HEARD: 2 AUGUST - 4 SEPTEMBER 2024 (FINAL SUBMISSIONS 14 JULY 2025)
DELIVERED : 27 AUGUST 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 1840 of 2023
BETWEEN: LINDA KAREN REYNOLDS
Plaintiff
AND
BRITTANY MAE HIGGINS
Defendant
Catchwords:
Defamation - Meaning - Publication of social media posts - Whether meanings conveyed by natural and ordinary meaning of words of publications - Whether meanings conveyed by way of true innuendo - Whether meanings defamatory
Defamation - Publication - Whether defendant participated in publication of tweet - Whether defendant a publisher of tweet for the purposes of the law of defamation
Defamation - Defences - Justification - Pleading by defendant of alternative meaning - Observations on the limits of Polly Peck defence - Where justification defences not established
Defamation - Defences - Statutory qualified privilege - Lange qualified privilege - Malice - Whether publications actuated by improper motive or purpose - Whether privileged occasions exceeded
Defamation - Defences - Limitation - Where action commenced after expiry of limitation period - Whether limitation period should be extended - Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - Limitation period extended
Defamation - Damages - Causation - Mitigation - Whether damage to reputation sustained before publication of defamatory statements - Plaintiff a political figure - Whether damage mitigated by damages recovered in respect of other publications
Defamation - Damages - Aggravated damages - Consideration of the concept of the circumstances of publication - Whether plaintiff's harm aggravated by knowledge that defendant had formulated strategy that involved causing plaintiff damage
Conspiracy - Lawful means conspiracy - Existence of an understanding between conspirators - Whether sole or predominant purpose of conspirators was to injure the plaintiff - Sole or predominant purpose not established
Contract - Term obliging parties not to make adverse critical or disparaging statements - Whether statement published in breach of term - Breach established - Declaratory relief ordered - Injunctive relief refused
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Reynolds v Higgins [2025] WASC 345
Case
[2025] WASC 345
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The plaintiff, Reynolds, initiated legal proceedings against Higgins, asserting claims of defamation, conspiracy, and breach of contract. The central dispute involved various social media posts, which Reynolds argued were defamatory. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The court had to determine several legal issues, including the meanings conveyed by the social media posts, whether the defendant participated in the publication of the defamatory content, and if the defendant could rely on any available defences. Additionally, the court considered whether the plaintiff's claims were time-barred, and if so, whether the limitation period should be extended.
The court examined the meanings conveyed by the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the publications, as well as by way of true innuendo. It was determined that the posts did convey meanings that could be considered defamatory. The court also found that the defendant had participated in the publication of the defamatory tweet, making them a publisher for the purposes of the law of defamation. The court considered various defences, including justification, qualified privilege, and honest opinion. However, none of these defences were successful as the justification defences were not established, the privilege was not applicable, and the statements did not qualify as honest opinion or fair comment.
The court held that the defendant's claims of justification, qualified privilege, and honest opinion were unsuccessful. The limitation period for the defamation claim had expired, but the court extended the limitation period under the Limitation Act 2005 (WA). The court found that the plaintiff had suffered damage to their reputation before the publication of the defamatory statements. The court awarded damages to the plaintiff, taking into account causation and mitigation. The court also considered whether the plaintiff's harm was aggravated by the knowledge that the defendant had formulated a strategy that involved causing the plaintiff damage, but ultimately found that the concept of aggravated damages did not apply in this case. Lastly, the court found that there was no evidence of a conspiracy between the defendants, and that the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract was successful, ordering declaratory relief but refusing injunctive relief.