Delpachitra v University of Technology Sydney

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Delpachitra v University of Technology Sydney [2023] FCA 18  

File number: SAD 124 of 2020
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J
Date of judgment: 20 January 2023
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Interlocutory application by applicant under r 16.53 of Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) for leave to file a second further amended statement of claim (SFASOC) — where applicant brings claims under Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RD Act), Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) (AD Act) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) concerning circumstances surrounding non-renewal of employment with respondent in position based at Shanghai University, Shanghai, China — where applicant seeks compensation including for loss of base salary under alleged employment contract with Shanghai University — where applicant has had prior opportunities to address appropriate pleading of his case — where critical paragraphs in SFASOC alleging breaches of RD Act, AD Act and FWA ambiguous in that not clear how pleadings of matters of law relate to accompanying paragraphs which applicant submits particularise allegations of breach — order refusing leave to file a SFASOC
Legislation:

Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), ss 14, 18(1)(a)-(c) & (2)(a) & (d), 56, 57

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 46PR, 49PH(1B)(b)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 3, 50, 171

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.02(2)(d), 16.53

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), ss 9(1), 9(1A), 15(1)(a) & (b) and (2)

Cases cited:

Amcor Ltd  Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241

Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association v Qantas Airways Ltd [2022] FCAFC 50

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Skilled Engineering Ltd [2003] FCA 260

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337

Delpachitra v University of Technology Sydney [2022] FCA 22

Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182

Maiocchi v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2014] FCA 301

McAleer v University of Western Australia (No 3) [2008] FCA 1490; (2008) 171 FCR 499

Spiteri v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 905

Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd v Marmara [2014] FCAFC 84; (2014) 222 FCA 152

Wotton & Ors v Queensland (No 5) [2016] FCA 1457; (2016) 352 ALR 146

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 101
Date of hearing: 17 June 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C Munt
Solicitor for the Applicant: Matti Lamb & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms K Edwards
Solicitor for the Respondent: Moray & Agnew Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 124 of 2020
BETWEEN:

SARATH DELPACHITRA

Applicant

 AND:

UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY SYDNEY, ABN 77 257 686 961

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JANUARY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to file…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Delpachitra sought leave to file a second further amended statement of claim against the University of Technology Sydney (UTS). The applicant alleged that the university had not renewed his employment, which was based in Shanghai, China, in violation of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth), and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The university opposed the application, arguing that the pleading was the eighth iteration and that the applicant had ample opportunity to plead his case correctly. The central legal issue was whether the court should grant leave for the applicant to file a second further amended statement of claim.

The court found that the proposed pleading was substantially similar to the one previously struck out by Besanko J, and the applicant had not sufficiently addressed the issues raised in the strike-out decision. Specifically, the applicant had not clarified how the pleadings of the matters of law related to the allegations of breach. The court also noted that the proposed pleading was ambiguous and did not provide a clear statement of the material facts said to found the claims against the university. The court held that leave to amend would not be granted if the pleading was liable to be struck out, and the proposed pleading was no different from the one previously struck out. The court refused the applicant's application for leave to file a second further amended statement of claim.

In conclusion, the court refused the applicant's application for leave to file a second further amended statement of claim against the University of Technology Sydney. The court held that the proposed pleading was substantially similar to the one previously struck out and that the applicant had not sufficiently addressed the issues raised in the strike-out decision. The court also noted that the proposed pleading was ambiguous and did not provide a clear statement of the material facts said to found the claims against the university. The court held that leave to amend would not be granted if the pleading was liable to be struck out, and the proposed pleading was no different from the one previously struck out.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to file a second further amended statement of claim is refused.

2. I will hear the parties as to any further orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The pleading now proposed to be filed is different both in form and substance to that which Besanko J ordered be struck out. The applicant continues to press causes of action based on alleged contraventions of s 9(1), alternatively s 9(1A) and ss 15(1)(a), 1(b), and/or (2) of the Racial Discrimination Act1975 (Cth) (RDA): at [37]-[45]; further or in the alternative for contraventions of ss 14, 18(1), 18(2), 56 and 57 of the Age Discrimination Act2004 (Cth) (ADA): at [46]-[56]. The applicant has now introduced a cause of action for a contravention of s 50 of the Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) (FWA): at [57]-[66].Pleaded Background The following matters are taken from the proposed pleading. The applicant is of Sri Lankan ethnicity, was at all material times an Australian citizen, and was employed by the respondent from 30 May 2016 until 31 May 2019. The respondent is an Australian University which, from in or about 1994, established and continues to operate an overseas business school known as “SHU-UTS SILC Business School” (SHU-UTS Business School) in conjunction with Shanghai University, Shanghai, China. It is alleged that the respondent is, “… in a partnership or joint-venture with Shanghai University, through a partnership or joint-venture known as ‘Sydney Institute of Language and Commerce’ or ‘SILC’, comprising a partnership between the respondent, UTS:Insearch and Shanghai University (the SILC Partnership)”. On or about 25 March 2016, the respondent offered, and the applicant accepted, a three year fixed term contract of employment for the applicant to work in Shanghai in the position of Director and Professor of the SHU-UTS Business School (UTS Contract). The term of the UTS Contract was from 1 May 2016 until 31 May 2019. The applicant was employed on a full-time basis with the UTS Contract covering the applicant for a 0.2 fractional appointment and an employment contract from Shanghai University covering the remaining 0.8 of the applicant’s full-time employment. It was a condition of the applicant’s employment with the respondent that he enter into a contract with Shanghai University, which he did on or about 18 March 2016 (first Shanghai University Contract). The term of the first Shanghai University Contract was from 1 June 2016 to 31 May 2019. As at the date of the UTS Contract, there was an applicable UTS Enterprise Agreement between the respondent and its employees (2014 UTS Enterprise Agreement). The 2014 UTS Enterprise Agreement was replaced with effect from 27 December 2018 (2018 UTS Enterprise Agreement) such that it was in place at the end of the applicant’s fixed term of employment under the UTS Contract. The applicant alleges a term of the 2018 UTS Enterprise Agreement had the effect that if the respondent decided to continue the position occupied by the applicant on a fixed term basis, the applicant will be offered further employment in that position, having been employed through a merit selection process and provided his performance in the position had been satisfactory. I deal with that allegation below.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 25 January 2022, Besanko J ordered the applicant’s further amended statement of claim dated 19 March 2021 be struck out: Delpachitra v University of Technology Sydney [2022] FCA 22 (strike out decision). Subsequently, the applicant applied for leave to file a second further amended statement of claim pursuant to r 16.53 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), ultimately in the form of the annexure to the applicant’s outline of submissions filed 6 May 2022. The sole issue in this case is whether leave should be granted to file the second further amended statement of claim. It is for the reasons that are set out below that leave to file the second further amended statement of claim is refused. The applicant made a complaint against the respondent to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) in relation to the matters the subject of these proceedings. The complaint was terminated pursuant to s 49PH(1B)(b) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act). The originating application was brought under the AHRC Act. As part of his submissions, counsel for the applicant referred to s 46PR of the AHRC Act which provides that the Court is not bound by technicalities or legal forms. Besanko J dealt with the same submission in the strike out decision at [10] holding that in his Honour’s view the correct position was as stated by Robertson J in Maiocchi v Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists [2014] FCA 301 at [8]. In that matter, his Honour considered that s 46PR did not prevent the appropriate application of the relevant rules of the Court which, in part, provide procedural fairness to other parties, and in the case of the respondent, in terms of being faced with a clear statement of the material facts said to found the claims against it. Counsel for the applicant accepted that the relevant rules as to pleadings apply, as appropriate, to provide procedural fairness to the respondent.Principles There is no dispute between the parties concerning the relevant principles. Although this is an application to file an amended statement of claim, nonetheless the principles applicable to a strikeout are relevant since leave to amend will not be granted if, amongst other things, the pleading is liable to be struck out. In the strikeout decision, Besanko J summarised the position at [7] on the question of strikeout and [44] on the question of leave to amend:[7]The power to strike out pleadings or portions of pleadings is discretionary and it should be employed sparingly and only in a clear case (Radisich v McDonald [2010] FCA 762; (2010) 198 IR 244 at [20] per Gilmour J). A pleading may be struck out, in whole or in part, on the basis of any one or any number of the grounds listed in r 16.21(1). Ultimately, whether a pleading is struck out depends upon whether, in the particular circumstances, it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice (John Holland Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [2009] FCA 437 at [60]–[61] per Graham J).[44]The starting point is that leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading is liable to be struck out or the matter the amendment would raise is unlikely to succeed (Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 320; (2009) 176 FCR 66 at [21]–[22] per Kenny J). There is a broad discretion under r 16.53 (University of Sydney v ResMed Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 232 at [14] per Stone J) and relevant matters include the importance of the amendment to the party applying for it, the stage of the proceeding at which leave to amend is sought, the explanation for any delay in applying for leave and the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system if the Court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification (see Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 at [30] per French CJ; at [111]–[114] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) and Bell J).The proposed second further amended statement of claim

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant alleges the employment relationship between him and the respondent ended on 31 May 2019.Pleaded cause of action - parties’ submissions and consideration The respondent opposes leave being granted. It submits that in reality, when different versions of the proposed pleading are counted, this is the eighth iteration of the pleading. In fairness to the applicant, some of those iterations have addressed corrections to previous versions but the point remains valid that the pleading the applicant now seeks leave to file is at least the fourth iteration of the statement of claim. The respondent submits that if leave is not granted, the proceeding should be dismissed. Alternatively, the applicant should be granted leave to plead only those paragraphs that are not prejudicial or embarrassing and are capable of sustaining an arguable case against the respondents.Strike out decision - issues not addressed The respondent refers to [54] and [55] of the strike out decision and two issues that arise from those paragraphs. First, that insofar as the applicant pleaded it was necessary for the respondent to procure the employment of the applicant with Shanghai University, that only dealt with the period 2016 - 2019 and not to the possibility of renewal of the applicant’s employment (contract renewed issue). Second, if the plea seeks to engage s 15(2) of the RDA, that plea appeared to have been abandoned before Besanko J (s 15(2) RDA issue). The applicant submits that [16] of the proposed pleading addresses those issues. The respondent submits that that paragraph does not do so.Contract renewal issue As to the first issue, Besanko J observed at [54] and [55] that:54The applicant also proposes to amend para 5.1 of the FASOC so that there is an allegation that in order to pursue its collaboration with Shanghai University, it was necessary for the respondent to procure the employment of the applicant with and for Shanghai University (schedule para 5).55There are problems with this plea. First, it is arguably a plea only as to matters pertaining to the period between 2016 and 2019 and not as to the possibility of renewal of the applicant’s employment. That is to say, there seems to me to be a distinction between the contract of employment and any further contract of employment. Secondly, if it is a plea seeking to engage s 15(2) of the RD Act the problem with that is that reliance on s 15(2) seems to have been disclaimed, a matter which I will discuss further below. The applicant submits the chapeau to [16], which pleads that the applicant’s employment with the respondent under the UTS Contract and with Shanghai University were interrelated and his ongoing employment for a further term was conditional and dependent upon his ongoing employment with the respondent and Shanghai University, addresses this issue. In support of that plea, the applicant pleads seven sub-paragraphs. None of those sub-paragraphs provide support for the allegation in the chapeau insofar as it pleads ongoing employment by the respondent and Shanghai University.Section 15(2) RDA issue