Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd (ACN 004 576 103) v Esso Australia Ltd [2000] FCA 1572

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – pleadings – statement of claim – cause of action in misleading or deceptive conduct – successive amendments – strike out – leave to replead – order allowing amendment – leave to appeal against order – whether necessary – whether order is interlocutory or final – criteria for grant of leave – determination whether repleaded claim tenable – criteria – representative proceeding – whether representative proceeding can continue on non-federal claim in accrued jurisdiction if federal claim untenable.
TRADE AND COMMERCE – misleading or deceptive conduct – monopoly supply of essential service – supply of gas – whether pleaded assumption by users of qualified continuity tenable – failure to correct or further qualify assumptions – whether misleading or deceptive – silence or non-disclosure as misleading or deceptive conduct.
NEGLIGENCE – economic loss through interruption of gas supplies to users – liability of gas producer for interruption derived from explosion and fire at gas plant – intervening chain of contracts – statutory and contractual limitations of liability – whether no reasonable cause of action – whether law is still developing.
COURTS AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM – federal jurisdiction – accrued jurisdiction – scope – federal claim – whether trivial or insubstantial part of matter – whether colourable – whether strike out of federal claim deprives court of accrued jurisdiction to decide non-federal claim – criteria for definition of accrued jurisdiction – discretion to exercise – nature of discretion – functional overlap with assessment of scope of jurisdiction – principles informing discretion.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part IVA, s 24, s 33G
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52, s 87, s 82
Fair Trading Act 1985 (Vic) s 37
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987  (Vic) s 4
Gas Industry Act 1994 (Vic)

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-679 considered
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 477 considered
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 569 considered
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-743 considered
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (No 2) (2000) 97 FCR 175 considered
Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1987) 18 FCR 212 applied
Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1993) 44 FCR 481 cited
Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1 cited
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd [No 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246 cited
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 cited
Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213 cited
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 discussed, followed
In re the Will of FB Gilbert (dec) (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 318 cited
Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1572
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd and others sought damages against Esso Australia Pty Ltd for alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and negligence, arising from a gas plant explosion in Longford, Victoria, which caused a gas supply interruption. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues before the Court involved determining whether Esso's silence regarding the safety of its gas supply constituted misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act and whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the negligence claim.

The Court, in its judgment, examined the nature of Esso's silence and whether it could be considered misleading or deceptive conduct. His Honour, Merkel J, held that the plaintiffs' claim was deficient as it failed to adequately allege that Esso's silence was the element that made their conduct misleading or deceptive. Furthermore, the Court rejected Esso's argument that the plaintiffs needed to specifically attribute their loss and damage to Esso's silence, stating that the plaintiffs' claim was based on the totality of Esso's conduct, including its silence, as misleading. The Court also dismissed Esso's contention that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction over the negligence claim.

The Court granted leave for the respondents to appeal specific parts of the judgment, but dismissed the appeals in part and allowed them in part. The appeals against the judgment given on 25 November 1999 and the orders made thereunder on 3 December 1999 were dismissed, whereas the appeals against the judgment given on 3 March 2000 were allowed in part. The Court set aside the orders permitting the plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim and refused the application for leave to amend instead. The Court further directed the parties to file written submissions regarding the costs of the motions for leave to appeal and the appeals within twenty-one days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondents and the Cross-Respondents each has leave to appeal against:

(i) the judgment of Merkel J given on 25 November 1999 and the orders made thereunder on 3 December 1999;

(ii) the judgment and orders of Merkel J given on 3 March 2000.

2. The appeals against the judgment given on 25 November 1999 and the orders made thereunder on 3 December 1999 are dismissed.

3. The appeals against the judgment given on 3 March 2000 are allowed in part.

4. The orders made on 3 March 2000 whereby the Applicants were permitted to amend the Statement of Claim in respect of their claim of misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the Respondents are set aside and in lieu thereof the application for leave to amend is refused.

5. The appeals are otherwise dismissed.

6. The parties have leave within twenty one days to file written submissions as to the costs of the motions for leave to appeal and of the appeals.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ
Loss and damage is asserted in paragraph 27 on the basis that by reason of the conduct pleaded in paragraph 26 the applicants and the group members acted on their assumptions in the way pleaded in paragraph 21 and suffered loss and damage on the occurrence of the accident and sequela pleaded in paragraphs 8 to 10. So the first applicant and business users are said to have been unable to carry on their businesses, and to have been compelled to purchase or hire machinery or equipment not dependent on gas in order to do so and/or to have suffered damage to their machinery or equipment as a consequence of the interruption of supply (paragraph 27(a)). The domestic users were compelled, in order to meet the domestic hot water, cooking and heating requirements, to purchase appliances not dependent on gas for their operation (paragraph 27(b)) and the third applicant and the stood down workers were stood down from their employment and lost wages for the period of the stand down. The Judgments In his judgment given on 25 November 1999, his Honour identified as the issues for determination by the Court whether the s 52 claim pleaded in paragraphs 16-27 of the second further amended statement of claim was to be struck out and whether the negligence claim in the proceeding should no longer be permitted to continue in the Federal Court on the ground that it was not a matter or part of a matter in respect of which the Federal Court had or should exercise jurisdiction. His Honour referred back to his judgment of 21 April 1999 in which he struck out critical paragraphs of the s 52 claim as it then stood on the basis that the only conduct of Esso relied upon as constituting a contravention of s 52 was a failure to correct or contradict assumptions held by gas users. That is to say the conduct of Esso relied upon was silence. His Honour identified, by reference to the authorities, first the situation where silence is an element of conduct which, in all the circumstances of a case, renders that conduct misleading or deceptive and a second situation where silence alone constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct in which event, it was said, an element of intent is necessary to bring it within the extended definition of conduct in s 4(2) of the Trade Practices Act. In the judgment of 21 April 1999 his Honour held that the applicants’ pleading of misleading or deceptive conduct was deficient. It fell outside the two situations identified as it relied upon the mere silence of the respondents as constituting their contravening conduct without any allegation either that the silence was the element that resulted in their conduct being misleading or deceptive or that it was intentional or reckless. In reasons for judgment given on 4 May 1999 his Honour rejected an attack on the section 52 cause of action based in part upon the contention that the pleading failed to assert material facts demonstrating the necessary causal link between misleading conduct and loss and damage. His Honour also rejected an alternative argument put by Esso that the pleading of loss and damage must be alleged to have been caused by the silence of Esso as the conduct in question rather than the operation of the plant, supply and silence as the conduct in question. That submission however misconceived the basis upon which the applicants were, in his Honour’s view, putting their claim. He said: “The applicants have not pleaded that silence alone constituted the misleading conduct giving rise to their loss. Rather, they have pleaded that the operation of the Longford plant and the supply of gas as a monopoly supplier together with the “silence” is the misleading conduct upon which they relied to order their affairs which led to their reliance on continuity of supply of gas and to the loss they allege they have suffered. The fact that it is the silence that is the element that resulted in the conduct being misleading does not alter the claim that it is the totality of the conduct, rather than the silence alone, that is being relied upon as constituting the breach of s 52.” ([1999] FCA 569 at par 4)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT, FRENCH AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

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