FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 1) [2025] FCAFC 91
Appeal from: DHI22 v Qatar Airways QCSC (No 2) [2024] FCA 348 File number: NSD 529 of 2024 Judgment of: MORTIMER CJ, STEWART AND STELLIOS JJ Date of judgment: 24 July 2025 Catchwords: AVIATION – carriers’ liability – where applicants had boarded flight at Doha airport bound for Sydney – where aircraft had been waiting at gate for hours – where applicants allege that all women passengers were directed to leave the aircraft – where four applicants allege that they endured bodily inspections and three applicants allege invasive examinations by a “nurse” in an ambulance on airport tarmac – where applicants subsequently returned to aircraft which eventually departed Doha and reached Sydney – whether claim can be brought against carrier under Art 17 of the Montreal Convention – temporal scope of Art 17 – meaning of “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”
AVIATION – scope of exclusivity principle in Art 29 of the Montreal Convention – whether, if accident not held to be “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”, applicants are precluded from bringing common law claims in negligence against carrier – whether temporal scope of exclusivity principle is coextensive with Art 17 – whether “international carriage by air” is broader than Art 17
NEGLIGENCE – where applicants assert alternative case in negligence against carrier – where “second limb” of negligence case is that the carrier failed to take steps to protect the applicants from harm once directed off the aircraft – where primary judge held that “second limb” of negligence claim had no reasonable prospects of success – whether any basis on which duty of care could extend to the risk of harm independently of embarking or disembarking the aircraft – whether applicants have a more than fanciful prospect of being able to plead facts that disclose cause of action
TORTS – where applicants assert claims in negligence, assault, false imprisonment and battery against airport operator – where applicants seek to attribute liability for actions of “nurse” to airport operator – whether nurse employed by operator or in a relationship of “true agency” – where applicants allege that airport operator owed duty of care covering acts occurring inside ambulance on tarmac – whether scope of duty extends to the circumstances in and around the ambulance
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where carrier granted summary judgment on the basis that the accident was outside the temporal scope of Art 17 of the Montreal Convention – whether temporal scope of Art 17 suitable for summary judgment – where question involves arguable questions of fact and degree – question inappropriate for summary determination
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where primary judge granted limited leave to the applicants to re-plead and in effect struck out various parts of the claim against the airport operator – where primary judge concluded that claims alleging that operator was vicariously liable for…
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- Case
- [2025] FCAFC 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants appealed the primary judge's decisions, arguing that the claims against Qatar Airways fell within the temporal scope of Article 17 and that the exclusivity principle in Article 29 did not preclude their common law claims in negligence. The applicants also sought leave to amend their claims against MATAR, asserting that the operator was vicariously liable for the actions of the "nurse" and that the scope of its duty of care extended to events occurring in the ambulance on the tarmac.
The court found that the primary judge's summary judgment in favour of Qatar Airways was inappropriate, as the question of whether the alleged incidents occurred during the operations of embarking or disembarking involved arguable questions of fact and degree. The court also found that the scope of the exclusivity principle in Article 29 was coextensive with the temporal scope of Article 17, meaning that if the negligence claims were not within the scope of Article 17, they were not precluded by the exclusivity principle. The court held that the claims against Qatar Airways should go to trial. Regarding the claims against MATAR, the court found that the primary judge had not erred in striking out certain parts of the applicants' claims, but that the applicants should have leave to amend their claims in relation to the "nurse" and the scope of MATAR's duty of care.
The court granted leave to appeal, set aside certain orders made by the primary judge, and ordered that the applicants have liberty to apply to file a second further amended statement of claim. The court also ordered that Qatar Airways and MATAR pay the applicants' costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal from orders 1 to 10 made by the primary judge on 10 April 2024 accompanying the reasons for judgment cited as DHI22 v Qatar Airways QCSC (No 2) [2024] FCA 348 be granted (the No 2 orders).
2. The draft notice of appeal dated 24 April 2024 stand as the notice of appeal against the No 2 orders.
3. The appeal against the No 2 orders be allowed in part.
4. Orders 2 to 10 of the No 2 orders be set aside.
5. In place of the orders that are set aside, it be ordered that:
(a) The relief sought in prayers 1 and 1A of the first respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 24 May 2023 be dismissed;
(b) The following be struck out from the further amended statement of claim:
(i) the words “on the Doha airport tarmac” in [33];
(ii) the words “in circumstances where its corporate subsidiary, the Third Respondent, was the contracted manager and operator of the Doha Airport” in [34]; and
(iii) particulars (viii) to (x) in [34].
(c) The costs of the first respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 24 May 2023 be reserved.
(d) The third respondent’s interlocutory application dated 30 June 2023 be dismissed with costs.
(e) The applicants have liberty to apply, at an appropriate time, to file a second further amended statement of claim.
6. The first and third respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
[Orders 7-10 accompany the separate reasons in DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 2) [2025] FCAFC 92]
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In reply, the appellants submit that the phrase “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking” is a broader concept than the concept of “disembarkation”. They submit that the examinations by the nurse “bore a purposive, spatial and temporal relationship to the women re-entering the plane, to continue their journey.”Consideration “The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution”; they “should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried”: Spencer at [24] per French CJ and Gummow J, quoting Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd [1983] HCA 25; 154 CLR 87 at 99. Summary disposition is available where “the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable” and includes cases in which “there is unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case which might be propounded by permissible amendment”: Spencer at [22] per French CJ and Gummow J. Although the test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, “all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way”: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256 at [46], quoting Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552 at [57]. In Kotsambasis, Meagher JA (with whom Powell and Stein JJA agreed) cited the three-pronged inquiry (quoted at [52] above) and then reasoned that “location, activity and control are useful in determining whether, on the facts of any given case, an accident can be regarded as having occurred in the process of embarking or disembarking”, but that they may not be the only factors and that in the end “the answer will lie in the facts of the particular case” (at 119). This was appreciated by the primary judge: see PJ [41]. The appellants point to later United States authority than that cited in Kotsambasis that has applied a four-factor inquiry, namely King v American Airlines Inc 284 F3d 352 (2d Cir 2002) at 359. There, the passengers brought a discrimination claim against the airline for having been “bumped” from a flight on account of their race. They had boarded the vehicle that was to transport them from the terminal to the aircraft when agents of the airline confiscated their boarding passes and informed them that they were being bumped from the flight involuntarily. Judge Sotomayor, with whom Jacobs and Parker JJ agreed, identified the four factors as: “(1) the activity of the passengers at the time of the accident; (2) the restrictions, if any, on their movements; (3) the imminence of actual boarding; (4) the physical proximity of the passengers to the gate.” The Court in King cited other cases that had applied that four-factor inquiry, including:(1)Day v Trans World Airlines Inc 528 F2d 31 (2d Cir 1975) at 33-34 per Kaufman CJ, Smith and Feinberg JJ agreeing, which held that passengers who had surrendered tickets, passed through passport control, entered an area reserved exclusively for departing passengers, and assembled at the departure gate in readiness for departure fell within the scope of Art 17;(2)Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana 482 FSupp 497 (EDNY 1979) at 500 per Costantino J which ruled that a passenger injured in a bus transporting passengers from the aircraft to the terminal was injured in the course of disembarking the aircraft (later affirmed by the 2nd Circuit in Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana 633 F2d 206 (2d Cir 1980)); and(3)Buonocore v Trans World Airlines Inc 900 F2d 8 (2d Cir 1990) at 10 per Timbers J, Meskill and Altimari JJ agreeing, which held that a passenger did not fall within the scope of Art 17 in circumstances where he had obtained his boarding pass and seat assignment, but was still in a public area of the airport and had not gone through immigration control or security inspection.