FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] FCAFC 41
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 41
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court held that the primary judge had erred in applying the Lange test at the wrong level. The primary judge had set aside the termination of the respondent's commission, finding that his political comments were protected by the implied freedom of political communication. However, the Court found that the primary judge had incorrectly applied the Lange test, which is generally directed at the exercise of legislative power, rather than the individual exercise of statutory power. The Court emphasised that the implied freedom of political communication could be a relevant consideration in the exercise of a statutory power, but this had to be done in accordance with the latest expression of the nature and scope of the freedom in McCloy. The Court concluded that the primary judge's approach was erroneous, and the issue did not arise because the respondent had not articulated a clearly articulated ground of judicial review commensurate with the dicta in Wotton.
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and ordered that the application for judicial review be dismissed, with costs. The Court's decision hinged on the proper application of the Lange test and the recognition that the implied freedom of political communication could be a relevant consideration in the exercise of statutory power, provided it was applied correctly.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed, with costs.
2. Set aside the orders of the Court made on 4 December 2015 and 18 December 2015, and in lieu thereof order that the application for judicial review be dismissed, with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
We accept that is the correct approach. Despite some references to executive power, the test as formulated since Lange is generally directed at the exercise of legislative power: see most recently, McCloy at [2] and [30]. That is sufficient to dispose of the constitutional issues on this appeal.The implied freedom as a relevant consideration in the individual exercise of a statutory power conditioned by the freedom We deal with this issue in this section of our reasons because of the overlap with what might be called the “purely” constitutional question. However, conceptually, this is a judicial review issue. There are dicta to the effect that the freedom may be seen as a relevant consideration, or as conditioning an individual exercise of statutory power in a way that requires a decision-maker to consider the effect of a particular exercise of power on the freedom. There are several passages in Wotton to this effect, and that case is worth examining because it (like the present proceeding) centred on a challenge to an individual exercise of a discretionary power, in the setting of parole conditions, although there was no administrative law challenge in Wotton. At [88] in Wotton, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) described the existence of the implied freedom as a relevant consideration in the exercise of a discretionary power under statute:Section 132 does not prevent a prisoner communicating with others on matters relating to government and politics. It is directed to the method by which the media and others obtain information or opinions from a prisoner. It does not prohibit interviews or the taking of statements. The limitation it effects is to require approval from the chief executive, whose consideration of the matter must be informed by the objects of the Corrective Services Act and the existence of the freedom, and whose refusal is subject to judicial review.(Emphasis added.) At [21], the plurality made a similar point, although not as obviously by reference to the freedom as a consideration:As remarked earlier in these reasons, with particular reference to what was said by Brennan J in Miller, while the exercise of legislative power may involve the conferral of authority upon an administrative body such as the Parole Board, the conferral by statute of a power or discretion upon such a body will be constrained by the constitutional restrictions upon the legislative power, with the result that in this particular respect the administrative body must not act ultra vires.(Emphasis added.) The reference to Brennan J in Miller is a reference to the following passage of his Honour’s reasons in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 60; 161 CLR 556 at 613-614 (speaking of the guarantee in s 92 of the Constitution):Of necessity, the area of the discretion must be large: the nature of the subject to be regulated requires that the discretion be wide. But it is not so wide that considerations foreign to the purpose for which the discretion is conferred can be taken into account. Nor can the discretion be exercised to discriminate against interstate trade, commerce and intercourse. That is because a discretion must be exercised by the repository of a power in accordance with any applicable law, including s. 92, and, in the absence of a contrary indication, ‘wide general words conferring executive and administrative powers should be read as subject to s. 92’: per Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ in Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales. In Inglis v Moore [No 2] St. John J. and I stated the relevant rule of construction: ... where a discretion, though granted in general terms, can lawfully be exercised only if certain limits are observed, the grant of the discretionary power is construed as confining the exercise of the discretion within those limits. If the exercise of the discretion so qualified lies within the constitutional power and is judicially examinable, the provision conferring the discretion is valid.(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)