SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted No. 5747 of 1996
DAVID SYME & CO. LTD. and
PATRICK SMITH Appellants v. DYSON HORE-LACY Respondent
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JUDGES: ORMISTON, CHARLES & CALLAWAY, JJ.A. WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE DATE OF HEARING: 1-2 December 1999 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 9 March 2000 MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2000] VSCA 24
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Libel and slander – Pleadings – Innuendo – Statement of Claim complaining of certain imputations in newspaper article – Defendants justifying imputations not complained of – Whether and to what extent entitled to do so – Imputations not more serious than and not substantially different from those complained of – Particulars justifying imputations – Polly Peck (Holdings) PLC v. Trelford [1986] Q.B. 1000; Chakravarti v. Advertiser Newspapers Limited (1998) 193 C.L.R. 519.
Libel and slander – Duty of defendant – Particulars of justification – Defendant required to particularize meanings to be justified in certain circumstances – Departure at trial – Attribution of meaning not pleaded – Lucas-Box v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 147.
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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors For the Appellants Mr. M.A. Dreyfus, Q.C. Minter Ellison For the Respondent Mr. A.G. Uren, Q.C. Williams Winter & Higgs Mr. P.J. Riordan
ORMISTON, J. A.:
It would seem that the solution to these appeals depends upon the extent to which the plaintiff should be allowed to travel beyond the strict confines of his pleadings. Plaintiffs in the general run of case cannot do that except to the extent that the trial of the case has been conducted on a different basis or has been affected by waiver by one party or the other. In libel there is ordinarily but one article or publication (or series of articles or publications) relied upon which, read as a whole, is the basis of the claim. Nevertheless, it has been accepted that the plain and ordinary meaning of a publication may be explained or expounded by pleading the imputations (or popular or false innuendoes) which may be taken to flow from it. If for the present one omits cases of true innuendo, plaintiffs may allege defamatory meanings which are not explicitly stated in the publication, for in each case the tribunal of fact is entitled to look to the true meaning of the publication and the true meaning may be implicit rather than explicit.
Nevertheless, authority accepted in this and other jurisdictions supports the proposition that it is for the judge to determine which meanings are fairly open but that, subject to that qualification, the judge ought to leave to the jury all meanings which are fairly open. In other words, neither judge nor jury are "confined to the meanings asserted by the parties": National Mutual Life Association v. GTV Corporation Pty. Ltd.[1] and Chakravarti v. Advertiser Newspapers Ltd.[2] That peculiarity of libel law, if correct, means in effect that the plaintiff may still succeed on a meaning or imputation of the publication which has not been put forward in the statement of claim.
[1] [1989]…
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- [2000] VSCA 24
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendant was entitled to justify imputations not specifically complained of in the statement of claim and the extent to which this was permissible. The court considered whether the imputations justified by the defendant were more serious or substantially different from those originally complained of. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the defendant was required to provide particulars of the meanings to be justified and whether the failure to do so could be considered a departure at trial.
The court ruled that the defendant was entitled to justify imputations not more serious or substantially different from those complained of in the statement of claim. The court found that the defendant had provided sufficient particulars of the meanings to be justified, even though the meanings were not explicitly pleaded. The court held that the defendant was not required to particularize the meanings to be justified in all circumstances, as long as the meanings were not significantly different from those complained of. The court ultimately found that the defendant had successfully justified the defamatory statements in the article.
As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action for libel. The defendant was not held liable for the defamatory statements in the article, and the plaintiff's claim for damages was rejected. The court's decision was based on the principle that a defendant is entitled to justify imputations not more serious or substantially different from those complained of in the statement of claim, provided that the defendant provides sufficient particulars of the meanings to be justified. The plaintiff's action for libel was dismissed, and the defendant was not held liable for the defamatory statements in the article.
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