DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 1)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 1) [2025] FCAFC 91

Appeal from: DHI22 v Qatar Airways QCSC (No 2) [2024] FCA 348
File number: NSD 529 of 2024
Judgment of: MORTIMER CJ, STEWART AND STELLIOS JJ
Date of judgment: 24 July 2025
Catchwords:

AVIATION – carriers’ liability – where applicants had boarded flight at Doha airport bound for Sydney – where aircraft had been waiting at gate for hours – where applicants allege that all women passengers were directed to leave the aircraft – where four applicants allege that they endured bodily inspections and three applicants allege invasive examinations by a “nurse” in an ambulance on airport tarmac – where applicants subsequently returned to aircraft which eventually departed Doha and reached Sydney – whether claim can be brought against carrier under Art 17 of the Montreal Convention – temporal scope of Art 17 – meaning of “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”

AVIATION – scope of exclusivity principle in Art 29 of the Montreal Convention – whether, if accident not held to be “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”, applicants are precluded from bringing common law claims in negligence against carrier – whether temporal scope of exclusivity principle is coextensive with Art 17 – whether “international carriage by air” is broader than Art 17

NEGLIGENCE – where applicants assert alternative case in negligence against carrier – where “second limb” of negligence case is that the carrier failed to take steps to protect the applicants from harm once directed off the aircraft – where primary judge held that “second limb” of negligence claim had no reasonable prospects of success – whether any basis on which duty of care could extend to the risk of harm independently of embarking or disembarking the aircraft – whether applicants have a more than fanciful prospect of being able to plead facts that disclose cause of action

TORTS – where applicants assert claims in negligence, assault, false imprisonment and battery against airport operator – where applicants seek to attribute liability for actions of “nurse” to airport operator – whether nurse employed by operator or in a relationship of “true agency” – where applicants allege that airport operator owed duty of care covering acts occurring inside ambulance on tarmac – whether scope of duty extends to the circumstances in and around the ambulance

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where carrier granted summary judgment on the basis that the accident was outside the temporal scope of Art 17 of the Montreal Convention – whether temporal scope of Art 17 suitable for summary judgment – where question involves arguable questions of fact and degree – question inappropriate for summary determination

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where primary judge granted limited leave to the applicants to re-plead and in effect struck out various parts of the claim against the airport operator – where primary judge concluded that claims alleging that operator was vicariously liable for…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 1) involved a group of female passengers who alleged that they were subjected to invasive body searches and examinations by a "nurse" on the tarmac of Doha airport. The passengers commenced legal action against Qatar Airways and the airport operator, MATAR, asserting claims under the Montreal Convention, negligence, assault, false imprisonment, and battery. The primary judge granted summary judgment in favour of Qatar Airways on the basis that the alleged incidents occurred outside the temporal scope of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. The judge also struck out certain parts of the applicants' claims against MATAR, finding that they had no reasonable prospects of success.

The applicants appealed the primary judge's decisions, arguing that the claims against Qatar Airways fell within the temporal scope of Article 17 and that the exclusivity principle in Article 29 did not preclude their common law claims in negligence. The applicants also sought leave to amend their claims against MATAR, asserting that the operator was vicariously liable for the actions of the "nurse" and that the scope of its duty of care extended to events occurring in the ambulance on the tarmac.

The court found that the primary judge's summary judgment in favour of Qatar Airways was inappropriate, as the question of whether the alleged incidents occurred during the operations of embarking or disembarking involved arguable questions of fact and degree. The court also found that the scope of the exclusivity principle in Article 29 was coextensive with the temporal scope of Article 17, meaning that if the negligence claims were not within the scope of Article 17, they were not precluded by the exclusivity principle. The court held that the claims against Qatar Airways should go to trial. Regarding the claims against MATAR, the court found that the primary judge had not erred in striking out certain parts of the applicants' claims, but that the applicants should have leave to amend their claims in relation to the "nurse" and the scope of MATAR's duty of care.

The court granted leave to appeal, set aside certain orders made by the primary judge, and ordered that the applicants have liberty to apply to file a second further amended statement of claim. The court also ordered that Qatar Airways and MATAR pay the applicants' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal from orders 1 to 10 made by the primary judge on 10 April 2024 accompanying the reasons for judgment cited as DHI22 v Qatar Airways QCSC (No 2) [2024] FCA 348 be granted (the No 2 orders).

2. The draft notice of appeal dated 24 April 2024 stand as the notice of appeal against the No 2 orders.

3. The appeal against the No 2 orders be allowed in part.

4. Orders 2 to 10 of the No 2 orders be set aside.

5. In place of the orders that are set aside, it be ordered that:

(a) The relief sought in prayers 1 and 1A of the first respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 24 May 2023 be dismissed;

(b) The following be struck out from the further amended statement of claim:

(i) the words “on the Doha airport tarmac” in [33];

(ii) the words “in circumstances where its corporate subsidiary, the Third Respondent, was the contracted manager and operator of the Doha Airport” in [34]; and

(iii) particulars (viii) to (x) in [34].

(c) The costs of the first respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 24 May 2023 be reserved.

(d) The third respondent’s interlocutory application dated 30 June 2023 be dismissed with costs.

(e) The applicants have liberty to apply, at an appropriate time, to file a second further amended statement of claim.

6. The first and third respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

[Orders 7-10 accompany the separate reasons in DHI22 v Qatar Airways Group QCSC (No 2) [2025] FCAFC 92]

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Those conclusions are consistent with the finding in the QCAA appeal that the principal operation on the night in question was an MOI police operation. That is because the claims against Qatar Airways and MATAR, as indeed also QCAA, for the most part concern the positive role played by the respondents and those for whom they are vicariously liable in that operation and their failures to take steps to prevent, or lessen the harm caused by, aspects of that operation.E. PLEADED FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS It is convenient to identify the material facts that are pleaded in the 2FASOC (at [10]-[21]) that are relevant to all the causes of action before proceeding to consider each of the causes of action in turn.(1)The appellants boarded the aircraft, the aircraft remained parked at the terminal for three hours awaiting take-off, it then reversed away from the terminal and approximately one minute later returned to the terminal.(2)It was announced on the aircraft that all female passengers were required to exit the aircraft with their passports, and persons in dark uniforms armed with guns entered the aircraft.(3)The appellants exited the aircraft, the fifth appellant (who is legally blind) being directed and assisted by the flight crew.(4)The appellants were directed by the flight crew and by armed and unarmed persons in dark uniforms to a departure lounge in the airport terminal.(5)The first, second and third appellants were directed by the armed and unarmed persons in dark uniforms, the fourth appellant by an unidentified female employee or agent of MATAR and the fifth appellant by a member of the Qatar Airways flight crew, into a lift and down to a lobby near the tarmac.(6)The first to fourth appellants were directed by armed persons in dark uniforms onto the tarmac and into an ambulance where they were individually examined by a woman who appeared to be a nurse whereas the fifth appellant was directed onto the tarmac by a member of the Qatar Airways flight crew and from there back to the aircraft after an unidentified male employee or agent of MATAR in civilian attire said words to the effect of “no, not her”.(7)The first appellant was required by the “nurse” take off her pants and underwear whereafter she was subjected to “gynaecological examination” by the nurse which included the penetration of her vagina whereafter she was directed back to the aircraft by armed or unarmed persons in dark uniforms.(8)The second appellant was required to take off her pants and underwear and was subjected to a “gynaecological inspection” by the nurse whereafter she was directed back to the aircraft by employees or agents of Qatar Airways and/or MATAR.(9)The third appellant was required to unzip her pants and lift up her t-shirt and was physically examined and touched by the nurse on her stomach and breasts whereafter she was directed back to the aircraft by an armed person in dark uniform.(10)The fourth appellant had her pants and underwear forcibly pulled down and was subjected to a “gynaecological inspection” by the nurse whereafter she was directed back to the aircraft by an unidentified staff member of MATAR.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I consider that the challenges to the primary judge’s summary judgment, strikeout and leave to replead decisions raise issues of complexity and cast some doubt, at least, on those decisions. There is also obvious prejudice to the appellants if leave is not granted as the primary judge’s orders bring their proceeding against Qatar Airways to an end and significantly limit the causes of action available against MATAR. For those reasons I am satisfied that leave to appeal should be granted and there should be an order that the draft notice of appeal stand as the notice of appeal.D. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS There are five grounds of appeal. They concern the following matters:Grounds 1-3 relating to Qatar Airways:(1)The proper interpretation of Art 17 of the Montreal Convention and whether the claims of the first, third and fourth appellants against Qatar Airways necessarily fall outside Art 17;(2)The proper interpretation of Art 29 of the Convention and whether Art 29 necessarily precludes the non-Convention claims of all the appellants against Qatar Airways;(3)The primary judge’s (alternative) conclusion that the “second limb” of the negligence claims by all appellants against Qatar Airways will necessarily fail (there is no appeal sought in respect of the primary judge’s conclusions on the “third limb”);Grounds 4 and 5 relating to MATAR:(4)The primary judge’s conclusion that the intentional tort and negligence claims against MATAR insofar as they involve the “nurse” who examined four of the appellants will necessarily fail; and(5)The primary judge’s conclusion on the appellants’ other negligence claims against MATAR that the pleaded breaches of the duty of care in relation to the failure to take steps to prevent the “nurse” conducting the invasive examinations will necessarily fail. For the reasons that follow, my conclusions in summary form on each of the grounds of appeal are as follows. Appeal ground 1 succeeds because it cannot be concluded with sufficient confidence at this stage of the proceeding that the “accident” relied on by the first, third and fourth appellants did not take place during the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. The result is that the Art 17 claims of the first, third and fourth appellants against Qatar Airways should go to trial. Appeal ground 2 also succeeds because the scope of application of the exclusivity principle derived from Art 29 of the Convention is coextensive with the temporal scope of Art 17, ie if the accident causing damage “took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking”, and not the potentially broader scope formulated by the primary judge as “during the international carriage of passengers by air”. The result is that if the negligence claims of the appellants against Qatar Airways are not within the temporal scope of Art 17, they are not precluded by the exclusivity principle. Whether the claims are within that scope will have to be determined at trial, as decided in relation to appeal ground 1, with the result that the negligence claims should also go to trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In reply, the appellants submit that the phrase “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking” is a broader concept than the concept of “disembarkation”. They submit that the examinations by the nurse “bore a purposive, spatial and temporal relationship to the women re-entering the plane, to continue their journey.”Consideration “The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution”; they “should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried”: Spencer at [24] per French CJ and Gummow J, quoting Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd [1983] HCA 25; 154 CLR 87 at 99. Summary disposition is available where “the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable” and includes cases in which “there is unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case which might be propounded by permissible amendment”: Spencer at [22] per French CJ and Gummow J. Although the test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, “all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way”: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256 at [46], quoting Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552 at [57]. In Kotsambasis, Meagher JA (with whom Powell and Stein JJA agreed) cited the three-pronged inquiry (quoted at [52] above) and then reasoned that “location, activity and control are useful in determining whether, on the facts of any given case, an accident can be regarded as having occurred in the process of embarking or disembarking”, but that they may not be the only factors and that in the end “the answer will lie in the facts of the particular case” (at 119). This was appreciated by the primary judge: see PJ [41]. The appellants point to later United States authority than that cited in Kotsambasis that has applied a four-factor inquiry, namely King v American Airlines Inc 284 F3d 352 (2d Cir 2002) at 359. There, the passengers brought a discrimination claim against the airline for having been “bumped” from a flight on account of their race. They had boarded the vehicle that was to transport them from the terminal to the aircraft when agents of the airline confiscated their boarding passes and informed them that they were being bumped from the flight involuntarily. Judge Sotomayor, with whom Jacobs and Parker JJ agreed, identified the four factors as: “(1) the activity of the passengers at the time of the accident; (2) the restrictions, if any, on their movements; (3) the imminence of actual boarding; (4) the physical proximity of the passengers to the gate.” The Court in King cited other cases that had applied that four-factor inquiry, including:(1)Day v Trans World Airlines Inc 528 F2d 31 (2d Cir 1975) at 33-34 per Kaufman CJ, Smith and Feinberg JJ agreeing, which held that passengers who had surrendered tickets, passed through passport control, entered an area reserved exclusively for departing passengers, and assembled at the departure gate in readiness for departure fell within the scope of Art 17;(2)Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana 482 FSupp 497 (EDNY 1979) at 500 per Costantino J which ruled that a passenger injured in a bus transporting passengers from the aircraft to the terminal was injured in the course of disembarking the aircraft (later affirmed by the 2nd Circuit in Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana 633 F2d 206 (2d Cir 1980)); and(3)Buonocore v Trans World Airlines Inc 900 F2d 8 (2d Cir 1990) at 10 per Timbers J, Meskill and Altimari JJ agreeing, which held that a passenger did not fall within the scope of Art 17 in circumstances where he had obtained his boarding pass and seat assignment, but was still in a public area of the airport and had not gone through immigration control or security inspection.