Counsel for the Appellant: S.E. Herbert QC and A.J. Glynn
Solicitors for the Appellant: J.A. Hodgins, Director, Legal Aid Office (Queensland)
Counsel for the Respondent: M.J. Byrne QC and D.J. Callaghan
Solicitors for the Respondent: D. Field, Solicitor to the Director of Prosecutions (Queensland)
Orders
Appeal allowed. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of Queensland and in lieu thereof order that the appeal to that Court be allowed, the verdict set aside, the conviction quashed and a judgment and verdict of acquittal entered.
Decisions
BRENNAN, DAWSON AND GAUDRON JJ. John Apps, then aged 16, had been living with his father in a caravan park at Caboolture when he went missing on or about 28 November 1989. In November 1990 his remains were found in the Glasshouse Mountains area, not very far away from his home. There was a bullet hole in the back of his skull just to the right of the midline down near the junction with his neck. The bullet, in a deteriorated state, was still within the skull. It was probably of .22 calibre but rifling marks could not be detected. It is possible that it was fired from his father's .22 rifle which disappeared at about the time when John went missing. No rifle was located. John's bicycle and a backpack were found in the vicinity of the body. The evidence showed that John had died at some time before February 1990.
2. The appellant was a boy of the same age as John. They were in the same class at the Caboolture High School. They had been best friends. The appellant was charged with and convicted of the manslaughter of John Apps. The case against him rested chiefly on the evidence of two girls, Jodie Parker and Leeanne Clack. Jodie Parker gave evidence that, at some time after John Apps' body had been found, the appellant said to her:
"I know whose body is up in the mountains. I know whose it is and I was the one that killed him. If you tell anybody I'll do the same to you."
The second statement was made to Leeanne Clack with whom the appellant had been friendly. In the course of the conversation he said:
"I shot (or I killed) John. It was an accident. I didn't mean to do it."
Under cross-examination, she thought that he had said "killed" rather than "shot" and she affirmed that he had used the word "accident".
3. The appellant, who did not give evidence at his trial, was interviewed by the police to whom he gave differing versions of when he had last seen John Apps and of what John had said to him. He told the police at one stage that John used to go shooting with someone from the Caboolture school but…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Griffiths v The Queen [1994] HCA 55
Case
[1994] HCA 55
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Griffiths v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Griffiths, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search of the applicant's property, which was conducted without a warrant. The Crown sought to rely on this evidence to prove the applicant's guilt.
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence obtained from the warrantless search was admissible, notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. This involved a consideration of the common law principles governing the admissibility of illegally or improperly obtained evidence, and whether any exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied in this instance. The Court also had to determine the proper application of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth) in relation to the admission of such evidence.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the evidence obtained from the warrantless search was inadmissible. Their Honours applied the principle that evidence obtained in contravention of the law, even if relevant, should generally be excluded unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the impropriety of its acquisition. In this case, the Court found that the Crown had failed to establish a sufficient justification for the warrantless search, and therefore the evidence should have been excluded. The Court emphasised that the onus was on the prosecution to demonstrate why the evidence should be admitted despite the illegality.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.