Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 960

File number: NSD 1148 of 2022
Judgment of: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 23 August 2024
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – gender identity discrimination – s 5B and 22 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA) – where transgender woman excluded from a woman’s only social media application – construction of “sex” in s 5 of the SDA – construction of s 5B of the SDA – construction of s 7D (special measures exception) of the SDA – whether respondents had engaged in direct or indirect gender identity discrimination – where applicant removed on visual inspection of a photograph submitted to the social media app in question – whether evidence established awareness of applicant’s gender identity on the part of the respondents – whether respondents effected a policy of excluding transgender women – HELD: respondents had engaged in indirect gender identity discrimination against the applicant

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – whether s 22, to the extent it prohibits discrimination on the ground of gender identity, not supported by head of Commonwealth legislative power – external affairs power – corporations power – operation of s 9 on construction of provisions of the SDA – Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) (CEDAW) – Art 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) – meaning of discrimination against women under CEDAW – whether gender identity is a status for the purposes of Art 26 of the ICCPR – whether Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd is a trading corporation – whether CEDAW and/or Art 26 of the ICCPR support the prohibition of gender identity discrimination in s 22 – HELD: s 22, to the extent that it prohibits discrimination on the ground of gender identity, supported by the external affairs power as an enactment of Art 26 of the ICCPR – s 22, to the extent that it prohibits discrimination on the ground of gender identity, also supported by the corporations power in application to the respondents as Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd is a trading corporation and the second respondent its officer

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – whether s 24(4) of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) invalid for inconsistency with the SDA under s 109 of the Constitution – HELD: legislation not inconsistent

DAMAGES – limitation of s 46PO(3) on Court’s jurisdiction to award remedies under s 46PO(4) of the Australian Human Rights Act 1986 (Cth) – availability of aggravated damages for subsequent conduct in discrimination claims – HELD: declarations made and compensation awarded under s 46PO(4) Australian Human Rights Act 1986 (Cth)  

Legislation:

Constitution ss 51(xx), (xxix), 109, 122

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15 (rep), 11B(1)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46P, 46PH(1B)(b), 46PO(1), (3), (4), 46PV

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 41, 76, 79, 161(1)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 960
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) involves a transgender woman, Roxanne Tickle, who alleges gender identity discrimination by the respondents, Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd and its director, Ms Grover. Ms Tickle claims she was excluded from a social media application marketed as a women-only space. The court was tasked with interpreting the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA) to determine whether the respondents engaged in direct or indirect gender identity discrimination, and to assess the constitutional validity of the SDA in prohibiting such discrimination. Additionally, the court examined whether Queensland's Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) was inconsistent with the SDA.

The primary legal issues were the construction of "sex" under s 5 of the SDA, the applicability of s 5B concerning gender identity discrimination, and the special measures exception under s 7D of the SDA. The court also had to decide if the prohibition of gender identity discrimination in s 22 of the SDA was supported by the Commonwealth's legislative powers under the Constitution, specifically the external affairs power and the corporations power. Furthermore, the court examined whether s 24 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) was inconsistent with the SDA under s 109 of the Constitution.

The court found that the respondents had engaged in indirect gender identity discrimination against Ms Tickle. The decision hinged on the interpretation of "sex" in the SDA, concluding that gender identity was included within its scope. The court also determined that s 22 of the SDA, prohibiting discrimination on the ground of gender identity, was supported by both the external affairs power and the corporations power. It found that the Queensland legislation was not inconsistent with the SDA. Regarding remedies, the court awarded declarations and compensation to Ms Tickle but declined to order reinstatement to the Giggle App due to its closure. The court also ordered the respondents to pay costs, capped at $50,000 for the constitutional validity and statutory construction issues.

This decision underscores the evolving interpretation of gender identity within anti-discrimination laws and the importance of legislative powers in enforcing such protections. The findings and remedies reflect a commitment to addressing gender identity discrimination while navigating complex legal frameworks.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties confer and within 7 days provide to the chambers of Justice Bromwich an agreed draft, or competing drafts, of a declaration of contravention by way of indirect gender discrimination.

2. The first and second respondents pay to the applicant a sum of $10,000 within 60 days.

3. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs.

4. The component of the costs awarded by order 3 which relate to the constitutional validity and statutory construction issues, be capped at $50,000, being the cap imposed in respect of those issues by order 3 made on 1 June 2023, for the reasons given in Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 553.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[1]

PART 2: OVERVIEW OF THE CASE

[13]

(a) Leave to the Sex Discrimination Commissioner to appear amicus curiae

[13]

(b) Overview of the evidence

[16]

(c) Key provisions of the SDA

[31]

(d) Pleadings

[41]

PART 3: INTERPREATION OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE SDA

[65]

(a) History of amendments to the SDA

[65]

(b) Construction of gender identity and s 5B

[74]

(c) The special measures exception to discrimination

[81]

PART 4: EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS

[87]

(a) Ms Tickle

[87]

(b) Ms Grover

[90]

(c) Giggle and the Giggle App

[95]

(d) The removal of Ms Tickle from the Giggle App

[108]

(i) Background

[108]

(ii) Ms Tickle’s account creation and removal

[110]

(ii) Conclusions on gender identity discrimination

[129]

(e) Other evidence relied upon by the respondents

[137]

(i) Expert evidence

[138]

(ii) Lay evidence

[148]

PART 5: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

[149]

(a) Is s 22 beyond the scope of Commonwealth legislative power to the extent it prohibits discrimination on the ground of gender identity?

[150]

(i) The external affairs power

[157]

CEDAW

[162]

Art 26 of the ICCPR

[181]

(ii) The trading corporations power

[189]

(b) Is s 24 of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) (Qld BDM Registration Act) invalid by reason of inconsistency with the SDA?

[197]

PART 6: REMEDIES

[205]

(a) Declaration

[214]

(b) General damages

[216]

(i) Exacerbation of a pre-existing psychiatric condition

[220]

(ii) Injured feelings

[223]

(iii) Conclusions as to general damages

[228]

(c) Aggravated damages

[232]

(i) Authority and principles

[232]

(ii) Refusal to attend AHRC conciliation proceedings

[252]

(iii) Refusal to reinstate Ms Tickle’s access to the Giggle App

[254]

(iv) Subsequent comments by Ms Grover and her supporters

[255]

Messages and posts by supporters

[256]

Posts by Ms Grover

[261]

(v) Conduct at trial

[272]

(vi) Conclusion as to aggravated damages

[277]

(d) An apology

[278]

(e) Reinstatement

[282]

PART 7: CONCLUSION

[283]

Background

Background to the litigation

Roxanne Tickle, who was assigned male at birth but identifies as a transgender woman, downloaded the Giggle App, a social media application marketed as a women-only platform, in February 2021. The registration process for the app included uploading a photograph, which was assessed by an artificial intelligence (AI) system designed to distinguish between male and female facial appearances. Despite the AI software being set to err on the side of inclusion to prevent exclusion of individuals who identified as women, Ms Tickle was initially granted access to the app. Over the following months, she used the app to read content posted by other users. However, in September or early October 2021, Ms Tickle found that her access to the app had been limited, preventing her from posting, commenting, or reading comments on other users' posts. Attempts to purchase premium features resulted in a "User Blocked" message, and her attempts to contact Giggle via the app's contact form went unanswered. Ms Tickle subsequently sent a series of emails to Giggle, to which the app's representative, Ms Grover, responded by asking for Ms Tickle's phone number. Although Ms Tickle provided her number, she did not receive a response beyond an unanswered call from Ms Grover.

This case, Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2), is a continuation of legal proceedings initiated by Ms Tickle against Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd and its officers, concerning the exclusion of Ms Tickle from the Giggle App. The matter has been through several stages, including an interlocutory hearing and consideration of submissions by the Sex Discrimination Commissioner as an amicus curiae. Prior decisions in this case, Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 553, dealt with certain preliminary issues and orders were made regarding the scope of the case and costs. The current proceeding focuses on the substantive issues of gender identity discrimination, constitutional validity of certain legislative provisions, and the availability of remedies under the Australian Human Rights Act 1986 (Cth).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Tickle largely adopted the Commissioner’s submissions on the above topics with little addition, while the respondents opposed them, but did not fully or even adequately address them. Not every aspect of the Commissioner’s submissions needed to be considered, especially on the topic of reliance on CEDAW to support the gender identity discrimination provisions of the SDA, because of the nature of the Ms Tickle’s case which did not allege any gender identity discrimination in favour of a man or men. (b) Overview of the evidence The essential facts as to what took place are largely not disputed, as briefly summarised below, and detailed further later in these reasons as necessary. In about February 2021, Ms Tickle downloaded the Giggle App. The Giggle App had been marketed as being a means for women to communicate with one another in what was described as a digital women-only safe space. Ms Tickle undertook a registration process to gain access to the Giggle App, which including providing information and uploading a self-taken photograph of her face, commonly known as a selfie. The photograph provided by Ms Tickle to Giggle was assessed by third-party artificial intelligence (AI) software, designed to distinguish between the facial appearance of men and women. The trial evidence from Ms Grover, which I accept, established that the AI software was deliberately set to less than its maximum reliability, so as to err on the side of inclusion of a user who identified as a woman rather than exclusion of a user because they were identified by the AI software as a man. If that AI software accepted the photograph, access was granted to the Giggle App. Ms Tickle gained access to the Giggle App. In the period between February and sometime in September 2021, Ms Tickle had access to the Giggle App’s features and used it to read content posted by other users. In September or early October 2021, Ms Tickle logged on to the Giggle App, but found that she could no longer post content or comment on other users’ posts, or read comments on posts made by other users. That is, the functionality of the Giggle App had become limited for her as a user. When she attempted to purchase premium features on the Giggle App, she received a “User Blocked” message. Her attempts to contact Giggle via the in-App contact form received no response. In October 2021, Ms Tickle sent a series of eight emails about being blocked to a general Giggle email address and Ms Grover. Ms Grover responded by replying to the first of those emails, requesting that Ms Tickle provide her phone number. That email from Ms Grover included, as part of her email signature block, a mobile telephone number. Ms Tickle provided a mobile number by reply email, but says she did not receive any response, an assertion that is only correct if this is understood as meaning that no subsequent conversation or email response took place, because her affidavit evidence states that she later missed a call from Ms Grover. In late October 2021, Ms Tickle tried to contact Ms Grover by SMS and two phone calls, at the number listed in Ms Grover’s email signature. Other than the missed call, there was no response.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The final relief sought is to order that Ms Tickle be given the same access to the Giggle App as is provided to other female users, upon Giggle’s usual terms. That app has been shut down, and Ms Grover has expressed a clear intention not to reinstate it unless it is legal to exclude transgender women. Accordingly, at present, Ms Tickle already has the same access as other female users, being none at all. If the Giggle App had been in operation, I could well have ordered reinstatement. In the circumstances, however, it is not appropriate to make an order that is incapable of being complied with. Accordingly, I decline to grant this kind of relief. PART 7: CONCLUSION Although the applicant did not include seeking costs in her pleadings, costs was argued at the interlocutory hearing last year, and was plainly in the contemplation of both sides since before 1 June 2023. In those circumstances there is no reason way costs should not follow the final outcome of this proceeding. I will order that the respondents pay the applicants costs, but with a cap of $50,000 in relation to the constitutional validity and statutory construction issues, imposed by order 3 made on 1 June 2023.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Roxanne Tickle was of the male sex at the time of birth, but is now recognised by an official updated Queensland birth certificate, issued under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) (Qld BDM Registration Act), as being of the female sex. This followed from, and was predicated on, sexual reassignment surgery, being the term used in the Qld BDM Registration Act, which will be used in these reasons. Roxanne Tickle’s updated birth certificate gives rise to an entitlement to be referred to by female pronouns. Accordingly, in these reasons I will refer to her as Ms Tickle. The term cisgender features in Ms Tickle’s amended statement of claim and appears in numerous places in these reasons, but does not appear in the SDA. As I noted in Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 553 (Tickle v Giggle No 1) at [11], cisgender refers to a person whose gender corresponds to the sex registered for them at birth. That is to be contrasted with a person whose gender does not correspond with their sex as registered at birth, commonly referred to as transgender. The respondents do not accept the legitimacy of the terms cisgender and transgender. The gender identity discrimination asserted by Ms Tickle is in relation to the provision of services, alleging both direct discrimination as defined in s 5B(1) of the SDA, and indirect discrimination as defined in s 5B(2). The conduct said to constitute both direct and indirect discrimination arises from Ms Tickle being prevented by the respondents from using a mobile phone digital software application, commonly known as an App, marketed for social communication between women (the Giggle App). While both direct and indirect discrimination may be alleged in the alternative, only one of the two can ever succeed in relation to a given allegation of discrimination. While both are alleged, Ms Tickle confirmed at the hearing that her allegations of direct and indirect gender identity discrimination were advanced as alternatives. Ms Tickle seeks declarations of contravention, damages (including aggravated damages), a published written apology and an order to allow Ms Tickle to access the Giggle App on the same terms offered to other female users. The claim for aggravated damages was not particularised, nor well evidenced. Ms Tickle’s pleadings were not well drafted. The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in s 5B of the SDA is considered in some detail later in these reasons. It suffices at this stage to note that:(a)direct discrimination is discrimination by reason of gender identity, whether it be that actual gender identity, or a characteristic that appertains to, or is generally imputed to, persons who have that gender identity;(b)indirect discrimination is the imposition, or proposed imposition, of a condition, requirement or practice that has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging a person relative to another person or persons who have a different gender identity.