Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liquidation)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2014] FCA 461

Citation: Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2014] FCA 461
Parties:

PEI XU v WAN ZE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (AUST) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 131 642 147, HONG JIANG and YONGAN XIE

KE QIN REN V WAN ZE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (AUST) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 131 642 147, HONG JIANG and YONGAN XIE

File numbers: NSD 1339 of 2012
NSD 1341 of 2012
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 12 May 2014
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – bankruptcy notices each stating the total debt amount as $2,374,995.70 as per judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales – applications to set aside bankruptcy notices – whether power to go behind judgment should be exercised – whether judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales obtained by fraud, bad faith or whether miscarriage of justice – whether substantial reasons for questioning whether a debt due to the judgment creditor – unsuccessful application to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to bring proceedings seeking to set aside the earlier judgment of that Court on the basis that it was procured by fraud or by conduct in bad faith by the plaintiffs in the earlier proceedings – proceedings now pending in the New South Wales Court of Appeal – whether abuse of process to seek to set aside bankruptcy notices – whether applicants in the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) estopped by reason of earlier findings of the Supreme Court of New South Wales – whether applicants in contempt of court such that they should not be permitted to pursue the proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act – whether bankruptcy notices invalid and a nullity by reason of any overstatement in the judgment sum of $14,000
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 30, 40, 41, 306
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 237, 471B
Cases cited: Agricultural & Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Atkinson [2013] NSWSC 1066
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Arthur J S Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256
Biritz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 117
Biritz v National Australia Bank Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 298
Boglari v Coadys (a firm) (Receiver and Manager Appointed) [2009] FCA 1398
Bourke v Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 264; (1993) 124 ALR 716
Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130
Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd t/as Clay & Michel (2008) 245 ALR 780
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (2005) 219 ALR 22
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343
Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 425
Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581; (1992) 109 ALR 539
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 461
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) involves the applicants, Mr Ren Xu and Ms Wenxia Xu, seeking to set aside bankruptcy notices issued by the liquidator, Ms Hong Jiang, and Mr Yongan Xie. The applicants contend that the bankruptcy notices were issued in bad faith and constituted an abuse of process. The primary focus of the case was on whether the applicants' claims of fraud and bad faith against the liquidator were valid, and if the bankruptcy notices were issued correctly. The court had to decide whether the bankruptcy notices were issued in good faith and if the applicants had a valid claim under s 471B of the Corporations Act to set aside the bankruptcy notices.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation and application of s 471B of the Corporations Act, which restricts certain proceedings against a company in liquidation without the court's leave. The liquidator argued that the bankruptcy notices were valid and that the applicants' claims of fraud and bad faith had already been rejected by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicants, on the other hand, argued that the bankruptcy notices were issued in bad faith and that they should be allowed to challenge them. The court had to determine whether the applicants' claims of fraud and bad faith were valid and whether the bankruptcy notices were issued in accordance with the law.

The court found that the claims of fraud and bad faith had already been rejected by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and therefore, the applicants' attempts to challenge the bankruptcy notices were considered an abuse of process. The court also determined that the liquidator was acting in good faith and that the bankruptcy notices were issued correctly. The court concluded that the applicants had not demonstrated that the bankruptcy notices were issued in bad faith or that they were an abuse of process. The court rejected the applicants' claims and found that the liquidator had acted appropriately in issuing the bankruptcy notices.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the applicants' claims and found that the bankruptcy notices were issued correctly. The court granted the liquidator's application to set aside the bankruptcy notices and ordered the applicants to pay costs. The court held that the applicants' claims of fraud and bad faith were invalid, and therefore, the bankruptcy notices were issued in good faith. The court also found that the applicants' attempts to challenge the bankruptcy notices were an abuse of process. The final orders of the court were that the applicants' claims be dismissed, and the liquidator's application to set aside the bankruptcy notices be granted. The applicants were ordered to pay costs to the liquidator.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground was submitted to relate to the combination of the matters relating to fraud and bad faith and the representation by Mr Terry Leung, solicitor. Because I have rejected the claims of fraud and of bad faith and in what follows I accept the evidence of Mr Terry Leung, I reject the submission that there was a miscarriage of justice in the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Whether there has been judgment on the merits There was no suggestion that the judgment in question of the Supreme Court was a default judgment. The judgment was, however, a summary judgment, the present applicants being represented in those proceedings by their then solicitor. The applicants submitted in this Court that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales had not been a judgment on the merits. In my opinion whatever the categorisation of the circumstances in which the judgment was given in the Supreme Court of New South Wales the evidence of Mr Terry Leung, the solicitor for the present applicants in the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, who was subpoenaed to give evidence before me by the liquidator, was compelling. His evidence, which I accept, was as follows. Mr Leung was introduced to the present applicants by another client of his, commonly referred to as Mr Frank Yu. Mr Leung appeared at a number of directions hearings in respect of the claim made against his (former) clients in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The instructions that he received for each of the directions hearings and for the substantive hearing in the Supreme Court were always received through Mr Frank Yu. At each of the meetings Mr Leung had with his former clients, some three or four, Mr Frank Yu was present also. At or after the first such meeting, when his former clients were present, Mr Leung was given a clear directive that in future instructions were to be obtained from Mr Yu. Mr Leung said there was no evidence filed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for the hearing on 24 May 2013 because he had sought instructions from Mr Yu as to the future conduct of the matter and the filing of evidence and he had repeatedly asked Ms Xu to provide him with information so that affidavit evidence could be filed but he, Mr Leung, was only given very limited instructions as to the contents. Mr Leung said he had received a copy of a document headed “Affidavit” but he did not recall receiving a version of it that had been written in Chinese characters. It came through by email from Mr Yu and it was a response to an amended pleading. Mr Leung read that and asked for more information from Mr Yu as to how it should be formalised into an affidavit but he got no response and he did not get an explanation as to why there was no response. Mr Leung said that he made some 10 phone calls requesting more instructions. He never received a spreadsheet which set out or attempted to set out any explanation of the financial transactions referred to in the pleadings. There were two or three handwritten pages as part of a small bundle of bank statements and invoices that he was supplied with and some part of the two or three handwritten pages was in Chinese, simply stating a date and the payee to certain transactions. He did ask for the financial information but apart from a limited response in about March 2011, he did not receive any other documents or information to answer the letters from the solicitors Austin Haworth & Lexon requesting information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In consequence, the issues remaining are those that arise on the final hearing in relation to s 471B, abuse of process, contempt, estoppel and the question of a $14,000 overstatement. It is preferable to consider whether there has been, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, judgment on the merits in the context of the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices.Section 471B of the Corporations Act By a further amended application filed only on 18 October 2013, each of Mr Ren and Ms Xu sought an order nunc pro tunc pursuant to s 471B that leave be granted to commence and proceed with the present proceedings against the company. Section 471B relevantly provides that while a company is being wound up in insolvency or by the Court a person cannot begin or proceed with: (a) a proceeding in a court against the company or in relation to property of the company; or (b) enforcement process in relation to such property; except with the leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms (if any) as the Court imposes. The liquidator submitted that an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice is within the definition of a “proceeding”. A Court is defined in s 58AA of the Corporations Act to include the Federal Court. “Property” is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act to include any legal or equitable estate or interest. Further the definition in s 9 refers to a definition for the purposes of winding up generally, namely s 513AA. The company has a debt owing in the amount of $2,364,995.70 and clearly the debt amount was property of the company for the purposes of the Corporations Act. That being so, the liquidator submitted, s 471B was engaged. The liquidator also submitted that the Court would grant leave, because to refuse such leave would result in Mr Ren and Ms Xu being precluded from exercising their legal right to challenge the bankruptcy notices. The liquidator referred to the question of terms on which leave may be granted. In my opinion, assuming the leave of the Court is necessary, that leave should be granted so that the applicants may challenge the bankruptcy notices. I would not impose conditions on the grant of that leave. I take into account that such leave was refused by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in In the Matter of Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 189 but that was for leave in respect of proposed proceedings seeking to set aside the earlier judgment in In the Matter of Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 722; (2012) 90 ACSR 593 on the basis that it was procured by fraud or by conduct in bad faith of the plaintiffs in those proceedings (now being the second and third respondents before me). The present proceedings are applications to set aside bankruptcy notices. Plainly, each application under s 471B must be assessed by reference to the proceedings in fact proposed. Abuse of process Ms Hong Jiang and Mr Yongan Xie submitted that because the charge of fraud and, I assume, the charge of lack of good faith or bad faith had already failed when put directly in In the Matter of Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 189, the present applications attempted a collateral attack on that judgment. It was submitted that it was an abuse of process to propound charges inconsistent with that judgment. Ms Hong Jiang and Mr Yongan Xie referred to Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons(a firm) [2002] 1 AC 615 at 706–707; Secretary of State of Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2004] Ch 1 at 16–17; Smith v Linskills (a firm) [1996] 1 WLR 763; Haines v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 43 NSWLR 404 at 410B, 415B.