FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ
LEX PATRICK WOTTON PLAINTIFF
AND
STATE OF QUEENSLAND & ANOR DEFENDANTS
Wotton v Queensland [2012] HCA 2 29 February 2012 S314/2010
ORDER
Order that the questions stated in the Further Amended Special Case filed on 15 August 2011 be answered as follows:
Question 1:(a) Is s 132(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act2006 (Q) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the freedom of communication of government and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?
(b)Is s 132(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act2006 (Q) to be construed so as not to apply to a prisoner on parole?
Answer:Section 132(1)(a) must be read together with s 132(2)(d) and, so read, in its application to prisoners on parole it is not invalid for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication about government and political matters.
Questions 2 and 3 should be answered together.
Question 2:Is s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) invalid to the extent it authorizes the imposition of the conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order?
Question 3:If s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) is construed so that the power it confers must be exercised in
conformity with the freedom of communication with the government and political matters provided for under the Commonwealth Constitution, are conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order invalid because they impermissibly burden that freedom?
Answer:Section 200(2), in its application to prisoners on parole, is not invalid for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication about government and political matters and the question of the validity of conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order does not arise in this proceeding.
Question 4:Who should pay the costs of the special case?
Answer:Each party should bear its own costs.
Representation
R Merkel QC with A D Pound and K L Walker for the plaintiff (instructed by Levitt Robinson Solicitors)
W Sofronoff QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland with G J D del Villar and A D Scott for the first defendant (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld))
Submitting appearance for the second defendant
Interveners
S J Gageler SC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with C L Lenehan intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with K M Richardson intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
S G E McLeish SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria with A M Dinelli intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Wotton v Queensland
Constitutional law (Cth) – Operation and effect of Constitution – Interpretation – Implied freedom of political communication about government or political matters – System…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Wotton v Queensland [2012] HCA 2
Case
[2012] HCA 2
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the validity of certain provisions of the *Corrective Services Act 2006* (Qld) in relation to the implied freedom of political communication. The case involved a prisoner, Mr Wotton, who challenged the constitutional validity of sections 132(1)(a) and 200(2) of the Act, arguing they impermissibly burdened his freedom to communicate about government and political matters. The Court was asked to determine whether these provisions, and specific conditions imposed on Mr Wotton's parole order, were invalid under the Commonwealth Constitution.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether section 132(1)(a) of the *Corrective Services Act 2006* (Qld) impermissibly burdened the implied freedom of political communication, and if so, whether it should be construed to exclude prisoners on parole. Additionally, the Court had to consider whether section 200(2) of the Act, which authorised the imposition of conditions on parole orders, was invalid to the extent it permitted conditions that impermissibly burdened this freedom, and whether specific conditions imposed on Mr Wotton's parole order were invalid on this ground. The Court also had to determine the relationship between the *Judicial Review Act 1991* (Qld) and the determination of constitutional validity.
The High Court reasoned that section 132(1)(a) of the *Corrective Services Act 2006* (Qld), when read in conjunction with section 132(2)(d), did not impermissibly burden the freedom of communication for prisoners on parole. The Court found that the impugned provisions were reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner compatible with the maintenance of representative and responsible government. Regarding section 200(2), the Court determined that it was not invalid in its application to prisoners on parole for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication, and consequently, the question of the validity of the specific parole conditions did not arise for determination in the proceeding.
The High Court ordered that section 132(1)(a) of the *Corrective Services Act 2006* (Qld), when read with section 132(2)(d), is not invalid for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication about government and political matters in its application to prisoners on parole. The Court further ordered that section 200(2) of the Act, in its application to prisoners on parole, is not invalid for impermissibly burdening that freedom, and the question of the validity of the specific parole conditions did not arise. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the special case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Order that the questions stated in the Further Amended Special Case filed on 15 August 2011 be answered as follows:
Question 1:(a) Is s 132(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) invalid because it impermissibly burdens the freedom of communication of government and political matters, contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution?
(b) Is s 132(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) to be construed so as not to apply to a prisoner on parole?
Answer: Section 132(1)(a) must be read together with s 132(2)(d) and, so read, in its application to prisoners on parole it is not invalid for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication about government and political matters.
Questions 2 and 3 should be answered together.
Question 2:Is s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) invalid to the extent it authorizes the imposition of the conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order?
Question 3:If s 200(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Q) is construed so that the power it confers must be exercised in
conformity with the freedom of communication with the government and political matters provided for under the Commonwealth Constitution, are conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order invalid because they impermissibly burden that freedom?
Answer: Section 200(2), in its application to prisoners on parole, is not invalid for impermissibly burdening the freedom of communication about government and political matters and the question of the validity of conditions (t) and (v) of the plaintiff's Parole Order does not arise in this proceeding.
Question 4:Who should pay the costs of the special case?
Answer: Each party should bear its own costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ
HEYDON J
(dissent)
KIEFEL J
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ,
KIEFEL J