R v Packer

[2023] NSWCCA 87

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Packer [2023] NSWCCA 87

Hearing dates:

14 October 2022

Date of orders:

24 April 2023

Decision date:

24 April 2023

Before:

Simpson AJA at [1]
Davies at [18]
Wilson J at [122]

Decision:

(1) Appeal upheld.

(2) Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court on 13 August 2021.

(3) In lieu, sentence the respondent to an aggregate sentence of 17 years commencing 13 August 2020 and expiring 12 August 2037 with a non-parole period of 12 years expiring 12 August 2032.

(4) The respondent will be first eligible for parole on 12 August 2032.

Catchwords:

CRIME — appeals — appeal against sentence — by Crown against inadequacy — respondent convicted of 12 sexual offences relating to two young foreign nationals — offences involving sexual assaults, recording and dissemination and threat to disseminate intimate video — whether sentencing judge failed to take into significant account emotional harm as an aggravating factor — s 21A(2)(g) Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act — whether sentencing judge misapplied principle of totality in setting aggregate sentence — whether sentence manifestly inadequate — where complainant suffered substantial emotional harm — alienation from family and friends in Nepal — where harm went well beyond what could ordinarily be expected — where sentencing judge erred in not finding substantial emotional harm as a matter of aggravation — whether aggravating factor applied to all the charges - sentence manifestly inadequate - appeal allowed — respondent resentenced

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 61I, 61KC, 91P, 91Q, 91R

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 13

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 3A, 21A

Cases Cited:

Ewen v R [2015] NSWCCA 117; (2015) 250 A Crim R 544

Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293

Kentwell v R (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96

Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 66

Mol v R [2017] NSWCCA 76

Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25

Muggleton v R [2015] NSWCCA 62; (2015) 250 A Crim R 180

Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39

Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221

Pannowitz v R [2016] NSWCCA 13

Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57

R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302

R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8; (2015) 248 A Crim R 502

Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656; [1998] HCA 74

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

The King (Applicant)
Michael Anthony Packer (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
C Curtis (Applicant)
D Carroll & J Whealing (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Applicant)
Ross Hill & Associates (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2019/221041

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of NSW

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Citation:

Nil

Date of Decision:

13 August 2021

Before:

C Smith SC DCJ

File Number(s):

2019/221041

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

On 11 May 2021, Michael Anthony Packer, the respondent, was convicted after a trial before a jury in the New South Wales District Court of six counts of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The maximum penalty for this offence is 14 years’ imprisonment, with a standard non-parole period of 7 years. The respondent was also convicted of a further count of attempting sexual intercourse without consent, which carries a maximum penalty of 14 year’s imprisonment, with no standard non-parole period. In addition, the respondent was convicted of one count of threatening to distribute an intimate image without consent (an offence against Crimes Act s 91R(2)), one count of distributing an intimate image without consent (an offence against Crimes Act s 91Q(1)), and one count of recording an intimate image without consent (an offence against Crimes Act s 91P(1)), each of which carries a maximum penalty of 3 years’ imprisonment. He also pleaded guilty to a further offence of threatening to distribute an intimate image without consent.

The complainant in each of these offences was a person described as NB. In January 2019, NB had arrived in Australia from Nepal on a student visa when she was aged 18. She had met the respondent after responding to a job advertisement to work at his home. She accepted the position in late April or early May 2019, and moved into his home. The offences were committed between 1 May and 12 July 2019 in the respondent’s house. The sentencing judge found that the acts of sexual intercourse without consent were accompanied by threats, amongst other things, to disseminate a video that the respondent had covertly recorded of the respondent and NB having sexual intercourse without consent to NB’s parents in Nepal, whom the respondent had connected with on Facebook. NB gave evidence at trial that she was of the opinion that her family would “break” their relationship with her if they viewed the video. The count of distribution of an intimate image without consent related to an occasion in July 2019 when the respondent disseminated pictures and a video of the respondent having sexual intercourse with NB without her consent to a person in Nepal, whom he had connected with on Facebook. That person shared NB’s surname, had met NB and was from the same area in Nepal, although he did not personally know her. On 12 July 2019, the applicant collected her belongings and, the following day, attended a police station to report the matters to the police.

At the same trial, the respondent was also convicted of a further count of sexual intercourse without consent against another complainant described as FP. He was also convicted of sexually touching FP without consent, which is an offence contrary to s 91KC(a) of the Crimes Act, and carries a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment, with no standard non-parole period. Those offences occurred between 13 July 2019 and 17 July 2019, after FP, who had arrived in Australia in May 2019 aged about 18 or 19, accepted an advertised role as a live-in housekeeper in the respondent’s home.

The respondent was found not guilty of five further offences.

On 13 August 2021, the respondent was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment of 12 years and 8 months, with a non-parole period of 8 years.

By s 21A(1)(a) and (b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, a sentencing court is required to take into account such aggravating and mitigating factors as are relevant and known to the court. Section 21A(2)(g) of the Act identifies “the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial” as one such aggravating factor.

In the sentencing proceedings, NB provided a victim impact statement (VIS), which set out what the sentencing judge described as the “significant impact” the offending had had upon her. The sentencing judge expressly declined to take that harm into account, since he concluded that he could not tie the emotional harm to any of the individual offences, which, he considered, was required by s 21A(2)(g).

Pursuant to 5D(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), the Crown appealed against the respondent’s sentence. Following the abandonment of ground (2), the following grounds were pleaded:

1. the sentencing judge failed to take into account that the emotional harm suffered by the complainant NB was substantial as an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW);

2. the sentencing judge misapplied the principle of totality in setting the aggregate sentence; and

3. the sentence is manifestly inadequate.

The Crown accepted that even if error were found with respect to ground (1) it would be necessary for the Crown to establish the manifest inadequacy of the sentence.

The Court held (Davies J, Simpson AJA agreeing with additional remarks, Wilson J agreeing) allowing the appeal, re-sentencing the respondent to an aggregate sentence of 17 years with a non-parole period of 12 years:

As to ground (1)

Per Simpson AJA, Davies and Wilson JJ

1. The sentencing judge erred in failing to give any weight to the significant emotional harm caused to NB, whether in relation to each of the offences ([110] per Davies J, Wilson J agreeing), or in relation to the aggregate sentence ([11]-[16]) per Simpson AJA).

2. The evidence before the sentencing judge established, with no real doubt, that the complainant had suffered substantial emotional harm, being harm well beyond what could be expected from the offences for which the applicant was convicted. That substantial emotional harm arose principally from the complainant’s background because of the cultural norms within the community from which she came: [6] (Simpson AJA); [79] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

Per Davies and Wilson JJ

1. The sentencing judge erred in expressly declining to take into account the substantial harm suffered by NB as a result of the respondent’s offending. The degree of emotional harm can be established by victim impact statements. In circumstances where no objection was taken to the VIS and no application made to limit its use, the sentencing judge could properly use the statement to establish the aggravating factor in s 21A(2)(g) of the Sentencing Act: [75]-[78] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8; (2015) 248 A Crim R 502; Muggleton v R [2015] NSWCCA 62; (2015) 250 A Crim R 180, cited.

1. The sentencing judge ought to have found that the offences constituted by counts 2, 9,10 and 11 (namely, the dissemination offences) were aggravated by reason of the substantial emotional harm suffered by the complainant. Although a determination of the objective seriousness of the dissemination offences included a consideration of the harm they were intended to avoid, many or most offences are enacted with the purpose of avoiding some sort of injury, emotional harm, loss or damage. The reason for the inclusion of s 21A(2)(g) as an aggravating factor is that in relation to some offending, the harm goes beyond what could ordinarily be expected, and amounts to substantial injury or harm. No double counting is involved in that regard: [80]-[84] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

2. As to whether the emotional harm could be attributed to the offences of sexual intercourse, although on one approach the substantial harm was caused by the actual distribution of the intimate image, the evidence both at the trial and in the VIS made clear that the reason for the substantial harm was the fact that the complainant’s family and friends became aware that she had engaged (albeit without consent) in sexual relations with the respondent. In those circumstances it was artificial to distinguish the sexual intercourse counts from the circumstances of their being recorded in the first place and their distribution thereafter: [85] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

Per Simpson AJA

1. In cases of multiple offending, where the evidence establishes that substantial harm has been caused but that harm or damage cannot be attributed to any individual offence, a sentencing judge can take that emotional harm or damage in the determination of the aggregate sentence. The harm caused by the offending (whether that be a single offence or multiple offences) is particularly relevant to the issue of totality: [12], [15]-[16] (Simpson AJA).

As to grounds (3) and (4)

1. The failure to take into account the emotional harm to NB supports grounds (3) and (4) that the sentencing judge misapplied the principle of totality and imposed a manifestly inadequate sentence: [16] (Simpson AJA); [96] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

2. Even if regard is had to the indicative sentences stipulated by the sentencing judge, the notional accumulation provided for by the aggregate sentence, when considered in the light of the indicative sentences, is inadequate and does not reflect the overall criminality in the offending. The aggregate sentence does not appropriately recognise the extent of the criminality involved, and gives the perception that the respondent is not being punished for committing multiple offences: [2] (Simpson AJA); [98]-[100], [104] (Davies J); [122] (Wilson J).

R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302; Pannowitz v R [2016] NSWCCA 13, cited.

Judgment

1. SIMPSON AJA:   I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment of Davies J, in which the relevant facts and circumstances are comprehensively stated. The following assumes familiarity with the facts of the respondent’s offences as stated by his Honour, the reasons of the sentencing judge, the grounds of the Crown appeal and the respective arguments of the parties.

2. I agree, for the reasons given by Davies J, that grounds 3 and 4 of the Crown appeal should be upheld. I wish to make some observations about ground 1.

3. As formulated, ground 1 makes a specific complaint of asserted failure by the sentencing judge to take into account, as an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Procedure Act”), that “the emotional harm suffered by the victim NB was substantial”.

4. By s 21A(1)(a) and (b) of the Sentencing Procedure Act in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence, a sentencing court is required to take into account such aggravating and mitigating factors as are relevant and known to the court. Subsections (2) and (3) respectively itemise, non-exhaustively, the aggravating and mitigating factors that are, by subs (1), required to be taken into account. Paragraph (c) of subs (1) makes it clear that the specified aggravating and mitigating factors are in addition to any other objective or subjective factors that affect the relative seriousness of the offence for which sentence is being passed. And, by a suffix to subs (1), those matters are in addition to any other matters that are required or permitted to be taken into account “under any Act or rule of law”.

5. Within that legislative context, s 21A(2)(g) specifies:

“the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial,”

as an aggravating factor required to be taken into account.

6. Justice Davies has set out the emotional harm suffered by NB as a result of the respondent’s offending. It was substantial.

7. The sentencing judge expressly declined to take that harm into account. His reason, as stated, was that he could not tie the emotional harm to any of the individual offences, which, he considered, was required by s 21A(2)(g).

8. It is well established that, in sentencing an offender for multiple offences, a sentencing court must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation, concurrence and totality: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57 at [45] per McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ, with whom Gummow J agreed. That principle found statutory expression the following year, in s 53 of the Sentencing Procedure Act which (as enacted) required a court sentencing an offender in relation to more than one offence to impose a separate sentence in relation to each offence.

9. Pearce was decided, and s 53 enacted, before the advent, in 2011, of aggregate sentencing: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW), which took effect from 14 March 2011. By that amendment, s 53A(1) permitted a court sentencing for multiple offences to impose an aggregate sentence reflecting the totality of the criminality involved. Section 53 of the Sentencing Procedure Act was amended to remove the requirement, when an aggregate sentence is imposed, for the imposition of a separate sentence for each offence. However, the importance of determining the appropriate sentence for each individual offence was recognised and perpetuated in s 53A(2)(b), which requires a court imposing an aggregate sentence for multiple offences to indicate the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence, after taking into account all relevant matters (including aggravating and mitigating factors).

10. The principle is further reflected in s 21A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, which focuses on sentencing “for an offence”. The aggravating factors specified in subs (2), including par (g), direct attention to “the offence” the determination of sentence for which is under consideration. Section 21A applies equally to the specification under s 53A(2)(b) of the sentence that would, but for the imposition of the aggregate sentence, have been imposed for each individual offence. It is clear that the specification of the indicative sentence must take into account any harm caused to the victim by the conduct that constitutes the offence.

11. It is commonplace in criminal courts that serious harm, emotional or other, is caused to victims of multiple offences. It is not always easy or possible to attribute that harm to any of the individual offences, and, frequently, it will be the case that the accumulation of the offending is the cause of, or increases, the harm. This is such a case. It would defy sentencing logic and principle to ignore the emotional (or other) harm caused by multiple or sequential offending because the harm cannot be tied to any individual offence.

12. Because of its express reliance on s 21A(2)(g) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, ground 1 of the appeal as formulated is not made out. But that does not mean that the harm caused to NB should or could be disregarded. It has always been the case that harm caused by an offence (or offences) is a relevant sentencing consideration: see, for example, Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656; [1998] HCA 74 at [29] per Gaudron J. The harm caused by the offending (whether that be a single offence or multiple offences) is particularly relevant to the issue of totality.

13. The Crown could not, and did not attempt to, isolate any of the 12 offences for which the respondent stood for sentence as the cause of the emotional harm NB suffered. Most likely, it was caused by a combination, or accumulation, of the offences. The sentencing judge was justified in hesitating to attribute the harm to any one of the offences and therefore to treat it as an aggravating factor within s 21A(2)(g). That had the consequence that it was difficult to treat it as a factor in the determination of the indicative sentences. That, however, did not mean that it should be discarded as a relevant and important sentencing consideration. It was properly to be treated as material to the selection of the aggregate sentence, reflecting the totality of the offending.

14. Counsel for the respondent was alive to the real issue, which was the failure of the sentencing judge in determining the aggregate sentence to give any weight to the significant emotional harm caused to NB. Having made submissions to the effect that the s 21A(2) aggravating factors must be applied to individual offences, counsel went on to argue that the sentencing judge had indeed taken into account the harm caused to NB. He submitted that the sentencing judge’s reference to “double counting” could only be understood if the harm to NB had already been taken into account. He was not, however, able to identify any passage in the remarks on sentence that demonstrated that that was so. Counsel contented himself with referring to the observations of the sentencing judge that the respondent knew that the offence the subject of count 10 (distributing an intimate image of NB without her consent) would damage her reputation and that that was “undoubtedly … an objectively serious example of” such an offence. As Davies J has pointed out, reputational damage is not the same as emotional harm. These arguments do not persuade me that the sentencing judge took into account, as he ought to have done, the harm caused to NB by the respondent’s conduct

15. In cases of multiple offending, where the evidence establishes that injury, emotional harm or damage has been caused, but it is not possible to attribute that injury, emotional harm or damage to any individual offence, is appropriate for a sentencing judge, having determined the indicative sentences for the individual offences, to take the injury, emotional harm or damage into account in the determination of the aggregate sentence.

6. While I would not uphold ground 1 as formulated, the failure to take into account the emotional harm to NB supports grounds 3 and 4, that the sentencing judge misapplied the principle of totality and imposed a manifestly inadequate sentence.

7. I agree with the orders proposed by Davies J.

8. DAVIES J:   The respondent was convicted after trial before Judge C Smith SC and a jury of the following offences:

Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8: Sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Crimes Act). The maximum penalty for this offence is 14 years’ imprisonment and there is a standard non-parole period of 7 years. The complainant in these counts was a person described as NB.

Count 6:   Attempt sexual intercourse without consent. The maximum penalty for this offence is 14 years’ imprisonment. There is no standard non-parole period. The complainant in relation to this offence was NB.

Count 2: Threaten to distribute intimate image without consent contrary to s 91R(2) Crimes Act. The maximum penalty is 3 years’ imprisonment. The complainant in this offence was NB.

Count 10: Distribute intimate image without consent contrary to s 91Q(1) Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is 3 years’ imprisonment. The complainant in this offence was NB.

Count 11: Record intimate image without consent contrary to s 91P(1) Crimes Act. The maximum penalty for this offence is 3 years’ imprisonment. The complainant in this offence was NB.

Count 13:   Sexual intercourse without consent. The complainant in this offence was a person described as FP.

Count 14: Sexually touch without consent contrary to s 61KC(a) Crimes Act. The maximum penalty is 5 years’ imprisonment and there is no standard non-parole period. The complainant in this offence was FP.

19. The respondent also pleaded guilty to Count 9, which was a further offence of threaten to distribute intimate image without consent contrary to s 91R of the Crimes Act. The complainant in this offence was NB.

20. The respondent was found not guilty of four other counts of sexually touching without consent where the complainant was FP, and a count of intimidation contrary to s 13(1) Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) where the complainant was also FP.

21. On 13 August 2021, his Honour Judge C Smith SC sentenced the respondent to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 12 years and 8 months commencing 13 August 2020 and expiring 12 April 2033, with a non-parole period of 8 years expiring 12 August 2028. It is convenient to identify the indicative sentences for each of the offences when the facts of those offences are set out later in this judgment.

22. The Crown now appeals against the aggregate sentence on the following grounds:

1. The sentencing judge failed to take into account that the emotional harm suffered by the complainant NB was substantial as an aggravating factor pursuant to s 21A(2)(g) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW);

2. (Abandoned);

3. The sentencing judge misapplied the principle of totality in setting the aggregate sentence; and

4. The sentence is manifestly inadequate.

23. The Crown accepts that even if error is found in relation to ground 1, it is necessary for the Crown to establish that the sentence is manifestly inadequate.

The offending

24. The following facts are taken from the sentencing judge’s Remarks on Sentence (ROS).

25. The respondent was born in October 1979 and was aged 39 at the time of the offences. He lived in Blacktown.

26. In January 2019, NB arrived in Australia from Nepal on a student visa when she was aged 18. She responded to a job advertisement from the respondent to work at his home. NB accepted the position, and in late April or early May 2019, she moved into his home.

27. The offences committed against her occurred during the period from 1 May to 12 July 2019. At the end of that time, NB collected her belongings from the home and on the following day attended at the police station to report the matters to the police.

28. FP arrived in Australia in May 2019 from another country when she was aged about 18 or 19. On or about 9 July 2019 she applied for a job as a result of an advertisement from the respondent on Gumtree calling for a live-in housekeeper.

29. FP met the respondent on or about 11 or 12 July 2019 and accompanied him to the Blue Mountains.

30. On or about 13 July 2019, FP moved into the respondent’s home, effectively having accepted the advertised role.

31. On 16 July 2019, police attended at the respondent’s home and arrested him in relation to the matters involving NB. At a later time, the police interviewed FP and charged the respondent in relation to the offences concerning her.

Counts concerning NB

Count 1:   Sexual intercourse without consent

32. The respondent was drinking and sharing with NB how his wife had left him, and he was crying at that time. He gave NB a drink which was a mixture of cola and alcohol which she drank. She said she was not feeling well and was feeling a bit dizzy.

33. He lifted her onto his shoulder and took her to his bedroom. She said she could feel the numbness in her body and then felt something go into her vagina. The sentencing judge accepted that the respondent had penile-vaginal intercourse with the complainant. NB could not remember exactly for how long this occurred but thought it was about 5 to 7 minutes. She said she felt he had ejaculated. At some point she fell asleep and woke up in the morning.

34. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 6 years 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.

Count 2:   Threaten to distribute an intimate image

35. The following morning the respondent told NB that they had had sex the previous night and that he had made a video of it. He said she should not worry, and he told her that he would marry her.

36. Sometime later, the respondent said he would send the video to her family if she did not listen to him and do whatever he said. At that time the respondent was friends with NB’s parents on Facebook. NB never actually saw any video of them having sex but believed that there was one. She said she was very scared and became very helpless because, as she said, these things are “not acceptable at all in my country”. NB said that if the video reached her family they would break the relationship with her. She said that if the respondent shared what occurred with her, her boyfriend would leave her and blame her for what had happened.

37. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 1 year and 10 months.

Count 3:   Sexual intercourse without consent

38. On a later occasion, NB was on the couch, and the respondent said to her that he wanted to have sex with her. He said that if she did not agree she knew what he was going to do. He said, “if you don’t want (sic) then you know what I’m capable of”. NB remembered the video and the threat concerning it. She became afraid, and because her family were very important to her, she agreed to have sex with the respondent.

39. They then went into the bedroom and the respondent had penile-vaginal sex with NB. It occurred for about five to seven minutes and he ejaculated. He told her that he “put the thing” inside her because he wanted to have a baby with her.

40. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 6 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.

Count 4:   Sexual intercourse without consent

41. On another occasion, NB was asleep in her bedroom with the door locked. The respondent opened the door in the middle of the night with a key he had, and went into the bedroom. NB was scared.

42. The respondent then had penile-vaginal intercourse with her on the bed. He ejaculated.

43. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 6 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.

Counts 5 to 8

44. These counts relate to the time when NB told the respondent she was leaving and not returning. The respondent said to her, “I will make you suffer so much that you will never forget”.

45. Count 5 was sexual intercourse without consent. The respondent started to take his and NB’s clothes off, and then put his penis into her mouth. NB said that she did not want to do it. He held her head with one hand and his penis with the other. She was screaming, crying, and begging him not to do it. He had his penis in her mouth for about 20 minutes. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 11 months.

46. Count 6 was attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The respondent tried to have anal intercourse with NB whilst her back was flat on the bed and he was on top of her. He was trying to put his penis into her anus and she was experiencing pain which she could not bear, so she turned around. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 6 years and 10 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

47. Count 7 was sexual intercourse without consent. The respondent put his penis into NB’s vagina. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 11 months.

48. Count 8 was sexual intercourse without consent. The respondent put a vibrator into NB’s vagina as she was lying flat and he was near her side. She was crying, afraid, and begging him not to do it. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years and 11 months.

Count 9:   Threaten to distribute intimate image

49. After NB left the respondent’s home, the respondent sent messages to her including threatening and abusive SMS messages. One of the messages said this:

-   well what a fucking strange slut you turned out to be.

-   You better call me…or I’ll send these pictures to him, your parents and everyone else I can fucking find

-   you fucking maggot, if I don’t hear from you tomorrow I will fucking send this and the video I have to parents

-   you are mine and you will one day fucking accept it

-   well you never met anyone like me before

-   honey I hope Basant is good in bed because nobody want you in Nepal now…. I really do hope you got what you wanted

50. The communications included explicit images and the threat to disseminate the intimate video.

51. The respondent pleaded guilty to this offence. He was accorded a discount of 5% for the plea. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 1 year 5 months and 3 days.

Count 10:   Distribute intimate image

52. In July 2019, a man named Narayan B in Nepal, accepted a friend request on Facebook from a profile operated by the respondent. Narayan was not related to NB, but they lived in a similar area in Nepal. He did not personally know her, he had met her, but she was not a close friend. They did share the same surname, and he knew that she was in Australia as he had been told by a friend. Narayan communicated with the respondent telling him that he knew her and that he was from the same place.

53. The respondent then sent him some pictures and a video. The video was about 5 minutes long and it depicted the respondent having sex with NB. Narayan said, “it was a private sex video”, and later Narayan blocked the respondent on Facebook because he thought it was not right.

54. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 1 year and 10 months.

Count 11 (record intimate image)

55. The respondent recorded himself and NB having penile-vaginal intercourse in his room, NB was on top of the respondent who was lying on the bed. The recording was about 11 minutes long and it was taken from a phone that was near the bed. NB said that she did not know the sexual activity was being recorded.

56. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 1 year and 10 months.

Other matters

57. There were other uncharged acts. After the events which constituted count 3, the respondent would have sex with NB every one to two days. Whenever she said “no”, the respondent would threaten to circulate the video to her family and friends. The sentencing judge indicated that the respondent was to be sentenced in relation to NB on the basis that the counts of sexual misconduct were not isolated acts, and the acts occurred in a context of the earlier threats about the distribution of the video and NB’s acquiescence in those circumstances.

58. Further, at a time when NB was living at the respondent’s house, she and the respondent attended at the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registry for the purpose of signing a notice of intention to marry. The sentencing judge accepted that NB did not want to go there nor sign that document.

Counts concerning FP

59. On or about 13 July 2019 when FP moved into the respondent’s house, there was sexual activity between them on that evening. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty in relation to that sexual conduct. After that sexual conduct, FP fell asleep.

Count 13 (sexual intercourse without consent)

60. At some time later, FP was woken up by the respondent pulling her pants and underpants off and inserting something into her anus. The sentencing judge found it was likely the respondent’s penis. As he did so, the respondent said something like, “please don’t fuck me monster jimmy”. Those words were said by the respondent to mock FP. FP felt pain. She said “please, please stop”. The sexual act lasted for a few seconds.

61. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 6 years with a non-parole period of 3 years and 11 months.

Count 14 (sexual touching without consent)

62. On a day subsequent to 13 July 2019, FP had been out at a separate cleaning job she had during the day. She returned home to the respondent at about 7.30pm. She was in the kitchen. The respondent kissed her neck and grabbed her breasts. This was done without her consent and she asked him why he was doing it. The respondent laughed and left the room.

63. The indicative sentence was imprisonment for 1 year and 3 months.

Grounds of appeal

Ground 1:   Failing to regard the emotional harm as an aggravating factor

The complainant’s evidence

64. NB gave the following evidence at the trial in relation to the threats the respondent made to her concerning the video:

A. INTERPRETER: I was changed by the time I reached Nepal, when I went back to Nepal there was a big change in me as well and I did tell my parents that I’m having difficulty in Sydney.

Q. When you said there was a big change in you, what do you mean by that?

A. INTERPRETER: I was like, kind of, I was having a depression, I wasn’t talking much, and I was in stress.

Q. Did you talk to them about staying in Nepal instead of coming back to Australia?

A. INTERPRETER: Yes. I did. I Didn’t want to come back.

Q. What did they say about you coming back?

A. INTERPRETER: The said that I have to go, I have to come back because there are loan that we need to pay.

Q. Did you want to come back to Australia?

A. INTERPRETER: No.

…

Q. How did you feel about having to come back to Australia?

A. INTERPRETER: Yeah, it was really hard for me to come back. Even at the airport, I begged to my father that I do not want to go, but he did not listen to me.

…

Q. You said he said he would send that video to all your family if you don’t listen and do whatever he says. What was your reaction to the idea of him sending that video to all your family?   

A. INTERPRETER: I was very scared when he said, and I became very helpless, because these things is not acceptable at all in my country.

Q. You said, “these things are not acceptable at all in my country”.

A. INTERPRETER: Yes.

Q. You told us you have very strict parents.

A. INTERPRETER: Yes.

Q. And you told us you weren’t allowed to have a boyfriend, for example.

A. INTERPRETER: Yes.

Q. Based on your experience spending your whole life until then in Nepal, what did you understand would happen if your family had that video sent to them?

A. INTERPRETER: If - if that video would reach to my family, they would break all the relationship with me, and my parents - there would not be a place where I could - I could make my parents be proud of me. Even if the society will come - come to know about it, my parents will be very ashamed from that.         

…

Q. But what were you thinking about having sex with him after he said that to you?

A. INTERPRETER: I got afraid when he said that, because I have only my family, and my family is very important to me, so I agreed to what he said.

…

Q. When you say you, “did not have any options”, what do you mean by that?

A. INTERPRETER: When I say that I mean that am - I have to do whatever he says otherwise he will send the video to my family. If he would send, then my everything would be finished.

…

Q. So, did you tell anyone he threatened that he’d made a video and would send it to your family?

A. INTERPRETER: No.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. INTERPRETER: Because if he sends the video to him - to - to my family, then this will really bring a bad, bad situation for me.

Q. Then the first time when he had sex with you when you'd been drinking, did you tell anyone about that?

A.   INTERPRETER: No.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. INTERPRETER: Is the same reason that I mentioned before.

Q.   Is that something you could've told your parents?   

A.   INTERPRETER: No.

Q.   What’s the reason for that?

A. INTERPRETER: My family would never accept this that happened.

Q. When you say, “they would never accept this”, what exactly do you mean by that?

A. INTERPRETER: In my country, sex is the big thing and having sex - having sex before - having sex - doing sex with - sorry, from, I will say it again. In my country, sex is the big thing and having sex without the knowledge or without telling anybody is not acceptable.

Q. Did you think about telling of any of these three times, your boyfriend is Hassan?

A. INTERPRETER: No.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. INTERPRETER: Because my boyfriend is also from Nepal and he also has the same concept as a general people, Nepali people would have, and it’s not that if I share with him he would leave me and he would blame me for this that happened.  

…

Q. You said that you felt that - your words were, “I had to give myself up to him." Why did you feel that way?

A. INTERPRETER: I - I did not have any other choice. I was - I have become -I had become like a playing doll for - for him.

Q. Was that a play doll, you said?

A. INTERPRETER: Yes.

Q. You talked to us about things he said about sending the video to your family.

A. INTERPRETER: Yes.

Q. Was this something that was said to you one time, or more than one time?

A. INTERPRETER: More than one time.

Q. During this period when he was regularly having sex with you, do you know how many times he said something to you about the video?

A. INTERPRETER: Every time whenever I would say “no" to have sex with him, he would say the same thing.

Q. And what was that thing that he said?

A. INTERPRETER: Yeah, that he would circulate the video to my friends and family.

Q. And what was your reaction when he said that?

A. INTERPRETER: I felt he was blackmailing me, knowing my weakness.  

65. In NB’s Victim Impact Statement (VIS), she set out what had resulted from the dissemination of the video as follows:

In 2019 I had been looking for a job and I was very happy to get the job with Mr Packer. I thought that I would become financially independent. I thought my parents would be happy and proud, I thought that everything would be fine. I thought everyone was a good person and I was taken advantage of. The assaults by Mr Packer have impacted me emotionally, socially, financially and physically.

My father had to borrow approx. $18000 in order to pay for my studies in Australia. I had agreed to pay him back by working part time while in Australia. Because of the trauma I experienced, I was unable to complete my course due to homelessness and lack of concentration. Also, my father refused to continue paying my tuition fees as he has disowned me now he has knowledge of the video. I had nowhere to live, I didn't have any money and, no way to even have adequate food. I had to engage with services to obtain free groceries so I could survive. Also, because my father refused to pay my tuition fees, my student visa was cancelled and I was afraid that I would be forced to return to Nepal.

This has also affected my employment prospects. At one time I was being trained as a housekeeper in a hotel. While making a bed, I experienced a panic attack as I was triggered by the bed as it reminded me of the sexual assault. I felt so scared and wanted to leave this situation. I was unable to continue with that job opportunity even though I had no other job and was desperate for a job. I couldn't do it.

When I would hear about other people being sexually assaulted I felt sad, but I never thought this would happen to me. While I was living in Carlton there was one room and an ensuite. I never used to come out of that room. I was so sad, I never wanted to do anything, I was tired and felt like there was no purpose in life. I used to cry in the bathroom while covering my own mouth so my boyfriend wouldn't hear me.

I lost all my friends because they no longer wanted to be friends with me. They have now either seen the video of me being sexually assaulted or they have found out about it.

When I remember the things that happened to my body I can still feel it happening. I feel disgusted and hate my body for what happened to me.

I have been seeing a sexual assault counsellor for psychological support.

I feel scared of people judging me and I don't feel safe. I always feel like somebody is trying to shoot me, like a sniper is around. I'm even scared of the sound of water dripping out of the tap. When I am at home alone I feel most scared.

Sometimes I cry for no reason. I cry so bad, like when someone has died. It continues for a long time, there are so many tears coming out of my eyes, I feel deep loss, however I don't really understand what has brought on the distress.

I feel shame because sex is a big thing in my country and getting raped is unacceptable. I have lost dignity in my society. It totally damaged my relationship with my parents. I never used to even change my clothes in front of my parents, but now they know about my naked sex videos. The relationship with my parents is not good. My mum still talks to me but she treats me like a victim and not a survivor. My father still has not talked to me, it's been over 2 years. He does not want to see my face. This breaks me. The most important part of my life are my family. They are the people who I love the most and they do not support me now. I would be much better now if I had the support from my family, I can't go back to Nepal because my family won't accept me and everybody knows of the video. Girls aren't safe in my country (even young girls) because they get raped they don't go out after dark. I will be judged by everyone. I would not be safe, I may be seen as a slut and be targeted and raped again. My father won't accept me now, he won't support me in Nepal.

When I think about all this and wonder "Why did this happen to me?" I feel angry. I have never wished anything bad for anyone, but this happened to me and that is what makes me angry. Sometimes I feel so angry that I bite myself to get rid of the mental anguish.

I can't sleep at night and I have nightmares. I wake up at night sweaty and feeling so scared.

This has already changed my life forever. I have lost my parents, I don't have any support from them. My future is precarious as I have no idea if I will be able to stay in Australia or be forced to return to Nepal.

The society of my home country - they judge me now. I will never be able to raise my head in front of these people because they have seen me naked and being sexually assaulted. I cannot get back the things that I have lost, but I just want to make a fresh start without my family and I will try to be happy.

Remarks on Sentence

66. In his ROS, the sentencing judge said this:

I received a Victim Impact Statement from NB and I have had regard to it. It is utterly clear that the offending has had such a significant impact upon her.

…

I must confess to having some difficulty in resolving the issue as to whether the aggravating factor of emotional harm being substantial has been made out in relation to an offence or offences in this matter. On the one hand it is clear to me that as I have described above the impact on NB of the offending against her in a general sense has had a devastating effect upon her. On the other hand in the context of multiple offences for which the offender will be sentenced there is some technicality/complexity (at least to my mind) in isolating, as I understand is required pursuant to s 21A, to which offence or offences the relevant aggravating circumstance is to be applied.

It is clear to me that factors relating generally to this issue are relevant to the sentences or at least the sentences for some of the specific offences. Although I am to a degree unsure I have resolved not to find as an aggravating circumstance this relevant feature in relation to any of the relevant offences notwithstanding what I have said in relation to the impact of this man’s offending behaviour against her. I am obviously cautious not to double count. I am cautious to impose an appropriate sentence in relation to each individual Count. I have had regard to all parts of s 21A.

Submissions

67. The Crown submitted that the complainant’s evidence, both at the trial and in her VIS established that she had suffered emotional harm above and beyond that which would normally be anticipated from the offences before the court. The harm was the loss of her family, and potentially her country of origin. Her family had disowned her, and it was unclear if she would ever be able to return to Nepal safely because she had become a victim of sexual assault.

68. The Crown submitted, as it had submitted to the sentencing judge, that the aggravating factor of substantial emotional harm was an aggravating factor that applied to every count relating to NB. This included the counts of sexual assault because the substantial emotional harm resulted from the complainant having been sexually assaulted, and the knowledge of that fact acquired by her family and friends.

69. The Crown submitted that the sentencing judge considered that the respondent’s knowledge of the harm he was causing, in relation to the dissemination charges, had a significant bearing on the respondent’s moral culpability, but submitted that that was a different matter from the objective seriousness of the offence where it was not taken into account. The Crown submitted that taking that matter into account only on the dissemination charges ignored the harm that flowed from the fact that the complainant had been sexually assaulted.

70. The Crown submitted that in the portion of his Honour’s ROS set out at [66] above, his Honour fell into error. This was because his Honour appeared to have found that substantial emotional harm had been made out on the evidence but his Honour declined to take it into account as his Honour was unsure how to do so, and he was being cautious not to double count. The Crown submitted that, in the result, the substantial emotional harm was not taken into account at all on the sentencing exercise.

71. The respondent submitted that where there are multiple offences, the aggravating factors in s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) must be applied to individual sentences, and not applied in a general or global way.

72. The respondent submitted that s 21A(2) is to be applied in conjunction with the common law. At common law, in assessing the seriousness of an offence, it is appropriate to take into account the consequences of the offence and, particularly, any harm resulting from the offence. That approach is given statutory force by virtue of s 3A(g) of the Sentencing Act. The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge, consistently with the common law, took into account the reputational damage to the complainant in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the harm.

73. The respondent submitted that the harm which occurred was in his contemplation at the time he distributed the images. That elevated both the objective seriousness and his moral culpability. That was reflected in the indicative sentence of 1 year and 10 months’ imprisonment against the maximum penalty of three years.

74. The respondent submitted that his Honour was correct not to apply in a global way the evidence of substantial harm, given the impossibility of dissecting the evidence on a count by count basis.

Consideration

75. In R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8; (2015) 248 A Crim R 502 Simpson J (as her Honour then was) (Ward JA and Wilson J agreeing) said:

[77] By s 28 of the Sentencing Procedure Act, complainant impact statements are part of the landscape in the sentencing process. That is not in issue. What is here in issue is the extent to which a complainant impact statement can be used to prove an aggravating factor of the kind specified in s 21A(2). Almost invariably the aggravating factor in question is that specified in s 21A(2)(g). It is to be remembered that such aggravating factors must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

[78]   In some of the cases considered above, considerable weight was attached to the manner in which the sentencing process was conducted. Where no objection was taken to the complainant impact statement, no question raised as to the weight to be attributed to it, and no attempt made to limit its use, the case for its acceptance as evidence of substantial harm has been considered to be strengthened. (It is, perhaps, a little unfair to take into account that no objection to the admission of the statement was taken, given that such statements are admissible by statute, but that does not preclude argument as to the weight to be attributed to them.)

[79]   Further, where the statement tends to be confirmatory of other evidence (either in a trial, or in the sentencing proceedings) or where it attests to harm of the kind that might be expected of the offence in question, there is little difficulty with acceptance of its contents.

[80]   Difficulties can arise, for example, where:

●   the facts to which the complainant impact statement attests are in question; or

●   the credibility of the complainant is in question; or

●   the harm which the statement asserts goes well beyond that which might ordinarily be expected of that particular offence; or

●   the content of the complainant impact statement is the only evidence of harm.

RP is an example of the third of these.

[81]   In these cases, considerable caution must be exercised before the complainant impact statement can be used to establish an aggravating factor to the requisite standard.

76. In Muggleton v R [2015] NSWCCA 62; (2015) 250 A Crim R 180, Adamson J (Simpson and Harrison JJ agreeing) said:

[40]   The degree of emotional harm suffered by the complainant can be established by complainant impact statements. Such statements have been described by this Court as "a particular species of evidence available to a sentencing judge": R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219 at [25] per Simpson J, Latham J agreeing. A sentencing judge is entitled to receive and consider complainant impact statements (as her Honour did in the instant case) under s 28(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act as long as they comply with the regulatory requirements. Section 30A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act permits a complainant to read, or to have read out by another, a complainant impact statement. In R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8 at [45]- [84] Simpson J (Ward JA and Wilson J agreeing) comprehensively analysed the decisions of this Court in which the use to which such statements can be put has been considered.

[41] Such statements can be used to establish the extent of the harm suffered by the complainant and, accordingly, whether it amounts to substantial emotional harm within the meaning of s 21A(2)(g) of Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. As Hunt CJ at CL said in R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76:

In cases where the complainant is still alive - that is, the complainant directly injured by the offender's criminal act - complainant impact statements will no doubt serve the useful purpose in the criminal courts of establishing the consequences of the crime upon that complainant.

…

[43]   In Aguirre v R James J approved of the remarks made by Simpson J in R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219 and said at [77]:

In the proceedings on sentence the complainant impact statements were tendered and admitted without objection. No submissions were made in the proceedings on sentence that the use of the complainant impact statements should be limited or that the evidentiary weight to be given to them should be limited. In these circumstances the sentencing judge could properly use the complainant impact statements to establish the aggravating factor in s 21A(2)(g) [of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act].

77. No objection was taken to the VIS at the sentence proceedings, and no application was made to limits its use. The VIS was entirely consistent with the evidence the complainant had given (set out above at [64]).

78. Section 21A of the Sentencing Act makes it clear that the aggravating and mitigating factors are considered in relation to “an offence”. The use of the singular “offence” appears in sub-s (1), twice in sub-s (2), and sub-sections 3, 5, 5A and 5AA. In that regard, the sentencing judge was correct in his concern about approaching the matter globally rather than considering which offence or offences might be relevant to a consideration of the aggravating factor in s 21A(2)(g). However, in my opinion, the sentencing judge fell into error in then determining not to find the extent of the emotional harm as an aggravating factor because of a concern about double counting.

79. The evidence before the sentencing judge established, with no real doubt, that the complainant had suffered substantial emotional harm, being harm well beyond what could be expected from the offences for which the applicant was convicted. That substantial emotional harm arose principally from the complainant’s background because of the cultural norms within the community from which she came. The evidence disclosed that she was largely alienated from her family and friends in Nepal, what occurred had affected her status in Australia as a student, with the concomitant matter of the need somehow to reimburse her father for the educational fees that she would otherwise have earned whilst working in Australia.

80. Two questions arise. First, do the offences constituted by counts 2, 9, 10 and 11 (“the dissemination offences”) have, effectively as an element, the suffering of emotional harm? Secondly, whether or not that is so, can the emotional harm suffered by the complainant be attributed to the offences of sexual intercourse?

81. In relation to the first question, the respondent’s submission both at the sentence proceedings and in this Court was that count 10, and possibly counts 2, 9 and 11 anticipate the very sort of harm that ensued in the present case. The purpose of creating an offence of distributing an intimate image without consent, it was submitted, was to avoid harm and suffering to a person who is depicted in the image. In that way, the respondent submitted that a determination of the objective seriousness of the dissemination offences included a consideration of the harm they were intended to avoid.

82. That may be true as far as it goes, but many or most offences are enacted with the purpose of avoiding some sort of injury, emotional harm, loss or damage. The purpose of the inclusion of s 21A(2)(g) as an aggravating factor is that in relation to some offending the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage goes beyond what could ordinarily be expected, and amounts to substantial injury or harm. No double counting is involved in that regard.

83. The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge’s references to reputational damage to NB at various time during the sentence hearing show that he did take account of the emotional harm to NB. There are two particular problems with that submission. First, reputational damage is not the same thing as emotional harm. Reputational damage is judged objectively; emotional harm is the personal suffering of the complainant viewed from the subjective position of the complainant. A person’s reputation may be damaged without the person suffering emotional harm. Secondly, a reading of the transcript of the sentence hearing shows that the sentencing judge was endeavouring to work through with counsel the difficult issue of the harm suffered by NB. Given what his Honour said ultimately (at [66] above), it is clear that what his Honour said during the sentence hearing cannot be taken to be his final determination of the issue.

84. The sentencing judge ought to have found that the dissemination offences were aggravated by reason of the substantial emotional harm suffered by the complainant. The fact that counts 2 and 9 were offences of threatening does not alter the position. NB was considerably harmed by the threats to the extent that she did what the respondent required of her, including unwanted sexual relations, because of her fear that her family would find out what had occurred and was occurring.

85. In relation to the second question, although on one approach the substantial harm was caused by the actual distribution of the intimate image, the evidence both at the trial and in the VIS made clear that the reason for the substantial harm was the fact that the complainant’s family and friends became aware that she had engaged, albeit without consent, in sexual relations with the respondent. In the circumstances, it is entirely artificial to distinguish the sexual intercourse counts from the circumstances of their being recorded in the first place and their distribution thereafter.

86. In my opinion, the sentencing judge erred in not finding that the substantial emotional harm suffered by NB was a matter of aggravation with respect to the sentence relevant to each of the counts where she was the complainant.

Ground 3:   The sentencing judge misapplied the principle of totality in setting the aggregate sentence; and

Ground 4:   The sentence is manifestly inadequate.

87. The Crown submitted that these grounds could be dealt with together because the principal reason why the overall aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate was on account of the misapplication of the totality principle. The Crown did not submit that the sentencing judge misapprehended the totality principle; rather, the Crown submitted that the overall sentence, when judged against the indicative sentences, revealed that an excessive degree of concurrence had been allowed such that the resulting aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate.

88. The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence had to reflect the commission of seven offences against s 61I, and an attempted offence against that section, in relation to two separate complainants, over five separate episodes. Further, the sentence had to reflect the substantial emotional harm suffered by NB. The Crown submitted that none of the s 61I offences against NB was isolated, and the dissemination offences reflected discrete, serious criminality that called for a substantial degree of accumulation. The Crown submitted that the offences against NB were committed in circumstances where, to the respondent’s knowledge, NB’s will had been completely suborned on account of his threats.

89. The Crown submitted that a number of the sexual intercourse offences involved ejaculation, and the evidence was that the complainant was concerned about pregnancy. There was evidence that the respondent would not permit her to take the morning-after pill. The offences also involved anal penetration, fellatio, and the use of a vibrator.

90. The respondent submitted that there was no misapplication of the totality principle by the sentencing judge. The principle is designed to avoid a crushing sentence being imposed. The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge complied with what was said in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 and Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [26].

87. The respondent submitted that in the circumstances of this offending, the sentence imposed could be more concurrent than might be appropriate in other cases. The determination of concurrency was within the discretion of the sentencing judge.

88. The respondent submitted that the sentencing judge had appropriate regard to his subjective case, and properly made a finding of special circumstances.

89. The respondent submitted that the statistics show that the sentence imposed was within the upper range for offences against s 61I.

90. The respondent submitted that, of the cases put forward by the Crown, the only one that could properly be regarded as comparative was Mol v R [2017] NSWCCA 76.

Consideration

95. The principles upon which the Court determines an appeal concerning manifest inadequacy or manifest excess in a sentence are well-known. They were summarised in Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221 at [443].

96. In the present matter the basis for the manifest inadequacy is said to derive from error in relation to ground 1, a failure to apply the totality principle appropriately, and because the aggregate sentence does not properly reflect the serious criminality in the offending. In my opinion, a combination of the first two of those matters results in the sentence being manifestly inadequate.

97. In circumstances where the evidence demonstrated that NB had suffered substantial emotional harm, and that this aggravating factor was relevant to all of the offences, the error of the sentencing judge in not taking that aggravating factor into account must have resulted in indicative sentences which did not properly reflect the criminality associated with each of the offences.

98. Further, even if regard is had to the indicative sentences stipulated by the sentencing judge, the notional accumulation provided for by the aggregate sentence, when considered in the light of the indicative sentences, is inadequate and does not reflect the overall criminality in the offending.

99. In R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 Johnson J said (Hunt AJA and Latham J agreeing):

[134]   In R v Knight (2005) 155 A Crim R 252, the following was said, at 272 [112], concerning questions of accumulation, concurrence and totality:

“It is necessary to fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation, concurrence and totality. The total effective sentence must represent a proper period of incarceration for the totality of the criminality involved: R v AEM Snr at para 70; R v Kalache (2000) 111 A Crim R 152 at 184. The mechanism of making some sentences cumulative and others concurrent (or partly so) may be used where the aggregate of sentences imposed in respect of each count exceeds the appropriate total sentence: R v Myers [2002] NSWCCA 162 at para 34. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice by imposing sentences which do not suggest that multiple offences will be punished in the same way as one or two offences: R v Wheeler [2000] NSWCCA 34 at paras 36–37.”

[135]   A paramount principle for the law of sentencing is that the aggregate sentence should fairly and justly reflect the total criminality of the offender’s conduct. This principle applies in all cases, including those where punishment is imposed for multiple offences: R v Weldon (2002) 136 A Crim R 55 at 62 [46].

100. In Pannowitz v R [2016] NSWCCA 13, I said at [40] (Hoeben CJ at CL and Beech-Jones J agreeing):

In Regina v XX [2009] NSWCCA 115 Hall J (with whom Tobias JA and Kirby J agreed) set out at [52] a number of propositions that his Honour said could be derived from the case law. Those propositions focused on a consideration of the similarity, differences and the degree of connection between the offending both in time and type to ascertain the extent to which the sentence for one offence can comprehend and reflect the criminality of the other. To those matters may be added a need to ensure public confidence in the administration of criminal justice to avoid the perception that an offender will not be punished more severely for committing multiple offences: Khawaja v R [2014] NSWCCA 80 at [24]-[25] following R v Harris [2007] NSWCCA 130; (2007) 171 A Crim R 267 at [46].

101. His Honour found that counts 1, 3 and 4 were in the midrange of objective seriousness, counts 5, 7 and 8 were above the midrange, and count 6 (the attempt sexual intercourse) was at the top of the midrange. The separate offending against FP of sexual intercourse was found to be just below the midrange. All of these offences carried a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment, and all but the attempt had a standard non-parole period of 7 years.

102. Putting aside the fact that the counts of sexual intercourse were effectively representative counts, those involving NB occurred on four separate occasions over a period of two and half months. Throughout that time, the respondent effectively controlled NB by reason of the threats to disseminate a sex video of her to her family. The offence against FP was a further separate occasion.

103. The indicative sentences for counts 1, 3 and 4 were each imprisonment for 6 years and 6 months, for counts 5, 7 and 8 a term of 7 years and 6 months, and for count 6 a term of 6 years and 10 months. The indicative sentence in respect of the sexual assault of FP was 6 years’ imprisonment.

104. It can be seen, therefore, that the aggregate sentence involved an accumulation that recognised only slightly more than two separate occasions of offending, whether related to NB only or related to each of NB and FP. In that way, punishment for almost all of the other offences of sexual intercourse, attempted sexual intercourse and the dissemination offences is subsumed in a penalty for two offences only. Looked at more broadly, the indicative sentences total 63 years’ imprisonment, but the aggregate sentence is 12 years and 8 months. Whichever way the matter is approached, the aggregate sentence does not appropriately recognise the extent of the criminality involved, and gives the perception that the respondent is not being punished for committing multiple offences.

105. The respondent submitted that his subjective case otherwise mitigated the sentence, so that the aggregate sentence was not manifestly inadequate. It may be accepted, as the sentencing judge found, that the respondent suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, a Major Depressive Disorder and a Substance Use Disorder. Those disorders stemmed from childhood loss of his father and grandfather at an early age, sexual abuse by a neighbour when the respondent was aged between five and seven, and from persistent bullying by his brother throughout his childhood.

106. However, since the respondent maintained to the psychologist that both complainants consented to the sex, there is nothing but the mere fact of the disorders to make any causal connection between them and the offending. The psychologist said only that it was not clear if his substance use had any connection with the offending. At best, the disorders make the respondent’s detention in custody more onerous, as the sentencing judge found.

107. The sentencing judge was not satisfied on balance that the respondent had good prospects of rehabilitation and was unlikely to offend. His Honour further considered that both specific and general deterrence had a role to play. His Honour did find, in the respondent’s favour, that his criminal record did not disentitle him to leniency, and the way that the respondent conducted the trial was a mitigating factor in the sense of facilitating the course of justice. His Honour also found special circumstances because it was the respondent’s first time in custody and because he would need a longer period to assist in his rehabilitation.

108. In all of those circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the respondent’s subjective case should have mitigated very much the appropriate sentence by reason of the seriousness of the offending. That being so, and for the reasons given earlier, I consider that the aggregate sentence was manifestly inadequate.

Residual discretion

109. It must then be determined if the Crown has established that the residual discretion not to intervene should not be exercised, so that this Court would proceed to resentence the respondent.

110. In my opinion, the discretion not to intervene should not be exercised. The error made by the sentencing judge in not finding substantial emotional harm in relation to each of the offences is a matter of significance, particularly in the face of submissions made to him by the respondent that the dissemination offences had built into them injury to the complainant’s reputation, which was said to be aligned with emotional harm. The present appeal falls well within the class of case where the primary purpose of a Crown appeal is “to lay down principles for governance and guidance of courts having the duty of sentencing convicted persons”: Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293 at 310.

111. No procedural matters provide any support for the exercise of the residual discretion. The appeal was brought promptly, within one month of the sentence being imposed. No submission on the Crown’s part resulted in the error of the sentencing judge, there are no co-offenders for parity issues to arise, and the respondent is not eligible for parole until August 2028.

Resentence

112. Reference has been made already to the respondent’s subjective case. The respondent does not demonstrate that the diagnosed mental conditions from which he suffered were in any way causative of the offending about which, on the basis of the psychologist’s report, he does not appear to accept guilt. I agree that the respondent’s record does not disentitle him to leniency, with his previous offending having been sporadic, ceasing in 2008, and not previously involving sexual offences.

113. However, on 2 May 2022, the respondent was found guilty by a jury of three offences which occurred on 3 September 2020, some 15 months after the respondent’s arrest on the present charges and, seemingly, whilst he was on bail for the present charges. The first was a break and enter with intent to commit a serious indictable offence, namely, kidnapping. The other two offences were aggravated attempts to have sexual intercourse without consent, the aggravation being that he had deprived the complainant of liberty before the offences. The sentencing for these offences has been adjourned.

114. The sentencing judge in the present matter found that he could not be satisfied on balance that the respondent had good prospects of rehabilitation or that he was unlikely to offend. His Honour also considered that there was a role for both general and specific deterrence. The further offences reinforce those assessments with which I agree.

115. The sentencing judge accepted that the respondent’s mental conditions would make custody more onerous for him. Evidence received on the usual basis disclosed that the respondent had been affected by the Covid pandemic in the sense of frequent lockdowns, and an inability to have any contact with his mother or his children. The respondent has achieved various certificates of attainment for courses he has undertaken in custody.

116. I agree with the assessments of the sentencing judge in relation to the objective seriousness of the offending for each of the accounts. Nevertheless, the failure to take into account the substantial emotional harm sustained by the complainant means that the indicative sentences should be varied.

117. Both the Crown and the respondent provided a number of cases said to be comparative. These included Kentwell v R (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96, Ewen v R [2015] NSWCCA 117, Lee v R [2016] NSWCCA 66, and Mol v R [2017] NSWCCA 76. Whilst some of those cases might have suggested that the sentencing judge in the present case erred on the lenient side, none was really comparative for what occurred in the present case.

118. I would indicate the following sentences:

Counts 1,3 and 4:   7 years with a non-parole period of 4 years 6 months.

Counts 5, 7 and 8:   8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years 2 months.

Count 6:   7 years 2 months with a non-parole period of 4 years 8 months.

Counts 2, 10 and 11:   1 year 11 months

Count 9:         1 year 6 months.

119. No error was made in relation to the complainant FP, and I would not alter the indicative sentences provided for by the sentencing judge.

120. Taking into account that there were two complainants, the number of offences and occasions of the sexual intercourse and attempted sexual intercourse without consent, the dissemination offences, the period over which the offending occurred, and the extent of the physical and emotional abuse, particularly of NB, the overall criminality is at high level. I consider that the aggregate sentence should be 17 years’ imprisonment. I would find special circumstances because it is the respondent’s first time in custody and he will need longer time on parole to assist in his rehabilitation, particularly having regard to the later offending. The non-parole period should be 12 years.

121. I propose the following orders:

1. Appeal upheld.

2. Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court on 13 August 2021.

3. In lieu, sentence the respondent to an aggregate sentence of 17 years commencing 13 August 2020 and expiring 12 August 2037 with a non-parole period of 12 years expiring 12 August 2032.

4. The respondent will be first eligible for parole on 12 August 2032.

122. WILSON J:   I agree with Davies J.

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Amendments

29 September 2023 - Publication restriction lifted

Decision last updated: 29 September 2023