Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis

Link copied
Case Copied 86 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission

v Cassimatis
[2013] FCA 641


Citation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis [2013] FCA 641
Parties: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION v EMMANUEL GEORGE CASSIMATIS and JULIE GLADYS CASSIMATIS
File number: QUD 574 of 2010
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 28 June 2013
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – principles applicable to summary judgment – whether summary dismissal involves a two-stage test that shifts the onus to the respondent on the application when the applicant has established a prima facie case

CORPORATIONS – where substantive proceedings allege contraventions of s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) by directors of a company for exposing the company to risk of various adverse legal outcomes – where adverse outcomes include proceedings arising out of contraventions of the Corporations Act because of the manner in which the company provided advice to 46 investors – whether ASIC has reasonable prospects of success of establishing that a reasonable director would have foreseen a risk of the adverse legal outcomes and concluded the risks were unacceptably high – whether affidavit evidence from the directors that contains general, unparticularised assertions establishes a prima facie case

CORPORATIONS – whether ASIC has reasonable prospects of success of establishing a breach of s 180(1) where: the respondents held all the shares in the company and were the only executive directors, the company was solvent and no allegation of bad faith – whether those circumstances are determinative – reliance on ASIC v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006] NSWSC 1052 – whether identity of interest between shareholders and directors changes the content of the duty under s 180(1) –whether s 180(1) imposes a minimum standard of care and skill

Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Companies (South Australia) Code
Rules of the Supreme Court (Qld)
Cases cited: Adnunat Pty Ltd (ACN 005 816 268) v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd (ACN 004 297 009) [2009] FCA 499
Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507; [2005] HCA 23
ASIC v Citrofresh International Ltd (ACN 064 551 426) (No 2) (2010) 77 ACSR 69; [2010] FCA 27
ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199; [2009] NSWSC 287
ASIC v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006] NSWSC 1052
ASIC v Sydney Investment House Equities Pty Ltd (2008) 69 ACSR 1; [2008] NSWSC 1224
ASIC v Warrenmang Ltd (2007) 63 ACSR 623; [2007] FCA 973
Australian Motor Finance Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) v Angeleri (No 3) [2010] FCA 1431
Bond v Barry (2008) 173 FCR 110; [2008] FCAFC 115
Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimati... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCA 641
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) brought proceedings against the Cassimatises, seeking declarations and orders against them as directors of Storm, for alleged breaches of their duties under the Corporations Act. The Cassimatises applied for summary judgment under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act, arguing ASIC had no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceedings. They relied on three grounds: solvency of Storm, no bad faith, and alignment with shareholders' wishes. The court needed to decide whether ASIC had a reasonable prospect of success, particularly considering the minimum standard of care and diligence imposed by section 180(1) of the Corporations Act.

The court examined the nature of the duty under section 180(1) and the relevance of factors such as solvency, bad faith, and shareholders' wishes. It considered whether the Cassimatises' conduct, even if aligned with shareholders' wishes, could still breach the duty of care and diligence. The court also assessed whether the Cassimatises' interpretation of the duty was consistent with the public policy objectives of the Corporations Act, including the disqualification of directors. The court noted that while identity of interest between shareholders and directors could modify the duty, it did not eliminate it entirely. The court concluded that directors must adhere to a minimum standard of care and diligence, irrespective of shareholders' views, to ensure appropriate corporate managerial conduct.

The court found that the Cassimatises had not established a prima facie case that ASIC had no reasonable prospect of success. The court held that the minimum standard of care and diligence under section 180(1) remained applicable, regardless of the shareholders' wishes. The court rejected the argument that solvency or lack of bad faith precluded a breach of duty, as the duty of care and diligence extends beyond these considerations. The court determined that the Cassimatises' conduct, even if in alignment with shareholders, could still constitute a breach of the statutory duty if it exposed the company to risks that a reasonable director would have identified. Consequently, the application for summary judgment was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The “caution uttered by Lord Hope” (mentioned in [26] of Spencer above) is a reference to the quotation from his Lordship’s opinion in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 at 260–1, which is set out earlier in the joint judgment of French CJ and Gummow J (at [21]) as follows:The method by which issues of fact are tried in our courts is well settled. After the normal processes of discovery and interrogatories have been completed, the parties are allowed to lead their evidence so that the trial judge can determine where the truth lies in the light of that evidence. To that rule there are some well-recognised exceptions. For example, it may be clear as a matter of law at the outset that even if a party were to succeed in proving all the facts that he offers to prove he will not be entitled to the remedy that he seeks. In that event a trial of the facts would be a waste of time and money, and it is proper that the action should be taken out of court as soon as possible. In other cases it may be possible to say with confidence before trial that the factual basis for the claim is fanciful because it is entirely without substance. It may be clear beyond question that the statement of facts is contradicted by all the documents or other material on which it is based. The simpler the case the easier it is likely to be to take that view and resort to what is properly called summary judgment. But more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being resolved in that way without conducting a mini-trial on the documents without discovery and without oral evidence. As Lord Woolf said in Swain v Hillman, … that is not the object of the rule. It is designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial at all.(Emphasis added) This caution is further amplified in the concluding sentence of [26] of Spencer (not included in the quotation at [49] of Polar Aviation above) where French CJ and Gummow J added: “The importance of those considerations is amplified if the case involves resolution of issues of law and fact, or mixed law and fact.” However, as Bennett J noted in Expo-Net Danmark A/S v Buono-Net Australia Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 710 at [8], there was a:… distinction drawn by Hayne, Brennan (sic Crennan), Kiefel and Bell JJ at [51] between the reference in the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 to ‘no real prospects’ and s 31A’s criterion of ‘no reasonable prospect’... In Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372; [2008] FCAFC 60 (Jefferson Ford), a pre-Spencer Full Court addressed this issue about how a judge should deal with disputed questions of fact and law in a summary judgment application under s 31A. All three judges agreed that “real” questions of fact should generally be determined at a trial. There was less agreement on the treatment of questions of law. On disputed questions of fact, Finkelstein J said (at [23]) that:In other words, the section requires the judge to conduct what might loosely be described as a preliminary trial and look more closely than he would under an O 14 application to a party’s assertion that there is a real question of law or fact to be decided. Such an assertion is to be examined with a critical eye. The judge is to decide whether the opposing party has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to be able to succeed at trial. There will be cases where the asserted facts appear to be so improbable that there is no point in allowing them to go to trial. There will be others where the opposing party has not been able to show that the asserted facts are likely to be established at a trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ASIC commenced these proceedings against the Cassimatises in late 2010. In them, ASIC seeks a series of declarations to the effect that the Cassimatises, as directors of Storm, each contravened their duties of care and diligence prescribed under s 180(1) of the Corporations Act by permitting Storm to provide financial product advice to 46 (couples or individuals) named Storm customers. ASIC also seeks orders under various provisions of the Corporations Act that the Cassimatises each: pay civil penalties to the Commonwealth; be disqualified from managing corporations; be restrained from holding an Australian financial services licence; and be restrained from providing financial services under such a licence.THE CASSIMATISES SEEK SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER SECTION 31A After a successful application in 2011 to strike-out ASIC’s amended statement of claim, the Cassimatises have brought this application directed to ASIC’s case as it is pleaded in its further amended statement of claim (FASC). This application is in two parts. First, it seeks summary judgment in relation to the whole of the proceedings under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act). Secondly, and in the alternative, the Cassimatises have again applied to strike-out various parts of ASIC’s FASC. These reasons are confined to the former part of the application, the latter part having been adjourned to await the determination of the former.THE THREE GROUNDS OF THE APPLICATION The Cassimatises contend that ASIC has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting these proceedings. They have relied upon three broad grounds. First, they argue that a breach of s 180(1) of the Corporations Act cannot be established in circumstances where: Storm was at the relevant times solvent; there is no allegation that they conducted the company’s affairs in bad faith; and they conducted the company’s affairs in accordance with the wishes of Storm’s shareholders, viz themselves, as to how they should employ and risk the capital of the company. On this ground, the Cassimatises’ counsel, Mr Doyle SC, placed heavy reliance on the decision of Brereton J in ASIC v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006] NSWSC 1052 (Maxwell). The Cassimatises’ second and third grounds rely, in part, upon a construction of s 31A of the Federal Court Act which they claim dictates a two-stage test being applied to their application. Under that two-stage test, the Cassimatises contend that they are first required to establish a prima facie case that ASIC has no reasonable prospects of success in these proceedings. If they are able to do that, they contend that ASIC is then required, in the second stage, to establish that there are specific factual or evidentiary disputes that respond to their prima facie case and therefore make it necessary to conduct a trial of the proceedings. In support of these grounds, the Cassimatises have each sworn affidavits which they claim establish that no reasonable director in their position at the relevant times would have been aware of the risks to Storm that are now pleaded against them by ASIC. In the alternative, as their third ground, the Cassimatises argue that even if ASIC is able to establish that a reasonable director in their position at the relevant times would have been aware of the pleaded risks to Storm, ASIC has no reasonable prospect of establishing that such a reasonable director would have concluded that those risks were unacceptably high.ASIC’S RESPONSE TO THE THREE GROUNDS OF THE APPLICATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Flanagan accepted that an identity of interest between the shareholders and the directors of a company could modify the content of the duty under s 180(1), noting Maxwell at [103]. However, he submitted that s 180(1) imposes a minimum standard of care and diligence on directors, regardless of the views of the shareholders of the company. He submitted that this minimum standard should be recognised as a matter of public policy. Mr Flanagan submitted that, in accordance with Maxwell at [100], the wishes of the shareholders was just one among many factors to be considered when determining the content of a directors’ duty under s 180(1). He submitted that s 180(1) served the public purpose of ensuring appropriate standards of corporate managerial conduct were maintained, and that public purpose was also reflected in the Court’s power to make orders for the disqualification of directors under s 206C of the Corporations Act. Further, he submitted that s 180(1) is a vehicle for ASIC to achieve its objectives as they are outlined in s 1(2) of the ASIC Act. Finally, he submitted that the Cassimatises’ interpretation of s 180(1) was inconsistent with the principle that the shareholders of a company cannot ratify the company’s contraventions of any civil penalty provisions of the Corporations Act, such as s 180(1).Consideration Maxwell certainly confines the operation of s 180(1) of the Corporations Act in the way described by Mr Doyle in his submissions. In particular, Brereton J makes it clear that the duty imposed on directors by that section is directed to a director’s conduct in jeopardising the interests of the company concerned, and not to making directors accessorily liable, by the back door, for contraventions of the Corporations Act by the company, where accessorial liability is not otherwise provided for. In this respect, Mr Doyle is also correct in his submission that none of the provisions identified in ASIC’s FASC provides for “front door” accessorial liability in this way. However, as Brereton J also makes clear at [104], [105] and [144] of Maxwell, there remain situations where directors can be held liable under s 180(1) for embarking on, or authorising, a course of conduct that attracts the risk of exposing the company to actual or potential civil penalties or other liability under the Corporations Act. The number of occasions where Maxwell has since been applied to that effect demonstrate that these situations of director liability under s 180(1) exist: see the cases relied upon by ASIC at [165] above as well as ASIC v Warrenmang Ltd (2007) 63 ACSR 623, [2007] FCA 973; and ASIC v Citrofresh International Ltd (ACN 064 551 426) (No 2) (2010) 77 ACSR 69, [2010] FCA 27. Indeed, in Maxwell itself, Brereton J proceeded to consider (at [111]–[113]) whether, by his conduct, Mr Nahed (the director concerned in Maxwell) was in one of those situations. His Honour did that by examining at length all of the relevant circumstances, many of which were earlier identified by his Honour at [100]–[101].