Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398  

File number(s): NSD 38 of 2021
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2021
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under r 26.01of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Australian Human Rights Commission under s 20(2)(ba) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) not to inquire into his complaint – where applicant seeks review of issues litigated unsuccessfully in the Federal Circuit Court – where the applicant seeks relief that is non-justiciable – whether the applicant has reasonable prospects of success – whether the application discloses a reasonable cause of action – whether the proceedings are an abuse of process – Held: application successful, proceedings dismissed.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – orders sought seeking substitution of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia as the second respondent in these proceedings – Held: orders made

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 6(1)(a), (c) and (g)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth),
ss 8(6A), 19(1), 20(2)(ba)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 78B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 9.11, 26.01

Cases cited:

ASZ21 v Commissioner of Taxation [2021] FCA 1304

FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014 FKV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1950

Glennan v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] HCA 31; (2003) 198 ALR 250

Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540; (2017) 72 AAR 219

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex Parte Hardiman [1980] HCA 13; (1980) 144 CLR 13

Re Culleton [2017] HCA 3; (2017) 340 ALR 550

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 25 June 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent:  Ms A Stomo (solicitor)
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Australian Human Rights Commission
Counsel for the Second Respondent  Mr J Hutton (solicitor)
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 38 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

ASSISTANT MINISTER TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHEESEMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to rule 9.11 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia be substituted for the Assistant Minister to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia as the second respondent to these proceedings.

2.The whole of the application for judicial review is dismissed pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Rules.

3.There be no order as to costs.

Note:…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1398
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant, Mr Przybylowski, sought judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission not to inquire into his complaint. The legal issues the Court needed to address included whether Mr Przybylowski had reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting his application for judicial review, whether the application disclosed a reasonable cause of action, and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process. The Court also considered an application to substitute the Attorney-General as the second respondent.

The Court found that Mr Przybylowski's application for judicial review was unlikely to succeed, as he had not particularised the grounds of review and had refused to amend his originating application when given the opportunity. The Court noted that a failure to provide particulars is sufficient grounds to dismiss an application for judicial review. Additionally, the Court found that Mr Przybylowski had not established a breach of procedural fairness in relation to the decision that was the subject of his complaint. Consequently, the Court granted the Attorney-General's application for summary dismissal and dismissed Mr Przybylowski's application for judicial review.

The Court also allowed Mr Przybylowski's application to substitute the Attorney-General as the second respondent to the proceedings. The final orders of the Court were to substitute the Attorney-General as the second respondent and to dismiss the whole of Mr Przybylowski's application for judicial review. There was no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to rule 9.11 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia be substituted for the Assistant Minister to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia as the second respondent to these proceedings.

2. The whole of the application for judicial review is dismissed pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Rules.

3. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Attorney-General bears the burden of satisfying the Court that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed. Finally, I note the discretion conferred by s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Rules must be exercised with caution: Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 at 131 – 132 [24] (French CJ and Gummow J).BACKGROUND The hearing was conducted remotely. As noted above Mr Przybylowski was self-represented. He clearly speaks, reads and understands English to a degree but it is not his first language. Mr Przybylowski had the assistance of an interpreter at the hearing of the application. Mr Przybylowski chose to participate in the proceedings by sometimes availing himself of the services of the interpreter and sometimes addressing and following the proceedings in English. In support of the interlocutory application the Attorney-General relied on the affidavit of Hongyi Gao, a solicitor in the employ of the Australian Government Solicitor, affirmed 7 June 2021 and the affidavit of Anastasia Stomo, a solicitor employed by the Commission, affirmed 7 June 2021. The Attorney-General tendered parts of the Court Book which included the decision under review, the material before the Commission and the documents filed in these proceedings. The Attorney-General also tendered a letter from Mr Przybylowski to the President of the Commission dated 25 June 2019 which contained Mr Przybylowski’s “complaints against Australia” which, amongst other things, alleges fraud and deceit on the part of the President. This letter is central to the complaint that Mr Przybylowski made to the Commission. In opposing the application, Mr Przybylowski relied on his affidavit affirmed 22 June 2021 and several other documents contained in the Court Book. The affidavit read and materials tendered by Mr Przybylowski were admitted subject to relevance and with a limitation, where appropriate, that they be received by way of submission. Before turning to the decision the subject of the substantive review proceedings, I note that the present proceedings are one of a number of judicial review applications Mr Przybylowski has pursued in this Court. The applications instituted by Mr Przybylowski may be traced back to the marriage of Mr Przybylowski in Poland and his subsequent divorce in Australia in 2002. A Polish Court has made orders requiring Mr Przybylowski to pay his former wife spousal support and child support (together, the Polish Orders). The Polish Orders were each, respectively, registered in 2014. Following a decision made on 10 January 2014 by the Child Support Registrar, Department of Human Services (Child Support), Mr Przybylowski sought review of the Registrar’s decision in the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) (now the Social Services division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)) on 17 June 2014. The SSAT affirmed the decision of the Registrar on 27 August 2014 (2014 SSAT decision).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicable principles in relation to summary dismissal were recently summarised in ASZ21 v Commissioner of Taxation [2021] FCA 1304 (Moshinsky J) at [27] – [33] as follows:27 Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act provides in part:(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.28Rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides in part:26.01 Summary judgment(1)A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:(a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or(b)the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or(d)the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or…(4)If an order is made under subrule (1) dismissing part of the proceeding, the proceeding may be continued for that part of the proceeding not disposed of by the order.29Section 31A was discussed by the High Court in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer). In that case, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated at [53]:… s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Those earlier provisions were understood as requiring formation of a certain and concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail. That this was the basis of earlier decisions may be illustrated by reference to two decisions of this Court often cited in connection with questions of summary judgment: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW).(Footnotes omitted.)30 Their Honours continued at [56] and [58]-[60]:56Because s 31A(3) provides that certainty of failure (“hopeless” or “bound to fail”) need not be demonstrated in order to show that a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting an action, it is evident that s 31A is to be understood as requiring a different inquiry from that which had to be made under earlier procedural regimes. It follows, of course, that it is dangerous to seek to elucidate the meaning of the statutory expression “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding” by reference to what is said in those earlier cases.…58How then should the expression “no reasonable prospect” be understood? No paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content. Nor can the expression usefully be understood by the creation of some antinomy intended to capture most or all of the cases in which it cannot be said that there is “no reasonable prospect”. The judicial creation of a lexicon of words or phrases intended to capture the operation of a particular statutory phrase like “no reasonable prospect” is to be avoided. Consideration of the difficulties that bedevilled the proviso to common form criminal appeal statutes, as a result of judicial glossing of the relevant statutory expression, provides the clearest example of the dangers that attend any such attempt.59In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like “clearly”, “manifestly” or “obviously”) as “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”. But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word “reasonable”, in the phrase “no reasonable prospect”, be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty” claim.60Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes.(Footnotes omitted.)31See also Spencer at [24] per French CJ and Gummow J and Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149 at [22] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ.32Turning to the principles relating to abuse of process, in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507, French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ stated at [25] that “abuse of process is capable of application in any circumstances in which the use of a court’s procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”.33In Victoria International Container Terminal Ltd v Lunt (2021) 388 ALR 376, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ (with whom Edelman J agreed) stated at [18]:The fundamental responsibility of a court is to do justice between the parties to the matters that come before it. In the performance of that function, the doing of justice may require the court to protect the due administration of justice by protecting itself from abuse of its processes. The power to stay, or summarily dismiss, proceedings because one party has abused the processes of the court is concerned to prevent injustice, and that power is properly exercised where the conduct of the moving party is such that the abuse of process on its part may prevent or stultify the fair and just determination of a matter.(Footnotes omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Przybylowski has filed five notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903. The section 78B notices should not be considered part of Mr Przybylowski’s pleadings: Przybylowski (No 2) at [24]. At their highest, they are notices to the Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General about the existence of a constitutional matter. The constitutional matter must be found in terms in Mr Przybylowski’s ‘pleadings’. Here, no “real and substantial” constitutional issue is raised by Mr Przybylowski’s pleadings, and so s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 is not engaged: Re Culleton [2017] HCA 3; (2017) 340 ALR 550 at [29] (Gageler J); Glennan v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] HCA 31; (2003) 198 ALR 250 at [14] (Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540; (2017) 72 AAR 219 at 225 [31] - [32] (Kerr J). For completeness, I note that there has been no indication in the response to the notices which have been served that the Commonwealth or State Attorneys-General wish to be heard in the proceedings on the purported constitutional issues. CONSIDERATION Mr Przybylowski has not particularised the grounds of review set out in his Originating Application. When offered the opportunity to amend his Originating Application, he refused to do so. In the substantive application, the onus is on Mr Przybylowski to demonstrate a relevant error. In that context, I note that a failure to provide particulars is a sufficient basis to dismiss an application for judicial review: FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014 at [90] (Greenwood J); FKV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1950 at [45] (Collier J). Having regard to the need to exercise caution in exercising the power of summary dismissal, I have attempted to address the substance of Mr Przybylowski’s submission in respect of the bare grounds of review as best I am able to understand them. The first ground is an assertion of a breach of procedural fairness: ADJR Act, s 6(1)(a). Mr Przybylowski has not established a breach of procedural fairness in relation to the decision that is the subject of his complaint. In the natural justice letter, Mr Przybylowski was advised of concerns the delegate had about his complaint and he was given an opportunity to, and did, respond. His responses were taken into account by the delegate. Although the delegate wrote to Mr Przybylowski on 21 December 2020 to advise Mr Przybylowski that the Commission did not require any further information from him, this was simply acknowledging that he had commented on the matters raised in the natural justice letter and that the Commission was in a position to make its decision on the material which it had. The delegate proceeded to make her decision on 14 January 2021. Mr Przybylowski continued to correspond with the Commission about the translation of the Polish documents but at no stage did he indicate that he intended providing any further response to the natural justice letter (rather his email of 18 December 2020 and letter dated 17 December 2020 proceeded on the basis that it was his entire response). For instance, Mr Przybylowski’s letter of 17 December 2020 (which appears to be erroneously dated in the year 2000) notes in the subject line that it is the “complainant response to the AHRC Assessment dated 17 December 2020”. In further email correspondence sent on 18 December 2020, Mr Przybylowski also sought confirmation from the Commission that they have received his “complainant response” being the letter of 17 December 2020 and its attachments.