Lesbian Action Group and Australian Human Rights Commission (Practice and Procedure) [2025] ARTA 34 (20 January 2025)
Applicant:Lesbian Action Group
Respondent: Australian Human Rights Commission
Other Party: Lesbian Action Group Inc
Tribunal Number: 2023/8450
Tribunal:General Member S. Fenwick
Place:Melbourne
Date:20 January 2025
Decision: The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
.........[SGD].............................................
General Member S. Fenwick
Catchwords
HUMAN RIGHTS – sex and gender identity discrimination – exemption – proposed public event for lesbians born female – exercise of discretion – relevant considerations – public interest test considered – decision affirmed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – joinder of parties – consideration of whether interests of incorporated association affected by decision – consideration of whether interests of United Nations Special Rapporteur affected by decision
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas)
Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)
Cases
Commissioner for Equal Opportunity v ADI Limited [2007] WASCA 261
Evans v New South Wales [2008] FCAFC 130
FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342
G v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1229
Jacomb v Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical and Services Union [2004] FCA 1250
Jessica Hoyle and LGB Alliance Australia (Review of Refusal of an Application for Exemption) [2002] TASCAT 142
Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR
Lifestyle Communities Ltd (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) [2009] VCAT 1869
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Peel Hotel Pty Ltd (Anti-Discrimination Exemption) [2010] VCAT 2005
R v Secretary of State for Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
Stevens v Fernwood Fitness Centres Pty Ltd [1996] EOC 92-782Tickle v Giggle for Girls Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FCA 960 (Tickle No 2)
Walker v Cormack [2011] FCA 861
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1974) 74 CLR 492
Secondary Materials
Australian Anti-Discrimination and Equal Opportunity Law, 3 ed, The Federation Press, 2018
Australian Human Rights Commission, Temporary exemptions under the Sex Discrimination Act, Commission Guidelines (2009)
Statement of Reasons
On 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) became the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). Under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (the Transitional Act), applications for review to the AAT that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Tribunal. The Transitional Act gives the Tribunal the authority to continue and finalise any aspect of the review not already completed by the AAT. This decision and statement of reasons is made by the Tribunal.
BACKGROUND
This matter is about whether a lesbian association can be granted an exemption under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (the SDA). The immediate objective of the original application by the Lesbian Action Group (LAG) for…
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- Case
- [2025] ARTA 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the exemption granted by the Respondent was in accordance with the SDA and whether the exemption could be considered reasonable under the public interest test. The Applicants argued that the exemption was necessary to protect the rights of lesbians born female to meet without interference from those who might not have their best interests at heart. The Respondent contended that granting the exemption would result in unlawful discrimination against transgender women and same-sex attracted transgender women.
The AAT considered the arguments presented by both parties and examined the relevant provisions of the SDA, including the prohibition on discrimination in the provision of goods and services and the public interest test for exemptions. The Tribunal noted that the exemption sought by the Applicants appeared to amount to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Furthermore, the AAT found that the exemption could lead to further exclusion and discrimination against same-sex attracted transgender women, who already experience discrimination, harassment, and social exclusion.
In reaching its decision, the AAT found that the exemption was not reasonable and denied the application. The Tribunal concluded that the exemption would not only contravene the SDA but also conflict with international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The AAT also noted that the exemption could have the effect of denying redress to individuals who might be affected by the discriminatory practices.
The AAT affirmed the decision of the Respondent and denied the exemption sought by the Applicants. The Tribunal emphasized that granting such an exemption could lead to further exclusion and discrimination against already marginalized groups, which is inconsistent with the objectives of the SDA and Australia's international obligations.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, Professor Gerber provides observations about aspects of Professor Jeffreys’ report, including that ‘overall there is strong support for the LGBTIQA+ acronym and community because of the strength and unity it represents’ [100]. She concludes with reference to a study of sexuality among trans women finding that 42% are attracted almost exclusively, or only, to women, and that permitting one group of lesbians to exclude others because they are trans would contravene both international law and the SDA [101]–[103].CONSIDERATIONApplication of Tickle No 2 The Applicants contend that, to the extent that the decision is binding upon the Tribunal, the ratio in Tickle No 2 does not apply to the issues here. These submissions flow from the Applicants’ arguments with respect to the application of CEDAW to the present matter which is to the effect that that convention protects the rights of (only) biological women (ASFIC [26]). In its supplementary submissions on Tickle No 2, the Respondent contends that the issue raised by the Applicants is resolved by the findings of Bromwich J at [176] and [178] with respect to CEDAW (Supplementary Submissions [11]–[12]). The Respondent also contends that gender identity discrimination under the SDA was held by His Honour to be valid and consistent with Australia’s obligations under art 26 of the ICCPR [13]. Tickle No 2 concerned gender identity discrimination under s 22 of the SDA (being discrimination in the provision of goods and services (Tickle No 2 [2])). The respondents in that matter did not accept that gender is a matter of self-identification, and in that matter the applicant was assigned male at birth, but had registered as female under the relevant state legislation [2]–[3]. The discrimination in question claimed by the applicant there was that they were prevented from using a social media application marketed for communication between women [5]. The respondents there challenged the validity of the gender identity provision in the SDA [8]. His Honour held that the gender identity provisions are valid, both constitutionally and as an enactment of art 26 of the ICCPR [10]. The respondent there argued that CEDAW cannot support the gender identity discrimination provisions of the SDA [11], but His Honour determined this issue did not need to be decided because CEDAW was not engaged, as the discrimination in question was not in favour of a man or men. I note that His Honour specifically declined to make a concluded finding on whether references to women in CEDAW include transgender women [180]. Shortly prior to making this statement, His Honour accepts that the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in AB v Registrar of BDM [2007] FCAFC 140 is binding on the application of CEDAW. In this respect, His Honour states as follows [178]: On that interpretation, assuming rather than deciding for present purposes that CEDAW is capable of supporting discrimination against a transgender woman at all, CEDAW can only go so far as supporting a prohibition on discrimination on the ground of gender identity where a transgender woman is treated less favourably than a man, or men … CEDAW does not support a prohibition on such discrimination which results in a woman or a class or group of women, however widely the word “woman” is understood, being treated less favourably than another woman, or other classes or groups of women …