2.Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 19 December 2003 and in its place order:
(a)the appeal to that Court is allowed;
(b)set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Mackenzie J) made on 14 February 2003 and in their place order that the application for a statutory order of review is dismissed;
(c)the University pay the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal;
(d)the question of the costs of the application before Mackenzie J is remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
3.The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland
Representation:
P A Keane QC with S E Brown for the appellant (instructed by Minter Ellison)
A J H Morris QC with J P Murphy for the respondent (instructed by Dibbs Barker Gosling)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Griffith University v Tang
Administrative law – Judicial review – Exclusion of respondent from PhD candidature programme conducted by appellant – Where appellant is a body created by statute – Power of appellant to function as a university and to confer higher education awards derived from statute – Whether exclusion was a decision to which the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Q) applied – Whether exclusion was a decision made under an enactment – Relevance of nature of relationship subsisting between parties.
Words and phrases – "decision", "under an enactment", "of an administrative character", "required or authorised", "aggrieved by".
GLEESON CJ. The respondent brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Q) of a decision to exclude her from the PhD candidature programme conducted by the appellant. The decision was made on the ground that she had "undertaken research without regard to ethical and scientific standards" and had thereby engaged in "academic misconduct". The finding that there had been misconduct, and that exclusion was the appropriate response, was made by an Assessment Board, which was a sub-committee of the Research and Postgraduate Studies Committee of Griffith University. The respondent pursued an appeal procedure within the University. An Appeals Committee concluded that misconduct had occurred, that exclusion was appropriate, and that the appeal should be dismissed. The respondent contends that, at both levels, there were breaches of the requirements of natural justice, failures to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, improper exercises of power, and errors of law.
In her application for review, the respondent…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7
Case
[2005] HCA 7
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Griffith University against a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland's Court of Appeal. The dispute concerned the exclusion of Dr. Tang from a PhD candidature program conducted by the University. Griffith University, a statutory body with powers derived from legislation to function as a university and confer awards, had made the decision to exclude Dr. Tang.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether Dr. Tang's exclusion from the PhD program constituted a "decision to which the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) applied" and, more specifically, whether it was a "decision made under an enactment." The Court was required to determine the nature of the relationship between the University and Dr. Tang and how that relationship informed the characterisation of the University's decision.
The High Court reasoned that the relationship between a university and a student undertaking a higher degree by research is primarily contractual, not one arising from the exercise of statutory power. While the University's existence and powers are statutory, the decision to exclude a student from a candidature program is not a direct exercise of those statutory powers in the sense contemplated by the Judicial Review Act. Instead, it is a decision made pursuant to the terms of the agreement between the University and the student. Consequently, the Court held that the exclusion was not a decision made under an enactment for the purposes of the Judicial Review Act.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The application for statutory order of review was dismissed. The appellant, Griffith University, was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to the High Court, and the question of costs at first instance was remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 19 December 2003 and in its place order:
(a) the appeal to that Court is allowed;
(b) set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Mackenzie J) made on 14 February 2003 and in their place order that the application for a statutory order of review is dismissed;
(c) the University pay the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal;
(d) the question of the costs of the application before Mackenzie J is remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland.
3. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ