HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJMatter No S167/2009
JEFFERY & KATAUSKAS PTY LIMITED APPELLANT
AND
SST CONSULTING PTY LTD & ORS RESPONDENTS
Matter No S168/2009
JEFFERY & KATAUSKAS PTY LIMITED APPELLANT
AND
RICKARD CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LIMITED
(SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY
ARRANGEMENT) & ORS RESPONDENTSJeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v SST Consulting Pty Ltd
Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Limited v Rickard Constructions Pty Limited
(Subject to deed of company arrangement)
[2009] HCA 43
13 October 2009
S167/2009 & S168/2009ORDER
Matter No S167/2009
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Matter No S168/2009
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
D F Jackson QC with J A Steele for the appellant in both matters (instructed by Colin Biggers & Paisley)
B W Walker SC with T G R Parker SC and R E Steele for the respondents in S167/2009 and for the fourth to seventh respondents in S168/2009 (instructed by J Biady & Associates)
No appearance for the first respondent in S168/2009
Submitting appearance for the second and third respondents in S168/2009
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
The costs of civil proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales are "in the discretion of the court". Section 98(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("CP Act") so provides. Power expressed in those terms extends to the award of costs against non-parties[1]. However, the power given by s 98(1)(a) of the CP Act is expressed to be "[s]ubject to rules of court"[2]. One of those rules, r 42.3(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ("UCPR"), provides that "the court may not, in the exercise of its powers and discretions under section 98 of the [CP Act], make any order for costs against a person who is not a party"[3]. A qualification to that prohibition follows immediately in r 42.3(2), which provides:
"This rule does not limit the power of the court:
…
(c)to make an order for payment, by a person who has committed contempt of court or an abuse of process of the court, of the whole or any part of the costs of a party to proceedings occasioned by the contempt or abuse of process …"
These appeals raise the question whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales has power to order costs against a non-party which, for a contingency fee, has funded an impecunious corporate plaintiff without providing the plaintiff with an indemnity for adverse costs orders. Whether the Court has the power depends upon whether the litigation funder has "committed … an abuse of process of the Court", thus attracting the application of r 42.3(2)(c).
[1]Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190 per Mason CJ and Deane J, 203 per Dawson J, 205 per Gaudron J, McHugh J…
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- Case
- [2009] HCA 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had the power to order a non-party, in this instance the funder, to pay the costs of proceedings. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the funder's actions, in funding an impecunious plaintiff on a contingency fee basis without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, amounted to an abuse of the court's process within the meaning of rule 42.3(2)(c). A key legal issue was whether "abuse of process" was limited to specific misconduct in the actual conduct of the litigation, or if it could encompass the entire institution and prosecution of proceedings under certain funding arrangements.
The High Court reasoned that the Court of Appeal had erred in adopting an unduly narrow construction of rule 42.3(2)(c). The court held that an abuse of process was not confined to instances of misconduct during the litigation, such as lack of restraint or unscrupulous manipulation. Instead, the rule permitted a broader interpretation, encompassing the entire process of initiating and conducting proceedings. The court found that the funder's arrangement, which involved funding an insolvent plaintiff on a contingency basis without an indemnity for adverse costs, could constitute an abuse of process. This was particularly so given the commercial nature of the funding and the potential for such arrangements to expose successful defendants to unrecoverable costs.
The appeals were dismissed. The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeals, meaning the funder was not ordered to pay the shortfall in costs. The court found that while the interpretation of "abuse of process" could extend beyond the conduct of the proceedings themselves, the specific circumstances of this case did not warrant making an order against the funder. The appeals were dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Matter No S167/2009
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Matter No S168/2009
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ,
The primary issue before the court in Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd was whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had the power to order costs against a non-party under r 42.3(2)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The court held that the Supreme Court does have this power and that it extends beyond merely the conduct of the proceedings to any abuse of process that may have occurred. The court found that the funding of an impecunious plaintiff by a non-party, without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, constituted an abuse of process. This was because the funder had a commercial interest in the outcome of the litigation, and the lack of an indemnity demonstrated a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff.
The court considered the scope of the term "abuse of process" within the meaning of r 42.3(2)(c) of the UCPR. The court rejected the narrower interpretation that limited abuse of process to particular instances of misconduct during the proceedings. Instead, the court adopted a broader interpretation that included any conduct that could be considered an abuse of the court's process, not limited to specific acts within the proceedings. This interpretation aligns with the broad language of the rule, which refers to "any abuse of process" without further qualification. The court also noted that the rule grants the court discretion to order costs against a non-party for the entirety of a party's costs, reinforcing the idea that the abuse of process could encompass more than isolated incidents within the proceedings.
Another key issue was whether the abuse of process must be limited to the actual conduct of the proceedings or if it could extend to other instances of abuse. The court found that the abuse of process did not need to be confined to the conduct of the proceedings but could include actions taken outside the formal litigation process. The funding arrangement between the non-party and the plaintiff, which occurred before and outside the formal litigation process, was considered relevant to determining whether an abuse of process had occurred. The court held that the non-party's decision to fund the plaintiff without providing an indemnity was part of the broader abuse of process, as it demonstrated a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff.
The court also examined whether the non-party's funding of the impecunious corporate plaintiff, without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders, constituted an abuse of process. The court concluded that it did, as the non-party had a commercial interest in the litigation and failed to protect the plaintiff from potential financial ruin. This conduct was seen as an abuse of the court's process because it exploited the plaintiff's financial vulnerability and disregarded the possibility of adverse costs orders. The court emphasized that the non-party's actions were driven by a desire to secure a financial benefit from the litigation, without assuming the risk of the plaintiff's potential liability for costs.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court of New South Wales has the power to order costs against a non-party under r 42.3(2)(c) of the UCPR if the non-party has committed an abuse of process, which includes conduct both within and outside the formal litigation process. The abuse of process can be broader than isolated incidents of misconduct in the proceedings and can include actions that demonstrate a disregard for the potential financial consequences for the plaintiff. The court held that the non-party's funding of the plaintiff without providing an indemnity against adverse costs orders constituted an abuse of process, as it exploited the plaintiff's financial vulnerability and showed a disregard for the plaintiff's potential liability for costs.