Chief of Defence Force v Gaynor

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] FCAFC 41

Appeal from: Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) [2015] FCA 1370; 237 FCR 188
File number: NSD 1685 of 2015
Judges: PERRAM, MORTIMER AND GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 8 March 2017
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – implied freedom of political communication – termination of respondent’s commission in Australian Defence Force – regulation 85 of the Defence Force (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) – primary judge set aside termination because respondent’s political comments protected by implied freedom of political communication – appeal allowed – primary judge erred in applying Lange test at wrong level – McCloy v State of New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 857 applied

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - s 116 of the Constitution – s 116 not engaged

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – primary judge found no administrative grounds made out – respondent contended primary judge erred in applying ss 5(1)(b), (f), (h), 5(2)(a), (b), (c) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) – primary judge correct to reject administrative law challenges

Legislation:

Constitution, ss 61, 68, 116

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 5(1), (2), 16)

Defence Act 1903 (Cth), ss 8, 9(1), (2), (5), 9A(1), (2), 16, 30, 31, 50(1)(b) 124

Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), ss 3, 27

Defence Legislation Amendment (First Principles) Act 2015 (Cth)

Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth), regs 6(1)(g), 7(2), (3), 85(1), (1A), (2), (4), (5), (6), 119

Defence Regulations 2016 (Cth), reg 24

Cases cited:

AMS v AIF [1999] HCA 26; 199 CLR 160

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; 170 CLR 1

Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation [2013] HCA 3; 249 CLR 1

Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45; 177 CLR 106

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353

Bateson v Chief of Army [2012] ADFDAT 3; 263 FLR 409

Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) [1983] HCA 40; 154 CLR 120

Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39; 220 CLR 1

Commonwealth v Quince [1944] HCA 1; 68 CLR 227

Corporation of the City ofEnfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; 199 CLR 135

Cunliffe v Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; 182 CLR 272

Graham v Deputy Chief of Air Force [2004] FCA 1377

Groves v Commonwealth [1982] HCA 21; 150 CLR 113

Haskins v Commonwealth [2011] HCA 28; 244 CLR 22

Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506

King v Chief of Army [2012] ADFDAT 4; (2012) 269 FLR 452

Kruger v Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; 190 CLR 1

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; 189 CLR 520

Levy v Victoria [1997] HCA 31; 189 CLR 579

McCloy v State of New South Wales [2015] HCA 34; 89 ALJR 857

McGinty v Western Australia

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Chief of Defence Force v Gaynor, the High Court considered the constitutionality of the termination of a military officer's commission in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) due to his political comments. The central issue was whether these comments were protected by the implied freedom of political communication under the Australian Constitution. The Court was also required to determine whether the termination of the officer's commission was an invalid exercise of power under the Defence Force (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth). Additionally, the Court examined whether the termination was an invalid exercise of power under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and if section 116 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion, was engaged.

The High Court held that the primary judge had erred in applying the Lange test at the wrong level. The primary judge had set aside the termination of the respondent's commission, finding that his political comments were protected by the implied freedom of political communication. However, the Court found that the primary judge had incorrectly applied the Lange test, which is generally directed at the exercise of legislative power, rather than the individual exercise of statutory power. The Court emphasised that the implied freedom of political communication could be a relevant consideration in the exercise of a statutory power, but this had to be done in accordance with the latest expression of the nature and scope of the freedom in McCloy. The Court concluded that the primary judge's approach was erroneous, and the issue did not arise because the respondent had not articulated a clearly articulated ground of judicial review commensurate with the dicta in Wotton.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and ordered that the application for judicial review be dismissed, with costs. The Court's decision hinged on the proper application of the Lange test and the recognition that the implied freedom of political communication could be a relevant consideration in the exercise of statutory power, provided it was applied correctly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed, with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Court made on 4 December 2015 and 18 December 2015, and in lieu thereof order that the application for judicial review be dismissed, with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal against the primary judge’s orders should be allowed. The notice of contention should be dismissed.BACKGROUND The factual background to the matter was described in detail in the primary decision and will only be summarised in short compass here. The appellant’s written submissions, which we accept, summarised how the ADF had, over recent years, engaged in a “process of cultural change towards greater diversity and gender equality”. These changes were manifested, for example, in documents such as a Defence Instruction (General) issued in October 2001, entitled “Equity and Diversity in the Australian Defence Force”. That instruction was directed at Commanders, who were to take action such as ensuring “that all personnel and prospective personnel are valued and treated fairly, on individual merit and with respect and dignity” (at [18(c)]) and preventing and/or eliminating “unacceptable behaviour” (at [18(e)]). Commanders were instructed to demonstrate through their own behaviour “commitment to the principles of equity and diversity” (at [18(l)]). Other public manifestations of the ADF’s attempts to change its culture were decisions such as granting permission to ADF members to march in uniform in the 2013 Sydney Mardi Gras, in July 2012 publishing strategic documents directed towards moving women into combat roles, and a number of publications, including from the office of the appellant, about the need to encourage and respect diversity within Australia’s armed forces. The issues on which all these policies and directives were focused included the role and treatment of women in the ADF, and the reported intolerance and treatment of ADF members with a sexual orientation that was not heterosexual, who were transgender, or who held non-Christian religious beliefs. It is also fair to say, in our opinion, that the ADF was attempting to encourage tolerance and acceptance of diversity at a broader level, both within the ADF and in terms of the publicly expressed attitudes and conduct of ADF members. Part of the enforcement of discipline within the command structure (a feature of the ADF) is the enactment of instructions and policies concerning public commentary by ADF members, including the way ADF members might use social media. The relevant instructions and policies were made pursuant to s 9A(2) of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), which we reproduce at [35] below. In particular, there was an instruction entitled “Use of social media by Defence Personnel”, which was issued on 16 January 2013. This policy (which relevantly extended to Army Reserve members not on duty), among other things, instructed ADF members at [19] that:…Defence personnel must not post material that is offensive towards any group or person based on any personal traits, attributes, beliefs or practices that exploit, objectify or are derogatory of gender, ethnicity or religion. Such behaviour involving social media may amount to conduct that could constitute an offence against provisions of the DFDA, the Public Service Act 1999 or amount to a breach of the APS Code of Conduct.(Emphasis in original.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the purposes of the present appeal that question, interesting as it is, also need not be determined. Even if it is legitimate for administrative law purposes to descend to examine a particular exercise of power by reference to the implied freedom of political communication, the primary judge was not asked to do this by the grounds of review put forward by the respondent on the administrative law side of the challenge. To do so would have required a discussion of whether the appellant had taken into account the implied freedom in the way he exercised his discretion: see Wotton at [21] and [88], and Miller at 613-614 per Brennan J. That is not because the respondent had a right to express himself on political matters (cf the United States First Amendment cases and the discussions of this in McCloy by the plurality at [40]-[42] and by Gageler J at [119]-120]), but rather because an exercise of power which had the effect of unduly, or disproportionately, impairing the freedom of the community (and therefore, its individual members) to give and receive information and opinions on political matters would be an exercise of power beyond the authority conferred by reg 85. Describing the implied freedom as a relevant consideration (as Kiefel J did in Wotton) is one way of characterising the nature of the excess of power, although not the only way.Conclusion on error by the primary judge Given our conclusions it is unnecessary to consider the appellant’s alternative submission (in Ground 3) that even if the primary judge was correct to examine the issue of the exercise of the power in reg 85(1)(d) at the “individual level”, his Honour erred in how he did so. On the basis of the latest expression of the nature and the scope of the freedom in McCloy as a limit on legislative power where the source of power is statutory, and in the absence of a clearly articulated ground of judicial review by the respondent commensurate with the dicta in Wotton, the issue does not arise. Having identified error in the approach of the primary judge, it is necessary for this Court to determine for itself whether reg 85 was invalid because it burdened the implied freedom (the first limb of Lange) and did so in a way which did not meet the tests for the second limb of Lange, as refined and developed in Coleman and McCloy. Current approach to the freedom of political communication All judgments in McCloy confirmed that in order to determine whether an impugned law infringes the implied freedom, the approach set out in Lange should be applied. We respectfully agree with the summary of the steps to be undertaken, given by Gageler J in McCloy at [125]-[132], which we do not understand to depart from anything in the plurality’s summary at [2], unlike later passages of his Honour’s reasons (for example at [140]-[155]). Of the first limb of the Lange test, his Honour said (at [126]-[127]):The first step in the Lange analysis is to inquire whether, and if so how, the law effectively burdens political communication in its legal or practical operation. “The expression ‘effectively burden’”, as Hayne J pointed out in Monis v The Queen and Keane J reiterated in Unions NSW, “means nothing more complicated than that the effect of the law is to prohibit, or put some limitation on, the making or the content of political communications”.The simplicity of the inquiry should not detract from its importance. The oral argument in this case seemed at times to proceed on the assumption that the first step is perfunctory – no more than a box to be ticked before moving to the second step. If that were the case, the Lange analysis would be detached from the function that it was formulated to perform. The first step is critical. If a law does not operate to impose a meaningful restriction on political communication, the supervisory role of the courts is not engaged. If the law does operate to impose a meaningful restriction on political communication, the supervisory role of the courts is engaged to consider the justification for that restriction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We accept that is the correct approach. Despite some references to executive power, the test as formulated since Lange is generally directed at the exercise of legislative power: see most recently, McCloy at [2] and [30]. That is sufficient to dispose of the constitutional issues on this appeal.The implied freedom as a relevant consideration in the individual exercise of a statutory power conditioned by the freedom We deal with this issue in this section of our reasons because of the overlap with what might be called the “purely” constitutional question. However, conceptually, this is a judicial review issue. There are dicta to the effect that the freedom may be seen as a relevant consideration, or as conditioning an individual exercise of statutory power in a way that requires a decision-maker to consider the effect of a particular exercise of power on the freedom. There are several passages in Wotton to this effect, and that case is worth examining because it (like the present proceeding) centred on a challenge to an individual exercise of a discretionary power, in the setting of parole conditions, although there was no administrative law challenge in Wotton. At [88] in Wotton, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) described the existence of the implied freedom as a relevant consideration in the exercise of a discretionary power under statute:Section 132 does not prevent a prisoner communicating with others on matters relating to government and politics. It is directed to the method by which the media and others obtain information or opinions from a prisoner. It does not prohibit interviews or the taking of statements. The limitation it effects is to require approval from the chief executive, whose consideration of the matter must be informed by the objects of the Corrective Services Act and the existence of the freedom, and whose refusal is subject to judicial review.(Emphasis added.) At [21], the plurality made a similar point, although not as obviously by reference to the freedom as a consideration:As remarked earlier in these reasons, with particular reference to what was said by Brennan J in Miller, while the exercise of legislative power may involve the conferral of authority upon an administrative body such as the Parole Board, the conferral by statute of a power or discretion upon such a body will be constrained by the constitutional restrictions upon the legislative power, with the result that in this particular respect the administrative body must not act ultra vires.(Emphasis added.) The reference to Brennan J in Miller is a reference to the following passage of his Honour’s reasons in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 60; 161 CLR 556 at 613-614 (speaking of the guarantee in s 92 of the Constitution):Of necessity, the area of the discretion must be large: the nature of the subject to be regulated requires that the discretion be wide. But it is not so wide that considerations foreign to the purpose for which the discretion is conferred can be taken into account. Nor can the discretion be exercised to discriminate against interstate trade, commerce and intercourse. That is because a discretion must be exercised by the repository of a power in accordance with any applicable law, including s. 92, and, in the absence of a contrary indication, ‘wide general words conferring executive and administrative powers should be read as subject to s. 92’: per Dixon, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ in Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v New South Wales. In Inglis v Moore [No 2] St. John J. and I stated the relevant rule of construction: ... where a discretion, though granted in general terms, can lawfully be exercised only if certain limits are observed, the grant of the discretionary power is construed as confining the exercise of the discretion within those limits. If the exercise of the discretion so qualified lies within the constitutional power and is judicially examinable, the provision conferring the discretion is valid.(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)