Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd v Lunt

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON AND EDELMAN JJ

VICTORIA INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER
TERMINAL LIMITED  APPELLANT

AND

RICHARD SIMON LUNT & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Victoria International Container Terminal Limited v Lunt

[2021] HCA 11

Date of Hearing: 9 February 2021
Date of Judgment: 7 April 2021

M96/2020

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

S J Wood QC with N Burmeister for the appellant (instructed by Seyfarth Shaw Australia)

N J Williams SC with C Tran and N K Kam for the first respondent (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers)

Submitting appearances for the second, third and fourth respondents

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ.   On 19 October 2016, the Fair Work Commission ("the Commission") approved an enterprise agreement upon an application by the appellant, Victoria International Container Terminal Limited. The application to the Commission was made with the support of the Maritime Union of Australia ("the MUA"), the trade union that later amalgamated with the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMEU") to form the fourth respondent, the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union ("the CFMMEU"). More than a year later, the CFMMEU arranged for the first respondent, Mr Lunt, to bring proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia seeking an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the Commission's approval of the enterprise agreement on the ground that the Commission's approval was beyond its jurisdiction.

  2. On an application by the appellant, the primary judge (Rangiah J) concluded that the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process because they were brought for the improper purpose of benefiting the CFMMEU. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia reversed the decision of the primary judge. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the Full Court was correct and should be upheld, and the appeal dismissed.

    The Enterprise Agreement

  3. On 6 October 2016, the appellant applied to the Commission for approval of the Victoria International Container Operations Agreement 2016 ("the Enterprise Agreement")[1]. On 10 October 2016, the MUA filed with the Commission a statutory declaration in support of the application for approval of the Enterprise Agreement, and a notice pursuant to the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ("the Act") that it wished to be covered by the Enterprise Agreement[2]. On 19 October 2016, the Commission approved the Enterprise Agreement[3]. Thereafter, the MUA did not apply for permission to appeal against that approval[4].

    [1]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 544 [11].

    [2]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 544 [13].

    [3]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 545 [16].

    [4]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 545 [17].

  4. Following…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCA 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd (VICT) against a decision of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned proceedings brought by Mr Lunt seeking to quash the approval of an enterprise agreement. VICT sought summary dismissal of these proceedings, arguing they constituted an abuse of process because they were funded by a union (CFMMEU) and that Mr Lunt was being used as a "front man" to avoid the union's own prior acquiescence in the agreement and the risk of discretionary refusal of relief if the union had brought the proceedings itself.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt, funded and directed by the CFMMEU, amounted to an abuse of process that brought the administration of justice into disrepute. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the deployment of Mr Lunt as a "front man" for the union, and the union's unwillingness to bring proceedings in its own name due to potential discretionary grounds for refusal of relief, constituted an illegitimate or improper purpose that warranted summary dismissal. The Court also considered whether the power to stay or summarily dismiss proceedings could be informed by considerations of deterrence or punishment.

The High Court reasoned that the substance of the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU did not present a substantive objection to the proceedings. It is well-settled that a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the court's jurisdiction has a prima facie right to its exercise. Where legal standing is broad, the choice of a plaintiff who enjoys a legitimate forensic or juridical advantage is a permissible use of legal processes, not an abuse. The Court found that Mr Lunt, as a person with undisputed standing, may have had such an advantage over the CFMMEU. Furthermore, the Court held that the CFMMEU's funding and direction of proceedings brought by Mr Lunt was not objectionable, drawing an analogy to arrangements with litigation funders, which are not of themselves an abuse of process. The appellant's primary argument focused on Mr Lunt's alleged lack of candour in concealing the CFMMEU's involvement, but the Court found that the desired result – the quashing of the Enterprise Agreement – was squarely within the scope of the remedy sought, and Mr Lunt's motive or the union's benefit did not alter this fact.

The appeal was dismissed. The High Court found that the proceedings were not an abuse of process, as the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU were permissible and did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ EDELMAN J
Before the primary judge, the appellant argued that the CFMMEU was the true moving party behind the current proceedings, with Mr Lunt being deployed to conceal the CFMMEU's role[14]. Mr Lunt denied this allegation. He maintained that he sought the quashing of the Commission's approval of the Enterprise Agreement by reason of his concerns about its conditions and the manner in which it was made[15]. The appellant also argued that Mr Lunt's evidence should be rejected as unreliable. In this regard, the appellant relied on Mr Lunt's intentional destruction of his mobile phone as going to the credibility of his account of the nature of his involvement in the proceedings[16].[14]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 543 [2].[15]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 543 [3].[16]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 549 [43], 550-551 [54], 556-557 [85]‑[86].The decisions below The primary judge allowed the appellant's application for summary dismissal of the current proceedings[17]. His Honour found that the MUA and the CFMMEU respectively funded the first proceedings and the current proceedings[18]. His Honour also found that the MUA was heavily involved in obtaining and communicating Mr Lunt's instructions to apply for leave to amend in relation to the first proceedings[19], that Mr Lunt allowed himself to be used by the CFMMEU as a "front man" to bring the current proceedings under its control, and that the MUA and the CFMMEU were unwilling to bring the first proceedings or the current proceedings in their own names[20]. Further, as to this last point, the primary judge found that the MUA and the CFMMEU were not willing to bring proceedings in their own names because of the risk that they would be refused relief on the discretionary grounds that the MUA had acquiesced in the approval of the Enterprise Agreement by the Commission, failed to exercise its right to apply for permission to appeal against the approval, and thereafter delayed in bringing any challenge for over a year[21]. [17]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542.[18]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 563 [125].[19]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 560 [113].[20]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 563 [129].[21]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 562-563 [121], [123]-[124]. The primary judge concluded that to deny the appellant the opportunity to resist Mr Lunt's challenge to the approval of the Enterprise Agreement on discretionary grounds would be unjustifiably oppressive to the appellant[22]. His Honour also concluded that Mr Lunt brought the current proceedings for the predominant purpose of enabling the CFMMEU to obtain relief which it was unlikely to obtain if the proceedings were brought in its own name, rather than for the predominant purpose of vindicating his own legal rights[23]. Although Mr Lunt may have had his own concerns about the merits of the Enterprise Agreement and the circumstances in which it was made, those concerns were not sufficient to motivate him to commence proceedings to have it quashed[24]. On that basis, the primary judge held that the proceedings were brought by Mr Lunt for an "illegitimate and collateral purpose"[25]. His Honour reasoned that it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the CFMMEU were permitted, by deploying Mr Lunt as a "front man", to bring the current proceedings to challenge the approval of the Enterprise Agreement while avoiding scrutiny by the Court of its acquiescence in the approval of, and reliance upon, the Enterprise Agreement[26].[22]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 564 [133].[23]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 562 [119], 564 [131].[24]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 560 [111].[25]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 564 [131].[26]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [No 2] (2019) 165 ALD 542 at 564 [134].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, KEANE AND GORDON JJ, EDELMAN J

In the present case, the desired result – the quashing of the Enterprise Agreement – was squarely within the scope of the remedy sought by the current proceedings. That Mr Lunt did not desire the result for himself, or desired the CFMMEU to take the benefit, does not change this fact[44]. Administration of justice [44]Lunt v Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd [2020] FCAFC 40 at [17]‑[18].Substance of the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU Before turning to address the appellant's principal argument as to Mr Lunt's alleged lack of candour, it is also desirable to say that there could not be any substantive objection to the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU. It is well settled that "a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of a court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise"[45]. Where the applicable rules as to standing are so broad as to enable a number of plaintiffs to bring proceedings, the choice of a plaintiff who is likely to enjoy some legitimate forensic or juridical advantage over other candidates is not an abuse of process. Rather, it is a use of the processes made available by the law. To the extent that Mr Lunt, as a person whose standing to bring his claim was and is undisputed by the appellant, may have enjoyed some forensic or juridical advantage over the CFMMEU as an applicant for the relief he sought in the current proceedings, there was nothing improper in taking advantage of what the law allows.[45]Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 554. Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU having made a choice between themselves as plaintiffs, there was similarly nothing objectionable in the CFMMEU's funding and direction of the proceedings brought by Mr Lunt. The decision of this Court in Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd[46], relied on by Mr Lunt, is instructive in this regard. In that case, the plaintiff entered into an arrangement with a litigation funder and the plaintiff's action was determined in favour of the defendant. Because the defendant was left with a shortfall of costs, it sought to recover costs from the litigation funder, who was not a party, on the basis that the litigation funder had caused an abuse of process. The majority of this Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) held that "an agreement by a non‑party, for reward, to pay or contribute to the costs of a party in instituting and conducting proceedings is not, of itself, an abuse of the court's processes"[47]. [46](2009) 239 CLR 75.[47](2009) 239 CLR 75 at 94 [30].Concealing the arrangements between Mr Lunt and the CFMMEU The appellant's argument focused upon what was said to be Mr Lunt's lack of candour in attempting to conceal the nature and extent of the involvement of the CFMMEU in promoting and maintaining the current proceedings. The appellant's concern was that the administration of justice had been brought into disrepute because the deployment of Mr Lunt as a "front man" for the CFMMEU was likely to avoid or minimise the possibility that the court would refuse to quash the approval of the Enterprise Agreement on discretionary grounds because of the MUA's longstanding acquiescence in and reliance upon the agreement.