HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJVICTORIA INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER
TERMINAL LIMITED APPELLANTAND
RICHARD SIMON LUNT & ORS RESPONDENTS
Victoria International Container Terminal Limited v Lunt
[2021] HCA 11
Date of Hearing: 9 February 2021
Date of Judgment: 7 April 2021M96/2020
ORDER
Appeal dismissed.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
S J Wood QC with N Burmeister for the appellant (instructed by Seyfarth Shaw Australia)
N J Williams SC with C Tran and N K Kam for the first respondent (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers)
Submitting appearances for the second, third and fourth respondents
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ. On 19 October 2016, the Fair Work Commission ("the Commission") approved an enterprise agreement upon an application by the appellant, Victoria International Container Terminal Limited. The application to the Commission was made with the support of the Maritime Union of Australia ("the MUA"), the trade union that later amalgamated with the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU") to form the fourth respondent, the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMMEU"). More than a year later, the CFMMEU arranged for the first respondent, Mr Lunt, to bring proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia seeking an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the Commission's approval of the enterprise agreement on the ground that the Commission's approval was beyond its jurisdiction.
On an application by the appellant, the primary judge (Rangiah J) concluded that the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process because they were brought for the improper purpose of benefiting the CFMMEU. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia reversed the decision of the primary judge. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the Full Court was correct and should be upheld, and the appeal dismissed.
The Enterprise Agreement
On 6 October 2016, the appellant applied to the Commission for approval of the Victoria International Container Operations Agreement 2016 ("the Enterprise Agreement")[1]. On 10 October 2016, the MUA filed with the Commission a statutory declaration in support of the application for approval of the Enterprise Agreement, and a notice pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act") that it wished to be covered by the Enterprise Agreement[2]. On 19 October 2016, the Commission approved the Enterprise Agreement[3]. Thereafter, the MUA did not apply for permission to appeal against that approval[4].
[1]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 544 [11].
[2]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 544 [13].
[3]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 545 [16].
[4]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 545 [17].
Following…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd v Lunt and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] HCA 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt, funded and directed by the CFMMEU, amounted to an abuse of process that brought the administration of justice into disrepute. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the deployment of Mr Lunt as a "front man" for the union, and the union's unwillingness to bring proceedings in its own name due to potential discretionary grounds for refusal of relief, constituted an illegitimate or improper purpose that warranted summary dismissal. The Court also considered whether the power to stay or summarily dismiss proceedings could be informed by considerations of deterrence or punishment.
The High Court reasoned that the substance of the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU did not present a substantive objection to the proceedings. It is well-settled that a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the court's jurisdiction has a prima facie right to its exercise. Where legal standing is broad, the choice of a plaintiff who enjoys a legitimate forensic or juridical advantage is a permissible use of legal processes, not an abuse. The Court found that Mr Lunt, as a person with undisputed standing, may have had such an advantage over the CFMMEU. Furthermore, the Court held that the CFMMEU's funding and direction of proceedings brought by Mr Lunt was not objectionable, drawing an analogy to arrangements with litigation funders, which are not of themselves an abuse of process. The appellant's primary argument focused on Mr Lunt's alleged lack of candour in concealing the CFMMEU's involvement, but the Court found that the desired result – the quashing of the Enterprise Agreement – was squarely within the scope of the remedy sought, and Mr Lunt's motive or the union's benefit did not alter this fact.
The appeal was dismissed. The High Court found that the proceedings were not an abuse of process, as the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU were permissible and did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ, EDELMAN J
In the present case, the desired result – the quashing of the Enterprise Agreement – was squarely within the scope of the remedy sought by the current proceedings. That Mr Lunt did not desire the result for himself, or desired the CFMMEU to take the benefit, does not change this fact[44]. Administration of justice [44]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [2020] FCAFC 40 at [17]‑[18].Substance of the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU Before turning to address the appellant's principal argument as to Mr Lunt's alleged lack of candour, it is also desirable to say that there could not be any substantive objection to the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU. It is well settled that "a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise"[45]. Where the applicable rules as to standing are so broad as to enable a number of plaintiffs to bring proceedings, the choice of a plaintiff who is likely to enjoy some legitimate forensic or juridical advantage over other candidates is not an abuse of process. Rather, it is a use of the processes made available by the law. To the extent that Mr Lunt, as a person whose standing to bring his claim was and is undisputed by the appellant, may have enjoyed some forensic or juridical advantage over the CFMMEU as an applicant for the relief he sought in the current proceedings, there was nothing improper in taking advantage of what the law allows.[45]Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 554. Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU having made a choice between themselves as plaintiffs, there was similarly nothing objectionable in the CFMMEU's funding and direction of the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt. The decision of this Court in Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd[46], relied on by Mr Lunt, is instructive in this regard. In that case, the plaintiff entered into an arrangement with a litigation funder and the plaintiff's action was determined in favour of the defendant. Because the defendant was left with a shortfall of costs, it sought to recover costs from the litigation funder, who was not a party, on the basis that the litigation funder had caused an abuse of process. The majority of this Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) held that "an agreement by a non‑party, for reward, to pay or contribute to the costs of a party in instituting and conducting proceedings is not, of itself, an abuse of the court's processes"[47]. [46](2009) 239 CLR 75.[47](2009) 239 CLR 75 at 94 [30].Concealing the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU The appellant's argument focused upon what was said to be Mr Lunt's lack of candour in attempting to conceal the nature and extent of the involvement of the CFMMEU in promoting and maintaining the current proceedings. The appellant's concern was that the administration of justice had been brought into disrepute because the deployment of Mr Lunt as a "front man" for the CFMMEU was likely to avoid or minimise the possibility that the court would refuse to quash the approval of the Enterprise Agreement on discretionary grounds because of the MUA's longstanding acquiescence in and reliance upon the agreement.