Fuller v Lawrence

Case [2024] HCA 45

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, GLEESON AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

BIANCA FULLER & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

MARK LAWRENCE  RESPONDENT

Fuller v Lawrence

[2024] HCA 45

Date of Hearing: 10 September 2024
Date of Judgment: 4 December 2024

B24/2024

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation

A D Scott KC with P K O'Higgins KC for the appellants (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

M Black with R H Berry for the respondent (instructed by Suncoast Community Legal Service)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Fuller v Lawrence

Administrative law – Judicial review – Decision of administrative character made under an enactment – Where prisoner was subject to supervision order of Supreme Court of Queensland – Where Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) required supervision order to contain requirement that prisoner comply with every reasonable direction of corrective services officer – Whether prisoner entitled to reasons for direction – Whether Act source of direction's effect on prisoner's legal obligations.

Words and phrases – "decision made under an enactment", "direction", "judicial review", "legal force or effect from statute", "legal rights or obligations", "statement of reasons", "supervision order".

Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), ss 13, 16, 16C, 20, 43AA.
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), ss 4, 30, 32, 33.

  1. GAGELER CJ, GORDON, EDELMAN, GLEESON AND BEECH-JONES JJ.   The issue raised by this appeal is whether a direction, given by a corrective services officer to a prisoner under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) ("the DPSO Act"), is subject to judicial review pursuant to the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) ("the Review Act"), so that the prisoner is entitled to receive a statement of reasons for the direction. That issue is determined by whether the direction is a decision of an administrative character "made ... under an enactment" within the meaning of the Review Act, as that phrase was explained by this Court in Griffith University v Tang ("Tang").[1]

  2. The respondent, Mr Lawrence, is the subject of a supervision order made by Bowskill J (as her Honour then was) on 16 April 2020 under s 13(5)(b) of the DPSO Act ("the Supervision Order"). Section 13(5) of the DPSO Act relevantly empowers the Supreme Court of Queensland to make an order that a prisoner "be released from custody subject to the requirements it considers appropriate that are stated in the order", if satisfied that the prisoner is a "serious danger to the community"[2] in the absence of such an order.[3] Section 16 of the DPSO Act specifies requirements that must be contained in a supervision order including, by s 16(1)(db), that the prisoner "comply with every reasonable direction of a corrective services officer that is not directly inconsistent with a requirement of the order".

    [2]A prisoner is a serious danger to the community if…

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Fuller v Lawrence [2024] HCA 45
Case
[2024] HCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a prisoner subject to a supervision order made by the Supreme Court of Queensland under the *Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003* (Qld). The prisoner contended that a direction given by a corrective services officer, which the prisoner was required to comply with under the supervision order, was invalid. The prisoner sought judicial review of the decision to issue the direction.

The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether the direction given by the corrective services officer was a "decision made under an enactment" for the purposes of administrative law. This involved considering whether the *Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003* (Qld) was the source of the direction's legal force and whether the prisoner was entitled to reasons for the direction.

The Court reasoned that a decision derives its legal force from an enactment if it takes legal force in part from that enactment. The Court found that the direction's purported efficacy depended on the making of a supervision order by a court, but this did not detract from the conclusion that the direction was "made under" the Act. The Act imposed an obligation on the prisoner to comply with every reasonable direction of a corrective services officer, and this obligation derived its force from the statute.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, EDELMAN, GLEESON AND BEECH-JONES JJ
The appellants' remaining argument was that there is no provision of the DPSO Act that imposes a consequence directly for noncompliance with a direction. Instead, the sole force of the obligation derives "indirectly" from provisions of the DPSO Act, including ss 20 and 43AA. However, as noted earlier, a decision which takes legal force in part from an enactment satisfies the second Tang criterion. It necessarily follows that, while the Direction Decision depends for its purported efficacy on the making of a supervision order by a court in the exercise of judicial power, this does not detract from the conclusion that the Direction Decision was "made under" the DPSO Act. Conclusion The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GORDON, EDELMAN, GLEESON AND BEECH-JONES JJ

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