NEW SOUTH WALES. Defamation-LibelInnuendo-Publication-Qualified privilege-Malice-Conduct H. C.
at trial-Dishonesty of plaintiff-Belief of defendant-Damages-Excessive- Changing value of money-Death of appellant after appeal instituted.
In assessing damages for defamation the jury may not take into account as a ground for giving or increasing damages, whether exemplary or com- pensatory, conduct of the defendant which was bona fide and justifiable or proper and therefore the jury cannot use for such a purpose a defence which is bona fide and raised properly or justifiably in the circumstances known to the defendant or evidence honestly given in support of such a defence. But the conduct of the defendant up to and including the trial may be taken into consideration not merely as evidence tending to show retrospectively malice at the time of publication or the intent with which the wrong was done. It may also be taken into consideration as improperly aggravating the injury done to the plaintiff if there is a lack of bona fides in the defendant's conduct or it is improper or unjustifiable. So Held (McTiernan J. dissenting) on the authority of Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. v. McGregor, (1928) 41
A new trial should not be granted in an action of defamation on the ground that the damages awarded by the jury to the plaintiff are excessive unless the amount is such that no reasonable body of men could have awarded it,
'but great latitude must be allowed to juries who are entrusted with the duty of estimating the general damages which should be awarded in an injury to his reputation, that being a matter regarded as peculiarly appropriate to be determined by a jury.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Triggell V. Pheeney, (1950) 50 S.R. (N.S.W.) 192; 67 W.N. 112, reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
An action for libel was brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by Daniel Triggell against Arthur James Pheeney in which the plaintiff claimed damages in the sum of £2,000 in respect of certain words written of him by Pheeney in a letter published by Pheeney to one Claude Lock Shearer, of Wolumla, New South Wales.
Triggell was a dairy farmer, aged seventy years, who for the greater part of his life had resided in or about the district of Bega. At all material times Triggell had occupied, as a share-farmer, a dairy farm near Bega, known as "Spring Dale " and owned by Pheeney, who claimed to have had a lifetime experience in dairy farming.
In 1945 Triggell and Pheeney entered into an oral arrangement whereby Triggell was, on 28th May 1945, to go into occupation of " Spring Dale " under a share-farming agreement. That agree- ment was not reduced to writing but, amongst other features, it appeared to have provided that the net returns from the supply of cream to the butter factory and from the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Triggell v Pheeney
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Triggell v Pheeney [1951] HCA 23
Case
[1951] HCA 23
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute originated in an action for libel brought by Daniel Triggell against Arthur James Pheeney. Triggell, a dairy farmer, sued Pheeney, the owner of the farm Triggell share-farmed, for damages totalling £2,000, alleging that Pheeney had written and published a defamatory letter about him to a third party.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in his directions to the jury regarding the assessment of damages, specifically concerning the defendant's conduct during the trial, and whether the damages awarded by the jury were so excessive as to warrant a new trial. The Supreme Court had previously set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial on the grounds of excessive damages and misdirection.
The High Court considered the principles governing the assessment of damages in defamation cases, particularly the extent to which a defendant's conduct, including their defence and testimony at trial, could be taken into account by a jury. The Court referenced the authority of *Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. v. McGregor*, holding that while conduct that is bona fide and justifiable cannot be used to increase damages, the defendant's conduct throughout the proceedings, including at trial, may be considered if it demonstrates a lack of bona fides or is otherwise improper or unjustifiable. The Court found that it was open to the jury to infer from Pheeney's conduct and testimony that he lacked genuine belief in the allegations against Triggell and was improperly persevering in his defence. The Court also addressed the question of excessive damages, noting that juries are afforded considerable latitude in assessing general damages for injury to reputation and that a new trial should only be granted if the award is such that no reasonable body of people could have reached it.
The High Court allowed the appeal, reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court held that the trial judge's directions regarding the assessment of damages were not erroneous and that the jury's award of £1,955 was not so excessive as to justify setting aside the verdict. Consequently, the original verdict for the plaintiff was reinstated.