Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

Matter No S167/2009

JEFFERY & KATAUSKAS PTY LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

SST CONSULTING PTY LTD & ORS   RESPONDENTS

Matter No S168/2009

JEFFERY & KATAUSKAS PTY LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

RICKARD CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LIMITED
(SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY
ARRANGEMENT) & ORS   RESPONDENTS

Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Ltd
Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v Rickard Constructions Pty Limited
(Subject to deed of company arrangement)
[2009] HCA 43
13 October 2009
S167/2009 & S168/2009

ORDER

Matter No S167/2009

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Matter No S168/2009

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

D F Jackson QC with J A Steele for the appellant in both matters (instructed by Colin Biggers & Paisley)

B W Walker SC with T G R Parker SC and R E Steele for the respondents in S167/2009 and for the fourth to seventh respondents in S168/2009 (instructed by J Biady & Associates)

No appearance for the first respondent in S168/2009

Submitting appearance for the second and third respondents in S168/2009

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. The costs of civil proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales are "in the discretion of the court". Section 98(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("CP Act") so provides. Power expressed in those terms extends to the award of costs against non-parties[1]. However, the power given by s 98(1)(a) of the CP Act is expressed to be "[s]ubject to rules of court"[2]. One of those rules, r 42.3(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ("UCPR"), provides that "the court may not, in the exercise of its powers and discretions under section 98 of the [CP Act], make any order for costs against a person who is not a party"[3]. A qualification to that prohibition follows immediately in r 42.3(2), which provides:

    "This rule does not limit the power of the court:

    …

    (c)to make an order for payment, by a person who has committed contempt of court or an abuse of process of the court, of the whole or any part of the costs of a party to proceedings occasioned by the contempt or abuse of process …"

    These appeals raise the question whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales has power to order costs against a non-party which, for a contingency fee, has funded an impecunious corporate plaintiff without providing the plaintiff with an indemnity for adverse costs orders. Whether the Court has the power depends upon whether the litigation funder has "committed … an abuse of process of the Court", thus attracting the application of r 42.3(2)(c).

    [1]Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190 per Mason CJ and Deane J, 203 per Dawson J, 205 per Gaudron J, McHugh J…

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Details
Case
[2009] HCA 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd and other defendants appealing a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. The dispute arose from litigation commenced by Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd against various defendants, including Jeffery & Katauskas. SST Consulting Pty Ltd ("the funder") provided financial backing for the impecunious plaintiff to prosecute these proceedings, on terms that included a significant "success fee" if the litigation was successful. The plaintiff ultimately failed at trial and was ordered to pay the defendant's costs, leaving the defendant with a substantial shortfall. The defendant sought an order that the funder pay this shortfall, arguing it constituted an abuse of process under rule 42.3(2)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

The High Court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had the power to order a non-party, in this instance the funder, to pay the costs of proceedings. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the funder's actions, in funding an impecunious plaintiff on a contingency fee basis without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, amounted to an abuse of the court's process within the meaning of rule 42.3(2)(c). A key legal issue was whether "abuse of process" was limited to specific misconduct in the actual conduct of the litigation, or if it could encompass the entire institution and prosecution of proceedings under certain funding arrangements.

The High Court reasoned that the Court of Appeal had erred in adopting an unduly narrow construction of rule 42.3(2)(c). The court held that an abuse of process was not confined to instances of misconduct during the litigation, such as lack of restraint or unscrupulous manipulation. Instead, the rule permitted a broader interpretation, encompassing the entire process of initiating and conducting proceedings. The court found that the funder's arrangement, which involved funding an insolvent plaintiff on a contingency basis without an indemnity for adverse costs, could constitute an abuse of process. This was particularly so given the commercial nature of the funding and the potential for such arrangements to expose successful defendants to unrecoverable costs.

The appeals were dismissed. The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeals, meaning the funder was not ordered to pay the shortfall in costs. The court found that while the interpretation of "abuse of process" could extend beyond the conduct of the proceedings themselves, the specific circumstances of this case did not warrant making an order against the funder. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No S167/2009

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Matter No S168/2009

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The circumstances are fully set out in the majority judgment. The essential facts On 5 September 2000 Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd ("the plaintiff") commenced proceedings against various defendants. The appellant was the second of these defendants ("the defendant"). Monies were advanced by SST Consulting Pty Ltd ("the funder") for the purpose, inter alia, of prosecuting those proceedings. Those advances, or some of them, took place before 13 October 2000, when a Deed of Charge was granted by the plaintiff to the funder to secure those and other advances[67]. At all material times, the plaintiff was unable to meet any order which might be made that it pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings[68]. The funder had not given any indemnity to the plaintiff against any liability that the plaintiff might come to have to the defendant under an order of that kind. The financial arrangements between the plaintiff and the funder appeared to be neither fully nor clearly evidenced before the primary judge. On one view of the murk, the funder had advanced $300,000 on terms that if the litigation succeeded it would be repaid that sum, together with a further $630,000 "success fee", to use the defendant's mild expression. On another view, the advance was only $200,000 and the success fee $730,000. The defendant succeeded in some aspects of its applications for security for costs but not in others: in total it obtained security for $187,750. The plaintiff failed at the trial. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs of the trial, which totalled $653,470.71. That left the defendant out-of-pocket, once the security had been realised, in an amount of over $450,000. The defendant sought an order pursuant to r 42.3(2)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ("UCPR") that the funder pay it that shortfall[69].[67]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 724 at 733 [34]-[35]. [68]See [74]-[75] below.[69]See [1] above.Two errors in the Court of Appeal Mr D F Jackson QC, who appeared for the defendant in this Court, contended that there were two key errors in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. It is desirable to deal with them at the outset. Is abuse of process limited to the actual conduct of the proceedings? The primary judge proceeded on the basis that r 42.3(2)(c) only applied to an abuse of process arising by reason of some aspect of the actual conduct of the proceedings. Thus he saw it as "dispositive" to inquire: "how can there be an abuse of process if there were no relevant abuse in the conduct of the proceedings?" He took as examples of relevant abuse "lack of restraint, excess in the conduct of the litigation, unscrupulous manipulation, or careless or irresponsible actions."[70] The Court of Appeal shared that view. It said that the primary judge was "correct in holding that an actual abuse of process must have been committed in order for an order for costs to be made against the third party."[71] Mr Jackson QC submitted that it was incorrect to hold that the defendant's application must fail merely because there had been no relevant abuse of process in the actual conduct of the proceedings. That submission is sound. No doubt r 42.3(2)(c) extends to particular instances of abuse in the actual conduct of proceedings. But it goes further. Rule 42.3(2)(c) provides that the court has power to make an order in relation to not only part of a party's costs of the proceedings, but the whole of them. As the primary judge said himself: "An abuse of process may infect the whole of proceedings, or some part only."[72] The rule assumes that the institution of the proceedings and the totality of their conduct thereafter can be an abuse of process, and that "abuse of process" is not limited to particular instances of lack of restraint, excess in the conduct of the litigation, unscrupulous manipulation, or careless or irresponsible actions. Grants of power to a court are not to be construed as subject to a limitation not appearing in the words of the grant[73]. The funder contended that this issue only arose because, it said, the defendant had conducted its case more narrowly in the courts below. In oral argument the funder seemed to retreat from this contention. Is that contention correct? Although it is unnecessary to decide the issue, its correctness seems very doubtful. But whether or not that contention is correct, Mr Jackson QC's submission remains sound. The funder also argued that the defendant had exaggerated the distinction which it attributed to the primary judge and the Court of Appeal. To the contrary, Mr Jackson QC's construction of the reasons for judgment is correct. The error is significant because the unduly narrow approach to the construction of r 42.3(2)(c) that it explicitly betokens appears implicitly to underlie the Court of Appeal's conclusion in other ways too.[70]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 724 at 743 [94]. See also 743-744 [96] and 744 [100]. The courts below considered but rejected various allegations by one of the other persons sued by the plaintiff of particular abuses in the conduct of proceedings. These were not relied on in this Court.[71]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 283 at [75].[72]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 724 at 740 [72].[73]Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 205; [1992] HCA 28.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ HEYDON J (dissent)
His Honour made a number of other findings of fact, not in issue on the appeals. They included the following[22]: [22]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 724 at 736 [51].1.Mr Rickard and SST funded the proceedings until 31 March 2001 on the basis and subject to the monetary limits set out in cl 15.2 of the DOCA. SST funded the litigation thereafter. 2.Mr Rickard gave instructions on behalf of Rickard Constructions in relation to the litigation and there was no evidence that SST was involved in the decision-making in that regard. Nor was there any evidence that Mr Rickard was trammelled in giving instructions by any agreement or arrangement between him or Rickard Constructions and SST.3.SST could have brought the litigation to an end at any time after 31 March 2001 by ceasing to provide further funding. The decisions of the Court of Appeal Jeffery & Katauskas and the other successful defendants sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. That Court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeals and also a motion by the successful defendants for an order that SST and its directors pay the costs of the appeal brought by Rickard Constructions against the substantive decision of the primary judge[23].[23]Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 283. As refined before the Court of Appeal, the submission on behalf of Jeffery & Katauskas and the other defendants in the primary proceedings was that[24]: "an abuse of process would occur where a non-party with a commercial interest in the fruits of the litigation funds proceedings by an insolvent plaintiff without providing the plaintiff with an indemnity against cost orders in favour of successful defendants".[24][2008] NSWCA 283 at [44]. Gyles AJA, with whom Giles and Tobias JJA agreed, rejected this proposition[25]. [25][2008] NSWCA 283 at [67]. On 19 June 2009, this Court granted one of the defendants, Jeffery & Katauskas, special leave to appeal against the orders of the Court of Appeal dismissing its appeal, and against the orders dismissing its motion seeking orders in respect of the costs of the appeal against the substantive decision of the primary judge. The notices of appeal subsequently filed named "SST Consulting Pty Ltd" as first respondent in the first of these matters and fourth respondent in the second. Leave was sought, and is granted, so that the relevant respondent in each matter is SST. Allianz Australia was a respondent in the second matter but took no active part in the proceedings in this Court.The issue on the appeals In this Court the grounds of appeal identified the abuse of process which it is said ought to have been found by the Court of Appeal thus: "by funding the proceedings and/or by assisting the assignment and prosecution of invalidly assigned bare causes of action in negligence and under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act by an insolvent plaintiff without provision to the plaintiff of an indemnity against a costs order in favour of successful defendants." As presented, however, the argument on the appeals did not rely upon any alleged invalidity of the assignment to Rickard Constructions of the causes of action in respect of the pavement design and construction. The abuse of process was reformulated by reference to two elements: 1. The success fee arrangement. 2.The failure by SST and its directors to provide Rickard Constructions with an indemnity for the costs of any successful defendants. The questions for determination

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ,

The primary issue before the court in Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd was whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had the power to order costs against a non-party under r 42.3(2)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The court held that the Supreme Court does have this power and that it extends beyond merely the conduct of the proceedings to any abuse of process that may have occurred. The court found that the funding of an impecunious plaintiff by a non-party, without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, constituted an abuse of process. This was because the funder had a commercial interest in the outcome of the litigation, and the lack of an indemnity demonstrated a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff.

The court considered the scope of the term "abuse of process" within the meaning of r 42.3(2)(c) of the UCPR. The court rejected the narrower interpretation that limited abuse of process to particular instances of misconduct during the proceedings. Instead, the court adopted a broader interpretation that included any conduct that could be considered an abuse of the court's process, not limited to specific acts within the proceedings. This interpretation aligns with the broad language of the rule, which refers to "any abuse of process" without further qualification. The court also noted that the rule grants the court discretion to order costs against a non-party for the entirety of a party's costs, reinforcing the idea that the abuse of process could encompass more than isolated incidents within the proceedings.

Another key issue was whether the abuse of process must be limited to the actual conduct of the proceedings or if it could extend to other instances of abuse. The court found that the abuse of process did not need to be confined to the conduct of the proceedings but could include actions taken outside the formal litigation process. The funding arrangement between the non-party and the plaintiff, which occurred before and outside the formal litigation process, was considered relevant to determining whether an abuse of process had occurred. The court held that the non-party's decision to fund the plaintiff without providing an indemnity was part of the broader abuse of process, as it demonstrated a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff.

The court also examined whether the non-party's funding of the impecunious corporate plaintiff, without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, constituted an abuse of process. The court concluded that it did, as the non-party had a commercial interest in the litigation and failed to protect the plaintiff from potential financial ruin. This conduct was seen as an abuse of the court's process because it exploited the plaintiff's financial vulnerability and disregarded the possibility of adverse costs orders. The court emphasized that the non-party's actions were driven by a desire to secure a financial benefit from the litigation, without assuming the risk of the plaintiff's potential liability for costs.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court of New South Wales has the power to order costs against a non-party under r 42.3(2)(c) of the UCPR if the non-party has committed an abuse of process, which includes conduct both within and outside the formal litigation process. The abuse of process can be broader than isolated incidents of misconduct in the proceedings and can include actions that demonstrate a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff. The court held that the non-party's funding of the plaintiff without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders constituted an abuse of process, as it exploited the plaintiff's financial vulnerability and showed a disregard for the plaintiff's potential liability for costs.