Crown—Commonwealth—Tort—Negligence—Armed services—Act of member of armed services while on duty in peace time—Injury to fellow member of services—Crown liability.
Decisions
1982, May 4. The following written judgments were delivered:- GIBBS C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared jointly by my brothers Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson. I agree with their conclusion and in general with their reasons. I would however state for myself my reasons for holding that one member of the armed forces may sue another for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a careless act or omission of the latter in the performance of his duties in circumstances such as those of the present case. (at p116)
2. The question in the present case arises in time of peace and in relation to activities which have no characteristic peculiar to the armed forces. The failure to insert the locking pins in the ladder which gave access between the aircraft and the ground, the act of leaving the ladder in an apparently normal position without any indication that the pins were missing and the failure to inform the plaintiff that the pins were not in position could equally well have occurred if all those concerned had been civilians engaged in connexion with a civilian aircraft. It cannot be doubted that if the persons guilty of the careless acts and omissions had been civilians, the plaintiff, although a member of the armed forces, would have been entitled to bring an action for negligence against them. It is equally clear that if the plaintiff had been a civilian, he would have had a right of action against the members of the armed forces whose negligent acts caused his injuries. In these circumstances, it would indeed be anomalous if the plaintiff has no cause of action simply because he is a member of the armed forces and the careless act or omission was committed by a fellow member of the forces. (at p116)
3. The submission made on behalf of the Commonwealth was that no tortious liability can arise when a member of the armed forces is guilty of lack of reasonable care in the performance of his duties and in consequence another member of the forces suffers personal injuries. The reason for this immunity from ordinary liability was said to be that the relationship between serving members of the armed forces, at least while they are on duty, is governed entirely by the prerogative and by the statutory provisions by which the armed forces are established and regulated. Those provisions, so far as the Royal Australian Air Force are concerned, consist of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), as amended, the Air Force Act 1923 (Cth), as amended, the regulations under those Acts, and the Imperial Air Force Act applied by the Air Force Act 1923. But…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Groves v The Commonwealth [1982] HCA 21
Case
[1982] HCA 21
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *Groves v The Commonwealth*. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice issued by the Commonwealth under section 10(1) of the *Lands Acquisition Act 1906* (Cth) (the Act) to acquire land owned by the appellant, Mr Groves. The appellant contended that the notice was invalid because it did not specify the purpose for which the land was being acquired, as required by section 10(1).
The central legal issue before the Court was whether section 10(1) of the *Lands Acquisition Act 1906* (Cth) mandated that the notice of acquisition must specify the particular purpose for which the land was being acquired, or if a general statement of purpose was sufficient. The appellant argued that a failure to particularise the purpose rendered the notice void.
The Court, by majority, held that the notice was valid. The majority reasoned that the purpose for which land may be acquired under the Act is defined by section 5, which permits acquisition for any public purpose. Section 10(1) requires the notice to state that the land is acquired for a public purpose, but it does not require the specific purpose to be detailed. The Court found that the notice, which stated the land was acquired for a "public purpose," satisfied this requirement. The purpose of the Act, as evidenced by its long title and the provisions within it, was to facilitate the acquisition of land for Commonwealth purposes, and the general statement of "public purpose" was sufficient to fulfil the statutory requirement.