Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCA 320

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend statement of claim and for further discovery – amendments sought to rely on doctrine of spoliation – whether proposition to be relied on at trial misconceived in law – whether proposed pleadings embarrassing and directed to matters of evidence – application refused  

Gray v Haig (1855) 20 Beav 219 referred to
The Ophelia [1916] 2 AC 206 referred to
Allen v Tobias (1958) 98 CLR 367 referred to
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 cited

The Oxford English Dictionary

RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD and RESEARCH IN MOTION AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 101 291 425) v SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 915 647)

VID 928 of 2007

KENNY J
6 APRIL 2009
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 928 of 2007

BETWEEN:

RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD
First Applicant

RESEARCH IN MOTION AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 101 291 425)
Second Applicant

AND:

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 915 648)
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 APRIL 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants have leave to amend their statement of claim to incorporate the proposed amendments to paragraph 21 thereof, as set out in Annexure A to the notice of motion dated 19 March 2009.

2.The motion, notice of which is dated 19 March 2009, be otherwise dismissed.

3.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 928 of 2007

BETWEEN:

RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD
First Applicant

RESEARCH IN MOTION AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 101 291 425)
Second Applicant

AND:

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 002 915 647)
Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

6 APRIL 2009

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicants market and produce a device known as “BlackBerry”. The respondent markets and produces a device known as “BlackJack”. To date, the applicants plead against the respondent: (1) trademark infringement; (2) contraventions of ss 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth); and (3) passing off. A trial of the proceeding is fixed to begin on 20 April 2009.

  2. The applicants apply, by a notice of motion dated 19 March 2009, for, amongst other things, leave to serve an Amended Statement of Claim and further discovery. 

  3. The proposed amendments fell into two categories.  The first was an amendment to [21(b)], which, at the hearing of the motion, the respondent did not oppose.  For reasons canvassed at that hearing, I would grant the leave sought to amend this paragraph in the manner sought.  The second more substantive amendments were proposed to be introduced as [28A] to [28K]. 

  4. The applicants invited the Court to consider the amendments in…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 320
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Research in Motion Ltd brought an action against Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia, seeking relief for alleged infringement of intellectual property rights. The primary dispute centred on whether Samsung had infringed on Research in Motion’s patents related to BlackBerry technology. The court was required to determine whether Research in Motion’s statement of claim complied with the procedural rules governing pleadings, particularly regarding the distinction between material facts and evidence. Additionally, the court had to decide if the proposed amendments to the statement of claim were permissible under the rules of court and whether they were necessary to avoid prejudice or delay in the proceedings.

The court examined the distinction between facts to be pleaded and evidence to be presented. It noted that while a pleading must include a summary of material facts, it should not detail the evidence supporting those facts. The court applied Order 11 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules, which mandates that a pleading must contain only a summary of material facts, and Order 11 rule 16, which allows for the striking out of pleadings that cause prejudice, embarrassment, or delay. The court also considered Order 13 rule 2, which grants the court discretion to allow amendments to pleadings. The applicants argued that their proposed amendments were necessary to avoid delay and were supported by legal precedents. However, the court found that the applicants’ proposed amendments were misconceived in law, as they attempted to introduce evidentiary matters into the pleading. The court also noted that the proposed pleading would be embarrassing and did not meet the criteria for amendment as it primarily related to evidence.

Consequently, the court declined to grant leave for the applicants to amend their statement of claim. The court held that the applicants’ proposed amendments were misconceived in point of law, would cause embarrassment, and primarily involved evidentiary matters rather than material facts. The applicants' reliance on the principle from Gray v Haig, which pertains to evidentiary issues, was deemed inappropriate as it did not align with the procedural requirements for pleadings. The court dismissed the motion to amend the statement of claim, except for a specific amendment to paragraph 21, as set out in Annexure A to the notice of motion dated 19 March 2009.

ORDERS:
1. The applicants have leave to amend their statement of claim to incorporate the proposed amendments to paragraph 21, as set out in Annexure A to the notice of motion dated 19 March 2009.
2. The motion, notice of which is dated 19 March 2009, be otherwise dismissed.
3. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants have leave to amend their statement of claim to incorporate the proposed amendments to paragraph 21 thereof, as set out in Annexure A to the notice of motion dated 19 March 2009.

2. The motion, notice of which is dated 19 March 2009, be otherwise dismissed.

3. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the motion.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

The applicants replied to the claim of delay, by noting that they relied on Ms Goodridge’s affidavit of 11 July 2008; and further that the respondent alleged no prejudice.CONSIDERATION Order 11 rule 2 provides that a pleading shall contain “and contain only” a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party relies, but “not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved”. Material facts are not limited to the cause of action but extend to the relief being sought and generally so that there is no chance of surprise. The evidence upon which facts are to be established is not to be pleaded. It is not always easy to distinguish between facts to be pleaded and evidence that should not. Order 11 rule 16 provides that, where a pleading has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding, the Court may order that it be struck out. Naturally, the Court would not give leave to amend in respect of a pleading that was liable to be struck out. Order 13 rule 2 confers on the Court a wide discretion to allow amendment of a pleading in an appropriate case. If the matter that the amendment would raise is unlikely to succeed, then leave will generally not be given. For the reasons to be stated, I would not grant such leave in this case because: (1) the propositions that the applicants seek to advance in support of their case are misconceived in point of law; (2) the proposed pleading would be embarrassing within the meaning of O 11 r 16; and (3) the proposed pleading is in the main directed to matters of evidence. In order to explain why I have reached this conclusion, it is necessary to examine the three cases relied on by the applicants to support their pleading. Gray v Haig (1855) 20 Beav 219 concerned one Mr Gray, who was the agent for Haig & Son, selling whisky on commission. When his agency ended, a dispute arose as to the amount of the commission due and an account was ordered. However, after the dispute arose, Gray destroyed the books, on which the taking of the account depended. The Master of the Rolls held, at 226, that:In a case before me this year, one partner, several years before the institution of the suit, and upwards of twenty years after the closing of the partnership business, and when the accounts had been settled between him and his partners by arbitration, and never afterwards opened or disputed, had destroyed the books which contained the accounts of that partnership, I treated lightly the circumstance of that destruction, and did not suffer it to prejudice his case. But the case is very different when the transactions to which they relate are recent, where the accounts arising from them have not been finally adjusted, or the balance ascertained or paid, and still more when that destruction takes place by the person who has actually filed a bill to have the accounts taken of those very transactions to which these books relate. In such a case some very cogent reason must be given to satisfy the Court that the destruction was proper or justifiable, and, in the absence of any such satisfactory reason, which is the fact here, I am compelled to act on the principle laid down in the well-known case of Armory v Delamirie (1 Strange, 505), and presume, as against the person who destroyed the evidence, everything most unfavourable to him, which is consistent with the rest of the facts, which are either admitted or proved.Counsel for the applicants stated that this was the applicants’ “inspiration for [their] plea”. The passage makes it clear, however, that the principle that was under discussion was essentially an evidentiary principle, the application of which depended on the particular circumstances of the case. These circumstances included that the documents in question were essential to the taking of the account and destroyed by the very person who sought the relief at a time when the account was yet to be taken. The destruction of the documents in this circumstance was reprehensible and not merely mistaken.