statement of claim struck out
COSTS – application for costs under s 570 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – principles concerning the award of costs under s 570 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where conduct in prosecuting the proceeding was unreasonable – impecuniosity not a relevant consideration in awarding costs – costs awarded
Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 343, 351, 570
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 26.01
Cases cited: Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25
Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166
Fuller v Toms [2012] FCAFC 155
McGrory v Horizon One Recruitment Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 810
Murdock v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (No 3) [2024] FCA 227
Mpinda v Fair Work Commission [2022] FCA 1111
Webb v Commonwealth [2021] FCA 1215
Quach v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 1729
Tsilibakis v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1048
Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd [2004] FCA 1393
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 42 Date of hearing: 23 July 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: Ms N A-Khavari Solicitor for the Respondent: Moray & Agnew Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 569 of 2023 BETWEEN: DR CLARE ANNE MCGRORY
Applicant
AND: HORIZON ONE RECRUITMENT PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Summary judgment be entered for the respondent against the applicant in respect of the originating application filed by the applicant on 1 December 2023, pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered two primary legal issues. First, whether Dr McGrory had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her proceeding against Horizon One, warranting summary judgment. Second, whether the entirety of Dr McGrory's statement of claim should be struck out as it included frivolous or vexatious material, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and was embarrassing. The court applied the principles concerning summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and considered the meaning of “embarrassing” in relation to pleadings. The court determined that Dr McGrory's proceeding lacked a reasonable prospect of success and that her statement of claim contained almost all frivolous or vexatious material, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and was embarrassing. Consequently, the court found no utility in allowing Dr McGrory to replead and ordered the statement of claim to be struck out.
In awarding costs under s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), the court considered the principles concerning the award of costs. It found that Dr McGrory's conduct in prosecuting the proceeding was unreasonable. The court ruled that impecuniosity was not a relevant consideration in awarding costs and thus ordered Dr McGrory to pay Horizon One's costs of and incidental to the proceedings. The final orders included entering summary judgment for Horizon One, striking out Dr McGrory's statement of claim, and awarding costs to Horizon One.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Summary judgment be entered for the respondent against the applicant in respect of the originating application filed by the applicant on 1 December 2023, pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
2. In the alternative, pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the statement of claim filed by the applicant on 1 December 2023 be struck out.
3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of costs, Counsel for the respondent referred to the Full Court decision of Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166 at [57]. Dr McGrory submitted that she would be unable to meet any costs order made against her.CONSIDERATION A helpful summary of the principles to which the Court may have regard in considering an application for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act was set out by Jackson J in Quach v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 1729. In that case, his Honour at [12] observed:(1)It is the applicant for summary judgment who bears the onus of persuading the court that the proceedings should be determined summarily: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641; (2013) 220 FCR 256 at [45].(2)It may be doubted that it is useful to adopt any gloss, paraphrase or lexicon as to the criterion of no reasonable prospect of success: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 at [58]; see also at [22].(3)As the combined effect of s 31A(2) and 31A(3) makes clear, the inquiry is whether the prosecution of the relevant part of the proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success, not whether that defence is hopeless or bound to fail: Spencer at [52].(4)The test is a departure from earlier provisions authorising summary judgment to be ordered: Spencer at [53]. Section 31A has lowered the bar and softened the test: Cassimatis at [46].(5)Nevertheless, the power to dismiss an action summarily must be exercised with caution and is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer at [24] and [60].(6)Section 31A(1) provides that when the court is satisfied that the respondent to an application for summary judgment has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting or defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding, then the court 'may' give judgment. The assessment required by s 31A of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the court: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401; 259 ALR 319; [2009] FCAFC 117 at [28].(7)A practical judgment as to the case at hand is required, by reference to the stage it has reached: Spencer at [25]; Cassimatis at [46]. Justice Feutrill in Mpinda v Fair Work Commission [2022] FCA 1111 adopted those principles referable to s 31A Federal Court Act but continued:23.Rule 26.01(1) also includes ‘no reasonable cause of action is disclosed’ as a ground for judgment. It seems to me that there is not a great deal of difference between an absence of a reasonable cause of action and a proceeding or part of a proceeding for which there is no reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution. However, there may be circumstances in which a reasonable cause of action is disclosed yet there is no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting that cause of action. For example, because the evidence necessary to prove the material facts at trial is not available: White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; (2007) 160 FCR 298 at [51]. Otherwise, if it is demonstrated that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed for the purposes of summary judgment under r 26.01(1), as opposed to the failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action in a statement of claim for the purposes of a strike-out under r 16.21(2), it will also be demonstrated that there is no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding to which the applicable cause of action relates.24.Section 31A is not an appropriate procedure for applying to strike-out the relief sought in an originating application. The relevant question on an application under s 31A is whether the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding. Put another way, the question is not whether the applicant has no reasonable prospect of obtaining the relief claimed in the originating application. The Court gives judgment in respect of the issues as these amount to a cause of action in the proceedings. If the applicant proves facts that amount to a cause of action, the Court will give judgment for the applicant on the cause of action and fashion the relief to which the applicant is entitled. If the applicant fails to prove facts that amount to a cause of action, the Court will not give judgment by dismissing the relief claimed, but by dismissing the proceedings: Noble Investments at [34].25.Pursuant to r 6.01, if a document filed in a proceeding contains matter that is scandalous, vexatious or oppressive, a party may apply to the court for an order that the matter be struck out of the document. Therefore, if a respondent is able to demonstrate that the applicant could not obtain any part of the relief claimed, that part of the originating application may be struck out, but that is not to give judgment for the respondent on that part of the relief claimed: Noble Investments at [40]. Also, pursuant to r 8.21(1)(a), an applicant may apply to the Court for leave to amend an originating application for any reason, including to correct a defect or error that would otherwise prevent the Court from determining the real questions raised by the proceeding. Accordingly, a claim for relief that is struck out may be capable of cure by adding a claim for relief if the material facts set out in the document accompanying the originating application disclose a reasonable cause of action for that relief.26.It is also relevant to note that pursuant to r 1.32, the Court may make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice. Pursuant to r 1.34, the Court may dispense with compliance with any of the Rules, either before or after the occasion for compliance arises. Pursuant to r 1.40, the Court may, at any stage of the proceeding, exercise a power mentioned in the Rules in the proceeding on its own initiative.