Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 1005

File number: NSD 374 of 2017
Judge: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 4 July 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application – application for leave to amend an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – circumstances in which the Court may go behind a judgment on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – whether the Court must satisfy itself that the debt on which the creditor proceeds is a just and proper debt – distinction made between proceedings involving a creditor’s petition and the making of a sequestration order under s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act – where the amendments raise a cross-claim within s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act – where the bankruptcy notice is issued as a result of consent orders – application refused
Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 30, 40, 41, 52

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 192A, 79

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 31A, 37M; 37P

Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) regs 4.01, 4.02

Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) r 3.02

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 1.32

Cases cited:

Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) [1987] FCA 504; (1987) 76 ALR 137

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175

Byron v Southern Star Group [1997] FCA 151; (1997) 73 FCR 264

Chancliff Holdings Pty Ltd v Bell [1999] FCA 1708

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Rafidi [2016] NSWSC 381

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Rafidi [2016] NSWSC 1931

Corney v Brien [1951] HCA 31; (1951) 84 CLR 343

Ebert v Union Trustee Company of Australia Limited [1960] HCA 50;(1960) 104 CLR 346

Ex parte Banner; Inre Blythe (1881) 17 Ch D 480

Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598

Harrison v Charalambous [1999] FCA 902

Jeans v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2003] FCAFC 309; (2003) 204 ALR 327

Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176; (2014) 319 ALR 646

Olivieri v Stafford [1989] FCA 731; (1989) 24 FCR 413

Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2017] NSWCA 96

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; (2017) 345 ALR 534

Re A Debtor [1929] 1 Ch. 125

ReBriggs; Ex Parte Briggs v Deputy Commission of Taxation (WA) [1986] FCA 512; (1986) 12 FCR 310

Re Brink; ex parte The Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 135

Re Halstead; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation  [1991] FCA 788; (1991) 31 FCR 337

Smith v Abbott, Stillman & Wilson [2007] FCA 1256

Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm), in the matter of Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 1098

Tamaya Resources Limited (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) [2016] FCAFC 2

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1005
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the applicant, Mr Rafidi, sought leave to amend his application to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA). The application raised issues concerning the validity of the bankruptcy notice and the circumstances under which the court could go behind a judgment on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. The case involved a complex background of alleged misconduct by the CBA and a dispute over the validity of a consent order that was the basis for the bankruptcy notice.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the court could go behind a judgment on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice, and whether the court must satisfy itself that the debt on which the creditor proceeds is a just and proper debt. The court also had to consider the distinction between proceedings involving a creditor's petition and the making of a sequestration order under section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the court had to determine whether the amendments raised a cross-claim within section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, and whether the bankruptcy notice was issued as a result of consent orders.

The court concluded that the application for leave to amend the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice should proceed to a hearing based on the vitiated consent allegations. The court found that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice should proceed to a hearing based on the vitiated consent allegations, and that the court would deal with the question of costs at the final hearing. The court dismissed the interlocutory application filed by Mr Rafidi and ordered that the parties confer and supply draft short minutes of order to the court within 14 days, setting out a timetable of the steps required to bring the proceedings to final hearing. The court also extended the time within which Mr Rafidi must comply with the bankruptcy notice until final hearing or as otherwise ordered by the court.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that consent orders are obtained fairly and without any vitiating factors, such as fraud or misconduct. It also underscores the need for careful consideration of the circumstances in which a court may go behind a judgment on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice, and the importance of satisfying itself that the debt on which the creditor proceeds is a just and proper debt.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 29 August 2017 be dismissed with the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs thereof.

2. The parties confer and supply draft short minutes of order to the Court within 14 days, setting out a timetable of the steps required to bring the proceedings to final hearing, marking up any areas of disagreement.

3. The proceedings be listed for a case management hearing at 9.30am on 30 July 2018.

4. The time within which the applicant must comply with Bankruptcy Notice BN212149 issued on 21 February 2017 be extended until final hearing or as otherwise ordered by the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the second interlocutory application, the CBA seeks preliminary rulings as to the admissibility of the affidavit evidence filed on behalf of Mr Rafidi pursuant to s 192A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) or alternatively summary disposal of the proceedings and certain orders as to costs. Orders in accordance with the first two of these are unnecessary in light of my conclusion in relation to the amendment application, and are in any event unlikely to be appropriate in the case of an application to set aside a Bankruptcy Notice. In the result, Mr Rafidi’s application to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice should proceed to hearing based on the vitiated consent allegations. I will deal with the question of costs at the final hearing. 2. THE PROCEEDINGS2.1 Background events On 16 March 2017 Mr Rafidi filed an application in the present proceedings seeking first, a declaration that the Bankruptcy Notice was not technically valid under the Act because at the time it was issued there was not attached to it a final judgment or order as required under the Act. Secondly, a declaration that there is in truth no indebtedness due by Mr Rafidi to the CBA for the reasons set out in a document attached to the application, styled “statement of claim”. Thirdly, an order that the Bankruptcy Notice be set aside. The statement of claim is some 23 pages in length and alleges that the Consent Orders arose from proceedings that did not adjudicate on matters that were the subject of the proceedings and was obtained by misfeasance. It asserts that the Consent Orders represent a judgment that a Court exercising jurisdiction in Bankruptcy can and should go behind. The reasons advanced in the document may be broadly summarised as follows. First, when the CBA acquired all of the share capital in BankWest in December 2008 it hatched a scheme (the statement of claim refers to it as the “plan”) that involved conducting a review of the commercial loan book of BankWest, transferring the facilities of certain performing loans to the credit asset management (CAM) department of that bank and writing the loans off, including the BBC facilities and Mr Rafidi’s guarantee of those facilities. The statement of claim alleges that this affected 1,958 commercial loans made by BankWest. Receivers were appointed in respect of the loans and the guarantors were pursued into bankruptcy in respect of any alleged shortfall. Central to achieving the purpose of the plan was the writing off and removal of performing loans from the loan book of BankWest sooner than it was legally entitled to do so. The statement of claim refers to the Supreme Court Proceedings and over 12 other legal proceedings, enquiries or incidents (named in the document as “scandals”) that Mr Rafidi contends reflect misbehaviour undertaken by the CBA which are apparently said to be in some way related to the execution of the plan. The alleged purpose of the plan was to switch the weight of the BankWest loan book away from commercial lending and towards residential lending which was said to be to the benefit of the profitability of the CBA. Secondly, the statement of claim alleges that the CBA engaged in 13 listed forms of misconduct during the course of the Supreme Court Proceedings. One is that the CBA falsely accused Mr Rafidi of fabricating a letter dated 14 January 2009 that is said to have contained a material offer of accommodation from BankWest (the 14 January 2009 letter). Others include making false statements to the Court, placing a fraudulent document in the court book, failing to produce documents as required, applying its skills and those of senior counsel in fraud and fabrication in order to obtain the Consent Orders and conceal the plan and failing to consent to the setting aside of the Consent Orders. By reason of these matters the statement of claim alleges that; the plan was a fraud or equitable fraud on the BBC facility and the guarantee given by Mr Rafidi; the debt that supports the Bankruptcy Notice arises by reason of misfeasance; and by reason of that fraud, the Court is asked to go behind the Consent Orders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 17 November 2016 Mr Rafidi filed a notice of motion to have the Consent Orders set aside. That application was rejected by Ball J (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Rafidi [2016] NSWSC 1931 – Consent Orders judgment) who found that as a result of developments in the case, Mr Hall, solicitor, who was by then acting for Mr Rafidi, indicated to the Court on 2 November 2016 that he had instructions to consent to entry of judgment on the CBA’s claim and Mr Rafidi’s cross-claim in favour of the CBA. The Court did not enter judgment at that time because Mr Rafidi was in the process of seeking the consent of insurers to that course of action. The matter was stood over until 4 November 2016. On 4 November 2016, judgment was entered in favour of the CBA. Before it was entered, senior counsel for the CBA produced lengthy submissions in support of an order that Mr Rafidi pay the CBA’s costs on an indemnity basis and in support of an application that the papers in the matter be referred to the appropriate authorities for investigation into the question of whether criminal charges should be laid against Mr Rafidi, amongst others, in connection with the matters that were the subject of the proceedings. One aspect of the referral concerned the contention advanced by the CBA that the 14 January 2009 letter was a fabrication. The application for referral was stood over until 14 December 2016. On that day his Honour dealt with the Notice of Motion seeking to set aside judgment. His Honour records that the only reason advanced by Mr Rafidi for why the judgment should have been set aside was to give him an opportunity to clear his name in light of the application for the Court to refer the papers to the authorities. His Honour concluded that that was not a sufficient basis on which to set aside the judgment, first, because there was no evidence from Mr Rafidi that he had not appreciated that the papers could be referred, or that that would have made a difference to his decision to consent to judgment. At the time, Mr Rafidi was legally represented and was on notice through his legal representative that an application would be made for the referral of the papers following entry of the judgment. Secondly, the application to set aside the judgment was misconceived in any event, because the decision to refer the papers involved an independent administrative decision by the Court. Thirdly, because it was far from clear to his Honour that Mr Rafidi could have taken further steps to clear his name. Most of the witnesses he intended to call had given evidence, and it was apparent that their evidence had gone badly for his case and that his prospects of success were poor. Mr Rafidi had given his evidence in chief through affidavits and, although his cross-examination was not completed, he had been cross-examined extensively. His Honour found at [11]: … It may be inferred that Mr Rafidi consented to judgment against him because, having regard to developments in the case, it was apparent that his prospects of success were poor. In my opinion, it was not in the interests of justice to permit Mr Rafidi to resile from the position he took previously, presumably on legal advice, to achieve a collateral benefit that he thought would arise from pursuing the court proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The proposed amended application deleted references to the statement of claim and seeks the following relief:Concerning the Bankruptcy notice referred to in this application, (a copy of which is annexed as “A”), and on the grounds stated in the statement of claim (a copy of which is annexed as “B”) and the accompanying affidavit(s) including the affidavit of Iyad Rafidi sworn 16 March 2017, the Applicant claims:1.A Declaration that the document described Bankruptcy Notice BN212149, issued on 21 February 2017 and served on 24 February 2017 … is not a Bankruptcy Notice as required or contemplated at the time of issue pursuant to s 40(1)(g), s 41, Bankruptcy Regulations 4.01 and 4.02 or the prescribed for[m] of Bankruptcy Notice contained in Schedule 1 to the Bankruptcy Regulations, in that at the time of the issue of the document, there was not attached to the signed form of Bankruptcy Notice, a final judgment or order as required;2.An Order for the purposes of section 30 of the Act that this Court go behind the judgment upon which the Bankruptcy Notice is based and that this Court determine that for the purposes of jurisdiction in bankruptcy the judgment is not a proper judgment and does not evidence what for the purposes of exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy is in substance and effect a true and proper debt.3.A Declaration that upon a consideration of the facts and circumstances existing, there is in truth no indebtedness due by the Applicant to the Respondent for the reasons set forth in the document entitled Statement of Claim and that the judgment is not a proper judgment for the purposes of a Court where exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy;4.An Order pursuant to s 30 of the Bankruptcy Act 1996, that Bankruptcy Notice BN212149 issued on 21 February 2017 and that was served on 24 February 2017, a copy of which is attached and marked “A”, be set aside;5.Costs. It will be seen that the technical objection in paragraph 1 of the claim for relief remains, and that paragraphs 2 and 3 assert, in effect, that there exists a reason why the Court would go behind the Consent Orders and find that there is in fact no debt owed. Immediately after the claim for relief, the draft amended application contains the following grounds, which appear to be directed towards the claim in paragraphs 2 and 3: (a) There is reason for questioning whether behind the creditor’s judgment, there is in truth and in substance, (and in so far as concerns the obligations of the debtor said to arise by reason of a contract of guarantee), a debt that is in fact due and owing to the creditor.(b) There are substantial reasons upon which a Court seized with jurisdiction in bankruptcy would seek to question whether the debtor is in truth and in fact, indebted to the creditor. (c) The effect of those substantial reasons is that this Court where exercising jurisdiction in bankruptcy, could not and would not be satisfied that there is any satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor’s debt or claim.(d) A court where called upon to exercise jurisdiction in Bankruptcy will be compelled to conclude in the affirmative, that there are substantial reasons to go behind the creditor’s judgment.(e) It is an abuse of process for the creditor to have issued the Notice with the intended effect that it would create an act of bankruptcy, where the judgment referred to in the Notice is not a proper judgment for the purposes of the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction in bankruptcy.(f) Alternatively, where the judgment does not evidence a proper debt for the purposes of the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction in bankruptcy, the Notice should be properly set aside and in order to avoid further litigation arising out of the Notice between the Applicant and the Respondent, as will otherwise needlessly follow.