BRENNAN CJ, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND KIRBY JJ
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v ROBERT JOHN MEWETT(Matter No S 33 of 1996); COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v MICHAEL JOHN ROCK (Matter No S 34 of 1996); COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v MARK JOHN BRANDON (Matter No S 35 of 1996) Constitutional law - Limitation of Actions - Private international law; (1997) 191 CLR 471, (1997) 146 ALR 299
Constitutional law—Nature and source of liability of the Commonwealth in contract and tort—Crown immunity—Effect of Ch III of Constitution. Constitutional law—Acquisition of property on just terms—Action by injured Commonwealth employees for common law damages—Statutory removal of right of action—Whether acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms—Effect of limitation statutes. Limitation of Actions—Alleged expiry of limitation period—Whether statute-barred cause of action property—Provision for extensions of limitation periods—Distinction between extinguishment of right and barring of remedy. Private international law—Applicable law—Action against Commonwealth—Injuries suffered in Victorian waters and on high seas—Proceedings commenced in Sydney Registry of High Court and remitted to Federal Court—Procedural and substantive law to be applied—"Picking up" of State limitation statutes. Constitution of the Commonwealth, ss 51(xxxi), 75, 78. Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s 44(1). Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 44(2A), 56, 64, 79, 80. Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 14(1), 58(2), 60F, 60G, 60I, 60K, 61, 63, 78. Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 (NSW), s 5. Limitation of Actions Act1958 (Vic), s 5(1A).
Orders
Order: Appeals dismissed with costs.
Decision
BRENNAN CJ.
The examination of the cases and the literature undertaken by Gummow and Kirby JJ lead their Honours to the statement of several propositions that result in the dismissal of these appeals. I am in agreement with those propositions and with the result but I would add some brief observations stimulated by a reading of their Honours' reasons.
Where a State statute of limitations bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right of action, the prescribed limitations apply to any suit to which the Commonwealth is a party in a court exercising its federal jurisdiction in that State either by operation of s 64 or by operation of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). As at present advised, I would not ascribe any operation to s 64 in respect of a State statute of limitations which extinguishes the right when it bars the remedy. The reasons for doubting whether s 64 has any operation in that context can be gleaned from my judgment in The Commonwealth v Evans Deakin Industries Ltd[1] but the question is of no present significance. Once it is understood that the acquisition of property which s 44 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Comcare Act") purported to effect was the extinguishment of the causes of action which existed when that provision came into effect on…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Commonwealth v Mewett [1997] HCA 29
Case
[1997] HCA 29
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered appeals by the Commonwealth of Australia against decisions of the Federal Court concerning claims for damages brought by injured employees. The dispute centred on whether the Commonwealth was liable for common law damages for injuries sustained by its employees, particularly in circumstances where statutory compensation schemes might otherwise apply, and whether such claims were barred by limitation periods.
The central legal issues before the High Court were: first, the extent to which the Commonwealth, as the Crown, was subject to suit in contract and tort, and whether this liability was affected by Chapter III of the Constitution; second, whether the statutory removal of a right of action for common law damages constituted an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms under section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution; and third, the application of limitation statutes, including whether a statute-barred cause of action constituted "property" and the principles governing the choice of applicable law for limitation periods in cases involving injuries sustained in different jurisdictions.
The Court reasoned that the historical immunity of the Crown in tort had been abrogated by statute and by implication from the Constitution, particularly sections 75 and 78, which confer original jurisdiction on the High Court in matters involving the Commonwealth. It was held that section 44(1) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) did not, in the circumstances, effect an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms, as it did not extinguish a cause of action but rather removed a remedy. The Court also addressed the application of State limitation statutes, confirming that under sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), the procedural law of the State where the court is held, including its limitation statutes, would generally apply. The Court distinguished between the extinguishment of a right and the barring of a remedy, noting that the latter does not necessarily involve an acquisition of property.