Lesbian Action Group and Australian Human Rights Commission (Practice and Procedure)

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Lesbian Action Group and Australian Human Rights Commission (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 34 (20 January 2025)

Applicant:Lesbian Action Group

Respondent:         Australian Human Rights Commission

Other Party:          Lesbian Action Group Inc

Tribunal Number:  2023/8450

Tribunal:General Member S. Fenwick

Place:Melbourne

Date:20 January 2025

Decision: The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

.........[SGD].............................................

General Member S. Fenwick

Catchwords

HUMAN RIGHTS – sex and gender identity discrimination – exemption – proposed public event for lesbians born female – exercise of discretion – relevant considerations – public interest test considered – decision affirmed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – joinder of parties – consideration of whether interests of incorporated association affected by decision – consideration of whether interests of United Nations Special Rapporteur affected by decision

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)

Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas)

Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic)

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)

Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)

Cases

Commissioner for Equal Opportunity v ADI Limited [2007] WASCA 261

Evans v New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 130

FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342

G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1229

Jacomb v Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical and Services Union [2004] FCA 1250

Jessica Hoyle and LGB Alliance Australia (Review of Refusal of an Application for Exemption) [2002] TASCAT 142

Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR

Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) [2009] VCAT 1869

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Peel Hotel Pty Ltd (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) [2010] VCAT 2005

R v Secretary of State for Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
Stevens v Fernwood Fitness Centres Pty Ltd [1996] EOC 92-782

Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 960 (Tickle No 2)

Walker v Cormack [2011] FCA 861

Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1974) 74 CLR 492

Secondary Materials

Australian Anti-Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Law, 3 ed, The Federation Press, 2018

Australian Human Rights Commission, Temporary exemptions under the Sex Discrimination Act, Commission Guidelines (2009)

Statement of Reasons

On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.

BACKGROUND

  1. This matter is about whether a lesbian association can be granted an exemption under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (the SDA). The immediate objective of the original application by the Lesbian Action Group (LAG) for…

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Details
Case
[2025] ARTA 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Lesbian Action Group and the Australian Human Rights Commission brought a case before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), challenging a decision by the Respondent to deny an exemption for the Applicants to hold a public event exclusively for lesbians born female. The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SDA) and the implications of granting an exemption that could exclude certain groups, including transgender women.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the exemption granted by the Respondent was in accordance with the SDA and whether the exemption could be considered reasonable under the public interest test. The Applicants argued that the exemption was necessary to protect the rights of lesbians born female to meet without interference from those who might not have their best interests at heart. The Respondent contended that granting the exemption would result in unlawful discrimination against transgender women and same-sex attracted transgender women.

The AAT considered the arguments presented by both parties and examined the relevant provisions of the SDA, including the prohibition on discrimination in the provision of goods and services and the public interest test for exemptions. The Tribunal noted that the exemption sought by the Applicants appeared to amount to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Furthermore, the AAT found that the exemption could lead to further exclusion and discrimination against same-sex attracted transgender women, who already experience discrimination, harassment, and social exclusion.

In reaching its decision, the AAT found that the exemption was not reasonable and denied the application. The Tribunal concluded that the exemption would not only contravene the SDA but also conflict with international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The AAT also noted that the exemption could have the effect of denying redress to individuals who might be affected by the discriminatory practices.

The AAT affirmed the decision of the Respondent and denied the exemption sought by the Applicants. The Tribunal emphasized that granting such an exemption could lead to further exclusion and discrimination against already marginalized groups, which is inconsistent with the objectives of the SDA and Australia's international obligations.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further written submissions, dated 16 September 2024, were lodged by Ms Alsalem following the close of the hearing. I informed the parties that I would not consider this material on the basis that the Special Rapporteur had no formal standing, and to avoid further ongoing commentary in circumstances where the parties had the primary responsibility for making submissions on international law.Applicant objection to evidence The Applicant initially raised an objection to the report of Professor Gerber at a telephone directions hearing at which matters relating to preparation for the hearing were discussed. It was submitted here that the report was ‘inadmissible’ because it deals with questions of law. In their Reply, the Applicants contended that the report does not go to any fact in issue and attempts to usurp the role of the Tribunal’s duty to find and apply the law [11]. The Reply went on to commend Ms Alsalem’s ‘commonsense reading of CEDAW’ [14]. This objection was pursued during the hearing. It was contended that Tickle No 2 was binding on the Tribunal, and that this decision adequately addresses matters such as the application of CEDAW to the SDA. I note for completeness that the Applicants’ reply observes further that, while Tickle No. 2 is binding on the Tribunal, the Applicants consider the decision to be wrong, and also that its ratio is not relevant to the matter before the Tribunal. As already noted, the statement of Carol Ann in effect has already put some material about aspects of international law before me. Accordingly, I determined that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to receive the report of Professor Gerber, but that any weight that would be placed on its contents would be determined by the prior question of the significance of matters of international law in the interpretation and application of the SDA. A second objection was raised by the Applicant during closing submissions of the Respondent. The Respondent sought to refer to the findings of a coronial inquest into the death of a person, delivered on 29 August 2024. The material had – I was told – only just come into the hands of the Respondent. It was contended that the findings were relevant to the issue of harm granting an exemption might do to members of the trans community. I agreed with the Applicants’ objection to the late production of this material, noting that I was satisfied with the material already available to me on this topic.LEGISLATION The full title of the SDA reads as follows:An Act relating to discrimination on the ground of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy, potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities, and relating to discrimination involving sexual harassment, harassment on the ground of sex or hostile workplace environmentsRecognising the need to prohibit, so far as is possible, discrimination against people on the ground of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities in the areas of work, accommodation, education, the provision of goods, facilities and services, the disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs:Affirming that every individual is equal before and under the law, and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law, without discrimination on the ground of sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities:

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further information was provided on 11 August 2023 (T7, 84–87). This was provided in response to questions put by the Respondent (T7, 88) including why it is reasonable and necessary to exclude the groups identified in the application, as well as what other activities might be covered in a five‑year exemption. In summary, the Applicants responded that:(a)there is a need to meet ‘without interference from those people in the dominant patriarchal culture who don’t always have the best interests of the minority at heart’, including a need to discuss personal health issues and stories of domestic violence as well as to rejoice in their culture;(b)a five‑year exemption was sought to engage in more fun and political action and ‘equally importantly, in this repressive and conservative political climate over the past two decades, 2003-2023, where we are having to ask permission to not only meet but to advertise’, the more events, the better; and(c)while the Applicants have the support of an incorporated lesbian group [not identified] they would consider incorporating if and when necessary.THE ORIGINAL DECISION As noted above, the Respondent undertook a public consultation process in two parts. It corresponded with a number of independent and government-run human rights institutions and agencies [T12]–[T26]. Submissions were also received from individuals and organisations [T27]–[T55].[2] At this point, the Respondent issued a preliminary view, dated 25 September 2023 (T60), in which it indicated that it was ‘not persuaded that it is appropriate or reasonable to grant the exemption’ [7.46]. [2] The Commission received 236 submissions at this point, 31 from organisations and 205 from individuals (T2 [6.2]). This document summarises views for and against the exemption, which I will not deal with here. The stated considerations are, in summary:(a)restricting access to a public event to celebrate International Lesbian Day and similar events in the future, appears to amount to unlawful discrimination on the ground of at least sexual orientation and gender identity in the provision of goods and services and the permanent exemptions under the SDA do not appear to apply [7.31];(b)the exemption for voluntary bodies (s 39 SDA) would likely permit discrimination in connection with the LAG’s own members and to hold events in private [7.32];(c)temporary exemptions should not be granted lightly and a grant ‘has the effect of taking relevant conduct out of the SDA’s prohibitions and denying redress to a person who is affected’, thus qualifying the norms of conduct the act seeks to establish [7.36];(d)the reasons provided for conducting the event indicate it ‘is intended to be a community social event, involving singing, dancing, celebrations and the discussion of ideas’ [7.38]–[7.39];(e)grant of an exemption may lead to further exclusion of, and discrimination against, same‑sex attracted transgender women, a group who experience discrimination, harassment and social exclusion [7.42];(f)the applicants did not describe how they would limit participation to the intended participant group, and to do so may involve intrusions on privacy that may amount to sexual or sex-based harassment [7.43]; and(g)the Respondent does not consider a five‑year exemption reasonable without details of future events and the opportunity for submissions about the reasonableness of the grant at these events [7.45].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, Professor Gerber provides observations about aspects of Professor Jeffreys’ report, including that ‘overall there is strong support for the LGBTIQA+ acronym and community because of the strength and unity it represents’ [100]. She concludes with reference to a study of sexuality among trans women finding that 42% are attracted almost exclusively, or only, to women, and that permitting one group of lesbians to exclude others because they are trans would contravene both international law and the SDA [101]–[103].CONSIDERATIONApplication of Tickle No 2 The Applicants contend that, to the extent that the decision is binding upon the Tribunal, the ratio in Tickle No 2 does not apply to the issues here. These submissions flow from the Applicants’ arguments with respect to the application of CEDAW to the present matter which is to the effect that that convention protects the rights of (only) biological women (ASFIC [26]). In its supplementary submissions on Tickle No 2, the Respondent contends that the issue raised by the Applicants is resolved by the findings of Bromwich J at [176] and [178] with respect to CEDAW (Supplementary Submissions [11]–[12]). The Respondent also contends that gender identity discrimination under the SDA was held by His Honour to be valid and consistent with Australia’s obligations under art 26 of the ICCPR [13]. Tickle No 2 concerned gender identity discrimination under s 22 of the SDA (being discrimination in the provision of goods and services (Tickle No 2 [2])). The respondents in that matter did not accept that gender is a matter of self-identification, and in that matter the applicant was assigned male at birth, but had registered as female under the relevant state legislation [2]–[3]. The discrimination in question claimed by the applicant there was that they were prevented from using a social media application marketed for communication between women [5]. The respondents there challenged the validity of the gender identity provision in the SDA [8]. His Honour held that the gender identity provisions are valid, both constitutionally and as an enactment of art 26 of the ICCPR [10]. The respondent there argued that CEDAW cannot support the gender identity discrimination provisions of the SDA [11], but His Honour determined this issue did not need to be decided because CEDAW was not engaged, as the discrimination in question was not in favour of a man or men. I note that His Honour specifically declined to make a concluded finding on whether references to women in CEDAW include transgender women [180]. Shortly prior to making this statement, His Honour accepts that the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in AB v Registrar of BDM [2007] FCAFC 140 is binding on the application of CEDAW. In this respect, His Honour states as follows [178]: On that interpretation, assuming rather than deciding for present purposes that CEDAW is capable of supporting discrimination against a transgender woman at all, CEDAW can only go so far as supporting a prohibition on discrimination on the ground of gender identity where a transgender woman is treated less favourably than a man, or men … CEDAW does not support a prohibition on such discrimination which results in a woman or a class or group of women, however widely the word “woman” is understood, being treated less favourably than another woman, or other classes or groups of women …