JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: PATOLE -v- CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE [2024] WASCA 126
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
MITCHELL JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 4 DECEMBER 2023
DELIVERED : 9 OCTOBER 2024
FILE NO/S: CACV 124 of 2022
BETWEEN: SANJAY PATOLE
Appellant
AND
CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE
First Respondent
MARY SHARP
Second Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ARCHER J
Citation: PATOLE -v- CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH SERVICE [2022] WASC 401
File Number : CIV 1331 of 2021
Catchwords:
Administrative law - Application for certiorari or declaration - General law power to employ - Procedural fairness - Reasonable apprehension of bias - State capacity to contract - Capacity to contract not conditioned by requirement of procedural fairness
Legislation:
Health Services Act 2016 (WA), s 26, s 104, s 140
Public Sector Management (Breaches of Public Sector Standards) Regulations 2005 (WA), r 6(1), r 8
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA), s 7, s 8, s 9
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | M N Blandford |
| First Respondent | : | C S Bydder SC & D J Anderson |
| Second Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Hoe Lawyers |
| First Respondent | : | State Solicitor's Office |
| Second Respondent | : | Kemp & Associates |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Acquista Investments Pty Ltd v Urban Renewal Authority [2015] SASCFC 91; (2015) 123 SASR 147
Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1
Attorney-General (Tasmania) v Casimaty [2024] HCA 31
Australian National University v Burns (1982) 43 ALR 25
Australian National University v Lewins (1996) 68 FCR 87
Chief Executive Officer, Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority v Director of National Parks [2024] HCA 16; (2024) 98 ALJR 655
Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ Case) [1985] AC 374
Crouch v Commissioner of Railways (Qld) (1985) 159 CLR 22
Davis v Minister for Immigration [2023] HCA 10; (2023) 97 ALJR 214
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v State Bank of New South Wales (1992) 174 CLR 219
Director General, Department of Education v State School Teachers' Union [2021] WASCA 14
Director General, Department of Justice v Civil Service Association of Western Australia (Inc) [2005] WASCA 244; (2005) 149 IR 160
Disorganised Developments Pty Ltd v The State of South Australia [2023] HCA 22; (2023) 97 ALJR 575
Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425
Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Wilson [2017] HCA 30; (2017) 262 CLR 510
Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99
Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; (2005) 224 CLR 44
Khuu & Lee Pty Ltd v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2011] SASCFC 70; (2011) 110 SASR 235
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- Case
- [2024] WASCA 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the statutory and non-statutory powers of the executive government were exercised within their lawful limits, and whether there were any obligations of procedural fairness that applied to these powers. Specifically, the court needed to decide if the Child & Adolescent Health Service's capacity to contract was conditioned by a requirement of procedural fairness and whether the Health Service's actions had breached any legal principles governing the exercise of its powers.
In its reasoning, the court examined the statutory provisions and common law principles relevant to the powers of the executive government. It found that while statutory powers may generally be subject to procedural fairness, this was not necessarily the case for non-statutory powers, which are derived from the executive's inherent authority. The court highlighted that statutory interpretation plays a crucial role in identifying the limits of such powers and that these limits must be determined by a close reading of the relevant statutes. The court also noted that the capacity to contract of the executive government is not inherently conditioned by procedural fairness unless explicitly stated or implied by statute. The court concluded that the Health Service had not acted outside the scope of its lawful powers and that no breach of procedural fairness had occurred.
As a result of the court's findings, the application for certiorari and declaration was dismissed. The court upheld the Health Service's actions and confirmed that its capacity to contract was not subject to the requirement of procedural fairness in the circumstances of this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Identifying the limits of, and conditions for the valid exercise of, a statutory power is entirely a question of statutory construction. The process may be informed by presumptions forming part of the rules of statutory construction. For example, common law rules of statutory construction start with the assumption that the rules of procedural fairness condition the valid exercise of certain kinds of statutory power.[3] A statute which contains an express or implied condition to be observed in a decision‑making process is ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non‑compliance.[4] However, these presumptive rules of statutory construction, while they may assist in identifying the limits on the relevant power, do not provide the answer in all cases. It is always necessary to construe the relevant statute to determine the limits of the statutory power under consideration in the particular case.[3] Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration [2012] HCA 31; (2012) 246 CLR 636 [97].[4] LPDT [7]. The courts may also be called on to enforce the legal limits on the 'prerogative' powers of public bodies and officers.[5] Reference to the 'prerogative' in this context may be to the 'residue of miscellaneous fields of law in which the executive government retains decision‑making powers that are not dependent on any statutory authority'.[6] It may also be to the 'special powers, greater than those possessed by individuals, which the Crown can exercise by virtue of the Royal authority'.[7] As the term 'prerogative' can conceal more than it illuminates in this field, in these reasons we will refer to the non‑statutory powers of the executive government. [5] See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ Case) [1985] AC 374; Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; (2005) 224 CLR 44 [69].[6] See Lord Diplock in the GCHQ case at 409, cited in Jarrett at [80].[7] Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139, 156 (Griffith CJ). Courts exercising judicial review jurisdiction may enforce the legal limits of the non‑statutory powers of an executive government to enter into contracts.[8] Courts may also enforce the legal limits of a non‑statutory power of the executive government which is conditioned by an obligation to accord procedural fairness to a person whose interests may be affected by the exercise of that power.[9] The court's judicial review jurisdiction also extends to enforcing legal limits on the non‑statutory powers of an executive government which may be imposed by statute.[10] [8] As occurred in Williams v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 23; (2012) 248 CLR 156 and Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] [2014] HCA 23; (2014) 252 CLR 416.[9] As occurred in The State of Victoria v Master Builders' Association of Victoria [1995] 2 VR 121 and cf MBA Land Holdings Pty Ltd v Gungahlin Development Authority [2000] ACTSC 89; (2000) 206 FLR 120 [220] (where the existence of a tender process contract may have made resort to the concept of procedural fairness unnecessary).[10] As occurred in Davis v Minister for Immigration [2023] HCA 10; (2023) 97 ALJR 214.